

I. THE SADVIDYA IN VEDANTA

The moment that the ancient Indian speculations on the creation and origin of the world passed from a mythological stage to a more or less philosophical one is often, and in my opinion correctly, fixed by the first occurrences of the term *sat* in cosmogonical Veda texts. This is of course not much more than a convenient landmark, the selection of which has been determined by the role of the term and conception of *sat* in later thought rather than by its significance in the Veda. Moreover, it would be too rash to assume a direct and complete evolution of cosmogonic speculations from a mythological to a philosophical plane: not only do mythological elements accompany the speculations on *sat*'s origin — elements which will persist, though later on they may conveniently be called theistic —, but also the manner in which they are introduced into some of the Vedic hymns creates the impression that the conception of *sat* and correlated ideas had already reached an advanced stage of elaboration before they were accepted in a Vedic context: in other words, that they derived from another milieu than that commonly represented by the Vedic poets. On the other hand, the strictly philosophical import of the notion of *sat* should not be exaggerated: it is anachronistic to render it as "being" in the sense of *esse*. It is a very concrete term with a distinct demonstrative value¹ and can perhaps best be rendered by "this which is here and now" — a meaning that can be followed through the Upaniṣads.

The paramount importance in later Indian thought of the idea complex that is from the beginning connected with *sat* needs no proof. Although in other systems of philosophy its influence can be shown, it is most conspicuous in Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. But when we survey these two *darśanas* as the clear-cut systems of later date, we find that *sat*, or corresponding terms, have assumed different, even opposite, connotations which reflect the fundamental difference between the *darśanas*: for Vedānta as a whole *sat* is the transcendent and immaterial, for Sāṃkhya the immanent and material first cause of the world. Within the fold of Vedānta again the elaboration of the

1. Cf. such formulae as *sac ca tyac ca* (TaittUp. 2, 6, where the context tempts us to understand *asat* by *tyad*), which is not merely a folk-etymology of the etymologically transparent *satya* but in which *sat* "that which is here" is also opposed to "that which is that or there", e.g. Brahman (cf. BĀUp. 3, 9, 9 *katamo deva iti — prāṇa iti — sa brahma tyad ity ācakṣate*, where we may recall that ib. 2, 3, 1 *sat* as an embodied form is distinguished from a disembodied form described as the wind and the sky: *prāṇa* as the micro-cosmic counterpart of *vāyu* is quite well known).

problems involved in the idea complex of sat as transcendent *causa prima* has led to extremely diverging solutions. We have therefore in the presystematic speculations about sat and its origin a convenient starting-point to seek a point of vantage from which we can survey the relation between Vedānta and Sāṃkhya, and between the systems of Vedānta, among which especially Rāmānuja's system will interest us most. We shall try to sketch in broad outlines the complex of notions associated with sat in its presystematic usage to see if there is anything in it that may add to our understanding of the later differences.

We may depart from the *sadvidyā* of Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6, Uddālaka's teaching of his son Śvetaketu, easily the most celebrated śruti text. It plays an important part in Vedāntamīmāṃsā, not only for its own sake, but also indirectly because it has been dealt with in the Brahmasūtras, so that all system-building commentators had to explain it precisely. Their explanations concern invariably the relation between the first cause and the effected world, and in so far as this relation is the fundamental problem of Vedānta the commentaries on the *ārambhanādhikaraṇa* represent the central doctrines of the systems. The general interpretation is of sat as the self-existent, transcendent and absolute Brahman as an essentially perfect entity in opposition—of varying degree—to its effect, the phenomenal world. Modern scholarship, on the other hand, has long since recognized² that the same *sadvidyā* represents an early stage of more or less 'Sāṃkhyan' speculations; and whereas translators like Böhtlingk, Deussen, Senart, Hume and Radhakrishnan render their text in a spiritualist sense, other scholars like Jacobi, Betty Heimann and Ruben³ urge that this famous *prapāṭhaka* voices a materialist tendency. We have to go beyond our text to discover its meaning in the context to which it belongs.

The earliest form—but not necessarily the most primitive one—of the question of the provenance of "this which is" is found in Ṛigveda 10, 72: it is asked how the gods came to be. The poet describes how Brāhmaṇaspāti forged these worlds as a blacksmith: for in the age before the gods sat originated from *asat*, and after it, or rather along with it, originated the worlds.⁴ The sequel shows that the poet had other, probably more congenial, cosmogonic associations in mind where Dakṣa and Aditi were the primeval progeni-

2. cf. OLDENBERG, *Die Lehre der Upanishaden*, pp. 185f.; JACOBI, *Ueber das Verhältnis des Vedānta zum Sāṃkhyam*, Festschrift Kuhn, p. 38.

3. JACOBI, o.c.; HEIMANN, *Studien zur Eigenart des indischen Denkens*, p. 49; RUBEN, *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, pp. 156ff., and again, but extremely tendentious, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, pp. 87 ff.

4. *brāhmaṇaspātir eṭā sām karmāra ivādhamat / devānam pūrvyē yugē 'sataḥ sād' aḥjayata* (with c. cf. 10, 129, 6 *arvāg devā asyā* (sc. *sato*) *visārjanena* / "the gods are since its emanation")// *tād āsā anv aḥjayanta*.

tors from whom the worlds were born. The relation between sat and the personality of Brāhmaṇaspāti, who somehow assisted at its origination, remains obscure. His personality reminds us of RV. 10, 81 where creation is described as the handiwork of the divine artisan Viśvākarman—who significantly is called Vācāspāti.⁵ In this *sūkta* the question is posed: what is the foundation, what the foothold on which Viśvākarman created; and again: seek with your minds, O sages, for that on which he stood while supporting the worlds. This question is, it would seem, directly answered in RV. 10, 129; the sages found out that sat is fastened to *asat*.

This famous hymn formulates elaborately and in an already advanced form the view that sat arose from *asat*. The progress made in this hymn concerns not so much the relation between sat and *asat* as that between both and the personality behind it: Brāhmaṇaspāti and Viśvākarman Vācāspāti are succeeded by a vague and anonymous *ādhyakṣa* or superintending person whose actual assistance at, and knowledge of, sat's origination is questioned: under whose protection did it take place? and: he knows, or does he?⁶ Henceforth the question of a personal agency behind the creation of this world will remain connected with the question of the relation between sat and *asat*.

The latter relation is expressed in this *sūkta* in the terms of conception and procreation:⁷ in the womb of *asat*, the dark hidden within the dark, in which the embryonic water was as yet 'unaccidented',⁸ the one first embryo (*ābhū*) is conceived with an excess of heat—orgasm; the procreative impulse (*kāma*) takes shape in that germ which is the first germ of will (*mānas*):⁹

5. Stt. 2 and 4 (see below), 3 (*sām bāhūbhyām dhāmati sām pātatrair dyāvābhāmī janāyan devā ékaḥ*), and 7 (*vācāspātim viśvākarmānam*); Brhaspati, of course, is called *vācāspati* in such texts as MS. 2, 6, 6 and ŚatBr. 14, 4, 1, 23. Note that Rāmānuja cites the *ādhyakṣa* as the personal deity in the immaterial heaven (§§ 81; 127f.).

6. 1 c *kāsyā śārmann*; 7 *iyām viśṣṭir yāta ābābhūvayādi vā dadhé vā nā / yo asyāādhyakṣaḥ paramé vyōman só aṅgā veda yādi vā nā veda*:

7. Cf. GELDNER ad 10, 129 "das Bild der Zeugung und Geburt wird in dem ganzen Liede folgerichtig durchgeführt"; it is difficult, however, to decide to what extent it is just "Bild" or symbolic representation: could, in that mythological period, world creation be easily conceived in other terms than those of procreation?

8. *tāma āsit tāmasā gūlhām āgre 'praketām salilām sārvaṃ ā idām*; GELDNER: *apraketā* "unerkenntlich" in the sense of "unterschiedslos" which is perhaps already too abstract.

9. *kāmas tād āgre sām avartatādhi mānaso rétaḥ prathamām yād āsit* (4 ab); GELDNER: "über dieses kam am Anfang das Liebesverlangen, was des Denkens erster Same war," where *yād* is a loose relative conjunction; perhaps it is preferable to take *sam-√vrt* in the attested sense of "to conglomerate, take shape in, become": the procreative impulse took concrete shape in that which then became the first seed of *mānas* (which is nearer to 'will' than 'thought'); cf. this will-to-create personified as the first self-created creature AthV. 9, 2, 19ff.; cf. also 13, 1, 6ff. and 13, 2, 25ff. where the sun personifying *tapas* (*rohita-*) is the first creating creature.

sages found out that this *sat* is fastened to *asat*—and one is inclined to add; with the omphalical cord.¹⁰ This intimate connexion between that which is *sat* and that which is not *sat* enables us to understand the somewhat enigmatic beginning of the hymn: *asat* “another than *sat*” is there only to account for *sat*’s origin and has no proper existence apart from *sat*, so that before *sat* came to be, its counterpart was not there either; it is rightly said that originally there was absolutely nothing, neither *sat*, or this which is here, nor another than this.¹¹ *Asat*, the other, the womb from which *sat* arises, has been completely abstracted from a primeval progenitrix; a reminiscence of a progenitor persists, though his function is questioned and he is at most, if at all, someone watching the process from the far-away sky.¹²

This tendency to do away with both the relicts of a creator person and *asat* as a necessary hypothesis for the origination of *sat* finds its conclusion in Uddālaka’s *sadvidyā* where for the first time the originality and eternity of *this which is* is posed in a polemical manner: originally *sat* was only here, nothing else: for how could it arise from *asat*?¹³ Something that is of a certain kind cannot arise from something else which is not of the same kind: *sat* is the irreducible, it is ‘kind’ itself, like in a clay pitcher clay is the ‘kind’ beyond which the pitcher cannot be reduced.

How does Uddālaka account for this view in the terms of his age? He begins by asking his son: “What is the instruction by which the unrevealed is revealed,¹⁴ the not understood understood, the unknown known?” The instruction is given in the following lessons which are summarized (4, 5) “this

10. *sató bāndhum ásati nīr avindan* (4c).

11. I cannot quite believe in a mystical or alogical “neither being nor non-being” as generally translated, which renders the poet at once capable of admirable abstractions but incapable of logical thinking; the poet is neither “ganz barock” nor guilty of “geheimnisvolle Gestammel” (RUBEN, *Philosophen*, p. 161), but, trying to do away with *asat* as an independent magnitude but still allowing a beginning of *sat*, he reduces *asat* to *sat*’s matrix, existing only by virtue of *sat*.

12. This *ādhyakṣa* in the sky must be a solar deity corresponding to Dakṣa in 10, 72, Viśvakarman ib. (cf. 10, 170, 4), Brahmanaspati in 10, 81 (cf. 2, 24, 3; 4, 50, 4; 10, 68, 12); worth noting is also TaittBr. 2, 2, 9 where the sun originates from *asat*.

13. As against the more or less contemporaneous contentions of TaittUp. 2, 7, 1; BĀUp. 1, 2, 1; ChUp. 3, 19, 1, that *sat* originated from *asat*, which was the old-fashioned position.

14. *śruta-* in a more technical sense of “known by or as Vedic revelation.”

is what the ancient who knew it, those who were great in disputations¹⁵ and great experts in *śruti*, have said: ‘Now there is no one who could name a single thing that is not yet revealed, understood and known;’ for they knew it by those (three colours): that which is red, they knew it for the colour of glowing-heat; that which is resplendent, they knew it for the colour of water; that which is black, they knew it for the colour of grown food; that which is not known (for anyone of these three colours), they knew it for a combination of these three deities.”

It is clear that the instruction is primarily concerned with an inventory of the world under the three ‘aspects’ (*rūpa-* “colour, coloured form”) of *tejas* “glowing-heat”, *āpas* “water”, *anna* “grown food”. These three aspects are described as the successive offspring of what is called *sat*. All the beings that in their turn went forth from the deities which are these ‘aspects’ (from *tejas* derives sun and all that is of sun etc.¹⁶) are described as “change proceeding from speech, or name.” What exactly is meant by this phrase becomes clear from the illustrations given by Uddālaka. His son asks what is the instruction which promises to reveal everything, and Uddālaka answers: “It is like this, my son: we can know all that is made of clay by knowing one lump of clay: the change is that which proceeds from speech or name: it is clay: that is the truth.” Similarly we know all that is made of copper by knowing a lump of copper ore,¹⁷ and all that is iron by knowing a nail-cutter. The last instance warns us that the point is not so much that we first are to know the first or rough material but that a small piece of the same *kind* is enough to classify the *kindred*; as indeed it is.

15. *mahāsālā mahāśrotriyāḥ*; the former term is invariably translated “having great houses” (BÖHTLINGK “grosze Hausherren”; DEUSSEN even “Groszen an Reichtum”; SENART “grands maîtres de maison”; RADHAKRISHNAN “great householders”) but the latter term in this sense is pointless in this connexion; besides *sālā* is “court, compound, enclosure, sure, hall” rather than “house as living-quarters”, and used for receiving guests, etc., as place of meeting, teaching and discussion (cf. *pāṭhasālā*, etc.); in connexion with *mahāśrotriyā* I would suggest “he who entertains large parties of theologians in his hall and hence himself shining in disputations” or “whose hall-disputes are great”; cf. ChUp. 5, 11, 1/3.

16. *apāgād agner agnītvam . . ādityād ādityatvam*, invariably translated “the quality of fire, etc. vanished from fire, etc.” can be understood much more significantly as where creation by triplication is described (*tejas*/fire > sun and sun-like, moon and moon-like, lightning and the like); suffix *°tva-* in the sense of a collective (cf. RENOU, *Grammaire sanscrite* § 187); esp. the translation of DEUSSEN, and those based on it (HUME’S, RADHAKRISHNAN’S) reveal a monistic bias more inspired by Śaṅkara than by their texts.

17. *lohamāni-*; *māni-* “any more or less precious stone, or stone-like metal ore, that is mined or delved”; RADHAKRISHNAN “nugget of gold”, but “gold” is a late sense of *loha* borrowed from Śaṅkara.

When this is made clear Uddālaka declares: "only sat was here¹⁸ originally, nothing else; i.e., nothing that was not sat, i.e., *asat*. "That wished: ¹⁹ 'I will be many, I will beget,' it beget *tejas*. That *tejas* thought: 'I will be many, I will beget,' it beget water. That is why whenever a man is hot then he sweats; consequently from the (engendered) heat water arises.^{19a} Water wished: "I will be many, I will beget,' it beget grown food. That is why whenever it rains, then there is plenty of food. Food and eatables consequently arise from water. All beings have three ways of being born, from an egg, a living being, or a plant. That first deity wished: "Well, now will I make separate forms and names by entering into these three deities as a living being myself: I will make each of them threefold." So she entered and divided.

We see that in this instruction an inventory is attempted of all beings under the three aspects or 'elements' *tejas*, water and food. These 'elements' however do not sum up the entire world: they are 'classes'. Nor do they sum up *sat*: as the comparisons show *sat* is the field on which *tejas* works to produce water, and both to produce food. This vision was no doubt inspired by nature: sun, rain and food work from and on earth. Later commentators invariably take these three 'elements' to imply the classical five. But, if not more primitive,²⁰ the series is of a different kind. Not only does it intend to distinguish the three spatial layers of sun, clouds and land,²¹ but also three

18. *idam* adverbially, as its position would indicate; otherwise BÖHTLINGK, SENART, DEUSSEN *cum suis*.

19. RADHAKRISHNAN's comment that "aikṣata, *thought*, lit. *saw* [but rather ~ *akāmayata*, cf. ŚatBr. 14, 4, 2, 30, TaittUp. 2, 6, 1 etc.; DEUSSEN rightly "beabsichtete"] indicates that pure being [abstract; but the term is a concrete "a being", less equivocal "this which is"] is conscious" suggests more than there is to it and rather begs the question if these mythologizing thinkers were able to conceive of world creation in non-anthromorphic terms; RADHAKRISHNAN's remark is inspired by BrS. 1, 1, 4 *īkṣater nāśabdām*.

19a. I follow here Edgerton's translation (JAOS, 1915, p. 240f.).

20. According to ChUp. 3, 11, Uddālaka Āruṇi was the eldest son of Āruṇa: this Āruṇa (his name "the ruddy one" is significant in view of his preoccupation with the sun) described the sun-power under five colours or aspects, under which the existent beings are classified: in this respect Āruṇa's five correspond to Uddālaka's three; noteworthy is moreover that his five colours are evidently built on the three mentioned by Uddālaka: they are 1. *rohita* (3, 1, 4); 2. *śukla* (3, 2, 3); 3. *kṛṣṇa* (3, 3, 3); 4. *paraḥ-kṛṣṇa* (3, 4, 3); and 5. *yad etadādityasya madhye kṣobhata iva*. Obviously father and son had a common starting-point; RUBEN's remark that Uddālaka "unter dem erdrückenden Eindruck der mythisch-mystischen Sonnenverherrlichung seines Vaters Āruṇa zu seinem realistischen Gegner werden musste, weil der Sohn (= Śvetaketu) unter der Grösze des Vaters litt" (*Philosophen*, pp. 158-59) is rather facile romance.

21. So SENART ad ChUp. 6, 3, 2, note.

temporal events: hot season, rainy season, harvest time.²² The stage of Uddālaka's speculations is yet more advanced: the three are also the three aspects under which the existent beings can be grouped according to colour. From this point of view the series shows affinities with that of the three *guṇas* under which the world, constituted by the five elements, is classified as being bright, moving and stationary. It is interesting to note how the colours persist: Śvetāśvatara 'puns' on an unborn male (*aja*- "constant self and *puruṣa*" or "he-goat") who copulates with an unborn female (*ajā*- "constant matter" or "she-goat") who is red, white and black;²³ red, white and black threads woven in a piece of cloth will be the Sāṃkhya's stock-example of the material cause persisting in the effect.

We may now ask: how does the *sadvidyā* continue RV. 10, 129? Fundamental is Uddālaka's polemic against those who hold a more original *asat* to account for *sat*. So did the Vedic poet hold, but his *asat* is by no means original: originally there was nothing at all. Uddālaka's did away with the hypothesis of *asat*: *sat* in the beginning—the beginning as far as the world is concerned, creation—was there alone. Is Rāmānuja right in explaining *advitīya* as denying that there was a separate *adhīṣṭhātr* who was 'instrumental' to the process of creation?²⁴ In any case the vague watching person has disappeared. Yet we find traces of the original birth-process of *sat* as described in the *sūkta*; but the events which in the Vedic hymn took place as successive stages in a conception are now represented as primary emanations of *sat* itself and the chronological sequence has become a causal chain. Nonetheless, the emanations of *tejas*, water and food are of a different kind from creation proper which only sets in *after* food has been produced and *sat* has entered the 'elements'.²⁵ The parallelism is unmistakable: in the *sūkta* the embryo which was conceived by an excess of heat (*tāpas*)²⁶ in the formerly unaccidental water was the germ in which the primary creative impulse took shape: an order *kāma*—*tāpas*—Water—conceived germ presents itself clearly. In Uddālaka's account these succeeding events are moments in a causal series proceeding from *sat*'s first impulse: *sat* *desires* to multiply and *tejas* appears, *after* and through *tejas* *water*, *after* and through *water* the *fruit* (*anna*).

22. For the original three seasons, cf. e.g. FILLIOZAT, *L'Enigme des 256 Nuits d'Asoka*, J. As. 1949; OLDENBERG, o.c., p. 185, makes in passing a similar suggestion.

23. ŚvetUp. 4, 5 *ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjyamānām*, etc. where *sat* has already completely become matter.

24. Ved. §§ 16; 33.

25. In this respect ŚvetUp. 4, 5 is illustrative: matter *which is red*, etc. starts to create.

26. An important parallel is furnished by AthV. 13, 1 and 2 where *rohita* is a personification of *tapas* (cf. 2, 25) from which or whom *agni*, sun, etc. arise: 1, 48; 2, 49 (with which compare ChUp. 6, 4, 4 and the note above 9).

Bearing the Vedic archetype in mind we could speak of sat's self-creation, which is completed with the origination of anna.

At this exact point we find a remark that is highly significant: there are three ways of being born, from an egg, as a living being, a plant. So long as we do not recognize that sat is creating itself, this remark seems irrelevant, and Senart was indeed led to regard it as an interpolation. But it is a necessary observation: how does the definitive birth of the now completely conceived sat proceed? To each of its constitutive 'elements' corresponds a mode of birth: to tejas that of the brooded egg, to water that of the living being born in the embryonic liquid, to anna that of a plant.²⁷ So naturally the next sentence reads: "I will now make separate names and forms (i.e. start creation proper) by entering the three deities as a *living being* myself." The three constitutive events of conception elaborated as separate moments of a causal series are now again condensed and integralized, and it is *sat*, not anna, which starts creation by being born in the manner of a living being itself.²⁸

It goes without saying that Uddālaka's vision is not a mere recast of the Vedic archetype. The contents of the Vedic description are its structure rather than its contents: to use our terms, the events of a more or less symbolical creation by procreation provide the structure of a temporal-spatial coherence of the three layers of the world and three successive creative changes, which is integralized in the self-creation of sat. This self-creation is preceded by, or proceeds from, a phase of sat as *ābhū*, a potentiality which actualizes itself by passing through a series of primary emanations, prototypes of the following creation by triplication; but these three prototypes form the triunity of the actual sat. Hence it is rightly said that *in the final analysis* sat is the

27. The latter function of the egg in cosmogony is already announced early: cf. Aitareya Up. 1 in a very similar context *ātmā vā idam eko 'gra āsīn . . . so 'dbhya eva puruṣaṃ samuddhṛtyāmūrccayat / tam abhyatapat tasyābhitaptasya mukhaṃ nirabhid-yate yathāṇḍam / mukhād vāg, etc.* and more explicitly ChUp. 3, 19 in similar context: *asad evedam agra āsīt tat sad āsīt tat samabhavat tad āṇḍaṃ niravartate tat saṃvatsa-rasya mātrām āyaya tan nirabhid-yate te āṇḍakapāle rajataṃ ca svarṇaṃ cābhavatām;* already ad RV. 10, 129, 4 GELDNER remarks "im *tāpas* steckt zugleich die Vorstellung des brütenden Vogels" (cf. also Sāyana ad *ekam* RV. 10, 82, 6 *āṇḍābhiprāyenoḅktam*); the idea that *tapas* "heat, body-heat" was a creative power naturally led to creation being conceived as originating from the brooded egg.—How near the notion of originating from a plant was to Uddālaka himself shows 6, 8, 6 clearly. A fourth way of birth, mentioned AitUp. 3, 3, origination from sweat, has a cosmic correspondent in Gopatha Br. 1, 1 where the primaeval waters originate from Brahman's sweat.

28. I take *ātmanā* as a reflexive pronoun; cf. a parallel passage in ŚatBr. 13, 1, 1, 1 *brahma vai svayambhū tapo 'tapyate / tad aikṣata—na vai tapasy ānantyam āsti: hantāhaṃ bhūteṣv ātmānaṃ juhuvāni bhūtāni cātmani, etc.,* cf. also RENOUE, *On the word ātman*, esp. § 6 (Vāk 2, Poona 1952); we may also compare such expressions as *ātmanū* i.f.c. in the sense of *bhāvena*, *ṭayā*, *ṭvena* "as being . . ."

amimā, the irreducible stuff of which everything is made, root, meeting-place,²⁹ solidity, ātman of everything: the atomic minimum that remains after all successive products have inversely been dissolved in their causes, and "you are it, Śvetaketu."

We have but lightly passed by the meaning of the phrase *vācārambha-ṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam*, describing the process by which the effect emerges from its cause.³⁰ This phrase has become the bone of content of the later commentators explaining BrS. 2, 1, 14 *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇasābdādi-bhyaḥ*. There can be little doubt that the term *ārambhana* is taken from, or inspired by, RV. 10, 81, 2 where it is asked: *kīṃ svid āsīd adhiṣṭhānam ārambhaṇaṃ katamāt svit kathāsīt / yāto bhūmiṃ janāyan viśvākarmā vi dyūm aúrnon mahimā viśvācakṣāḥ* "what was the underlay or foothold, what the support, and how was it, out of which Viśvakarman, producing the earth, separated the sky by his power, he the all-seeing One?"³¹ This question is repeated and illustrated (4): "What was the forest and what the wood, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth? Seek for that with your minds, O sages, on which he stood while supporting the worlds." One reply was given in 10, 129: *sat is fastened to asat*. Uddālaka replies: the effect is *vācārambhaṇaṃ*, i.e. *nāmadheyam*.

No doubt with this connexion of the Vedic hymn in mind Rāmānuja tries to show that the *sadvidyā* by *advitīya* denies a separate *adhiṣṭhātr*, and he quotes TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6 where the question of the Vedic poet was directly answered: brahman is the forest and the wood on which the creator stood, i.e., the *materia prima* out of which he created. Mādhva, even more explicitly, refers directly to the Vedic hymn,³² and though the use he makes of it is objectionable, GHATE is wrong in declaring that "the topic is irrelevant".³³ *Ārambhana* is synonymous with *adhiṣṭāna* "the stable and solid

29. ChUp. 6, 8, 6-7; *āyatana* in *sadāyatana* can be more significantly translated than "abode" by deriving it from $\sqrt{yat} + ā$ "place where": "the place where the beings meet, their common ground."

30. Since this was written I have resumed the subject in greater detail in *Vācārambhaṇam*, Festschrift S. K. CHATTERJEE Indian Linguistics vol. XVI (Poona 1955).

31. GELDNER "er der ganz Auge ist"; but Viśvakarman / Dakṣa here represent the sun which separates earth from heaven by rising from night; cf. 10, 170, 4.

32. He comments on the sūtra: *svatantrabahuśādhanaḥ sṛṣṭir loke drṣṭā / naivam brahmaṇaḥ / svarūpasāmarthyād evaitasya sṛṣṭih / kīmsvid . . . kathāsīt ity ākṣepaḥ / adhiṣṭhānādyukteḥ*: "creation in the world proceeds in our experience with the aid of many instruments that have an independent existence; this is not so in brahman's case: his creation proceeds from his essentially self-sufficient creativeness: this is implicit in RV. 10, 81, 2 ab, because of the mention of *adhiṣṭhāna*, etc., (which may be explained as 'instrument')."

33. V. S. GHATE, *Vedānta*, p. 81.

foundation" which in Indian thought, where the notion of cause is inseparably linked up with that of a permanent, immobile and solid substructure, is virtually synonymous with our "material cause". As the second quoted stanza shows *ārambhaṇa* is the *materia prima* from which things take their beginnings and in which, apart from some individual modifications, they consist. So one would translate: "Name is the effect, name which has its basis in speech". We are reminded of the fact that Viśvakarman, who created the worlds while standing on the *ārambhaṇa* was called the Lord of *Vāc* and that Brahmanaspati, who forged the worlds when sat emerged from *asat*, is the Lord of *Brahman*, and that according to Taitt Br. that on which Viśvakarman stood was again *Brahman*. Sat, wishing to multiply, said: "I be many", and it was many. *Vāc* and *Brahman*, it seems, both³⁴ stand for the powerful and powerfully creative word that creates a thing in its individuality by pointing it out and thus distinguishing it from the common stuff it is made of. He who names uses of the power of naming to create:—name is what he resorts to ($\bar{a}\sqrt{rabh}$) when singling out a new thing from the common undistinguished stuff. Uddālaka, doing away with the creating and naming person, still preserves the power of naming to account for the emergence of new things out of the common stuff that is sat, or of sat: *satya*.

Is this stuff, this sat that is the *ātman* of everything, a material or immaterial entity for Uddālaka? In an interesting śruti³⁵ Uddālaka himself replies to a similar question of king Aśvapati: "Gautama, how do you conceive of the *ātman*?" "As the earth." Aśvapati paraphrases this answer: Uddālaka's *ātman* is the solid basis,³⁶ on which he stands solid himself, solid in children and cattle, and eats and enjoys life: but his *ātman* is the *ātman*'s feet. Important are other descriptions of sat: BĀU. 1, 3, 28, ChUp. 8, 3, 5 it is deathless (*amṛta*), so BhG. 9, 12; BĀUp. 2, 3, 1 it is *Brahman*'s embodied form, corresponding to that which is stationary and transient, this embodied form being distinguished from a disembodied one that is described as being wind and sky: sat is clearly the earth here. Later on, Praśn. Up. 2, 5; 4, 5; BhG. 4, 5 sat and *asat* simply sum up the entire world.

34. The relation between *vāc* and *brahman* is very close as witness RV. 10, 114, 8d *yāvād brahma tiṣṭhati tāvatī vāk* (GELDNER remarks: "brāhman ist hier die Grundlage der *vāc*"); AitBr. 4, 21, 1, ŚatBr. 2, 1, 4, 10, BĀUp. 1, 3, 20 *vāg vai brahma*; TS. 7, 3, 1, 4, etc., etc. One wonders if a detailed study of the relation *brahman-vāc* as sacred and sacrally creative speech would not contribute materially to our understanding the 'evolution' of the notion of *brahman* "sacred powerful speech, creative word, the word that is creation" to that of cause of creation, etc.

35. ChUp. 5, 17, 1 *atha hovācoddālakam Āruṇim — Gautama kaṃ tvam ātmānam upāssa iti / pṛthivīm eva bhagavo nājann iti hovāca / eṣo vai pratiṣṭhātmā vaiśvānaro yaṃ tvam upāsse*, etc.

36. *pratiṣṭhā*.

It is clear that Uddālaka's teaching is not 'spiritualist' in the sense that the irreducible stuff at the bottom or root of all things is conceived as an entity different in kind from the matter of the phenomenal world and transcending it as an immaterial spirit that happens to be also immanent to some extent. Yet, no more can it be urged that the teaching is materialist. Matter and spirit—the term nearest to spirit is neither *ātman* nor *manas*, but *vāc* in *vācārambhaṇam*—are not treated as different or distinct. Actually the question of matter and spirit does not arise. Nor is the diversity emerging from the stuff *sat* disparaged as being *merely* effects: there is nothing discreditable in things being created by naming out of their common substratum: rather is the discovery of name as a principle of individuality a precious one. One might go further and suggest that Uddālaka's main purpose was not to set forth the rather obvious unity of things in general, but just the manner of deriving diversity from it: his is after all a creation myth.

Another point is worth interest: Uddālaka manages to elaborate a cosmic vision without once borrowing terms from ritual terminology. The majority of Upaniṣad thinkers cannot conceive of wide perspectives in both macrocosmos and microcosmos except in ritual terms: small wonder, for it was in these terms that the Brāhmaṇas had described a coherent sacrocentric universe. Uddālaka, one may gather, did not care to depart from the ritually sacred, and his *brahman* was *vāc*.

We may read an essentially 'Sāṃkhyan' tendency in his discourse: Sāṃkhya not in the sense of a coherent system with a psychology and eschatology of its own, but rather of an attitude, an approach of study, an interest in classifying the world, a summing-up and inventorizing, indifferent to a distinction between matter and spirit, or even sacred and non-sacred, but primarily concerned with *this which is*, or *sat*.

Does this long analysis justify itself in helping us to understand the latter differences in interpreting the relation between the first cause and the effected world? I think it does. Though necessarily we must study the history of thought by the texts that have come down to us, we should while doing so never lose sight of the fact that the actual history moved on another plane, stages of which happened in passing to be fixed and perpetuated in texts while thought moved on. Indian culture was incomparably less *livresque* than the Western. The continuity of thought was at first served unconsciously by the thinkers, but when gradually the spirit changed, the time came when they began to return consciously to former thought as preserved in ancient texts to receive inspiration from it and so to be better able to serve its continuity. Trends that had been partly or incidentally or not at all voiced in those texts had then been developed, and original visions of a more primitive, and hence often more comprehensive, character

been elaborated and distinguished. So texts came to be vehicles of views which, if expressed in them at all, had been part of a different context; and gradually the Word became really transcendent.

When the inspiration of the Upaniṣad fragments, with their sudden *aperçus*, cosmic imagery and criss-cross flashes of penetration, had given way to a spirit of systematization, and, after the example of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, brahmajñāna was succeeded by brahmajijñāsā or Vedāntamīmāṃsā, order was imposed on the kaleidoscopic teachings of the ancient. Later darśanas or outlooks distinguished themselves. Sāṃkhya, from a more or less independent attitude, became a more independent inquiry. Among those principally interested in the sacred, distinction began to be made—though not yet contradistinction—between the study of the rites proper and the study of that comprehensive power hovering over the rites, their language, their function and their fruits, that more or less objective but mysterious and enigmatic object of speculations about the cosmic constancy correlated to the not less cosmic dynamics of the all-comprising ritual—the *brahman*. With this brahman dealt the upāsanās of the upaniṣads and now this in its vastness unalterable constancy was sought to be grasped, described and defined on the basis of these texts—mainly, if not exclusively at first, on the basis of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.³⁷

Though we saw that Uddālaka did not conceive of his sat as an immaterial entity, yet he must have been surrounded by thinkers who tended to do so. A vedic poet already declared that *ekaṃ sat viprā bahudhā vadanti*.³⁸ What he called *sat* was elsewhere named *brahman* or *ātman* or *Nārāyaṇa*.³⁹ It was conceived as the one principle existing *par excellence* as the stable foundation of cosmic ritual,⁴⁰ which to recognize and command would secure release from the retributory effects of ritual, from world itself. In this respect the brahman, too, was *satya* “true, real” with the peculiarly Indian connotation of “permanently and underivably real”. Macrocosmically that vast, hidden power that supports the world, microcosmically the solid soul of the body, its character of basic constancy attracted the function of cause, which was inseparably connected with the notion of permanent, underlying solidity. Side by side, a brahma-centric and a more tellurian approach developed out of the sacrocentric cosmology of former ages, but in constant interaction. *Sat* was conceived of differently as cause. Simultaneously a mythology of the creator god, of a strictly personal character

37. cf. BELVALKAR, *Lectures on Vedānta*, I, p. 141 ff.

38. RV. 1, 164, 46 “The visionaries give many names to the One that is”.

39. AitUp. 1, 1 *brahmaivedam agra āsit*; BĀUp. 1, 4, 1, *ātmaivedam agra āsit*;

MahUp. 1 *eko ha vai Nārāyaṇa āsit*.

40. The origin of this equation *sat = brahman* should be studied further.

which forbade microcosmic identifications, persisted and gained new importance with the rise of the religions. Though more allied to the Sāṃkhyan spirit of lucid distinctions by names and forms, this personalism influenced the monistically tending brahmanical spirit profoundly and persistently. Such is the composite picture which the *Gītā* shows, and in this picture belong historically the activities of the Brahmasūtrakāras. They conceived synthetically of the mystic relation between this effected word of transitory phenomena and Brahman, the hypostatized constancy, as a relation of immanent causality. Brahman—never exclusively regarded as an undifferentiated abstract entity—emanated the world; the effect grew upon it: while remaining essentially its constant and undisturbed self it passed by a process of *pariṇāma* into the condition of effect.⁴¹ That in Bādarāyaṇa's collection this view is summarized under the ‘Sāṃkhyan’ *sadvidyā* is not surprising; Uddālaka's indifference did not preclude a dichotomy of matter and spirit, still less such a vague and pantheistic relation as envisioned by the sūtras; and early Sāṃkhya formed part and parcel of early Vedānta where it would remain its substructure.

It took long before the logical difficulties of maintaining the immanence of a transcendent Absolute in an imperfect, relative and transitory world were recognized, and the *pariṇāma* doctrine was challenged. The doctrine of *vivarta* was formulated, at first it seems by śabdādvaitya,⁴² and later elaborated in Śaṅkara's school. HACKER has shown that the *vivarta* doctrine was not yet fully accepted by Śaṅkara who tended towards modifying *pariṇāma* in an illusionist sense.⁴³ A more oldfashioned position was taken up by Bhāskara who maintained *pariṇāma* in its full force, allowing *upādhis* or limiting conditions to render the absolute and perfect partly relative and imperfect. Yāmuna,⁴⁴ and more systematically Rāmānuja, represented a very different view in which *pariṇāma* took place not in the Absolute but in the phenomenal world of matter and souls which were eternally and really related to the Absolute as its natural modes. Mādhva, at last, went one step further and rejected this relationship: he professed a radical dualism.

However divergent these solutions, they show one basic agreement: all agree upon the primacy of the transcendence of the Absolute that is *sat*. We have reached the end of the development.

41. That the Sūtrakāra adhered to the *pariṇāmavāda* is now generally recognized.

42. HACKER, *Vivarta*, § 5, pp. 197 ff.

43. HACKER, o.c. pp. 208 ff.

44. See Ch. III.

ŚRINIVASACHARI⁴⁵ in his useful study of *bhedābheda*vāda says that Bhāskara's philosophy marks a transition from Śaṅkara to Rāmānuja, but it is doubtful if such an evolution Śaṅkara — Bhāskara — Rāmānuja, suggested by the relative chronology of their works, can be maintained historically. One would hesitate even to speak of an evolution *within* Vedānta exclusively: for Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja at least one would rather assume influence, or inspiration, from without Vedānta. That Śaṅkara was influenced by Buddhist thought is now generally recognized, and the inspirations of the popular Sāṃkhya of the Purāṇas are manifest in Rāmānuja's philosophy. Bhāskara would seem to represent a more traditional view of Vedānta which admitted *pariṇāma* within the absolute and perfect Brahman, a view which both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja declined to accept without profound modification. Śaṅkara's modification towards illusionism was perhaps the simplest and, on the given premisses, the most logical procedure: given the unique reality of Brahman as the eternal spirit, the reality of the phenomenal world with its plurality and variety of transitory material and conscient entities could not be of the same degree of ultimate reality. The world, obviously imperfect and relative effect of the perfect and absolute sat, could not be described as wholly sat; but somehow deriving its relative reality from its perfect cause, it could neither be described as wholly asat, but, for merely *practical* purposes, it could be taken at least provisionally as real. This view is, in the final analysis, a development of a more ancient Vedānta view — as represented later on by Bhāskara — in that it accepts some effected change of and in Brahman, yet questions the ultimate validity of the conditions of this change and consequently of the change itself.

Rāmānuja's thesis is essentially different from both Śaṅkara's and Bhāskara's in that it attributes an ultimately valid, distinct and definable reality to the phenomenal world, and within the phenomenal world to the component orders of non-spiritual matter and individual spirits or souls. The souls are not real (or *practically* real) and conditioned *projections* of the absolute spirit, but fundamentally uniform spiritual monads, which in a beginningless process of causation (*karman*) happen to suffer degrees of change in their essential attribute knowledge.

This thesis is basically Sāṃkhyan, but not dualistic for that. Even with regard to Sāṃkhya itself one hesitates to subscribe to the qualification of dualism. Eternally soul and matter are interrelated in interaction; however different both may be, soul is accessible to matter in its essential quality of knowledge. Though soul may be free from matter, still in potentiality it is vulnerable to it. The union of soul and body is no doubt

45. SRINIVASACHARI, *Bhedābheda*, p. 7.

brought about by a deception: the soul mistakes itself for a material ego. From the soul's point of view the union is a deficiency, but from the ego's point of view a harmony: the body obeys the orders of the captive soul to fulfil its purposes: it is completely dependent on the soul for its very existence, it is the mode and the particularization of the egotized soul, without which it is purposeless; and through the body the soul may ultimately rediscover itself in its essential difference.

It is this microcosmic harmony of the soul, as the consciously directing agent and the body as its perfect instrument,⁴⁶ which Rāmānuja has elaborated into an analogy for a macrocosmic harmony. It is remarkable that the conception of the body as the defect of the soul has hardly any significance for Rāmānuja: the marvellous utility of the body is for him its most significant function. This attitude is the consequence of his positive interpretation of Release: it is not an escape from the evils of embodied life but a supreme hankering after a higher fulfilment in the loving adoration of God. So Rāmānuja could conceive of a harmonious Universe, in which the harmony of body and soul was repeated in the harmony of matter and souls which form the body of God who himself is the directing spirit within it. This harmony is eternal; soul and matter exist, and have existed, eternally as modes of God, essentially dependent and subserving the single but supreme purpose of glorifying his Majesty.

Sat at the beginning of creation is God Nārāyaṇa as modified by soul and matter which both constitute His body. The *vikāra* or *pariṇāma* described by Uddālaka takes place only in God's modes. God is His perfect self, with the modifying body that at the beginning of creation abides in the subtle or causal phase. Thus God is the material cause, though only his mode of matter undergoes transformation in its essence and his mode of soul in its attribute of knowledge. God is also the operative cause inasmuch as He is the inner Ruler, setting in motion and allowing to operate the causality of *karman* which brings about the diversity of the finished products, or the gross, effectual phase of God's body.

We are not concerned here with the question how far Rāmānuja's exegesis of the *sadvidyā* is the 'correct' one, but only with the developments of the idea-complex for which Uddālaka in the terms of his age had found a suggestive expression in the famous sixth prapāṭhaka. The regularity with which the Indian thinkers have ever since returned to the *sadvidyā* to interpret into it their own theses is proof of the fundamental significance for

46. Rāmānuja defines the body: "that substance (*dravya*) that a spiritual entity can use and support entirely for his own purposes and that in its essence is exclusively subordinate (*śeṣa-*) to that entity, is the body of that soul"; cf. trsl. note 21.

Indian thought of the concept which it expresses. Sat, originally determined neither as an impersonal law nor as a personal demiurge, took in the course of history either form without excluding the other completely. The divergencies between the different schools concern the degree in which the immanence of the transcendent is admitted. But basically they all agree that the transcendent is somehow present and accessible. Even the more radical advaitins, restating the satkāryavāda as satkāraṇavāda, allow that the Absolute be cause. The perfect is never completely unattainable to the imperfect, the absolutely real never wholly inaccessible to the relatively real. The instinct urge to Release of the soul implicated in samsāra is a bridge between world and godhead. And sat preserves its ancient meaning throughout the fluctuations between an eminently transcendent, disembodied and unqualified Brahman and an eminently immanent, embodied and qualified Deity: the sat is the one that is *present*, the transcendent that is immanent.

Uddālaka expressed sat's immanence in creation to some extent as the soul's presence within it, from which presence all this derives its satya: similarly Rāmānuja formulated God's immanence in the world as His inner presence as the soul of the Universe, His body. For Uddālaka sat was the *aṇimā*, the subtlest possible reduction, for Rāmānuja it is God whose body abides in the subtle phase of cause. Though in other respects their views are far apart, yet both thinkers have a common approach in dealing with the most ancient and most vital problem of Indian thought: the cause is approached from the effect, not the effect from the cause. The formula in which their common approach is summed up is, not *tvam tad asti* "it is you", but *tat tvam asi* "you are it".

It is not for merely polemical reasons that Rāmānuja begins his exposition of his views in his philosophical *début* the Vedārthasaṃgraha by a fresh interpretation of the sadvidyā, but because he recognized the basic significance of this text, which for him, not less than for Śaṅkara, expresses the profoundest truth that man is able to grasp.

II. THE ANCIENT MASTERS

Among the names which Rāmānuja mentions in his list of ancient commentators,⁴⁷ Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva, Kapardi and Bhārucci, only the three first mentioned are known as authors of specific commentarial texts, whereas of the others nothing but the names has been

47. Ved. §93; Śrīnivāsa, YID. I, p. 2 gives a similar list where Bodhāyana's name is followed by those of Guhadeva and Bhārucci, then Brahmanandin's (= Ṭaṅka) and Dramiḍa's: does he suggest that Guhadeva and Bhārucci were the masters who summarized the Vṛtti?

saved from oblivion. Nonetheless, the identities of the first three are hardly less obscure and they have been obscured further by several attempts to clarify them. It would seem to be necessary, after KUPPUSWAMI's interesting but unconvincing identifications⁴⁸ and DASGUPTA's critical but incomplete account,⁴⁹ to restate the problems and rearrange the available evidence.

§ 1. Bodhāyana the Vṛttikāra :

Rāmānuja declares in the first line of his Śrībhāṣya⁵⁰ that he will follow the interpretation that Bodhāyana has given of the Brahmasūtras in his extensive *vṛtti*, which has been abbreviated by the ancient Masters. He quotes this Vṛtti—to conform to the custom and use the class-name as its title—some seven times in his Śrībhāṣya and nowhere else.⁵¹ These seven fragments, it would seem, are all that is known of a *vṛtti* by a Bodhāyana. Śaṅkara, however, according to his commentators Rāmānanda and Ānandagiri refers implicitly to a Vṛttikāra in several places of his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.⁵² They identify this author with an Upavarṣa, possibly⁵³ on the strength of a remark by Śaṅkara *ad BrS.* 3, 3, 53: *ata eva bhagavatopavarṣeṇa prathame tanre ātmāstitvābhīdhānaprasaktau 'śārīrake vakṣyāma ity' uddhāra uktaḥ* "therefore the venerable Upavarṣa declared at a point in the First Tantra where there was occasion to discuss the existence of the Soul: "We shall explain this in the Śārīraka". This remark is, according to KUPPUSWAMI, a clear indication that Upavarṣa was the author of

48. MM. S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRIGAL, *Bodhāyana and Dramiḍācārya—two old Vedāntins presupposed by Rāmānuja* (Proc. & Tr. 3rd Or. Conf. Madras 1924), pp. 465.

49. DASGUPTA, *Indian Philosophy* III, pp. 105 ff.; cf. also S. KRISHNASWAMI IYENGAR, *Manimekhalai in its historical setting*, pp. 91 ff.; V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, intr. to Vācaspati's *Tattvabindu* (Annamalai Un. Skt. Ser. 3, 1936), pp. 14 ff.

50. *bhagavadbodhāyanakṛtāṃ vistīrṇāṃ brahmasūtravṛttīm pūrvācāryāḥ saṃci-keṣipuḥ / tanmatānusareṇa sūtrākṣarāṇi vyākhyasyante*; Abhyankar's reading *Baudh'* is incorrect.

51. Collected and shown against the relevant sūtras in Appendix § 1.

52. BrSBh. 1, 1, 19/23/31; 1, 2, 23; Ś. quotes him by name *ad* 1, 3, 28 *varṇā eva tu śabda iti bhagavān Upavarṣaḥ*.

53. The utmost caution should be observed in assuming that comparatively late commentators knew works which have been lost long since; in many cases it is probable that they too inferred rather than knew. We should not even be too sure that Ś. knew Upavarṣa's complete commentary: both citations may easily have been current dicta in school-tradition; his one citation *varṇā eva tu śabda iti* summarizes Śabara's Upavarṣa quotation; his other one is also found in Bhāskara 1, 1, 1, (Chaukh. ed. p. 6) *ata evopavarṣācāryeṇoktam prathamapāde—ātmavādam tu śārīrake vakṣyāma iti*. If Upavarṣa's prestige was great enough to render these relatively unimportant citations significant, one wonders why his authority is not evoked in more controversial sections—if his views were known. That Bhāskara quotes Upavarṣa in exactly the same connexions as Ś. (though under different sūtras) and only there makes it probable that Bh. quoted from Ś.

vṛttis in both karma — and brahmasūtras and he proceeds to identify him with Rāmānuja's vṛttikāra Bodhāyana.

The question is, however, appreciably more complicated than at a first glance it would appear to be. An Upavaṛṣa is mentioned by Śabarasvāmin *ad* Karmasūtra 1, 1, 5 in a discussion on the topic of what constitutes a word.⁵⁴ So, on the basis of Śaṅkara's and Śabara's references and citations and of Rāmānanda's identification, we may conclude that Upavaṛṣa did indeed write a vṛtti on both Karma- and Brahmasūtras. Venkaṭanātha, writing in the 14th Century, suggests the identity of this Upavaṛṣa with our Bodhāyana, but it is noteworthy that he refers to him by quoting Śabara's quotation.⁵⁵ One wonders whether he knew much more of him than just that analysis of the word *gauḥ*, and whether, for that matter, Śaṅkara's commentators did.

The citation from Upavaṛṣa by Śaṅkara is in itself most interesting. It is remarkably worded. *Tantra* may indeed mean "system, doctrine" but much more frequent is the sense of "chapter, part of a larger treatise". If we accept this sense we shall be led to conclude that Upavaṛṣa's text contained both the Karma and Śārīrakasūtras as one context.⁵⁶ KUPPUSWAMI just stops before this conclusion: "Upavaṛṣa was, decisively in favour of treating the Karma-Mīmāṃsā and Brahma-Mīmāṃsā as forming the former and the latter parts of an integral whole". Left at this the statement *vakṣyāmaḥ* means simply that Upavaṛṣa contemplated writing a vṛtti on the Śārīraka part. Yet, to express such an intention of commenting on another work some time in the future is most uncommon with Indian commentators; but very frequent indeed are references to, and anticipations of, what is to follow later on in the same text. Reading the citation naturally we under-

54. *kaḥ śabdaḥ—gakāraukāravīsarjanīyā iti bhagavān Upavaṛṣaḥ*: if, as is generally accepted, the quotation of the Vṛttikāra (*vṛttikāras tv anyathenam grantham varṇayām cakre*, etc.) runs to the end of *bhāṣya* ad 1, 1, 5, then, JACOBI argues (*the Dates of the philosophical sūtras of the Brahmans*, p. 17 (JAOS 1911); followed by P. V. KANE, *Gleanings from the Śabarabhāṣya* (JBBRAS 1921)), the Vṛttikāra quotes Upavaṛṣa and cannot be identical with him; this is too cautious: it is clear from the context as well as Śaṅkara's reference 1, 3, 28 that this Vṛttikāra is Upavaṛṣa; for an account of his views, cf. V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, *Old Vṛttikāras on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras* (IHQ 1934), p. 431 ff.

55. *Tattvaṭikā*, p. 149.

56. Another interpretation is possible by which *prathama tantra* comprises I-XII, a second *tantra* the Saṅkarśakāṇḍa XIII-XVI, and the Śārīraka is appended as the third part; cf. this use is Prapañcahr̥daya, p. 39. A third one is suggested by Bhāskara who has *prathame pāde* where Ś. has *prathamatantra-*; ad 1, 3, 10 Bh. however uses *tantra* for the entire corpus of KM Sūtras when quoting Upavaṛṣa: *prathamatantrasiddhatvāc cātra sphaṭanīrākaraṇam niṣphalaṃ syāt*. The use of *tantra* as a whole of *sūtras* "threads" is of course natural.

stand that Upavaṛṣa postponed the discussion of a certain topic to a later chapter of the treatise on which he was commenting. But all our evidence points to the fact that Jaimini's and Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras are not only different treatises by different authors but belong to two altogether different śāstras; and any evidence extracted from one stray sentence crumbles before this firm fact.

Sureśvara, however, in his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi *saṃbandhokti* ad 1, 91 makes incidentally a surprising statement: .. *yato na Jaiminer ayam abhiprāya 'āmnāyasya sarva eva kriyārtha' iti: yadi hy ayam abhiprāyo 'bhaviṣyad 'athāto brahmajijñāsā janmādy asya yata'ityevamādi .. sarva-vedāntamīmāṃsaṇam śrīmacchārīrakaṇ nāsūtrayīṣyat; asūtrayac ca* "Jaimini cannot have meant that 'all scripture bears on acts': if he had he would not have composed his Śārīrakasūtras *athāto brahmajijñāsā* etc. in which he interprets the sense of all Upaniṣads: but the fact is that he *did!*" In the light of this remark⁵⁷ our explanation of Upavaṛṣa's statement as referring to one treatise of both corpora of Sūtras becomes more plausible.

Let us also consider the testimony of one of Bodhāyana's fragments: *saṃhitam etac chārīrakaṇ Jaiminīyena ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇeneti śāstraiikatvasiddhiḥ* "that Karma- and Brahmasūtras constitute one śāstra is proved by the fact that this Śārīraka is incorporated in one treatise with Jaimini's Sūtras in 16 Chapters": the wording again is significant: *etat* must mean that Bodhāyana refers to the work on which he is commenting, whereas the pregnancy of the word-order *Jaiminīyena ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇena* can only be brought out in rendering it "Jaimini's work, i.e. the one in 16 chapters": in other words at least two forms of the *Jaiminīya* were already known to Bodhāyana, one in 16 and one *not* in 16 chapters.

There is little doubt that the 16 Chapters refer to KMSūtras I-XII with Saṅkarśakāṇḍa XIII-XVI.⁵⁸ It follows that we have three corpora of

57. S. K. BELVALKAR was the first to accept the direct sense of this remark (*Jaiminīya's Śārīraka-Sūtra*, Fest-Gabe Garbe "Aus Indiens Kultur", Erlangen 1927), but he has not answered Hirianna's pertinent objection to taking it literally: H. rightly points out that Padmapāda, Sureśvara's contemporary, does not know a Jaiminīyāśārīraka (even denies it: cf. Pañcapādika 40, 153-54 cf. also Śaṅkara BrSBh. 1, 1, 4); Belvalkar's summary condemnation of the traditional view that the pupil shares his teacher's opinions and that Jaimini therefore may just stand for Bādarāyaṇa may be right from the point of view of modern scholarship, but the question is what view Sureśvara himself held. On the other hand the fact remains that the point of Sureśvara's argumentation is that Jaimini (and no other) *did* compose a sūtra; striking also is the almost conversational tone which suggests that it is a fact of common knowledge.

58. I refer to V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI, *Saṅkarśakāṇḍa—a genuine supplement to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* (IHQ. IX, 1933).

sūtras known to Bodhāyana: one in 12, one in 16, and one in 20 chapters including the 4 adhyāyas of the śārīraka. Did he comment on the preceding 16 Chapters of the Jaiminīya also? I doubt it. The quoted fragment II must have been connected with fragment I in some discussion like this: "Atha has the sense of immediate succession. [Objection: No; for Karmamīmāṃsā and Brahmanīmāṃsā being different śāstras immediate succession is excluded. Reply: No;] that both constitute one śāstra is proved by the fact etc." It is possible to explain *śoḍaśa*° as 12 KMS. + 4 BrS., as Rāmānuja clearly does.⁵⁹ In that case we are to conclude that Jaimini wrote a Śārīraka, which as we saw is quite possible, and that Bodhāyana did not comment on that one but a different one, since otherwise the specific mention of Jaiminīya would be pointless; moreover Rāmānuja, had he known about such a Śārīrakam, would no doubt have made the most of it because the continuity of the śāstras is the corner-stone of his system: that he does not think of it although it is implied by his own interpretation of *śoḍaśa* proves that he did not know of the existence of a continuous treatise of Sūtras that was commented on in its entirety by Bodhāyana. As Rāmānuja is the only author of whom we know that he consulted this vṛtti, we have to accept his evidence—whether he was right or wrong—and leave it at that.

There is other confusing evidence which contradicts this. The Prapañcahrdaya states that Bodhāyana did write vṛttis on both Sūtras, even a complete extensive commentary called *Kṛtakoti* "Disputation on Karman"^{59a}, this bulky commentary was abbreviated by Upavaṛṣa, but slightly (*kiṃcit*), and further abbreviated—for the slow-witted—by Devasvāmin.⁶⁰ Then Bhavadāsa was the first to comment the 16 Chapters of the Jaiminīya only; finally Śabarasvāmin was the first to comment on the 12 Chapters only, leaving out the Saṃkarśakāṇḍa. How reliable is this account? We know nothing about the author and its age, but we gather that he was a Vaiṣṇava bhākta following Saṃkhya and a tantric kind of Yoga, which would render his date rather late. Of the Vedānta systems he describes only an advaita

59. Right after the quotation he remarks: *ataḥ pratipipādāyīṣīṭārthabhedena śaṭkabhedavad adhyāyabhedavac ca pūrvottaramīmāṃsāyor bhedaḥ*, etc. "pūrva and uttaramīmāṃsā are distinguished according to their subject-matter like the division of (the 12 chapters of KMS in two parts of) six adhyāyas and in separate adhyāyas".

59a. If we read it as a bahuvrīhi: "(the commentary) in which arguments are made".

60. *tasya viṃsatyadhyāyanibaddhasya mīmāṃsāśāstrasya kṛtakotiṇāmādheyam bhāṣyam Bodhāyanena kṛtam / tadgranthabāhulyabhayād upekṣya kiṃcit saṃkṣiptam Upavaṛṣaṇa kṛtam / tad apī mandamatīṃ prati duṣpratipādam vistīrnatvād ity upekṣya śoḍaśa-lakṣaṇapūrvamīmāṃsāśāstramātrasya Devasvāmināṭisaṃkṣiptam kṛtam*, etc. Prapañcahrdaya IV, p. 39.

school, which seems to be post-Śaṅkara and he mentions the names of Śaṅkara, Brahmadaṭṭa and Bhāskara. He is right about Śabara, at least partly right about Devasvāmin of whom we have a commentary on the Saṃkarśakāṇḍa left.⁶² His other data conflict with what little evidence we have. Rāmānuja did not know about a Sūtra collection in 20 Chapters. Besides, the convincing name of the Commentary is more probably that of Upavaṛṣa's, whom the Vaijayantī calls *Kṛtakotikavi* "author of the Kṛtakoti".⁶³ His history of the Sūtras and its commentaries sounds plausible, but some of the earlier names may have been filled in to make it stick. Withal its authority is dubious.

To sum up. On our evidence the probabilities are that Upavaṛṣa, author of a vṛtti on both Sūtras, probably entitled *Kṛtakoti*, is different from Bodhāyana known from Rāmānuja's quotations; that Bodhāyana did not compose a vṛtti on the KMSūtras; that therefore he was later than Upavaṛṣa, recognised the schism between the two śāstras but did not accept it. Further we may consider the possibility that Upavaṛṣa's *śārīrakam* not only formed part of, but also went under the name of, *Jaiminīyasūtras*; and finally that—abstracting from the dubious Devasvāmin—since Śabarasvāmin was the first commentator to explain the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras only and therefore also recognised the schism, Bodhāyana's date will not be far removed from Śabara's.

Again we may ask: what is Rāmānuja's evidence worth? In other words, how much did he know of Bodhāyana himself? Tradition relates⁶⁴ that Rāmānuja had his pupil Kureśa procure a copy of the vṛtti from a Śāradā Māṭh in Kaśmīr:⁶⁵ possibly it was purloined, for as soon as it was missing Rāmānuja and Kureśa were chased by the temple-keepers and the manuscript was recovered; meanwhile Kureśa had learnt it by heart. The circumstances of the story may be fictitious, but they would hardly have been invented unless Bodhāyana MSS. were known to have been extremely scarce. And is it a coincidence that all the quotations are from the first adhyāya? Arguments *ex silentio* are seldom conclusive; but that neither Sudarśanasūri nor Venkaṭanātha quote once from the vṛtti in their com-

61. cf. p. 40 *tato māyāsabalabrahmaṇi samanvayād avirodho dvitīye*; that he mentions neither Rāmānuja nor Mādhva does not necessarily mean that he preceded both Vaiṣṇava vedāntins.

62. He is usually dated much later than Śabara.

63. ed. G. OPPERT (Madras 1893) I, 3, Brāhmanakāṇḍa, 158 cd. *halabhūtiṣ tūpavaṛṣaḥ kṛtakotikaviṣ ca saḥ*..

64. DASGUPTA III, p. 102.

65. Far from the battle-fields of India, Kaśmīr and, in the extreme south, Travancore, have been traditionally the find-spots of rare or unique MSS.

mentaries on a treatise that professes to have been inspired by it—whereas they do quote both the Vākya and the Bhāṣya, which are far less fundamental to the Śrībhāṣya—renders the conclusion that neither one ever saw a copy of it virtually unavoidable. Significant is also Rāmānuja's statement that Bodhāyana's supposedly extensive vṛtti has been abbreviated by ancient Masters; he does not actually say that he is following the vṛtti, but the vṛtti as abbreviated. It is quite possible that Rāmānuja, too, knew it only by fragments from quotations. This possibility is further increased by the comparative insignificance of the fragments quoted; except for I and II they hardly contribute anything to the argumentation and sometimes they are added as an after-thought. But they may conceivably have been found cited in early treatises which continued ancient traditions of interpretation.

Against this background no special authority can be attributed to Venkaṭanātha's identification Bodhāyana = Upavaṣa on which Kuppuswami's case rests but which Venkaṭanātha himself offers as a guess.

Of interest also is another point. Yāmuna, at the beginning of his Ātmasiddhi,⁶⁶ gives a list of ancient Vedāntins. Strangely enough he does not mention the Vṛtti by which Rāmānuja set great store and which must have enjoyed great authority—if only by report—in their common milieu. But he mentions a bhāṣyakṛt who had explained Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras "briefly and profoundly": *bhagavatā Bādarāyaṇenedamarthāny eva sūtrāṇi praṇītāni vivṛtāni ca tāni parimitagambhīrabhāṣiṇā bhāṣyakṛtā*. This bhāṣyakṛt is always identified with Dramiḍa the Bhāṣyakāra, for which, as we shall see, there are no arguments. Rāmānuja declares that the vṛtti was an extensive one, Yāmuna that the bhāṣya was a brief one. Vṛtti "gloss, scholion" is mainly distinguished from a bhāṣya "commentary" by its size:⁶⁷ a long vṛtti will be very similar to a short bhāṣya. As Bodhāyana's omission cannot be accounted for in this context—where also a sub-commentary by a Śrīvatsāṅkamīśra, another ancient Master, is mentioned—I am inclined to think that Yāmuna and Rāmānuja both referred to the same work by different descriptions; Rāmānuja may have preferred the term vṛtti to avoid confusion with Dramiḍa's bhāṣya.

§ 2. Ṭaṅka the Vākya-kāra and Dramiḍa the Bhāṣya-kāra :

Apart from the Vṛttikāra and rarely if ever in the same context Rāmānuja quotes regularly from the Vākya of an anonymous vākya-kāra and

66. Ātmasiddhi, p. 8.

67. Similar confusions happen oftener: cf. TRIPATHI, *Tarkasamgraha*, p. XV "Śaṅkarāchārya styled his commentaries on Kaṭha and Bṛhadāraṇyaka vṛttis, yet as they are really bhāṣyas it appears that in old times both words were interchangeable".

from a bhāṣya thereof by Dramiḍa. Both are also known elsewhere. The Vākya-kāra is generally named Ṭaṅka, and he is identified by Sudarśanasūri and others with Brahmanandin. Ṭaṅka's name, which has the second place in Rāmānuja's list, does also occur in a list of Yāmuna, but here he has the distinction of being mentioned the first of a series of adversaries and is put on a par with Advaitins like Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara and with Dvaitādvaitins like Bhartṛprapaṅca and Bhāskara.⁶⁸ Whatever his persuasion, we have no reason to doubt that Yāmuna's Ṭaṅka is identical with Rāmānuja's. That Rāmānuja, who never introduces him as such, also regarded Ṭaṅka as the Vākya-kāra is indicated by the place which his name holds between Bodhāyana the Vṛttikāra and Dramiḍa the Bhāṣya-kāra. Dramiḍa, this is evident from the citations themselves, followed Ṭaṅka's vākya scrupulously. This is another argument against identifying Yāmuna's bhāṣyakṛt with Rāmānuja's bhāṣyakāra.

Besides, we can understand why Ṭaṅka was excluded by Yāmuna and included by Rāmānuja. Sarvajñātman, the author of the Samkṣepaśārīraka, quotes in 1,218 ff. a Vākya-kāra by name of Ātreya who was commented upon by a Bhāṣya-kāra: beyond any doubt the latter is Dramiḍa, for the quotation corresponds literally to one by Rāmānuja.⁶⁹ Nṛsiṃhāśramin⁷⁰ commenting on the Samkṣepaśārīraka identifies this Ātreya with Brahmanandin to remove the last doubt of his identity. Sarvajñātman's reference reads: "Ātreya's Vākya tells us also that all effect is merely phenomenal, not of ultimate reality (*saṃvyavahāramātram*). The many defects inherent in the satkāryavāda cannot affect the māyāvāda because it is contradictory: thus, if the effect is merely phenomenal, the defects inherent in the Sāṃkhya view are

68. Ātmasiddhi p. 8: *tathāpy ācāryaṭaṅkabhartṛprapaṅcabhartṛmitrabhartṛhari-brahmadattaśaṅkarabhāskaraḍiviracitasitavitavidhanibandhanaśraddhāvīpralabdhabuddhāyo na yathāvad anyathā ca pratipadyante*; on Bhartṛprapaṅca cf. M. HIRIYANNA, *Fragments of Bhartṛprapaṅca* (Proc. & Tr. 3d Or. Conf., Madras 1924), p. 9; Bhartṛmitra is known as a commentator of the Karmamīmāṃsāsūtras and KUPPUSWAMI is inclined to see in him a precursor of Prabhākara (*The Prābhākara School of Karma Mīmāṃsā*, Proc. & Tr. 2nd Or. Conf. Calcutta 1922), pp. 410 f.; Brahmadatta is reputed to have written on Karmamīmāṃsā, cf. Prapaṅcahṛdaya, p. 39 *brahmakāṇḍasya bhagavatpādabrahmadattabhāskaraḍibhir matabhedenāpi kṛtam*, i.e., Śaṅkara, Brahmadatta and Bhāskara, but there can be no question of it but Br. preceded S.: further material in HIRIYANNA's paper *Brahmadatta: an old Vedāntin* (J. Or. Res. Madras 1928), p. 1 ff.; on Bhartṛhari see V. A. RAMASWAMI SASTRI's papers, *Was Bhartṛhari a Bauddha?* and *Bhartṛhari as a pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin* (resp. All-India Or. Conf. Mysore 1935 and Trivandrum 1937), also *Bhartṛhari as a Mīmāṃsaka* (Deccan College Bulletin XIV, 1).

69. Fragment XIII.

70. Quoted by KUPPUSWAMI in the paper mentioned supra note 48; the Subodhini (Ānandāśrama ed.) identifies the Vākya-kāra with Brahmadatta; HIRIYANNA's first alternative (o.c. p. 7-8) that this is an error is certainly the right one.

completely avoided. Hence the sage of Atri's clan, who is well conversant with the stages of Vedānta, declares that the effect is merely phenomenal. The statement *tat satyam* in ChUp. 6, 8, 7 is based on the effect's dependence on *satya*. His example of the sea and the foam should be understood on the basis of phenomenality (i.e. the effect = foam is phenomenal, Brahman = sea is ultimately real). After the Vākyakāra has described the effect (*vikāra-*) he adopts immediately afterwards, and develops gradually, the view that all effect is merely phenomenal, and therefore he maintains non-duality (*advaita-*). The venerable Bhāṣyakāra declares likewise that "the Venerable Lord the Supreme Deity is *antarguṇa*, i.e. *pratyagguṇa* "intrinsically real".⁷¹ And this agrees with our view of a Brahman without qualities, not with the view of a Brahman with qualities".

We understand that Sarvajñātman refers to the Vākya on ChUp. 6, 2 ff. and especially 6, 8, 7 *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā*, where Ātreya illustrates the relation between *idaṃ sarvaṃ* "this Universe" and its underlying principle by the example of the foam and the sea and explains it as *satyasamāśrayatva*: the Universe has its ontological basis in the 'Real' that is its cause (ChUp. 6, 2, 1). Sarvajñātman applies his doctrine, or exegetical method, of the "didactic stages" (*bhūmi-*),⁷² pretending that Ātreya was "well-conversant with the stages of teaching of the Upaniṣads", and interprets the *ḍṣṭānta* as the first stage or *pariṇāmavāda* (*satkāryavāda*) and the comment corresponding to *satyasamāśrayatva* as the second stage or *vivartavāda* (*māyāvāda*), and so claims him a true-blue Advaitin. The Bhāṣyakāra's quotation is most probably taken from the commentary on *Daharavidyā* ChUp. 8, 1, 1 (*tasmin yad antas tad anveṣṭavyam*) and *antarguṇa-* "in whom qualities inhere" explained as "who is essentially interior". Sarvajñātman seems aware of diverging explications and emphasizes that it agrees with the *nirguṇavāda*. Foam-and-sea is a favourite example of the *bhedābhedavādins*, and I think it extremely probable that Yāmuna excluded Ṭaṅka by name and Dramiḍa by implication because they tended toward *dvaitādvaita*. For compare now a quotation by Bhāṣkara ad BrS. 1, 4, 25 (Ś. 26; R. 27) *ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt*, where *pariṇāma* is that of Brahman's creative power: Bhāṣkara proceeds to say that this is the traditional view taken by the authors of the Vākya and the *Vṛtti* on the *Chāndogya*, and quotes the Vākya: "There is an inner causal change (*pariṇāma*)

71. Madhusūdana comments: *guṇaśabdah svarūpaparah, anyā devatāḥ parāgrūpāḥ paradevatā tu pratyagātmarūpāroḥṣadicakarasety arthah.*

72. On Sarvajñātman's "stages of Vedānta". Cf. HACKER, *Vivarta*, pp. 231 ff. See *Samkṣepasārīraka* II, 60 ff.

as in the case of curds etc."⁷³ We may trust this statement which goes unchallenged by Rāmānuja and fits in remarkably well with Sarvajñātman's exposition.⁷⁴

Rāmānuja, now, who addressed a larger audience of Vedāntins than Yāmuna, was no less a dialectician than Sarvajñātman and a far superior exegete. Though the expression *nirbhugnadaivatam* is difficult,⁷⁵ it is clear that Rāmānuja's interpretation of the common citation is the more natural one. Moreover, in his zeal to show that his system of Vedānta was the one favoured by the ancient Masters, Rāmānuja was at pains to include both ancient commentators Ṭaṅka and Dramiḍa, who enjoyed great esteem. This is also proved by Śaṅkara's references to Dramiḍa in his *Bhāṣya*⁷⁶ and by Sureśvara's adoption of a story of his,⁷⁷ the well-known one of the prince who, suffering from amnesia, lived with hunters until his memory returned and he recognized himself for what he was. We may conclude that both commentators were ancient Vedāntins whose names were hallowed by tradition. Certainly Ṭaṅka was not identical with the Ṭaṅkākārya profusely quoted by Haṃsayogin in his *Gītābhāṣya*:⁷⁸ one glance at the style of both will prove this immediately.

73. *sūtrakārah śrutyanukārī pariṇāmapakṣaṃ sūtrayāmbabhūva / ayam eva chāndogyā vākyakāravṛttikārābhyaṃ sampradāyaḥ* [DVIVEDIN's text reads *sampradāyam*]/ *ataḥ samāśritāḥ/tathā ca vākyaṃ pariṇāmas tu syād dadhyādīvad iti vigītam*; the *vṛttikāra* must be the same as Rāmānuja's *bhāṣyakāra*; for the synonymy of *vṛtti* and *bhāṣya* see above.

74. I take it that the quotation by Bhāṣkara explains the meaning of the word *vikāra-*; according to Sarvajñātman, the Vākyakāra first describes *vikāra* still in terms of the first *bhūmi*, or *pariṇāmavāda*, before developing the meaning in terms of the second *bhūmi*, or *vivartavāda*. The fact that three different authors tried to make use of the same passage of an ancient gloss is too remarkable to go unmentioned. One would suggest that Sarvajñātman endeavoured to challenge Bhāṣkara's claim and forced his own interpretation of two didactic stages on the Vākya text, while Rāmānuja again corrected Sarvajñātman by bringing out the full force of Dramiḍa's comments. This is a guess, but there is nothing in the chronology to conflict with it; besides, tacit references by one author to another are far more numerous than one would suspect at a first glance.

75. See my translation and note ad Fr. XV; obscurity must have been the rule and may account for the divergency of interpretation.

76. ChUpBh. Intr. and 3, 8, 10; Ś. Maṇḍūkya KBh. 2, 32; cf. also Ānandagiri's *Tarkasamgraha* and Tripāthi's (not conclusive) remarks p. XVI; KUPPUSWAMI is certainly right to consider the *Draviḍa* of the Advaitins identical with the *Dramiḍa* of the *Viśiṣṭādvaitins*; *Draviḍa* and *Dramiḍa* are also in *Viśiṣṭādvaita* MSS. variants of the same name.

77. *Vārttika* on Śaṅkara's BĀUpBh., 2, 1, 506, included in Appendix § 2 as *Fragment XVI b*.

78. Cf. F. O. SCHRADER, *Neues über die Bhagavadgītā* (Fest-Gabe Garbe "Aus Indiens Kultur"), p. 179.

It cannot be doubted that both Vākya and Bhāṣya explained the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.^{78a} This is not only borne out by the testimonies of Bhāskara, of Sarvajñātman's commentators and of Ānandagiri, but also by the internal evidence of the quotations themselves. All except three of the fragments can somehow be connected with Chāndogya texts and have been so connected by Rāmānuja. Apart from Yāmuna's dubious *bhāṣyakṛt*, there is no evidence at all to connect them with the Sūtras. I have collected all fragments known so far and shown against the corresponding ChUp. texts in Appendix I, § 2.

A final question might be asked. Is Ṭaṅka, who must have been a very ancient Master, known in the older literature? The language of his very concise Vākya displays an antique sūtra-like style; old-fashioned words and constructions are the rule. Ṭaṅka appears as the first in Yāmuna's list, of which the chronological arrangement is borne out by the other names mentioned. Although the date of the Sūtras is far from fixed, one would assign a date to the Vākya not too far removed from Bādarāyaṇa's. Of course we enter here the realm of speculation, but it may be pointed out that Bādarāyaṇa mentions an Ātreya by name as advocating a view to which an Auḍulomi is opposed. It would seem that the occasion of the cryptic difference is the interpretation of a Chāndogya passage.⁷⁹ Incidentally we have good reasons to believe that the Sūtrakāra, whoever he was or whoever they were, tended himself toward dvaitādvaita of a kind.⁸⁰ We may also remark that the Sūtrakāra's main concern was with the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. BELVALKAR on plausible grounds goes so far as to contend that the original Sūtras were Chāndogya Sūtras.⁸¹ Though all this is not much evidence, yet it is not entirely out of the question that one of the several unknown sages⁸² mentioned in the Sūtras may have left some vestiges in literature: and we would hardly expect these vestiges to be other than incidental and ambiguous citations by later successors on the same road.

It is impossible to fix a date for Brahmanandin Ṭaṅka Ātreya. Does it signify anything that in Yāmuna's list he precedes Bhartṛmitra, who accord-

78a. There is also a tradition that Dramiḍa commented on the BĀUp.

79. BrS. 3, 4, 44-45, which according to R. refers to the ritual accompaniments of the *daharavidyā*, ChUp. 8, 1.

80. I refer to V. S. GHATE's important conclusions in *Les Brahma-Sūtras et leur cinq commentaires* (Thesis, Paris 1919), English translation, *The Vedānta, A study of the Brahma-Sūtras*, etc., Poona 1926; cf. also DASGUPTA, II.

81. S. K. BELVALKAR, *Lectures on Vedānta* I, p. 141: "There is nothing improbable in a 'Chāndogya' Brahmasūtra having in fact formed the nucleus of the present Sūtras, and been even incorporated therein;" for his arguments see pp. 142 ff.

82. Ātreya, Āsmarathya, Auḍulomi, Kāsakṛtsna, Kārṣṇājini, Jaimini and Bādari; note that all the names are patronymics and may refer to families rather than individuals; the Ātreya family belongs to Sāmaveda.

ing to the Prapañcahṛdaya would not seem far removed from Śabara? In any case it is significant that all Vākya quotations, not only Rāmānuja's but also Sarvajñātman's, Sudarśana's and Venkaṭanātha's, are accompanied by citations from Dramiḍa's bhāṣya, and Bhāskara refers to both simultaneously. We may take it that the Bhāṣya, which seems to have been the most authoritative commentary on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad before Śaṅkara's eclipsed it, has preserved the Vākya. Dramiḍa's language is not only so much more archaic than Śaṅkara's but also than Bhartṛprapañca's that a lapse of at least three centuries may reasonably be presumed. Besides, whereas Śaṅkara attacks Bhartṛprapañca, he pays Dramiḍa the compliment, due to venerable age, of accepting his interpretation where he can safely do so and passing without comment the many passages which he must have found objectionable.

§3. The views of the ancient Masters:

The few fragments of Bodhāyana's vṛtti are not very informative of his views. We may conclude from the way in which he stresses the continuity of Karma- and Brahmanmīmāṃsā that he accepted the great importance of ritual acts as preparatory to the liberating intuition of the Absolute—however he may have conceived of it—and adhered somehow to the *jñānakarma-samuccaya* view with its corollaries of the reality of the phenomenal world and the validity of the criteria of perception and reason in theology. To derive from the fact that Rāmānuja professes to follow him — or rather the ancient masters as commenting him — the probability that Bodhāyana anticipated in all points his late successor, would seem speculative. The most we can say is that the manner in which he was interpreted by his early commentators — possibly the mysterious Guhadeva, Kapardi and Bhāruci — was generally favourable to Rāmānuja's system of unity in difference.

On Ṭaṅka and Dramiḍa we are better informed. Though their antiquity made them venerable alike to such opposites as Sarvajñātman, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja, the last two certainly had better claims on them. Ṭaṅka rejects explicitly the doctrine that God's body is a mere pedagogic fiction and must therefore have affirmed to some extent the reality of the world. The relation between God and world — including the empirical soul — is expressed in terms reminiscent of dvaitādvaita: it is like that between sea and foam: the changing phenomena of the world are no more, but not less, than odd and useless products of an accidental commotion on the surface of a Being which, remaining undisturbed in its infinite profundity, reabsorbs them when calm returns. He adhered to the pariṇāmavāda according to which Brahman as cause changes into effect like curds change into butter. We may conveniently call this *dvaitādvaita* as long as we are aware of the falsification that is implied: the term belongs to a later period and a different universe of discourse.

The personal Deity, possessed of a suprasensible body to his soul, is the object of our knowledge. Interesting are Ṭaṅka's views on *upāsana*, those upaniṣadic meditations which, originally the mental accompaniments of the bodily ritual acts, in the end would supersede the acts themselves. For him they are propaedeutic to the beatific vision: *upāsana* is their constant rememorization or *anusmṛti*, not once and for all but repeatedly and habitually, until, fortified by the observance of cumulative restrictions — ranging from proper nourishment to the suppression of the last relicts of animal life-satisfaction and dissatisfaction —, the completely expurgated mind has penetrated the sense of *tat tvam asi* and attains God in identity.

Dramaḍa appears to have advanced beyond Ṭaṅka's pantheism to a more anthropomorphic theism. Akṣara and Brahman are for him *Bhagavān*. He quotes the *Bhagavadgītā*. He considers the *māyā* doctrine unscriptural. He is a realist and is fond of graphic comparisons — oceans jumping the shores like rutting rams —, parables and stories. His God is a merciful sovereign who, waving the fan of his omnipotence, rules all the worlds as a paramount king.

As they stand the *Vākya* and *Bhāṣya* quotations are the oldest instances of commentarial *Vedānta* texts; and it is important to note that on the whole — however much may escape us — they are more favourable to Rāmānuja's than to Śaṅkara's system of *Vedānta*.

III. THE VEDĀRTHASAMGRAHA

1. Its date :

There can, in my opinion, be no doubt that the *Vedārthasamgraha* was Rāmānuja's philosophical *début*. It was written prior to the *Śrībhāṣya* which refers to it twice,⁸³ not to speak now of innumerable tacit references. Elsewhere I have tried to demonstrate that the *Gītābhāṣya* presupposes the *Śrībhāṣya*⁸⁴ and no evidence has so far come up to correct this opinion. Another work ascribed to Rāmānuja, the *Vedāntadīpa*, is also later than the *Śrībhāṣya* to which it refers explicitly.⁸⁵

83. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 58, where reference is made to the Ved. explication of the *Sadvidyā* (§ 13 ff.), and ib. p. 116, where reference is made to the Ved. discussion of God being denoted in *sāmānādhikaraṇya* sentences with objects of which he is the inner Ruler (§§ 17; 21).

84. See my *Rāmānuja on the Bhagavadgītā*, Ch. III.

85. Benares ed. p. 8 *śrutinyāyavirodhas tu teṣāṃ bhāṣye prapañcita iti neha pratanayate / bhāṣyodito 'dhikaraṇārthaḥ sasūtravivaraṇaḥ sukhagrahanāya samkṣepanopanyasyate*.

There is, however, a curious problem created by still another abridgement of the *Śrībhāṣya*, known as *Vedāntasāra* 'essentials of *Vedānta*', not to be confused with Sadānanda's well-known *advaita* manual. SUDARSANACHARYA maintains⁸⁶ that the *Vedāntasāra* is prior to the *Vedārthasamgraha*, on grounds whose cogency I fail to see. In itself the very existence of a second and rather thorough-going abridgement of Rāmānuja's *magnum opus*, side by side with the useful *Vedāntadīpa*, is curious enough. That it was Rāmānuja's *début*, as SUDARSANACHARYA suggests, is extremely unlikely. To me it is unconceivable that Rāmānuja would have put forward his system of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* for the first time to a highly critical audience of contemporary *vedāntins* by merely indicating its barest outlines as it is done in the *Vedāntasāra*, which is nearer to being a *vākya* than a *bhāṣya*. In the most detailed explication to be found in the booklet, that of BrS. 1, 1, 2 *janmādy asya yataḥ*, to which the basic scriptural evidence of ŚBh. 1, 1, 1 is delegated as a more convenient place to deal with it, the bare essentials of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* are enumerated without the slightest attempt at convincing presentation and plausible argumentation. Read, for instance, toward the end: "all *vedāntins* agree that at the time of resorption there persists a subtle differentiation between, on the one hand, spirit and matter, and the Supreme Being on the other hand, a differentiation so subtle that it does not admit of phenomenality;⁸⁷ for they, too, (i.e., *advaitavādins* and *aupādhikavādins*) assume that the differentiation (between the three ontological orders), being brought about either by nescience or by limiting conditions, has no beginning. But our view differs peculiarly in this: whereas the others contradict all scripture and reason by maintaining either a brahman that is nescient or a brahman that is limited by conditions, we are guilty of no such contradictions on account of the absence (of such doctrines)." This is an extremely tendentious presentation of the rival views, which can only be understood when we have seen Rāmānuja's arguments either in *Vedārthasamgraha* or in *Śrībhāṣya*. We may also note that Rāmānuja nowhere uses the term *vedāntin*, nor indeed *vedānta* in the sense of *Vedāntamīmāṃsā*; nor is *vyavahāra* in the sense of "phenomenality" common with Rāmānuja; finally, the last sentence is clearly a recast of the second stanza of the *Vedārthasamgraha*.

Similar observations can be made on the majority of the comments in the *Vedāntasāra* by anyone well-read in Rāmānuja; and I think it extremely improbable that Rāmānuja presented his system to the thinkers of his age in such a poor form. If the text was at all composed during Rāmānuja's life-time, it will at most have been an authorized epitome by one of his

86. *Upodghāta* to his *Vedārthasamgraha* ed. p. 35.

87. *vyavahārānarhasūksmahedah*; NARASIMHA Ayyangar (Adyar ed. 1953) translates 'subtle and indescribable difference'.

be more authentic and its existence has length and difficulty of the Śrībhāṣya. Yet believe that Rāmānuja, who, after a trade-work in comparison with Śaṅkara, would rankless task of abridging his own composition of, for example, commentaries

ascribed to Rāmānuja, the Gadyatraya is found referred to sufficiently often by it here. It may be described loosely as unequal parts, Śaraṅāgatigadya, Śrīraṅgā-kt has been commented on by the Vedān-āra Rāmānuja, and tradition has it that The gadyas may be described more pre-ht by Rāmānuja, an endless and repet-ing of God's infinite perfections. Large again and many passages are practically he introduction to the Gītābhāṣya and e also strongly reminiscent of Yāmuṅa's rring expression *ekāntikāṭyantikaparā-* which the Vedāntadeśika reads an ascen-mediate intuition of a supreme kind tion and finally the uninterrupted retain-wn to me from Rāmānuja's other works; ension karman → jñāna → bhakti, where a "propitiation" of God, combined with spirit and matter, gradually culminates n of God.⁸⁹ The later distinction be-a higher bhakti of complete *abandon* to, or at least accepted by, Rāmānuja, and it is significant that Vedāntadeśika Though formerly I hesitated, there is nticity of this little devotional work: to suspect lyrics that are ascribed to

lāntadesika-granthamālā, part 4, ed. by Śrī am 1940), p. 104: *atra parabhaḥktīr uttarot-ityādiṣv iva svabhāvavajā, na tv iśtasūdhana-dah / sūktākteṛte nirantarāmububhūṣā paramā-prītir avivekānām viśayeso anapāyini / tvām*

philosophers and to forget that these philosophers were theologians and officiating priests. The songs of St. Thomas Aquinas, whom nobody would suspect of lyrical aspirations on the basis of his philosophical works, furnish an interesting parallel.

2. Its Sources

A. SMṚTI

§1. Function of Smṛti:

The scope and authority of smṛti texts have been fixed ever since Jaimini ruled: "Smṛti is to be disregarded whenever it militates against śruti."⁹¹ A propos of this sūtra Rāmānuja, commenting on Brahmasūtra 2, 1, 1, defines the function of smṛti in the following terms: "The Vedānta texts aim at establishing complete objects on the basis of apodictical assumption, which is beyond the scope of all other pramāṇas, from perception onwards; therefore, those people whose knowledge of scriptural revelation falls short stand in need of corroboration of these objects; many smṛtis, promulgated by perfectly trustworthy personalities in harmony with the contents of the śruti, serve to corroborate them. This corroboration being equal to the elucidation of the truths set forth by the scriptures is impossible whenever smṛti militates against śruti in its primary meaning." In this connexion, where the authority of the traditional doctrine of Sāṃkhya is condemned, he mentions a number of smṛti texts which do fulfil this corroborative function: Mahābhārata, Bhagavadgītā, Manu, Viṣṇupurāṇa, Āpastambiyadharmasūtra, Dakṣasmṛti, etc., and which fail to do so, Kapilasmṛti and Bṛhaspatismṛti.

The same view is stated in the Vedārthasamgraha⁹² with reference to the Rāmāyaṇa text: "Seeing that Kusa and Lava were wise and firmly established in the Vedas, the Lord made them apprehend in order to corroborate the Vedas:" for this exactly is the function of epics and purāṇas.

Distinction is always made between the Mahābhārata and its celebrated episode the Bhagavadgītā. On the place of the latter text in Rāmānuja's system the present writer has commented elsewhere in great detail, and little need be added here. Noteworthy is that in our text the quotations from the Viṣṇupurāṇa outnumber those from the Bhagavadgītā, while in the Śrībhāṣya the latter text appears to play a far more important rôle. There is an ancient Vaiṣṇava tradition that Rāmānuja wrote his Gītābhāṣya

91. KMS. 1, 1, 3.

92. Ved. § 33.

in extreme old age, which may signify that the Gītā grew in importance for Rāmānuja in the course of his career.

Strictly epical citations are mainly from the Mahābhārata, especially from the Mokṣadharmā which Rāmānuja once styles the *jñānakāṇḍa* of the great epic, and rarely from the Rāmāyaṇa. Quotations from the smṛtis in the stricter sense of the word are chiefly from the cosmological and philosophical portions of Manusmṛti.

Generally, with the possible exception of the Gītā citations, the quoted stanzas from other smṛtis are incidental, supplementary rather than decisive, current quotations of a certain milieu rather than the significant fruits of a dedicated study. The references to the Viṣṇupurāṇa, however, play a more important rôle: it is to this text that Rāmānuja turns to enlarge upon topics most dear to his heart.

§2. Viṣṇupurāṇa :

In comparison with the smṛtis that were generally accepted as authoritative, the epics among which the Bhagavadgītā has a privileged position, and Manu, the *smārta* authority of the Purāṇas was not so widely and completely recognized before Rāmānuja's age. Śaṅkara, for instance, only makes sparingly use of corroborative evidence from the Purāṇas.⁹³

Rāmānuja, however, quotes profusely from the Purāṇas, or rather from one of them, the Vaiṣṇavite Śrī-Viṣṇupurāṇa.⁹⁴ But even he does not do so without an attempt at justification. He introduces⁹⁵ a typically purāṇic classification of the purāṇas into four groups, those promulgated by Brahmā on a 'day' — that is one day of Brahmā's life — when his *sattva* constituent preponderated, those promulgated when *rajas* preponderated and when *tamas* preponderated, and those promulgated on a day when the guṇas were mixed. In accordance with the classification only the *sāttvika* purāṇas are fully authoritative, and in case there happen to be conflicts between different purāṇas, the teaching of the better qualified one is decisive.⁹⁶ The multiple authorship of the Purāṇas exists only in appearance: Brahmā himself is the *auctor intellectualis*, on his dictation the sages have compiled their Purāṇas.

By far the greater majority of the smṛti quotations in the Vedārthasamgraha have been taken from the Viṣṇupurāṇa. It is worth noting how

93. Śaṅkara's Sūtrabhāṣya quotes the Purāṇas some 8 times (DEUSSEN, *System of Vedānta*, p. 31).

94. Ved. § 94.

95. § 94.

96. § 94.

Rāmānuja defines⁹⁷ the scope of its authority: "The Vaiṣṇava Purāṇa is accepted without dissension by all scholars from the East, North, South and West of India as being adequate (*pariyāpta*-) in so far as it establishes all the dharmas and all the tattvas". We may assume that in Rāmānuja's age the Viṣṇupurāṇa had gained wide currency and popularity — not necessarily only in Vaiṣṇavite circles — as a religious and edifying book in all the Indian senses of the words. Interesting is the restriction to "all dharmas and all tattvas": the basic doctrines do not stand in need of corroboration by the Viṣṇupurāṇa, they are not *smārta* but *śrauta*. The description of this Purāṇas as a *dharma*-book is possibly with reference to the huge appendix Viṣṇudharmottara — which, incidentally, is quoted only once in the Śrībhāṣya⁹⁸ and not at all in the Vedārthasamgraha —, whereas the *tattvas* refer either to the three ontological orders of Supreme Being, soul and matter, or to the categories of Sāṃkhya, the influence of which on this popular Purāṇa has been very great.

The strictly metaphysical object of the Viṣṇupurāṇa is described in the following terms:⁹⁹ it serves the special and exclusive purpose of setting forth a certain aspect of Brahman's essence, that is not a phenomenal projection of the Supreme Being, but a particular manifestation of Its *essence*. This aspect of Brahman or, personally, of Nārāyaṇa who is the Supreme Brahman, is Viṣṇu who represents Nārāyaṇa's character of omnipresent pervader and saviour-god of incarnations.

A *propos* of Rāmānuja's introduction of the Viṣṇupurāṇa a few general remarks may be made. Not infrequently Rāmānuja is opposed to Śaṅkara as the 'first sectarian commentator', by which is meant that he was the first to introduce into Vedāntamīmāṃsā, so far kept pure, external and deteriorating elements which made his system a parochial *manifesto* rather than a universally valid system of thought; or it is said that he fabricated scriptural evidence, that is to say, made room within Vedānta for a great many śrūtis and smṛtis that Śaṅkara either ignored or delegated to the rank of relative truth. It is clear that those who pass these criticisms take Śaṅkara's selection and treatment of scriptures as normative, in other words, believe on speculative grounds that Śaṅkara is more right than Rāmānuja.

Rāmānuja's citations of the Viṣṇupurāṇa are only illustrative and corroborative. His justification of these citations shows clearly that he was anxious not to introduce any evidence that would be unacceptable to his fellow

97. § 110.

98. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 70 f. (104, 23-26).

99. § 110.

at he claims to speak. I doubt whether we disputed the relevancy of any quotation in his interpretation. No doubt there are at times picturesque. Yet remarks of a poetic describer of Rāmānuja's thought—stories of the other world, which he says who had personally assisted at the conviction," are not quite fair in many instances of world origin beyond the God; phenomenal world of soul and matter; permanent guiding spirit. Finally, if ever we are forced to do so by his texts. This is done seriously. A more comprehensive conclusion may be made. And he takes his texts literally which is the very foundation of orthodox thought about the golden splendour of God, about angelic beings eternally absorbed in him, he accepts them in their literal sense and supplement them by quotations. He criticizes the results of his exegesis, we do so in order to pass judgment on them, not proof.

ma.

It indeed taken for granted, that Rāmānuja's so-called Āgama or Tantra of the multitudinous and voluminous texts which he writes A.D. side by side with the Purāṇas. They embody the ancient tradition

of Mādhva is instructive; this author, who, not only quotes Purāṇas and Tantras much evidence as decisive for Vedānta; in the first (1); Garuḍa (3); Narāḍya (3); Pādma (6); Śaṅkha (4); Brahmavaivarta (5); Brahmāṇḍa (3); Vyoma Saṃhitā (1); Skandha (19);

of Pañcarātra, combining a Sāṃkhyan or Sāṃkhya-inspired cosmogony with the devotion of Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. Although ideally treating of metaphysics as well, they are for the greater part manuals of Tantric ritual and mantra. Their metaphysical doctrines and speculations are, if at all, stated in a cosmogonical context.¹⁰² A striking feature is the doctrine that the Supreme Personal God, quasi-independent of whom his personified śakti or creative potency operates as his active female counterpart, at the beginning of creation becomes differentiated into four *Vyūhas* or divisions, Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha, over whom the perfections and functions of the God are distributed and who develop the new universe in several successive stages. Although most of the origin of Pañcarātra is obscure, it would in my opinion not be too speculative to regard this system, at least the cosmogonical-metaphysical side of it, as a continuous development of pre-systematized theistic Sāṃkhya as alluded to or expressed in Upaniṣads like the Chāndogya, Śvetāśvatara and Kātha and in philosophical portions of the epic. Extraneous elements may have been absorbed when the personality of Viṣṇu became increasingly complex. Esoteric speculations on hidden meanings in language, as old as the Brāhmanas, may always have formed part of it, even though the contents of these speculations—jealously kept secret, even now—have changed. The conspicuous ritualistic tendencies would also point to ancient associations. One is inclined to think of this comprehensive and syncretistic 'system' as one of the main channels by which the old Brāhmanistic spirit continued to flow through the wasteland of the Buddhist period, never quite running dry but receiving from underground tributaries that sprang from distant and unexplored sources. That this spirit was able to receive inspiration from the popular beliefs around the divine figure of Viṣṇu the *viśvarūpa* could find some explanation in the fact that of the Vedic gods who in Hinduistic times became prominent Viṣṇu was from of old intimately associated with the life-preserving ritual.

Āgama appears to have played an important rôle with Rāmānuja's precursors who attempted to emancipate their traditional Vaiṣṇavism and Bhāgavatism. No less a part did it play in post-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaita. Yāmuna composed a special prakaraṇa to defend its authority, the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*. Venkaṭanātha the Vedāntadesika wrote a *Pañcarātrarakṣā*, and in the brief but authoritative manual *Yatīndramatadīpikā* the authority of Pañcarātra is stated without question.¹⁰³ This often emphatically expressed favour of ancient and modern Viśiṣṭādvaitins for Pañcarātra is the main reason for the prevailing view that this corpus of mythological, cosmogonical,

¹⁰². I refer to SCHRAEDER'S *Introduction to Pañcarātra*, p. 27.

¹⁰³. YID VII, p. 45... *śrīpāñcarātrāgamasya kvacid api vedavirodhābhāvāt kārt-sneyena prāmāṇyam*.

ritualistic and occult speculations and practices occupied a privileged place in Rāmānuja's philosophical system.

We have already seen that Rāmānuja, far from being a "sectarian commentator fabricating śrutis" actually took the utmost care to avoid any parochialism and, when attacking his adversaries and erecting his own school on the ruins of their systems, used recognized weapons and tools. When he adduces evidence from so venerable a smṛti text as the Viṣṇupurāṇa he carefully proceeds to define and confine the scope of its authority. We would expect, and his adversaries demand, a similar *avant-propos* before he would introduce the Āgama in evidence.

It is however remarkable that neither in the Vedārthasamgraha nor in the Śrībhāṣya — except in the *utpattiyasambhavādhikaraṇa* — Rāmānuja quotes a single pāda from the one and a half crore of ślokas in which, according to the tradition, the Āgama consists.¹⁰⁴ Nor are any of the characteristic doctrines of this system as much as hinted at. It is true that Rāmānuja enlarges upon Pañcarātra in his comments on *Brahmasūtras* 2, 2, 39-42, but even there it should be noted that he does not confess himself a Bhāgavata or Sātvata and that he mainly repeats and restates the arguments adduced by Yāmuna against Śaṅkara's and Bhāskara's controversial explanations. As this section of the Śrībhāṣya is our only evidence that Rāmānuja admitted the Pañcarātra at all, we should not interpret its significance too pregnantly. We cannot conclude that he regarded those texts, three of which he quotes, as authoritative in any other sense than other smṛti texts like Manusmṛti, Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, each of which is quoted more often than all Āgamas together.

The main points of his commentary are 1. Pañcarātra does not hold that the soul has a beginning;¹⁰⁵ 2. The Vyūhas are the subtle or causal phase of the Supreme Being as the material and operative cause;¹⁰⁶ 3. Āgama embodies the Vedic doctrine in an easily comprehensible popular form; 4. Bādarāyaṇa the Sūtrakāra and Vyāsa the composer of the Mahābhārata are identical and therefore cannot deny in one place what they affirm in another;¹⁰⁷ 5. Pañcarātra, in contrast to Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pāsupata, is not founded by men but promulgated by God himself.¹⁰⁸

Taking all positive and negative evidence of all his works together we may say that the Āgama, albeit recognized in passing as an orthodox system

104. SCHRADER, o.c. p. 14.

105. Corresponds to Āgamaprāmāṇya, p. 54, 1. 6 ff.

106. O.c. 55, 1. 10 ff.

107. O.c. 54.

108. O.c. 23 ff.; 42 ff.

of thought, is not at all utilized as a source of knowledge in its own right to corroborate Rāmānuja's system of Vedānta. One reason has been offered: Rāmānuja addresses himself to all Vedāntins and endeavours to support his original theses by scriptural evidence that is acceptable to all. Another reason is no doubt that he was very little interested in the mechanics of world creation and evolution and had no occasion to make use of a class of texts whose only contributions to metaphysics were inseparably linked up with cosmogonical speculations that are of small value in explaining God's relation to the world in harmony with śruti and reason. Rāmānuja's and indeed Vedānta's main concern is with ontology: only when the ontological relation between the supreme Cause and the phenomenal Effect has been established cosmology and cosmogony may proceed. Rāmānuja's evident indifference toward Pañcarātra should therefore not necessarily be regarded as typical of this Vaiṣṇavite philosopher.

B. DARSANAS

§ 1. Mīmāṃsā:

That Rāmānuja was well-grounded in Pūrvamīmāṃsā need hardly be mentioned. For all Vedāntins, however differently they may ultimately conceive of the relation of the two mīmāṃsās, the First Exegesis is propaedeutic to the second.

Both schools of Karmamīmāṃsā on the basis of Śābarabhāṣya, the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara, were known to Rāmānuja. But, apart from one occasional quotation of Kumārila, his principal, though antagonistic, interest is directed to the doctrines of Prābhākara's school. This is interesting in view of the fact that in later time the Viśiṣṭādvaitins have come to be associated with the Prābhākaras in the same way as the Advaitins were associated with the Bhāṭṭas, though perhaps not so exclusively.

a. Śabarasvāmīn:

That Rāmānuja was familiar with Śabara's commentary on the Karmamīmāṃsāsūtras is—if proof were needed—evidenced by several passages dealing with fundamental Mīmāṃsaka concepts. Quotations from the Vedic scriptures of the karmakāṇḍa have generally the form—also abbreviated—in which they are cited by Śabara, and though I have taken some pains in my notes to identify them in śruti, it is certain that Rāmānuja himself knew them from or through Śabara. What Edgerton remarked¹⁰⁹ can be fully applied to the Vedāntins as well: "For the most part it is clear that the

109. Intr. Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa, p. 23.

later Mīmāṃsakas limited themselves to the passages used in Śabara-svāmin's Bhāṣya as illustrations of the laws of Jaimini. These were the accepted stock in trade of the school and were discussed and worked over again and again, obviously with little reference to the original Vedic texts. This is the custom of scholasticism everywhere". This holds good for the stock-instances of the various schools, and also, but in a lesser degree, for the śruti quotations of the Vedānta schools separately.

b. *Kumārila*:

The founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā is once found quoted with approval. The citation is from the Nirāmbanavādakāṇḍa of the Śloka-vārttika and fits in so neatly with Rāmānuja's exposure of the advaitin's ultimate nihilism that we are inclined to look for other verbal reminiscences. So it would seem probable that Rāmānuja's example of the real vision of an imaginary *gandharvanagara* has been inspired by Kumārila's mention of the same in st. 110 of this kāṇḍa.

c. *Prābhākara*:

It seems very likely that Rāmānuja's main source of the doctrines of Prābhākara was Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, though we cannot be sure before we have more Prābhākara works available. He quotes half a śloka which is found in Śālikanātha's section on *vākyārthamāṭṛkā* (p. 190) with a slight variant, and there introduced as usual with *āha*. That Rāmānuja may have quoted directly from Śālikanātha's eventual source is not entirely out of the question, but not probable in view of other correspondences: from the same section, p. 190, Rāmānuja borrows a casual example verbally—with the rare word *garbhadāsa* "born slave", misunderstood by many copyists—and develops it into a cosmic analogy. Other correspondences have been pointed out in my notes to the relative paragraphs of the translation.

§ 2. *Vedānta*

a. *Advaita*:

It would seem unquestionable that Rāmānuja knew Śaṅkara's works. For the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya this is evidenced clearly by the Śrībhāṣya where the pūrvapakṣa's that are set aside regularly conform to Śaṅkara's siddhāntas. More difficult is it to decide the same on the comparatively scanty evidence of the Vedārthasamgraha, but probably § 49-51 are a case in point: it is plausible to connect the argumentation of Rāmānuja à propos of two analogies, that of a person dreaming and the stock-instance of the snake in the rope, with Śaṅkara's comments on Brahmasūtras 2, 1, 14 (p. 198) *yathā*

suptasya prākṛtasya janasya svapna uccāvacān bhāvān paśyato niścitam eva pratyakṣābhimatam vijñānam bhavati etc.

Rāmānuja's refutation of the advaitin's interpretation of BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 *athāta ādeśo neti netīti* may have been evoked either by Śaṅkara's commentary ad BrS. 3, 2, 22 or by his comments on the passage in his upaniṣad-bhāṣya. The fact that Rāmānuja quotes BrS. 3, 2, 22 in favour of his own exegesis probably means that he refers to Śaṅkara's view as expressed in his sūtrabhāṣya.

There is at least one clear indication that Rāmānuja knew other works as well. His polemical explication of the meaning of *satyam jñānam anantaṃ brahma* is no doubt directed against Śaṅkara's interpretation in his commentary on the Taittiriya Up. 2, 1, which will be discussed in another connexion; here the requisite terminological correspondences are clear enough. Less obvious is a possible reference to Śaṅkara's Chāndogya Up. Bhāṣya: commenting on the satkāryavāda of the sadvidyā (6, 2, 2), Rāmānuja introduces a rival theory that contends that the passage *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta* intends mainly to refute the Buddhist nihilist view by way of rejecting the asatkāryavāda, instead of refuting this last naiyāyika theory only. In fact, Śaṅkara in his Chāndogyabhāṣya formulates this precise view, but so does Maṇḍaṇamīśra in his Brahmasiddhi.¹¹⁰ However, I have not been able to identify unequivocal references to the latter thinker in the Vedārthasamgraha;¹¹¹ besides, Rāmānuja's subsequent discussion of lakṣaṇā in *tat tvam asi* as assumed by the rival advaitin would point to Śaṅkara rather than to Maṇḍaṇa.

The question to whom Rāmānuja would here refer is of special interest, for the pūrvapakṣa is formulated in significant terms: *nanu niradhiṣṭhānabhramāsaṃbhavajñāpanāyāsatkāryavādanirāsaḥ kriyate / tathā hy ekaṃ cid-rūpaṃ satyam evāvidyācchāditam jagadrūpeṇa vivartata ity avidyāśrayatvāya mūlakāraṇam satyam ity upagantavyam ity asatkāryavādanirāsaḥ*. Variant readings for *avidyācchāditam* are °śabalam and °śabalitam. It is

110. BrSiddhi, p. 20: *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyete ca svayam sūnyatāyā niṣedhāt / bhāvo hi yathāvad aprakāśamāno 'dhyastāvīdyamānarūpaḥ prakāśate; sūnye tu kvādhyāsaḥ, kim prakāśatām iti nirbījataiva*; the expression *nirbījatā* occurs also in Śaṅkara's ChUpBh.; *bīja* is what Rāmānuja calls in this connexion *mūlakāraṇa*; the terms are suggested by ChUp. 6, 8, 6.

111. HACKER, in his paper *Jayantabhaṭṭa and Vācaspatimīśra* (Schubring Festschrift, Hamburg 1951), p. 165, n. 4, remarks that ŚBh. 1, 1, 1 the confutation of advaita mainly concerns the monistic doctrine of pratyakṣa and may therefore have been inspired by Maṇḍaṇa; on closer inspection, however, it appears that R. investigates advaita theory on the basis of *all three pramāṇas*, and I for one am not convinced that in dealing with pratyakṣa R. had Maṇḍaṇa in mind.

difficult to decide whether *ācchāditam* is a *lectio facilior* or *śabalam* an hypercorrectness of a copyist inspired by *vivartate*. The fact that Rāmānuja does not use the term *śabalam* elsewhere and that the best MS. reads *ācchāditam* make the latter alternative the more probable one. Both *śabala-* (but rather *māyāśabala-*) and *vivarta-* would remind us of Sarvajñātman. On the other hand neither Maṇḍana nor Śaṅkara use *vi-√vṛt* and its derivatives in the sense of an *illusory* evolution or causation, which sense is clearly intended by Rāmānuja. His use of the term is in itself noteworthy: neither Bhāskara nor Yāmuna use or know it in this sense. Yāmuna employs it in an important description¹¹² of the advaita doctrine of God (= impersonal brahman): . . . Its essence (viz. of pure consciousness) is subject to limiting conditions (*upādhis*): it obtains such perfect qualities as omniscience because it is conditioned by *māyā*, which undergoes a variety of evolutions that are dependent on itself (. . . *svārūpam eva . . . svādhīnavicitravivartasvabhāvamāyopahitatayā samāsādita-* [! not *adhyasta-* or *adhyāropita-*] *-sārvajñyādisampadam upahitam abhidadhāti*). It is evident that for Yāmuna *vivarta* equals *parināma*, *vikāra*, etc.: *māyā*, not brahman, is *vicitravivartasvabhāva*. So, though there be occasion to connect Rāmānuja's *pūrvapakṣin* with Śaṅkara ad ChUp. 6, 2, other arguments, mainly Rāmānuja's special use of *vivarta* tell against direct connexion, so that at most we can say that if Rāmānuja referred to his august antagonist he already interpreted the later *vivartavāda* into Śaṅkara's doctrine. Besides, there are more associations: it would seem probable, as we saw, that Rāmānuja consulted the Śloka-vārttika here.

Unless certain authors are quoted verbally it is exceedingly difficult to identify them in *pūrvapakṣins*. Moreover, we have to consider the supreme probability that Rāmānuja addressed himself in the first place to living adversaries of his time and *milieu*, in whose teachings old advaita doctrines were being restated and developed. It will also happen that the references are just too vague: *Vimuktātman*, on clear terminological grounds identifiable in the Śrībhāṣya,¹¹³ does not emerge in the Vedārthasamgraha, whereas Śālikanātha, so evidently referred to in the latter text, can only be guessed behind the corresponding portions of the Śrībhāṣya.

b. *Bhedābhedavāda* :

Bhāskara's doctrine, as presented here by Rāmānuja, that Brahman is conditioned by *upādhis* into becoming the phenomenal world cannot be entirely derived from the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Though certain *drṣṭāntas*

112. Ātmasiddhi, pp. 4-5.

113. For brevity's sake I refer to HIRIYANNA'S introduction to the Iṣṭasiddhi (Baroda 1933), pp. XI-XII.

can be identified, they appear much more elaborate and may hail from followers. One instance is curious: Rāmānuja avails himself of the analogy of space and a space-unit enclosed in, that is conditioned by, a pitcher. This analogy had already been given by Śaṅkara and we note that Rāmānuja's terminology corresponds more closely to Śaṅkara's than to Bhāskara's: *tasmād yathā ghaṭakarakādyākāsānām mahākāsānanyatvam . . . evam asyabhogyabhoktrādiprapañcajātasya brahmavyatirekeṇābhāva iti draṣṭavyam* (BrSBh. 2, 1, 14, p. 197).

Rāmānuja's last argument against the *aupādhikavādin's* view that not God but his creative potency undergoes modification is no doubt to be connected with Bhāskara's commentary ad BrS. 1, 4, 25.

c. Yāmuna :

The doctrine of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja's predecessor and teacher's teacher, has not yet been made the subject of a monograph, in spite of the fact that his *Siddhitraya*, in which his doctrine is preserved fragmentarily, seems to be of great importance for the history not only of Viśiṣṭādvaita but also of Vedānta as a whole. This is not the place to go into great detail and we have to content ourselves for the time being with mentioning a few fundamental points.

His principal tenets can best be described in his own words, taken from the beginning of the Ātmasiddhi, where he enumerates a great many different views that were held by Indian schools of thought before him on the cardinal truths. Generally his own opinion concludes the series of theories as a preliminary thesis to be demonstrated later on.

On the nature of the ātman, the individual, 'empirical' soul, he concludes that it is not material and non-spiritual, is not identical with the body, or the vital breath, or the manas; nor yet is it unqualified consciousness upon which certain qualities are projected by nescience¹¹⁴ or by limiting conditions,¹¹⁵ but that it is a substance qualified by the essential property knowledge.¹¹⁶ This special knowledge acquires the designation 'beatitude', 'bliss', etc., from the fact that its object is pleasurable, not because it would be pleasurable itself.¹¹⁷ This ātman, though self-illuminating, can be the object of our knowledge by the *pramāṇas* of scriptural revelation, reasoning, introspective perception: by means of these instruments and sources of

114. Advaitavāda.

115. Bhāskara's *aupādhikavāda*.

116. *ātmanaviṣaye āśrayānukūlyapratilābhdhānandasukhādīvyapadesābodhaviṣeṣa evāśya svābhāvika ity anye*, pp. 2-3.

117. Cf. R.'s exposition, §§ 142-43.

knowledge we can come to an immediate apprehension of the ātman so as it is, in its essential and categorical difference from everything else, with a gradually increasing clarity of cognition which finally culminates in a perfect lucidity.¹¹⁸ Although the ātman is in itself without magnitude, it is localized by the magnitude of the corporeal mass which it pervades in its totality, not merely by knowledge or consciousness.¹¹⁹ It is unchanging and eternal.¹²⁰ In each of the fields of empirical experience, that is in each body, the ātman has a distinct individuality.¹²¹

The Supreme Spirit, the paramātman, is described as a person, dependent on whom are the existence and the activity—in all its forms—of the three classes of spiritual beings, or ātmans, and of non-spiritual, material entities. This personal God is a mighty ocean of all perfections, primarily the six beautiful qualities of knowledge, strength, dominion, heroism, power and splendour, which are natural properties, limitless and absolute.¹²²

DASGUPTA, describing Yāmuna's doctrine of the soul on the basis of the Ātmasiddhi,¹²³ comes to the conclusion that "Yāmuna's main contribution consists in establishing the self-consciousness of the soul" but "gives hardly any new ideas about Īśvara and His relation to the souls and world." As the manner in which Rāmānuja's vedāntic predecessors conceived of the relation between the absolute and the non-absolute is of importance to decide his own originality of contribution, we may inquire whether, and if so to what extent, Dasgupta's verdict is just.

In Ātmasiddhi p. 4-5, after summing up the advaitin's relation *brahman*—*avidyā* and the bhedābheda-vādin's relation *brahman*—*upāhītabrahman*, Yāmuna states finally what, by exclusion, should be his own view or *siddhānta*: "granted that there is diversity, yet the relation itself is non-difference: it is an intimate connexion definable as that between *aṃśa* and *aṃśin*, or has the form of a *śeṣa-śeṣin*¹²⁴ relation that is characterized by

118. *tathedṛśo* (sc. *svayamjyotiḥ*-) 'py āgamānumānāyogajapratyakṣaiḥ svetarasakalavilakṣṇasvābhāvyaena viśadaviśadataraviśadamatayāntāto yathāvad aparokṣyata iti p. 3; cf. R.'s recurring expression *viśadatatamapratyakṣatāpanna-* to describe the vividness of knowledge through bhakti.

119. *tathā svataḥ parimāṇārahito* 'pi vyāpyavastuparimitikṛtapariccheda iti, *vyāptir* ... *svarūpeneti*, p. 3.

120. *tathā kūṭastho nitya iti*, p. 4.

121. *pratikṣetraṃ nānābhūta iti*, p. 4.

122. *tathā paramātmaviśaye* 'pi .. *anye tu svādhīnatrividhacetanācetasasvarūpa-sthitipravṛttibhedam svābhāvikaniravadhikātiśayaajānābalaīsvaryavīryasaktitejahprabhṛti-sakalakalyāṇaṅamahārṇavaṃ puruṣaviśeṣam īśvaram ātiṣṭhante*, p. 5.

123. *Indian Philosophy*, III, p. 139 ff.

124. On *śeṣa* see trsl. notes 3.

dependence, or again is the relation between possession and possessor that is characterized by servant and master."¹²⁵

Again, at the end of the Īśvarasiddhi, we have a notable reading: "the entire Universe in its three phases of past, present and future, is for its subsistence and resorption dependent on a Being that has a wealth of qualities, among which the capacity of sustaining and resorbing the Universe, because it is of an inconceivably varied and various composition: it may be compared to paintings and sculptures which we infer to be exclusively dependent for their existence, etc., on an extremely gifted person."¹²⁶

The same reading continues: "The Universe, which is described by the word *vibhūti*, stands to the One Being in a relation of object supported, object governed and object accessory, because it is His body, comparable to the relation between the "I" and its body."¹²⁷ It is true that this reading is not found in the mss. that are mainly utilized by the different editors—whose critical principles, incidentally, remain completely mysterious¹²⁸—yet a comparison with the first quoted passage, found in all mss., renders this variant acceptable.

We may also compare the final stanzas of the Īśvarasiddhi: "This Universe obeys the command of one person because it is not spiritual: like a body. All spiritual beings perform the task under the control of one person, as the senses—touch, etc.—, because the task requires the association of a body. The Universe, the topic of our polemic, has one Supreme Soul, because he is the soul of spiritual and non-spiritual beings: it forms as it were one country with one king."¹²⁹ In other words—which would

125. *nānāṭve saty evābhedo nāmānvayaḥ / aṃśāṃśibhāvalakṣṇaḥ samavāyaḥ / paratantratālākṣṇaḥ śeṣaśeṣitvarūpaḥ / svasvāmībhāvobhṛtyasvāmīlakṣṇa itī ca nānāvidhā vādāḥ*; RAMANUJACHARYA in his translation of the Ātmasiddhi, Journal, Annamalai University, connects *nānāvidhā vādāḥ* only with this paragraph, suggesting that these views are at variance mutually; but rather it sums up the entire section: .. *iti kecīti .. itanye .. itare .. itī ca, nānāvidhā vādāḥ*.

126. *traikālikaṃ kṛtsnam jagat tadānugūṇasaktiyādiguṇaṇavadāyattasthīlayakam acintyavivīdhavicitraracanatvāt / atikuśalāikāyattasthīyādīkatayā pramītacitrapratīmādivat, Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 79-80 (Chaukh. ed.)

127. *vibhūtipadābhidheyaṃ kṛtsnam ekādheyavidheyaśeṣabhāvaṃ / taccharīratvān maccharīratvat*; RAMANUJACHARYA, o.c., renders "all things denoted by", which is not so apt.

128. Neither RAMA MISRA SASTRI, *Chaukhambā Skt. Ser. ed.*, nor SRINIVASACHARI, *Journal Annamalai University ed.*, give an account of their mss and critical methods; the Telugu ed. I have been unable to consult.

129. *ekecchānuvidhāyidam acatanyāt svadehavat // ekenādhīṣṭhītāḥ kāryaṃ kurvate sarvacetanāḥ / dehasaṃbandhasāpekṣakāryatvāt tvagādivat // ekapradhānapuruṣaṃ vivādādhyasītaṃ jagat / cetanācetanātmatvād ekarājakadeśavat // RAMANUJACHARYA'S translation differs but is less plausible.*

seem the most plausible explication of these lines: the material Universe is obedient to God's will, like a man's body to that of man; the personal entities, the *cetanas*, again perform God's work under God's control, work that requires bodily action which they provide: but their function is of a higher order than that of matter, and they may be likened to the senses of the body of God. So the composite Universe in its totality is governed by one Supreme Person or Soul who is comparable to the soul of the body constituted by spirit and matter.

DASGUPTA is certainly right in asserting that it "is almost certain that his (Yāmuna's) own attitude did not differ much from the Nyāya attitude". In *Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 75, the arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas against a Nyāya view are countered in a *kārikā* with *atra brūmah*, which supports the Naiyāyikas; elsewhere, however, he attacks the Nyāya proofs for the existence of God.¹³⁰ But Dasgupta's statement that Yāmuna, too, "left the duality of the world and *Īśvara* absolutely unresolved" is, as we have seen, too sweeping. Not less sweeping is the pronouncement that "he is also silent about the methods which a person should adopt for procuring his salvation."

In *Ātmasiddhi*, p. 5, Yāmuna sums up the prevailing views of the way in which release is achieved and the final view or *siddhānta* is that it — *paramapurūṣārthabhūta brahmaprāptilakṣaṇamokṣa* "man's supreme goal release, which consists in attaining brahman" — can only be achieved by means of the bhakti-yoga, of an exclusive and absolute character, of one whose inner faculty has been prepared by both *jñāna*- and *karma*-yoga."

Similarly, in *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, st. 32, it reads *aikāntyātīyāntadāsyai-karatī tatpadam āpnuyāt* "he whose only joy is in perfect and absolute serenity will achieve that end (or God's place)", an expression patently utilized by Rāmānuja in his Introduction to *Gītābhāṣya*: °*aśeṣaśeṣataikaratīrūpa*° and throughout the *Gadyatraya*.

Finally, in a special study, the *Āgama-prāmāṇya*, Yāmuna professes in emphatical terms his adherence to *Pañcarātra* which describes the relation between God and the Universe in terms of the farthest possible reduction of difference verging on, but never quite merging in, unity, and the method of salvation as that of a most humble and exclusive loving devotion or bhakti.

We have seen that, on account of the fundamental *problématique* of Vedānta itself, the basic conceptions of the various systems concern the relation between the Absolute and the Universe, and that these conceptions can best be studied from the commentaries on the *ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* which

130. *Ātmasiddhi*, pp. 75-78.

summarizes the import of the *sadvidyā*. So also Yāmuna's conception, though he did not comment on the *Sūtras* — a task he assigned to Rāmānuja. Yet he too had to deal with the *sadvidyā*, and he did so at some length in the *Samvitsiddhi*.

What is the meaning of *advitīya*? Is it a *tatpuruṣa* or a *bahuvrīhi* compound? In neither case the existence of the Universe is denied. Skipping his more ingenious than convincing remarks on a grammatically possible *tatpuruṣa* and concentrating on the term as a *bahuvrīhi*: he argues that *advitīya* is a *viśeṣaṇa*, a qualifying adjective, and that therefore it cannot be explained thus that nothing else exists but Brahman.¹³¹ The non-existence of a second thing cannot qualify Brahman: because it does not exist it is not qualifying, unless Brahman be itself non-existent. Consequently the real existence of the phenomenal world — the *prapañca* that consists in spirit and non-spirit (*cidacinmaya*-) — is not denied in this text of non-duality: proved by its own *pramāṇas* of perception and inference it is further corroborated by *śruti*.

For what does our text mean? Brahman has no second, that means that there is no one and nothing in past, present and future that can be counted his second, i.e., his equal or superior.¹³² The world, consisting of a particle of a division of His manifestation,¹³³ can hardly be called a "second". "Matchless" is the true sense: just as in the phrase: "The king of the Colas is a universal monarch who does not find his match in the present world." The uncounted millions of existent beings are but drops in the ocean of the majestic manifestation of Viṣṇu, the Paramount Sovereign unaffected by suffering, action, evolution, etc., the treasury of the six divine qualities, Viṣṇu whose supernal manifestation is beyond imagination. Who, counting the seven seas by his fingers, could count their waves, foam-spots, bubbles and drops? If we say there is no second sun in the sky, do we deny by the sun its rays? The world with its animate and inanimate beings is just *vācārambhaṇa* and *vikāra*: sat is the unchanging radical cause.¹³⁴ The effect is not different from its cause: sparks are not different from the fire from

131. *dvitīyavastunāstitvaṃ na brahmaṇo* (Chaukh. ed. *brahma na*) *viśeṣaṇam / asattvān na hy asad brahma bhaven nāpi viśeṣaṇam // tasmāt prapañcasadbhāva nādvaitaśrutiḥ bādhitāḥ / svapramāṇabalāt siddhaḥ śrutyā cāpyanumoditāḥ // Samvitsiddhi* (Chaukh. ed. p. 82).

132. *sama*- and *abhyadhika*-, terms we find repeated by R., Ved. § 10; compare also *Stotraratna*, st. 16.

133. *vibhava vyūhakalāmātram*; *vyūha*- is in *Pañcarātra* is fourfold personified projection of the Supreme, over which the six divine qualities are "divided"; together the four *Vyūhas* form also part of God's *vibhava* "projection, manifestation".

134. *kuṭastham mūlakāraṇam*; the radical cause is of course the *material* cause; cf. also supra note 110.

which they shoot forth,¹³⁵ nor the pot from the clay, etc.¹³⁶ The element derives its power and force from its cause. So, by knowing the one material cause we know the Universe.¹³⁷

In the light of all this DASGUPTA'S judgment cannot well stand. On the contrary, in his, admittedly mainly polemical, works Yāmuna departed from a more or less clearly defined conception of Vedāntic cosmology and eschatology. The relation between the Personal God and the Universe is stated in various, mutually complementary ways: as that of *aṃśa* and *aṃśin* — so also sparks of fire —, of *śeṣa* and *śeṣin*, of body and soul: the Universe is God's manifestation, governed, supported and ensouled by Him. These terms recall immediately those in which Rāmānuja couches his central ideas: so much so that we are justified in saying that Rāmānuja, developed and elaborated systematically what Yāmuna had already discovered. Yāmuna did not yet systematize his views nor exhaust the fertile concept of *śarīra-śarīribhāva*, but it is clear that his thoughts went in the direction of this analogy as the basic solution.

IV. OBSERVATIONS ON RAMANUJA'S EXEGETICAL PRINCIPLES AND METHOD

The increasing tendency among historians of Indian philosophy to study the systems of Indian thought, particularly Vedānta, with special reference to and in comparison and juxtaposition with Western philosophies has created an unfortunate misunderstanding of the typically theological character of Vedāntic speculation as a whole. The reasons are many and diverse. On the Indian side this tendency is an interesting cultural phenomenon which may well prove to be of the greatest importance for the future of Indian thought in the context of world philosophy. On the Western side there is often apparent a certain aversion to theology as such and an inability to keep in mind that the soteriology of Vedānta is not 'philosophic' in purpose, but religious, inspired and borne out by scripture and revelation. Vedānta is after all a positive theology based upon scripture. The fact that the results of scriptural exegesis do not conform to the conclusions of historical philological research does not mean that therefore scripture plays a subordinate rôle, as a handmaiden to the philosopher who cannot hope to put across his original views without the authority of revelation, and so makes it fit in with his own doctrine. This view fails to take into account the importance of the tradition of exegesis, of its method and rules.

135. From BĀUp. 2, 1, 20.

136. The *dr̥ṣṭāntas* summed up in ChUp. 6, 1, 4-6.

137. *ekapradhānavijñānād vijñātam akhilaṃ bhavet: the pratijñā* or promissory assertion of ChUp. 6, 1, 3.

It is only recently that a studious attempt has been made to describe systematically the theological method of Śaṅkara.¹³⁸ Now that a serious beginning has been made, one realizes how far we are still removed from a complete and comprehensive study of the theological principles and hermeneutical methods of the great Indian commentators, without and within Vedānta, and generally of the rules of ancient Indian commentatorial industry. When studying the many bhāṣyas on scriptures and sūtras the student is surprised at the freedom, and often arbitrariness, with which the commentators thought fit to treat their texts. A just appreciation of these interpretations will remain difficult: not only are the presuppositions of theological exegesis far removed from, if not actually in conflict with, those of philological explication — and ultimately the profane scholar has no criterion to evaluate supra-rational significance —, but also the breach in the commentatorial tradition of the Vedānta before Śaṅkara prevents us to understand the why and wherefore of interpretations that are taken for granted later on.¹³⁹

Especially in Rāmānuja's case the loss of ancient vākyas, vṛttis and bhāṣyas make themselves gravely felt. He more than Śaṅkara names and cites many precursors, of whom only a few are identifiable, and he claims that his system is nothing but a systematical elaboration of their views: "I have come to the conclusion that this is the central doctrine of the Vedānta texts after having made a painstaking study not only of the whole mass of all the various śrutis but also of the commentaries that have been composed and accepted by judicious thinkers".

But even less than Śaṅkara is Rāmānuja concerned with describing, or even alluding to his exegetical principles, which for him and his contemporaries were doubtless self-evident. We have to gather them from his works. In the following sections a few topics have been discussed, in so far as relevant to the Vedārthasamgraha, which may contribute a little to our understanding of his principles and method.

138. R.V. DE SMET, *The Theological Method of Śaṅkara* (thesis Rome, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1953), mimeographed edition with limited circulation; a revised edition is under preparation; *excerpta* and partial French translation *Langage et connaissance chez Śaṅkara* in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, tome 52 (3e série, no. 33), 1954, p. 31-74.

139. This is most clearly shown by the commentaries on the Brahmasūtras where there is nothing in the text to account alike for the agreement and the disagreement of the bhāṣyakāras.

§ 1. *The authority of śabda :*

The authoritative character of *śabda* "verbal testimony" is, within the pales of orthodox Indian philosophy, one of the fundamental assumptions; for those systems, moreover, which deal especially with metaphysics, *śabda* is the only valid instrument and criterion (*pramāṇa*) for supra-sensible knowledge. We should bear in mind that *śabda* is not only human and profane language, but also and even primarily, sacred language, the revelation of scripture, which, by its self-sufficiency,¹⁴⁰ is authoritative in its own right. The principle that *śabda*—i.e. sacred revelation—can give us reliable information about things which, by their very nature, fall outside the scope of the other two fundamental *pramāṇas* of sensual perception and rational inference, has been developed by the *Mīmāṃsakas*. The precise extent of this authoritativeness has, however, been disputed.

In order to understand the controversy we have to consider the suppositions of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* and remember that the authority of *śabda* in the form of scriptural revelation had been taken for granted long before the necessary theories had been evolved to account for it and define it. Then the very trustworthiness of *śruti*, without which the whole fabric of ritual would crumble, necessitated the assumption that it did not derive from human agency with its implicit fallibility, but must be *apauruṣeya* "preterhuman".¹⁴¹ This again led to the conclusion that the language of the scriptures, and by extension all language—which derives from the scriptures—,¹⁴² has not a human but a preterhuman origin: if its trustworthiness be preterhuman, it must be preterhuman itself. In other words, it could never have come into being on the strength of a convention or agreement to which man was a party;¹⁴³ consequently, that peculiar power that makes language significative, the power by which words can denote meanings and refer to objects, could not be based upon an immemorial agreement of human beings that henceforth this word was to denote that meaning, but must have been eternally inherent in the words themselves, which were not created or invented by man but in their entirety of language given at the beginning of creation.¹⁴⁴

140. *svataḥpramāṇatva-*.

141. I will gladly give up this rendering for a better one; the usual "impersonal" is wholly inadequate.

142. Cf. e.g. Ved. § 21.

143. The *prācīna-naiyāyikas* held that the relation word-object derives from a convention initiated by *Īśvara*; the *navya-naiyāyikas* simplified this formulation and stated that it derives from convention.

144. The descripton is, of course, a rationale; the doctrine of the hypostasized character of the revealed Word is no doubt a continuation of the ancient speculations on the divine progenitrix *Vāc*.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā was primarily concerned with studying and systematizing the principles governing the ritual with respect to its fruits as described in the *karmakāṇḍa*. Accordingly the whole mass of *śruti* was classified into three categories: 1. those portions which prescribe or enjoin the performance of certain rites to secure certain results, *vidhi* or *codanā* "injunction", comprising *niṣedha* "prohibition"; 2. those portions which explain, describe or generally add to the injunctions, *arthavāda*; 3. those portions which comprise the Vedic *mantras* that are used in the rite.¹⁴⁵ In this classification the order of importance is given: the injunction constitutes the principal element to which the others are accessory.

This principal importance of injunction, without which all the rest would be purposeless and hence meaningless, was generally recognized. *Mīmāṃsā* as a whole maintains that the non-*vidhi* portions derive their relevancy from their being accessory and supplementary to injunction. It follows that purposive signification of scriptural testimony abides, and its authoritative validity is vested, in injunction only.

Among the *Mīmāṃsakas* the school of *Prabhākara* went consistently a step further. Whereas the *Bhāṭṭas* admitted the authoritative character of speech that is *pauruṣeya*, i.e. human and profane speech, the *Prābhākaras*¹⁴⁶ contended that as a *pramāṇa* *śabda* is always *śāstra*, that is to say, only the sacred language of revelation is a source of valid knowledge. In profane language words refer to objects which generally do not stand in need of verbal testimony in order to be validly known and established; the objects are established by other *pramāṇas*, perception or inference. Validly established objects cannot be again validly established by language. Even in those cases where there are no other *pramāṇas* to establish an object and we have to resort to verbal testimony, in other words to rely on hear-say, we have not *invariably* reliable knowledge, because of the human factor. Profane speech does not fulfil the necessary condition of authority: to be *invariably* a source of valid knowledge. Consequently only *śāstra* is *pramāṇa stricto sensu*. Here *śāstra* is to be taken literally: scriptural injunction; for inasmuch as language cannot validly establish an object already completely established¹⁴⁷ (*pariniṣpannavastu, siddhavastu*), it must *invariably* bear on something yet to be established, a task yet to be undertaken, an act yet to be performed, *kārya*. The authority of *śabda* and therefore its exclusive significance as a source of valid knowledge, lies

145. This is *Rāmānuja's* classification; *Mīmāṃsakas* often make *niṣedha* into a separate category and add *nāmadheya* "proper name".

146. JHA, *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, p. 240.

147. JHA, o.c., p. 237 ff.

in its enjoining a *kārya*. Another consequence is that the smallest significative unit of language is the sentence, that is ideally the injunctive sentence.

To illustrate this theory they described the way in which a child learns a language. In this description they departed, understandably, from the verbal character of language: the verb is the operative word in the sentence without which the rest is not effective and significative. As it bears on action, the sentence can only be understood by a child when it sees it acted upon by its elders.¹⁴⁸

This theory that language is only significative when it is an injunction bearing on *kārya*—which does not mean that every significative and validly authoritative sentence has to be an injunctive one, but that it can be either construed as one or subordinated to one—leads to curious consequences when applied to that part of śruti whose purport is not to enjoin acts but to teach knowledge, the *jñānakāṇḍa*.

The Mīmāṃsaka applying his categories, which had been developed and elaborated with exclusive reference to the *karmakāṇḍa*, to the descriptive *jñānakāṇḍa*, has only one way open: like all scriptural śabda it must derive its relevancy from the injunction. Accordingly the Bhāṭṭa subordinates the *jñānakāṇḍa* to the *karmakāṇḍa* as an *arthavāda* of the eternity of the soul which is fundamental to the eternal validity of the Vedic injunctions. The Prābhākara appears to have taken a different view: like all śabda the Vedānta—i.e. *jñānakāṇḍa*, comprising the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads*—must bear on *kārya*. Brahman however, which is the object of the Vedānta texts, is not a *kārya* but a completely established entity. Consequently it was held that “those Vedānta texts that speak of Brahman must be regarded as speaking of Brahman as something on which one is enjoined to meditate or know (sic), in order to escape the meshes of metempsychosis”.¹⁴⁹

This view we find discussed and refuted in Rāmānuja's complicated commentary on the *samanvayādhikaraṇa*, BrS. 1, 1, 4, where it is stated in these terms: “Although the Vedānta texts cannot be the means of valid knowledge about brahman's proper form which is completely established, yet brahman's proper form can be established (anew). How? Because the Vedānta texts can denote the injunction of meditation”.¹⁵⁰ In the same connexion we find another Prābhākara view discussed, not mentioned by

148. JHA, o.c., p. 228 ff.

149. JHA, o.c., p. 62.

150. ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.

Jha, which Sudarśanasūri styles *niṣprapañcīkaraṇanīyogavāda*: “Just because they bear on *kārya*, the Vedānta texts can bear validly on brahman itself. From where do they derive this authority? The object of these texts is an injunction by means of the annihilation of phenomenality: an injunction to this effect that “one is to render brahman—which, because of beginningless ignorance, is conceived as phenomenal—devoid of phenomenality, without second and essentially knowledge.”^{150a}

To sum up, whereas the Bhāṭṭas do not admit that the *jñānakāṇḍa* can deal authoritatively with its object brahman in its own right, the Prābhākara allows that it can do so, provided that it be construed as a *vidhi*—or in his terminology—as a *nīyoga*. Leaving aside the second alternatively the injunction to “dephenomalize” brahman—this goes to say that the meditation on, and knowledge of, brahman can be the object of an injunction.

To this construction Śaṅkara took serious exception. In his view, *brahmajñāna*, in virtue of its nature, does not admit of being enjoined at all: it can only be evoked by a text:¹⁵¹ it cannot initiate any action but only remove our consciousness from any other entity but brahman: when this consciousness has been removed, then there is no room for any action because that would be incompatible.¹⁵² The knowledge of brahman puts an end to all activity.¹⁵³ Knowledge derives only from *pramāṇas* and the real existence of the object concerned; — not from man's volition, but simply from that which exists really and unchangeably.¹⁵⁴

Rāmānuja, as far as I can judge, does not express himself so categorically, at least not in the *Vedārthasamgraha*. As a matter of fact, to know Brahman in Rāmānuja's sense, that is to ascend to knowing the personal God through constant loving adoration, is the final stage of one road to perfection, leading from the conscientious performance of ritual acts to the self-recognition of the individual soul and from there to the love-attainment of the Supreme God, whom to serve is the soul's sole purpose and essence. The ritual acts, whichever gods they are dedicated to, are essentially propitiations of the one God. To serve God would be imperative indeed, it is the *paramapurūṣārtha*, the supreme end to be achieved; there is noth-

150a. Same view refuted by Bhāskara ad BrS. 1, 1, 4; for a discussion cf. HIRIYANNA's paper *Prapañca-vilaya-vāda—A doctrine of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta* (J. Or. Res. Madras, 1927, p. 109 ff).

151. ChUpBh. 6, 7, 7; in this paragraph I have made use of material collected by DE SMET, o.c., p. 202 f.

152. BĀUpBh. 1, 4, 7.

153. BĀUpBh. 1, 4, 7.

154. BrSBh. 2, 2, 21.

ing in this to militate against the supposedly injunctive character of all śruti.

Rāmānuja's objections are directed first against Prabhākara's high and mighty command¹⁵⁵ that language can only be significative in enjoining actions to be effected. By a few well-selected examples he shows this. A child does not learn a language by watching how his elders react to a series of words, but by having things named: it is nominal description rather than verbal motivation by which he learns how to speak and understand. A dumb adult, conversant with the language of gestures, can read the meaning of a person who instructs his servant, not by word of mouth but by gestures, to convey a certain message to another. When the dumb man, watching the whole story, hears the servant translate the message into worded speech, he knows what the words of the message mean without seeing any action taken on it.¹⁵⁶ Which goes to prove that the signification of the words cannot lie in their relation to an action that is to be effected in consequence thereof. On this showing there is no ground whatever to deny that language has the power of denoting a completely established entity, about which nothing is to be effected.

Then Rāmānuja proceeds that the arthavāda *brahmavid āpnoti param* can indeed be construed as a vidhi. He compares this text with such śrutis as *pratitiṣṭhanti ha vai ya etā (rātrīr) upayanti/brahmavarcaśvino 'nnādā bhavanti ya etā (rātrīr) upayanti* (Śabara ad KMS. 4, 3, 17 = Pañcaviṃśa Br. 23, 2, 4) which is an example of a text which, though being arthavāda, is yet vidhi and therefore significative:¹⁵⁷ with regard to the rite of rātrisattra it is an arthavāda, but it is significative for the reward, *pratīsthā*, which is the *phala* that cannot be known by any other pramāṇa. Similarly *brahmavid āpnoti param* is informative of the fruit, i.e. *param*, the highest Brahman. Consequently the *phala* that is the Supreme Brahman is established and all the śrutis and arthavādas which contribute to our knowledge of Brahman's essence and qualities are therefore fully informative.

Another argument he borrows from Dramiḍa,¹⁵⁸ who reasons: if the arthavādas have the purpose of praising an object that has a function in a vidhi, it can only praise this object *if it exists*. It follows that all arthavādas are really significative or informative of the real existence of qualities, so as to give rise to the knowledge that the object of the act is praiseworthy. Hence follows again that in this very manner all objects known through

155. *rājājñā*, Ved. § 116.

156. § 116.

157. § 117.

158. § 118.

mantras and arthavādas are proved to exist. To sum up, arthavādas are really significative themselves, not merely laudatory.

The same question is touched upon in another connexion¹⁵⁹ where the meaning of the śruti *tad Viṣṇoh paramam padam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ* is discussed. This śruti can be read either that those *who are sūris* regard or that those *who regard* are sūris. Here a Mīmāṃsaka objects that in either case not more than one *guṇa* can be enjoined; either the quality of being sūris or the quality of regarding, not both, otherwise there would be *vākyabheda*.¹⁶⁰ Rāmānuja points out that the objection is not to the point and demonstrates that here there is question of a *viśiṣṭavidhi* where more than one quality can be enjoined. Here again he upholds that in themselves the mantras are informative of the objects or qualities which they describe and he concludes: As we have said before, even if we assume that mantras and arthavādas are significative only when bearing on an action to be effected their objects signified are established; *a fortiori* when etymological explication proves that in fact they bear on established objects in their own right. In this manner everything is sound.

From all this we can conclude that Rāmānuja did not want to supersede the principles of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, as Śaṅkara had done, but to modify them with respect to the uttarabhāga, where emphasis is not on vidhi but on arthavāda, and admit of a fully significative character of these arthavādas. He does not exclude the view that, after all, these arthavādas may find their significance and purpose in vidhi, but he is obliged to refute the extreme views of the Prabhākaras who are not less radical in upholding the autonomy of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā as Śaṅkara is in maintaining the self-sufficiency of Uttaramīmāṃsā. For Rāmānuja, however, both mīmāṃsās are not different śāstras, but constitute one continuous discipline. The substance and objective of both inquiries is fundamentally the same: both inquire into the way in which brahman is worshipped. But whereas the *pūrvabhāga* describes the ritual acts by which God, the Supreme Brahman, is worshipped indirectly in His multiple manifestations of the Vedic deities, the *uttarabhāga* describes the way in which God is directly worshipped by an immediate knowledge of perfect love. The former is ancillary and propaedeutic to the latter; both chapters of the same śāstra cannot, however, be in conflict.

The reservation which Rāmānuja makes—reluctantly enough—for the possibility of construing the jñānakāṇḍa as injunctive is, it would seem, peculiar to the Vedārthasamgraha and has been abandoned in the Śrībhāṣya.

159. § 128.

160. cf. MNPr. § 33.

161. *vyutpatti-*

In the *samanvayādhikaraṇa*¹⁶² Rāmānuja states his view in a preliminary thesis: "these aggregates of words (sc. *śāstra*) which have the power of denoting completely established objects that have already been proved by the very etymology of the terms, can and do bear completely and harmoniously on the Brahman that is the cause of the origination, subsistence and annihilation of the entire universe, absolutely opposed to all imperfection, eminently possessed of unlimited perfections, and, in essence, boundless and incomparable bliss. Thus they serve no purpose conducive to activity or inactivity¹⁶³ and therefore do not bear on any other purport. For all *pramāṇas* terminate, not in a purpose, but in the knowledge of the objects with which they are concerned. Nor is the operation of any *pramāṇa* determined by a purpose: on the contrary, the purpose is determined by the knowledge resulting from the *pramāṇa*. Nor does the fact that the *pramāṇa* has no direct connexion with activity or inactivity mean that it is devoid of all purpose, for we see that it is related to anyone of the goals of human life."

This thesis is meant to reject Kumārila's definition: "*śāstra* is called that (verbal testimony) either eternal (sc. *vaidika*) or conventional (sc. *laukika*) which sets forth which actions man has to perform or is not to perform".¹⁶⁴ According to the Bhāṭṭa, the *jñānakāṇḍa* is *arthavāda*, setting forth the eternity of the *ātman* of man engaged in ritual acts, without which eternity the ritual acts themselves would lack permanence.

On Rāmānuja's Vedānta thesis follows the Mīmāṃsaka's (Bhāṭṭa's) *pūrvapakṣa*, in the course of which two apparently Prābhākara views are discussed and refuted, the *niṣprapañcikaraṇaniyogavāda* or the view that the *jñānakāṇḍa* enjoins the establishing of a non-phenomenal Brahman, and the *dhyānaniyogavāda*, the view that it enjoins the meditation on Brahman. In the course of the discussion of the latter view *advaitavāda* and *bhedābheda-vāda* are refuted. The Bhāṭṭa's *pūrvapakṣa* is then refuted again in the Vedāntin's *siddhānta*, that is to say, the entire argumentation which preceded in the course of the Mīmāṃsaka's discussion is accepted, except the thesis that, in as much as the *jñānakāṇḍa* does not terminate in direct purpose, i.e., describes what is to be done and what not, it has no purpose at all.

Consequently, Rāmānuja's provisional thesis and his *Siddhānta*, with in between the entire complicated argumentation, go to prove that he no longer made the reservation that the *jñānakāṇḍa* could possibly be construed as being injunctive.

162. ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.

163. *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*.

164. Śloka-vārttika, Śabdaparicheda st. 4; *pravṛtir vā nivṛtir vā nityena kṛtakena ca / puṃsām yenopadīsyate tac chāstram abhidhīyate / /*

§ 2. All *śrutis* are equally authoritative :

We have seen that whereas Śaṅkara refuses to admit the Mīmāṃsā category of *vidhi* into Vedāntamīmāṃsā, Rāmānuja, in order to save the continuity of the First and the Second Inquiries, takes a more conciliatory view and, without denying the applicability of a typical Mīmāṃsā construction *vidhi* — *arthavāda* to the *jñānakāṇḍa* as well, yet urges the independent informativeness of the latter category.

One of the most striking features of Śaṅkara's exegetical method is the distinction that he introduces between the pure Vedānta texts, which set forth the *paramārthajñāna*, and the far more sizeable texts in which definite *upāsanas* are set forth describing the absolute in anthropomorphic terms and which consequently are *vyavahārika*. DE SMET attempts to show¹⁶⁵ that this distinction between major and minor texts corresponds to that which Pūrvamīmāṃsā makes between the injunctions, which are principal, and the *arthavādas*, etc., which are accessory to the principal texts; on the strength of this correspondence he suggests that Śaṅkara's distinction was inspired by Jaimini's. This correspondence, which at a first glance looks plausible, breaks however down when we scrutinize it more closely. For Śaṅkara the minor texts have a definite propaedeutic function, by preparing the mind of the pupil alike by describing magnificent projections of brahman, which are first to be contemplated upon, then to be abandoned, and by pointing out the underlying unity in the great variety of things with respect to their common cause, the Supreme Soul. Ultimately these texts cannot lead the student to the final truth by themselves. In other words, in the last analysis these minor texts are not at all accessory to the major texts. Actually the division between major and minor texts reflects that most general one between *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra*, a division far more fundamental than, and not at all related to, that of Pūrvamīmāṃsā between the principal texts and the accessory texts which are relevant with regard to the principal ones.

This division between *paramārtha* and *vyavahāra* is reflected in *śruti* on two different levels, first in *śruti* as a whole in the main division between major and minor statements, secondly in the major statements themselves, where the terms are distinguished as having their primary sense with regard to their empirical concepts and another sense by *lakṣaṇā* when they are referring to the non-qualified brahman. Rāmānuja who does not allow Śaṅkara's distinction between an 'ideal' and a 'practical' reality, rejects consequently its twofold reflection in *śruti*.

165. DE SMET, o.c., p. 199 ff.

To Rāmānuja, all śrutis are equally authoritative. This position is, as far as I can see, not expressly stated but throughout his works taken for granted. At one place,¹⁶⁶ for example, he maintains in passing the equal authority of the śruti ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *atha ya eṣo 'ntarāditye hiraṇmayah puruṣo dṛśyate* — which according to Śaṅkara does not even refer to the paramātman but only to a highly qualified individual soul¹⁶⁷ — and of the 'mahāvākya' *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*: both śrutis predicate specific qualities of the personal God, who is the brahman.

Elsewhere he hints at the vicious circle implicit in the distinction between major and minor statements: we decide which texts are major and which are minor ultimately on the strength of an insight acquired by the study of those texts which later on we shall classify as major. Rāmānuja exposes the advaitin's scriptural eclecticism in §§86-87, after he has reconciled the various texts, propounding difference, difference-non-difference and non-difference, within the conception of a Supreme Being modified by distinct but dependent orders of matter and soul. The advaitin objects: *tat tvam asi*, etc., clearly declares identity and it follows that this knowledge of identity alone is conducive to release. Rāmānuja replies: no, for another śruti (Śvet.Up. 3, 9-11) declares that release is obtained in consequence of the knowledge of the distinct orders of Supreme Spirit, individual soul and matter. The advaitin then exclaims that, since this is obviously in conflict with the śruti he quoted, the other śruti can only refer to knowledge conducive of attaining, not the absolute non-differentiated brahman, but the relative qualified and not absolutely real brahman. Rāmānuja then raises the question: why should the former śruti be more authoritative than the latter one? We are not to ignore but to reconcile, as to do he proceeds.

Incidentally, for the so-called *mahāvākyas*, which set forth the sole reality of the absolute non-qualified brahman, Rāmānuja uses the term *śodhakavākyas*, which I have not been able to trace to an advaita source. It is plausible that it has been borrowed from the terminology of a *milieu* which used the term *śuddhabrahman* to describe the absolutely real non-qualified brahman, and we are reminded of this usage with Sarvajñātman, etc. For Rāmānuja, of course, these 'purificatory' statements are not privileged. They deny simply that God is affected by a number of specified imperfections and thereby assert that He possesses the opposite perfections. On this point he touches in connexion with his interpretation of *satyam jñānam anantam brahma*, to be discussed below.

166. Ved. § 136.

167. BrSBh. 1, 1, 21.

§3. *Lakṣaṇā*:

The second level on which the distinction 'ideal'—'practical' is reflected in śruti, viz., in the primary and secondary meanings of the terms employed with reference to the non-qualified brahman, comes in for a direct discussion in a polemical passage.

This polemic seems to be directed especially against Śaṅkara's interpretations ad Taittirīya Up. 2, 1. There it reads: *bhāvasādhano jñānaśabdo, na tu jñānakartṛ / brahmaviśeṣaṇatvāt satyānantābhyāṃ saha / na hi satyātānantatā ca jñānakartṛtve saty upapadyate*. As this passage has been misunderstood before,¹⁶⁸ a short analysis is indicated. The above quotation means: "the term *jñāna* is a verbal noun with the sense of the root, not the agent of *jñāna* (in other words: *jñāna* "the knowing, knowledge", not "knowing, knower"), because it serves as an attribute of brahman, together with *satya* and *ananta*; for if brahman were the agent of knowledge, then it could be neither *satya* nor *ananta*." Śaṅkara develops the view that the *viśeṣaṇas satya, jñāna* and *ananta* have here not an attributive but a definitive function¹⁶⁹ (*lakṣaṇārtha*). Since a specifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*-) serves only to specify members of a same class as distinct from one another (*samānajatibhya eva nivaratakāni viśeṣaṇāni viśeṣyasya*), the terms cannot very well have this attributive function in this case, because brahman does not belong to any class: but they have a definitive function: definitives distinguish the object from all other objects (*lakṣaṇam tu sarvata eva [sc. nivaratakam viśeṣyasya]*). On the other hand, Śaṅkara does not exclude the attributive function of the terms entirely: *viśeṣaṇārthavattve 'pi satyādīnāṃ svārthāparityāga eva / śūnyārthatve hi satyādīśabdānāṃ viśeṣyāniantṛtvānupapattih / satyādyair arthavattve tu tadviparīṭadharmavadbhyyo viśeṣyebhya brahmaṇo viśeṣyasya niantṛtvam upapadyate / . . tatrānantaśabdo 'ntavattvapratiśedhadvāreṇa viśeṣaṇam / satyajñānaśabdau tu svārthasamarpaṇenaiva viśeṣeṇa bhavataḥ*: "even if the terms *satya*, etc., are taken as attributes (not as definitions), they do not lose their proper sense. In fact, if they had a non-existent object, they could not determine the object to be attributed at all. However, while retaining their meaning, they determine brahman as their object attributed by distinguishing it from all objects that possess properties opposite to those which they denote themselves. . . The term *ananta* is a *viśeṣaṇa* of brahman by denying that brahman has a limit; the terms *satya* and *jñāna* are *viśeṣaṇas* particularly in their own right, just by apply-

168. DE SMET, Langage et connaissance chez Śaṅkara, p. 47.

169. LACOMBE, who devotes a few pages to Ś.'s exposition ad TaittUp. 2, 1 (ASV. p. 79 ff), surprisingly mistakes *lakṣaṇa* (n) in *lakṣaṇārtha*- for *lakṣaṇā* (f) and translates and argues accordingly.

ing their own meanings to brahman." In other words, to the extent in which the terms are negative, i.e., deny properties of phenomenal objects rather than affirm properties of brahman, they are attributable to brahman. But how about terms like *satya* and *jñāna*? They cannot have the same significance for brahman as they have for the phenomenal objects or minds: from the point of view of brahman It alone is reality and knowledge and all other objects are unreality and nescience. Yet the terms are taken from phenomenal life where they have a definite meaning. So Śaṅkara replies: *tathāpi tadābhāsavācakena buddhidharmaviṣayena jñānaśabdena tal lakṣyate na tūcyate, śabdapravṛttihetujātyādidharmarahitatvāt / tathā satyaśabdenāpi / sarvaviśeṣapratyastamitasvarūpatvād brahmaṇo bāhyasattāsāmānyaviṣayena satyaśabdena lakṣyate satyaṃ brahmeti / na tu satyaśabdavācyaṃ eva brahma*: "yet the term *jñāna*, which (in phenomenal life) has reference to a property, sc. knowledge, and which expresses only a phenomenal projection of absolute knowledge, can only indicate brahman but not express it directly, because brahman is devoid of all properties — like generality, etc. — which are the basis of the operation of all speech. Similarly the term *satya*: this term denotes the general concept of external being, but brahman being essentially devoid of all differentiations can only indirectly be indicated in *satyaṃ brahma*, and cannot be expressed directly by the term *satya*." This view has been summarized by Sarvajñātman :¹⁷⁰

ākāśādau satyatā tāvad ekā pratyaimātre satyatā kācid anyā / tatsaṃparkāt satyatātra cānyā vyutpanno 'yaṃ satyaśabdas tu //

"the concept of *satya* when predicated of phenomenal entities — from space onwards — has another content than when predicated of that which is absolutely interior: in the latter case the concept of *satya* is analogously used, whereas the term has its proper meaning in the former." The question is resumed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī¹⁷¹ who comments: *na ca — anṛtasvarūpe śābale satyatvāyogaḥ, yoge vā tato nānṛtavāyāvṛttir iti vācyaṃ; śābale hi satyatā eṣaiva yat paramārthasamsargeṇa pratīyamāne tasmin satyaśabdasaṃgatigrahaḥ / tad uktam Saṃkṣepaśārīrake — ākāśādau etc., iti / evam ānandādīpadeṣv api draṣṭavyam / tathāca kathaṃ teṣāṃ nānṛtādīvyāvartakatvam? etena — śuddhād anyatra satyatvādyasambhavātsatyatoādivākyaṣya lakṣṇayā akhaṇḍārthatve śuddhe satyatvāder abhānāt paryāyatvaṃ durvāram iti — parāstam / svarūpamātre 'pi na padāntaravaiyartham vyāvṛttibhedabodhanena sāphalyād iti coktam ca*: (it is said that, when applied to the perfect brahman, the words *satya*, etc., which denote the imperfect brahman qualified by reality, etc., have to be taken with *lakṣṇā*). *Objection*: no

170. Saṃkṣepaśārīraka 1, 121.

171. Advaitasiddhi, p. 692 (*akhaṇḍārthalakṣṇa*).

reality, etc., can be predicated of the imperfect which is essentially unreal; or, if they are applied, it follows that they do not exclude, but imply, the unreal. *Reply*: You cannot say that: in fact, the reality in the imperfect is such that the applicability of the term *satya* "real" (to phenomenal objects) is grasped when the imperfect is understood in its relation to the ultimately real. This is stated in the Saṃkṣepaśārīraka: "...". The same can be noted in the case of the words like *ānanda*, etc. So how would these terms not exclude the unreal, etc.? This argument takes also care of the objection that, inasmuch as no reality, etc., is conceivable in anything but the perfect, the terms *satya*, etc., can only have their absolute sense by *lakṣṇā*, but then, since *satyatva*, etc., are not apparent in the perfect, all such terms are necessarily synonymous. We may add another rejoinder: even when applied to the pure essential simplicity, other words do not lose their significance but retain their significance by conveying all the various aspects of exclusion."

This view is summed up by Rāmānuja (§11) as follows: *etacchodakāni prakaraṇāntaravākyaṇy api satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma (etc.) ityādīni sarvaviśeṣapratyanīkākāratām bodhayanti / na caikākāratābodhane 'pi padānām paryāyatā / ekatve 'pi vastunaḥ sarvapratyanīkākāratavopasthāpanena sarvapadānām arthavattvāt*: "the purifying statements in other contexts, like *satyaṃ*, etc., convey an object that is absolutely opposed to differentiations; yet, even though all words convey its perfect simplicity, they are not therefore synonymous: for they all are significant, even though referring to the simplicity of an entity, just by establishing its absolute opposition to everything else." But Rāmānuja refuses to admit that a number of words can refer to a non-differentiated object, even if they be merely apophatic: *śodhakavākyaṇy api niravadyaṃ sarvakalyāṇaguṇākaram param brahma bodhayanti / sarvapratyanīkākāratābodhane 'pi tattatpratyanīkākāratāyām bhedasyāvarjanīyatvān na nirviśeṣatvasiddhiḥ*: "the purifying statements, too, convey that the supreme brahman is perfect and possessed of perfect qualities: for even if they convey that He is essentially opposed to everything else, yet necessarily they convey differentiation in that He is essentially opposed to each different quality separately."¹⁷²

Further objections are raised against Śaṅkara's interpretation of *jñāna*, and these objections are fundamental. Knowledge is not an independent substance but a property.¹⁷³ Not only is it logically absurd to maintain an objectless and subjectless knowledge, but also grammatically the *advaitin* is at a loss to find a term which could convey a non-differentiated notion. *Jñāna* or its synonym *jñapti* are nouns of a certain gender and number and

172. Ved. § 23.

173. § 24.

take on certain functions, when used in a sentence, which are everything but non-differentiated. The occurrence of the substantive noun *jñāna* side by side with plain adjectives like *satya* and *ananta* is easily explained. More than "real" and "limitless", *jñāna* is an essential property of God and may be used to describe it, in a way comparable to our "his Majesty, Holiness", etc., which describe persons who are eminently possessed of majesty and holiness. Rāmānuja does not borrow Yāmuna's argument that the accent *jñānā* forbids us to take *jñāna* as a noun,^{173a} but takes essentially the same position that in this particular connexion *jñāna* cannot mean anything but one eminently characterized by knowledge; aptly he refers to the next line of the Taittiriya Up. so 'śnute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaściteti and BrS. 2, 3, 30-31 where the same problem is discussed with regard to the ātman.

The problem of *lakṣaṇā* is touched upon immediately afterwards, in a discussion of *tat tvam asi*. Although, as far I as know, Śaṅkara does nowhere commit himself explicitly on this point, his interpretation on this cele-

173a. Ātmasiddhi, p. 74: *satyaṃ jñānam ity atrāpi brahmalakṣaṇanirdeśe jñāna-śabdo na jñānamātravacanah / api tu tadvadvacanah, tadvacanatve liti ity ādyudāttatva-prasakteh / antodāttaś cāyaṃ jñānaśabdaḥ / matvarthīyācpratyayāntatve tathātvaṃ gha-ṭate, nānyathā ity etat paramātmanirūpaṇe 'tinipunaṃ upapādiṣyāmaḥ / aitareyakopa-niśad api prajñānam brahma ity uktvā sa etena prājñēnātmanā itī prakṛṣṭajñānavantam evesvaram darśayati / tat siddhaṃ jñātaivāyam ātmā* "the word *jñāna* in the text *satyaṃ jñānam*, etc., with the function of defining brahman, does not mean 'only knowledge', but 'one who possesses knowledge': for if it were to mean 'only knowledge' it should have had the accent on the first syllable according to the rule *liti*, Pāṇini 6, 1, 193; but here the word *jñāna* has the accent on the final syllable. Now it can only be *jñānā* if the last syllable contains suffix *ac* in the sense of the possessive suffix *matu(p)*, and not otherwise. We shall demonstrate this point exhaustively when we discuss the Supreme Soul. Incidentally, the Aitareya Up., too, expounds that the Lord is indeed possessed of eminent knowledge (*prakṛṣṭa-* explaining *pra-*) in *prajñānam brahma*, continuing *sa etena prājñēnātmanā*. So it is proved that the ātman is a knower." Yāmuna's point is an interesting one; it appears that *jñāna* in this śruti is recited at present as an oxytone: either this practice existed in Yāmuna's days already, or the practice then (and now) continues the original one: Yāmuna is about half-way the age of the text. His argument is less acceptable: Pāṇini 5, 2, 127 rules *arśādibhyo 'c* in cases of certain bodily deficiencies and colours (and similar ones: *ākṛtigāṇo 'yam* adds *Siddhāntakaumudī*). Oxytonesis of *jñānā*, though as far as I know not attested, is not impossible and would point to an agent noun (WACKERNAGEL-DEBRUNNER II 2, § 81, a, B; § 82, c; WHITNEY, § 1150, g. But as RENOÜ notes (*Gr. scte* § 26) "l'accent dans les textes classiques n'est pas noté, et rien ne permet d'indiquer avec précision la nature de l'accent dans la période post-védique." The most recent translation of our text (RENOÜ-LESIMPLE, Paris 1948) follows the traditional interpretation "Brahman est réalité, connaissance, infinitude." It should be remarked, however, that the line between personal and impersonal, concrete and abstract, was infinitely less sharp for the Upaniṣadic thinkers than it is for us, and either translation cannot help being too clear-cut.

brated *vākya* implies *lakṣaṇā*. Most explicit perhaps, is he in Upadeśasāhasrī II (*padyabhāga*), 18, stt. 177-183, where he declares that when we establish the sense of *tvam* by means of positive and negative formulation,¹⁷⁴ the sense of the judgment *tat tvam asi* becomes clear (183).

*vākyaṛtho vyajyate caivam kevalo 'haṃpadārthataḥ /
duḥkḥīty etadapohena pratyagātmaniviniścayāt //*

"thus it appears that the sentence is an identity judgment, for by abstracting the notion of empirical ego from the complete entity "I", we establish (for the words *aham* in *ahaṃ brahmāsmi* and *tvam* in *tat tvam asi*) the meaning of ātman."

And st. 197 :

*tacchabdaḥ pratyagātmārthas tacchabdārthas tvamas tathā /
duḥkḥitvāpratyagātmatvaṃ vareyatām ubhāv api //*

"the word *tat* has the meaning of interior self, the word *tvam* has the meaning of the word *tat*; both words drop part of their meaning, *tvam* that of empirical ego, *tat* that of non-self."

This last stanza shows that the *lakṣaṇā* implied is that of *jahad-ajahallakṣaṇā*. Sureśvara,¹⁷⁵ in his *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* 2-3 follows Śaṅkara's view as expressed in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* very closely, without however enlarging on the particular significance of the implicit *lakṣaṇā*.^{175a} Padmapāda, in his *Pañcapādikā* 9, 21 (p. 307), is the first to compare the judgment *tat tvam asi* with so 'yam (*Vivaraṇa*: so 'yam *Devadattaḥ*), which is the stock-instance of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. Most explicit of all is Sarvajñātman,

174. i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, not further explained in the US., occur again in *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* II, 8-9 in identical connexion. HIRIYANNA notes ad 2, 8 (p. 236) not very helpfully: "there are two methods of inquiry which may, perhaps, be described as 'method of agreement' and 'method of difference'." HACKER, *Untersuchungen*, p. 74, describes the terms as "Reflexion darüber, dasz der Inhalt der Wörter und des Satzes wohl-begründet und das Gegenteil logisch unmöglich ist." More precisely: the proposition is first considered positively by *anvaya*, whereby the connexion is realised between that in *tat* which is in *tvam* and contrariwise; then it is considered negatively by *vyatireka*, whereby that in *tvam* which is not *tat* is excluded from *tvam* and contrariwise.

175. HACKER, *Untersuchungen*, p. 75 ff. has dealt extensively with Sureśvara's exegesis of *tat tvam asi* in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, but unfortunately has not gone into the question of its relation with the US. as quoted here.

175a. This *lakṣaṇā* is meant by Dharmarāja when he states: *tasmāt tat tvam asiti vākya ācāryānām* (honorific plural = Ś.) *lakṣaṇoktir abhyupagamavādena* ("by way of hypothesis" leaving scope for diverging interpretations) *bodhyā*, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* IV.

Samkṣepaśārīraka stt. 1, 149 ff. and Pañcaprakriyā I, p. 10 sq. . . jahada-jahallakṣaṇā pāroksyasadvitīyaśabale vyutpanmayos tattvampadayor ekāṃśa-parityāgenāmśāntare vṛttisaṃbhavāt so'yam ityādivākyaṛthapadayor iva / tasmāj jahadajahallakṣaṇayā pratyagātmā bodhyate, "the words tat and tvam, which have their proper sense respectively for remoteness and for the manifold and imperfect, are to be taken with partial lakṣaṇā, since, by dropping part of their meaning, they can function significantly in another part of their meaning, like the words in judgments of the type 'this is he (that)'. He also allows *guṇāvṛtti*, figurative use, of the type *siṃho devadattaḥ* "Devadatta is (like) a lion (in that he is cruel, brave)". This is the generally accepted advaita view until Dharmarāja suggests another solution (Vedānta-paribhāṣā IV).

Rāmānuja takes exception to assuming lakṣaṇā in "you are it". Not only is there no need at all to resort to lakṣaṇā in explaining the identity of "this here and now" (*ayam*) and "that there and then" (*tat*), because the differences between the two terms are accounted for by a lapse of time and do not as such militate against identity: "This is that Devadatta" means nothing but "Our Devadatta here was, at some previous time, somewhere else, he is the same person who was there at the time". This polemic, irrelevant though it may seem, touches again a fundamental difference of view: for the same *dr̥ṣṭānta* is an illustration of the so-called indeterminate perception, by which an object is perceived without any determinant properties, an analogy of the intuition of a non-differentiated brahman.

DE SMET has drawn a comparison between Śaṅkara's *lakṣaṇājñāna* and the knowledge by analogy of the scholastic theology;¹⁷⁶ with some caution we may also avail ourselves of the term analogy to explain Rāmānuja's method of interpreting the śruti. We have seen that Rāmānuja, by analogy of the microcosmic harmony between body and soul, conceived of a macrocosmic harmony between the phenomenal world of matter and spirit, and the Supreme God who is the soul that animates the world as his body. When we refer to a body, we refer simultaneously to the soul, on which the body is entirely dependent and apart from which it has no proper existence. Just because of this intimate relation between body and soul, judgments are possible of the type "I am stout", by which a property of a body is predicated of the self. What is actually said is this: "I, the individual ātman, who am empiricised by my descent into a body, am stout as far as this body is concerned". This type of judgment can be generalized to that of "I am my

176. R. V. DE SMET, *The correct interpretation of the definitions of the Absolute, according to Śaṅkarācārya and Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Philosophical Quarterly, 1955, XXVII, 4), p. 187 ff.

body" which means "I am the soul which has taken possession of this body and apart from which this body does not exist". Analogously we can understand the *sāmānādhikaranyas* of the śruti where the Absolute is described and defined by terms that express concepts which in profane linguistic usage are considered to be exclusively phenomenal. In *tat tvam asi*, where *tat* resumes the Deity called *sat* in the preceding section,¹⁷⁷ *tvam* has its full significance of "individual ātman within a body"; but this is not the complete significance of the term. Just as the body has no proper existence apart from serving the soul, similarly the soul has no proper existence apart from serving the Supreme Soul, God, who is immanent in it as the inner Ruler. Just as the body terminates in the soul, so the soul terminates in the inner Soul. Consequently all words which describe the body, ultimately refer to the soul, and all words which describe the soul ultimately refer to God. This reference of words is not due to any significative power in themselves, but to the very constitution of the objects which they express. By denoting the part they do not imply the whole, but the part itself implies the whole compositum of matter animated by individual souls that are internally guided by the Supreme Self.

From this discussion of Rāmānuja's polemics, which for all their abstrusity concern the most fundamental problems, a general idea of his realism emerges. He has been called all-too-literal; and so he is. But this literalness lies at the very root of his hermeneutics. His glorious vision of a God who includes the world like the soul includes the body would never allow him a method of interpretation by which any term is applicable to God, only when all worldly connotations have been carefully excluded from it. To his mind such a procedure would detract from God's glory. He realizes that in the end we would be left without any means of knowing Him at all. All Scripture is of necessity anthropomorphist; Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja represent diametrically opposed views of how to approximate the Absolute in its transcendence in spite of the anthropomorphism of Revelation. Whereas for Śaṅkara brahman is the *Other*, and he goes ever farther the way of excluding from its concept all that is related to the world, to the point of denying the reality of the world in the final analysis, Rāmānuja worships a God that is verily *Supreme* and includes in His concept all that is of this world, to the point of affirming this world just because it is related to God. Devout Vaiṣṇava if ever there was one, his vision can be understood. Viṣṇu, the god of incarnations *par excellence*, who in every age takes personally a hand in the direction of the world's affairs, god of preservation and maintenance, who pervades the Universe, the Viśvarūpa and omnipresent one, will lead

177. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.
V. 9

his devotee to a very different conception of Absolute and World from that to which Śiva would inspire, the god of annihilation, who represents yogic renunciation and systematic abnegation.

§ 4. Context:

Rāmānuja's categorical rejection of the two methodological principles of Śaṅkara's exegesis, the distinction of major and minor statements and of primary and secondary sense,—a distinction which is ultimately purely human and therefore presumptuous to make in preterhuman revelation—naturally aggravates the difficulty of interpreting the kaleidoscopic and often contradictory teachings of the sacred texts in a satisfying and consistent sense.

In order to arrive at a consistent sense, which is of course given since śruti is not subject to human fallibility, Rāmānuja makes an ingenious and skillful use of the criterion of *prakaraṇa*, or context: "We have declared that the scriptural statements are no longer in conflict as soon as we have determined their true purport correctly."

How he applies this criterion of context may be illustrated by a few exemplary śrutis which are often quoted by advaitins to prove their own views.

The celebrated vākya of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (2, 3, 6): *athāta ādeśo neti neti* "thus the instruction that it is neither such nor such", which according to Śaṅkara denies all differentiation of brahman by negating that brahman has any form, either embodied or disembodied, takes, according to Rāmānuja, an entirely different sense when we consider the context to which it belongs. Does it really deny the initial statement of 2, 3, 1 *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca*, as Śaṅkara holds?¹⁷⁹ But then, what is the point of introducing this admitted falsehood at all, only to deny it in the same breath? This is unconceivable. Besides, in the immediate sequel the same text affirms that brahman has qualities like *satya* etc. Clearly *upakrama*, or initial statement, and *upasaṃhāra*, or concluding statement, are in agreement, so that the context is established.¹⁸⁰ Within this context *neti neti* cannot mean to deny differentiation. For the true explication he refers to the Brahmasūtras (3, 2, 22): *prakṛtāitavattvaṃ pratiśedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ* "this expression denies that brahman is only so much as has been

178. Ved. 83 ff.

179. BrSBh. 3, 2, 22.

180. The most important of the indications of the coherence of a context.

set forth here, and affirms consequently that brahman is more than that alone".

Similarly, only a painstaking scrutiny of the entire sadvidyā will help us in understanding the true sense of the *upasaṃhāra tat tvam asi* within this context. The context opens with the *pratiḥñā* or thesis that when the *ādeśa*—i.e. the directing Person¹⁸¹—is known this all is known. This person, later on called *sat*, is described as the universal cause by which we can know the world its effect: in *sat* the world has its material cause (*sanmūla*) and its operative cause (*sadāyatana*). The effectuation of this world with all its variety of material objects and conscious spirits takes place by the descent of *sat* into this world by means of the individual ātman (*jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇvāṇi*). Finally, all has been summed up in the complete statement *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā: tat tvam asi, Śvetaketo* "the entire Universe is ensouled by Him who is *sat*, it is real, for He is the ātman: so you are He, Śvetaketu": which can only mean that you are ensouled by God, so that you are He in so far as you are the body to Him, your soul. There can be no question that the declaration *tat tvam asi* only means to say that *tvam* does not exist as the ensouled effect at all: this would militate against the obvious sense of the entire *prakaraṇa*. What is expressed here is not the identity of cause with cause, but the relation between God and creature as that between soul and body: *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ, sa ātmā*.

These interpretations are comparatively straightforward and simple. So to make good his challenge that all superficial contradictions between the many śrutis will disappear instantly as soon as we have discovered the true purport of them, Rāmānuja quotes a few apparently conflicting śrutis: "Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra have all been begotten, but not the cause: therefore we are to meditate on the cause: Śambhu, the Supreme One who enjoys universal paramouncy should be meditated upon in the middle of space."^{180a} He combines this with a śruti from ŚvetUp 3, 9-11 where the Supremacy of the *great person* is declared. Here we have two claims to universal paramouncy which we are at a loss to reconcile within one being. Yet, replies Rāmānuja surprisingly, everything fits in perfectly when we bear in mind that Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Brahman, and he proceeds to substantiate this statement.

As he states elsewhere, we cannot understand the śruti properly unless we consider all the śākhās: they often help us to understand the full significance of certain statements. ChUp. 6 asserts that *sat* was here alone in the

180a. AtharvaśikhUp.¹

181. See trsl. n. 75.

beginning, in other words, is the universal cause. Elsewhere, this sat is called *brahman*, elsewhere *ātman*, all in the same connexion: *sat*, *brahman* and *ātman* are different designations of the same being. Who is this being? We turn to another śākhā: *Nārāyaṇa was here at the beginning*. *Sat*, *brahman* and *ātman* denote *Nārāyaṇa*: it is He who is the first and universal cause. We have specified the being who appears as the cause in the *AtharvaśikhUp.*

The same Upaniṣad describes the Sovereignty of the cause. Do we find a similar description of *Nārāyaṇa*? He refers to *TaittĀr.* 10, 13 where it is said of some personal deity that the sages weave him *in the middle of the sea* (we are reminded of the *AtharvaśikhUp.* where the cause is to be meditated upon *in the middle of space*) and that *no one is master to him*. Who is this deity? The text itself refers us further: it quotes as its context *adbhyaḥ sambhūtaḥ*, etc., *TaittĀr.* 3, 13, 2. Here we find that this deity is styled "Great Person" and that *Hrī* and *Lakṣmī* are his consorts: from which it is clear that the Paramount Deity of 10, 13, 1 and the Great Person of 3, 13, 2 are no one but *Nārāyaṇa*.

The connexion with the *Nārāyaṇānūvāka*, *TaittĀr.* 10, 11, 1 is now given. This text, inspired by the *Puruṣasūkta*, concludes that *Nārāyaṇa* is *Brahmā*, *Śiva*, *Indra*, *Akṣara*, the supreme, self-sufficient Sovereign. Meanwhile it has been shown that *ŚvetUp.* must be understood within the *Mahā-puruṣaprakaraṇa* of *TaittĀr.* 3, 13, 2. Now it is clear that the originally totally unrelated statements between which we suspected contradiction have clarified each other and themselves: *Śambhu* and the Great Person are *Nārāyaṇa*, who is the first and universal cause and who enjoys paramount sovereignty. The description of the dissolution of *prāṇa* and senses into the *manas* and the *manas* into the supreme object of meditation in *AtharvaśikhUp.*, is compared with the description in *Mahānārāyaṇa Up.* of the dissolution of the *Veda* into *Oṃ* and of *Oṃ* into the *A* which is *Nārāyaṇa*, who, we may recall, was called *Brahmā*, *Śiva*, *Indra*, *Akṣara*, that is the ensouling principle and cause of them. Yet another statement of the *AtharvaśikhUp.*, that the cause is to be meditated upon *in the middle of space*, fits into the established context where *MahānārUp.* 10, 7 reads *dahraṃ vipāpmaṃ varam veśmabhūtam* etc., which without any doubt is inspired by the *Daharavidyā* of *ChUp.* 8; this will lead *Rāmānuja* to a further discussion of the true sense of this śruti. So we see how each śruti can and should be understood only when all the references, correspondences and parallels have been brought out by a subtle analysis. Only then we can pretend to interpret the śruti, without resorting to convenient but presumptuous distinctions between statements which suit our views and which do not.

But apart from these detailed interpretations, at what general conclusions does *Rāmānuja* arrive about the sense of the Scriptures? Can we explain them in the sense of a strict monism, denying all qualities of the Absolute and reality of the Universe, or of a radical dualism, separating God from world and matter from souls, or of difference-non-difference in a pantheistic harmony? To a certain extent all these senses are valid, but we have to harmonize them within a new conception of the relation between Absolute and World. When the śruti denies qualities of *brahman*, it denies imperfect ones; when the reality of the world is negated, it affirms the utter dependence of the World on God. When diversity is denied, the uniqueness of God as the unitive inner soul of the diverse Universe is affirmed. When diversity is asserted, the wonderful variety of God's manifestations in the Universe of matter and spirit is affirmed. All these senses find their place within the fundamental doctrine that the Personal God, who is possessed of perfect qualities, is modified by the world of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, whether in subtle or causal state, or gross or effectual state, which constitute the body to which He is the Soul.

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reason, has spread all over the world: such errors⁹ as the view that the Supreme Brahman, being nescient and afflicted with misconceptions, is implicated in saṃsāra; or that the Supreme Brahman is liable to adventitious limiting adjuncts¹⁰ that are different from itself,¹¹ and as such is subject to karman; or that the Supreme Brahman itself is the abode of imperfection.¹²

§ 3. The only meaning which is to be found in the most important part of the whole body of śrutis,¹³ which set forth what is blissful for the entire Universe, is as follows:¹⁴ True knowledge of the individual soul¹⁵ and of the Supreme Spirit,¹⁶ applied to the obligations imposed¹⁷ by the various dharmas pertaining to each stage and station of life,¹⁸ are to precede pious and humble acts of devotion for and meditation on the Supreme Spirit—acts held extremely dear¹⁹ by the devotee—that ultimately result in the attainment of the Supreme Spirit.

§ 4. In truth, all declarations of the Vedānta are meant to set forth the knowledge of the proper form and nature²⁰ of the individual soul which are

9. Resp. the advaitin's and the two types (*Bhāskara* and *Yādavaprakāsa*) of *bhedābhedavādin's* positions, summarized and refuted below.

10. *upādhi*- "non-essential element or factor adjoined to the pure form (*svarūpa*-) of an entity which is thereby delimited and conditioned.

11. *para*- "other", showing the insoluble dualism ultimately fundamental to *bhedābhedavāda*.

12. *aśubha*- or *heya*-, opp. of *kalyāṇa*-, "imperfect, affected by the various limitations etc., due to karman to which souls are subject.

13. i.e., the upaniṣads or Vedānta.

14. This sums up the three stages of the one road from transmigration in bondage (*saṃsāra*-) to the ultimate attainment of perfect bliss; corresponds completely to the three paths—*jñāna*, *karma*, *bhakti*—of the *Gītā* as interpreted by R. See my *Rāmānuja* etc. Intr. 19 sqq.

15. *jīvātman*—"the individualized ātman in natural conjunction with (*saṃsṛta*- "created jointly with", generally "related to, having a relation") the body."

16. *paramātman*—"God as the ātman beyond the individual ātman, as the ātman's inner ātman," connoting both God's transcendence and immanence.

17. *itikartavyatā*, for the meaning of this term, cf. MNPr. § 126. *dhyanā*- "contemplation inspired by love" synonymous with *bhakti*- and *upāsānā*-; *arcana*- esp. "worship of God's image".

18. Station and stage of life = *varṇāśrama*: *varṇa*- "social order founded on religious law" rather than "(sociological) class"—*āśrama*- the ideal life-periods of *brahmācārin*- "boy initiated into religiously founded society"; *gṛhastha*- "pater familias, keeper of the fire"—*vanaprastha*- "retired from public life"—*saṃnyāsīn* "retired from all social and marital life."

19. R. frequently emphasizes the fact that the loving devotion to God is an act which in itself is extremely dear to the devotee and, as an entirely disinterested mental act, is its own reward. Cf. Ved. § 141-144.

20. *svarūpa*- "proper form" (where 'form' is the principle of individuality, cf. *nāmarūpa*-), free from adventitious adjuncts but (for R.) possessed of essential properties;

different from the body;²¹ the proper form and nature of the Supreme Spirit who is the inner Ruler²² of the soul; the worship of the Supreme Spirit; and the apprehension of Brahman as perfect boundless bliss which presupposes the revelation of the proper form of the soul that results from the worship of the Supreme Spirit.²³ By setting forth all this the declarations of the Vedānta serve to remove the danger of rebirth which is inevitable since it results from the misconception²⁴ of the individual soul that it is identical itself with that one of the four types of bodies—sc. gods, from *Brahmā* onwards,—men—animals—inanimate beings—, into which it has entered by the impulsion of the continuous flow of good or evil karman amassed during ageless ignorance.²⁵

svabhāva- "this essential form in the process of being and becoming with and through its essential qualities."

21. Note R.'s definition of body: *yasya cetanasya yad dravyaṃ sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam taccheṣṭaikaśvarūpaṃ ca tat tasya śarīram iti śarīralakṣaṇam āstheyam* ŚBh. 2, 1, 9; cf. LACOMBE, ASV. 108 sqq.; Proceedings, All-India Conf., 1946.

22. *antaryāmin*- "God as the immanent principle directing and guiding the soul in its actions in the same way as the soul directs the body;" term from *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* (BĀUp. 3, 7, 22) in the *mādhyaṃdina* recension, which reads *ya ātmani tiṣṭhann antaro 'tmanaḥ*, etc.; on this difference cf. ŚBh. 1, 4, 27; 2, 3, 19.

23. For it is by dedicating all actions to God (BhG. 18, 46) and devoting himself entirely to God (cf. GBh. 2, 61 sqq.) that a person is able to shed the bonds of karman and realize, i.e., recognize, his soul for what it is in essence.

24. *abhimāna*- "misconception (lit. "prejudice, bias, self-centred opinion") that the aloof ātman is identical with the body which, with the psychological functions of *ahaṃkāra* "subjectifier", constitutes the empirical ego that is mistaken for the ātman. Cf. also K. C. VARADACHARI's paper on *abhimāna* in *Rāmānuja's Theory of Knowledge*.—There has never been a paradisiac period before the "Fall" (*jñānabhraṃśa*, pañcarātric term); saṃsāra has existed from all eternity; for the corresponding eternity of souls that are never implicated in saṃsāra, the *nityas* or *sūris*, cf. infra § 128.—For the way in which the ātman's unlimited knowledge is contracted (*saṃkucita*-) to the scope of a body-bound soul, see infra.

25. Sharply to be distinguished from Śaṅkara's *avidyā* (always rendered "nescience"), R.'s "ignorance" is a real factor which is not some undefinable shadow of the absolute but a concrete lack of knowledge in the saṃsāric being of the fundamental autonomy of its individual ātman as a spiritual entity of unlimited knowledge subject to the supreme Spirit. As the advaitin takes knowledge as the essence, nescience takes on a completely different, ultimately inexplicable character; whereas for R. who considers knowledge a property of a substance (*dharmabhūtajñāna*-) ignorance has its limited and definable scope of action. On this point see infra § 43. Besides, whereas the cessation of nescience, however conceived, is for the advaitin equal to the *summum bonum*, the self-realisation/self-recognition of the individual ātman in the *Sāṃkhyān* sense is for R., although doubtless release, but the next step to the supreme goal of attaining God.

Such declarations are met with in śrutis like "Thou art That,²⁶ this soul is Brahman,²⁷ He who, although residing in the soul, is different from that soul, whom the soul does not know, whose body is the soul, and who directs the soul from within, He is the immortal inner Ruler of thy soul,²⁸ He is the inner soul of all beings, free from all evil, the divine and sole God Nārāyaṇa,²⁹ 'tis He whom the Brahmans aspire to know by repeating the Vedas, by sacrifice, charity, mortification and fasting,³⁰ he that knows Brahman attains the Most-High,³¹ he that knows this is immortal: there is no other way to tread,"³² and so on and so forth.

§ 5. The proper form of the soul is free from all various differentiations consisting in the distinctions that are brought about by the natural evolution³³ of prakṛti into the bodies of gods, men, etc. In essence it is only characterized by knowledge and beatitude. When these differentiations of god, man, etc.,—which have been brought about by the karman of the soul—have vanished³⁴ there persists a differentiation in its proper form³⁵; it is beyond the power of expression and can only be known by the soul itself. So the soul can only be defined as essentially knowledge;³⁶ and this essential nature is common to all souls.³⁷

26. *tat tvam asi* ChUp. 6, 9, 4, etc.

27. *ayam ātmā brahma* MāṇḍUp. 2.

28. *yā ātmani tiṣṭhann* etc. BĀUp. 3, 7, 22 (Mādhyamā recension)

29. *sa eṣa sarvabhūtāntarātmā* SubālUp. 7.

30. *tam etaṃ vedānuvacanena* etc. BĀUp. 4, 4, 22.

31. *brahmavid āpnoti param* TaittUp. 2, 1

32. ŚvetUp. 3, 8.

33. *pariṇāma*- "the effectuation of an entity which has the same degree of being as its material cause" (cf. e.g. the definition in Vedāntaparibhāṣā I *pariṇāmo nāmopādāna°sama°sattākakāryāpatih*); on the *pariṇāmavāda* see Intr. I.

34. S. is unquestionably right in quoting as R.'s references the śloka *ekasvarūpabheda hi bāhyakarmāvṛtiprajāḥ/devādibhede 'padhvaste nāsty evāvārno hi sah*//VP. 2, 14, 33 "the differentiation in the actually undifferentiated proper form has its origin in the obscuration caused by karman that is extrinsic to the proper form; so when those differentiations of god etc. have disappeared, there is no obscuration left," (also quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 81 in similar context), and *pratyastamitabhedaṃ yat sattāmātram agocaram/vacasāmātmasaṃvedyaṃ taj jñānaṃ brahmasaṃjñitam* // VP. 6, 7, 53 (where *brahma = ātma*-), discussed in detail ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 69 sqq. and explained in my paper *The Subhāśrayaprakaraṇa* etc.

35. *svarūpabheda*- "essentially distinct as an individual, having essentially distinct individualities."

36. *jñānasvarūpamityetāvannirdeśyam* cannot be taken to mean that the ātman is pure knowledge, but that the knowledge characteristic for the ātman is a *svarūpanirūpanadharmā* "an attribute describing the proper form," cf. infra § 43; the tenet that *jñāna* is an attribute, not the essence, is fundamental to R.'s doctrine.—SUDARSANACHARI in his ed., traces *jñānasvarūpam* to VP. 1, 4, 40, but this st. refers to the Supreme Spirit. I would rather connect it with 6, 7, 53 *yat sattāmātram taj jñānaṃ brahmasaṃjñitam*, interpreted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 69 *ātmanah svarūpaṃ jñānasattāikalakṣaṇam*.

37. R. endorses the Sāṃkhya view that there is an infinite number of ātmans which

§ 6. The proper form of the inner Ruler is as follows: He is the sole cause of the cessation of saṃsāra, which itself consists in the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the phenomenal world³⁸ constituted by the above spiritual and non-spiritual entities. His proper form is therefore distinct from all entities other than Himself, since He is absolutely opposed to all evil and comprises solely infinite perfection. His beautiful qualities are immeasurable, perfect and innumerable. He is known in the entire Veda under the various designations of Soul of all,³⁹ the Supreme Brahman,⁴⁰ Supreme Glory,⁴¹ Supreme Principle,⁴² Supreme Spirit,⁴³ Real Being,⁴⁴ etc.,—all of which denote the Venerable Lord⁴⁵ Nārāyaṇa,⁴⁶ the Supreme Person.⁴⁷ The śrutis are meant to set forth his manifestation,⁴⁸ so they expound the universal dominion of the Supreme Spirit as the inner Soul of the totality of spiritual and non-spiritual entities by expressions like *His power*,⁴⁹ *His portion*,⁵⁰ *His manifestation*,⁵¹ *His form*,⁵² *His body*,⁵³ *His shape*,⁵⁴ etc., and by *sāmānādhikaraṇya*⁵⁵ constructions.

although mutually distinguished, all have the same generic structure (*ākāra*-) of unrestricted knowledge.

38. *prapañca*—is the completely evolved phenomenal Universe of matter ensouled by spirit in the gross (*sthūla*-) phase of effect.

39. *sarvātmā* ŚvetUp. 3, 21.

40. *paraṃ brahma* TaittUp. 2, 12

41. *paraṃ jyotiḥ* ChUp. 8, 3, 4.

42. *paraṃ tattvam* ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

43. *paramātmā* BĀUp. 3, 1, 1.

44. *sat* ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

45. *bhagavān*, for the meaning of the term cf. the discussion JRAS 1910-12; cf. also R.'s quotation of VP. 6, 5, 73 sqq. infra.

46. *nārāyaṇa*- for R. the name of the Supreme Personal being *par excellence*, one aspect of whom is denoted by Viṣṇu as the all-pervading supporter of the Universe, cf. infra §§ 99 ff.

47. *puruṣottama*-, term frequently used in the Gītā denotes the Supreme as a spiritual being transcending the puruṣa or order of individuals souls constituting his higher prakṛti (the oft-cited passage Gītā 7, 4, sq.).

48. *vaibhava*- "the totality of God's *vibhūti*s, his divine manifestation in the phenomenal world of matter and spirit."

49. *śakti*- : *parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate* ŚvetUp. 6, 8.

50. *aṃśa*- : *mamaivāṃśo jīvaloke* G. 15, 7; cf. MaitrUp. 5, 2.

51. *vibhūti*- : G. 10, 7 etc. PraśnUp. 5, 4.

52. *rūpa*- : *ekaṃ rūpaṃ bahudhā yaḥ karoti* KaṭhUp. 5, 12.

53. *śarīra*- : *Antaryāmibrāhmaṇa* BĀUp. 3, 7, 3-22.

54. *tanu*- : *tasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanuṃ svām* KaṭhUp. 2, 23.

55. *sāmānādhikaraṇya*- grammatical term: community of case relation of two or more words; logical: coordination of the two (or more) terms in a judgment: the lotus is blue etc. Term defined (infra § 26) *bhinnapravṛtīnimittānāṃ śabdānām ekasminn arthe vṛtīḥ* "the bearing on one sense of more words with different reasons for their application". The stock-example is the 'mahāvākya' *tattvamasi* discussed in detail infra § 20

§ 7. While attempting to explain these *sāmānādhikaraṇya* constructions, etc., which in fact only propound Brahman's manifestation, some philosophers contend⁵⁶ that Brahman is nothing but non-differentiated knowledge. Although it is eternally released and by its very nature self-illuminating, it is identical with the individual soul; this identity is concluded from *sāmānādhikaraṇya* constructions such as *Thou art That*. Accordingly Brahman Itself is nescient and as such may be in bondage as well as released. The entire Universe, with its infinite variety of Sovereign Lord, submissive souls etc., is false, for it is different from pure non-differentiated spirituality. The distinction that one soul is in bondage and the other soul is released cannot be made at all. It is false that some souls have attained release before: only one single body has an indwelling soul and all other bodies have no souls at all; but which body that is cannot be positively determined. The preceptor who imparts knowledge is false, the person who has correct knowledge of the *śāstra*⁵⁷ is also false. All this is to be gathered from the *śāstra*, which is false itself.

§ 8. Others⁵⁸ occupy a different position and hold that Brahman, though having all perfections like freedom from evil etc.,⁵⁹ is—because of the conception of identity—afflicted with some sort of adjunct, so that He may be alternatively in bondage or in released state and is consequently the abode of evolution which takes the form of various imperfections.

§ 9. Others⁶⁰ again, describing the exact nature of the conception of identity, maintain that Brahman—ocean of incomparable and immeasurable noble qualities which belong to its nature—is in essence at once distinct and indistinct with regard to all spiritual beings—divine, human, animal, inanimate, infernal, celestial and released, and thus the abode of evolution in the form of all kind of imperfections proper to ether, etc.

II

§ 10. Philosopher who have pondered over the true meaning of the śruti have pointed out a number of errors in the first school which cannot be explained away.⁶¹ As a matter of fact, the śruti passage from “*It wished: I be many; I will multiply*”⁶² to “*all these creatures, my dear son,*

have their roots in real being; therein they have their abode and their foundation,” expounds that the origination, subsistence and resorption etc. of the world are due to the will of Brahman, to whom the word *It*, indicative of the topic under discussion, refers.

Besides, all the perfect attributes which according to other contexts belong to Brahman, those multitudes of immeasurable, perfect and innumerable perfections like omniscience, omnipotence, universal sovereignty, his being modified by all, unequalled and unsurpassed, having all desires materialized and every will realized,⁶³ and being all-illuminating, as well as his absolute freedom from evil as is proved by countless expressions like *He, who is free from sin*,⁶⁴ etc.—all those perfections are done with in this school.

§ 11. —But, it may be objected, at the very beginning this śruti asserts, by stating that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one,⁶⁵ that only the cause has reality. By adducing the instance of the clay⁶⁶ it shows that the One, being the cause, is real whereas all transformations have no reality. In the śruti *my dear son, this real being was alone in the beginning and without a second*,⁶⁷ all distinctions, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, are denied reality, and it is set forth that Brahman, to whom this “real being” refers, is non-differentiated. In other contexts the so-called purifying statements⁶⁸ do also declare that Brahman is absolutely opposed to all distinction: e.g. *Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite*,⁶⁹ *He is whole, inactive, unqualified*,⁷⁰ *He is knowledge and bliss*,⁷¹ etc. Our conception of the essential simplicity of Brahman does not imply that these words are all synonymous: even when applied to the simplicity of an entity all words retain their peculiar meanings inasmuch as they establish the absolute opposition of that entity to all distinctions.⁷²

56. Summary of advaita school.

57. *pramātā*.

58. Summary of the BHASKARA school of bhedābhedavāda.

59. *apahatapāpmā* etc. ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

60. Summary of the YADAVAPRAKASA school of bhedābhedavāda.

61. Here starts R.'s refutation of advaitavāda: first it is shown that the doctrine of absolute non-duality is contradicted by śruti, §§ 10-39.

62. *tad aikṣata bahu syāṃ prajāyeyeti* ChUp. 6, 2, 3—*sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ* etc. ChUp. 6, 8, 4; this entire context is the theme of §§ 10-22.

63. *satyakāma-* (explained infra § 132) and *satyasamkalpa-* from ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

64. *apahatapāpmā* ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

65. i.e. .. *ūdeśam* .. *yena* .. *avijñātaṃ vijñātam* ChUp. 6, 1, 3.

66. i.e. *yāthā somyaikena mṛtipiḍena* etc. ChUp. 6, 1, 5.

67. *sadeva somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam* ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

68. *śodhakāni vākyāni*, śruti statements like the ones summed up below (*niṣkalaṃ niṣkriyaṃ* etc.) which, acc. to the advaitin, purify the Supreme Brahman of all differentiating qualities, and, acc. to R., of all imperfect qualities.

69. *satyaṃ jñānamanantaṃ brahma* TaittUp. 2, 1; see infra §§ 28, 3 f.

70. R. must have had in mind SvetUp. 6, 19 *niṣkalaṃ niṣkriyaṃ śāntaṃ niravadyam nirāñjanam*; cf. also AdhyātUp. 62 *nirguṇaṃ niṣkriyaṃ sūkṣmam* etc.

71. cf. BUp. 4, 9, 3 *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma*.

72. i.e., no quality can be attributed to Brahman. In other words: the above terms *niṣkala* etc. do not express perfect qualities as R. would have it, but deny for Brahman each quality negatively denoted by them. Cf. ŚANKARA TaittUpBh. 2, 1, *viśeṣanārvattve 'pi satyādināṃ svārvāparitāyā eva*..... *satyādyair arthavattve tu tadviparītadharmā-*

§ 12. — My reply to this is: No! If everything is false, then it cannot be reasonably held that all can be known when the One is known, for the simple reason that there is no "all" to know.⁷³ Or else it would follow that truth and falsity are identical. On the other hand, the assertion that we can know all by knowing the One is only tenable in case that "all" has reality of its own by having the One for its soul.

§ 13. The true meaning of our śruti is this: "He said to Svetaketu: 'Stabdho 'sy uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyah,'"⁷⁴ that is 'you seem to be an accomplished scholar; now, have you questioned your teachers about the ādeśa?' ādeśa- means "he who exercises ādeśa"; this ādeśa is synonymous with praśāsana- "command";⁷⁵ in agreement with the śruti it is by the command⁷⁶ of that imperishable being, O Gārgī, that the sun and the moon stand apart;⁷⁶ similarly in Manu's expression: sarvesāṃ praśāsītāram⁷⁷ "the Commander of all". In the context under discussion it is propounded, by the use of the words *ekam eva*,⁷⁸ that He is also the material cause. And since the word *advitīyam* denies that there was another operator⁷⁹ as well, it is thereby declared that that sole One is also the operative cause.

Therefore the sentence runs like this: "Have you asked about that Commander, who is also the material cause of the world, by whom, when heard-of, known and realized, the unheard-of is heard-of, the unknown is

vadbhṃ viśeṣyebhṃ brahmaṇo viśeṣyasya niyantrtvam upapadyate; for a discussion see Intr. IV.

73. The assertion (*pratiṣṭhā*, term from BrS. 1, 4, 23) that there is someone or something (for R. the personal ādeśa-) *yena* (sc. *viṣṭātena*) *aviṣṭātaṃ viṣṭātam* presupposes the reality of that which is *viṣṭātam*, i.e. the effected Universe (by analogy of the example *yathaikena mṛtṭpīṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ viṣṭātam syāt*). This very text poses the satkāryavāda (cf. 6, 2, 2 *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta*) so that here the identity is urged of the first cause and the effected Universe. If the advaitin holds that the Universe is 'false' (*mithyā*) as against brahman 'true' (*satyam*) there are two alternatives 1. there is no assertion at all but mere tautology: if the one is known the one is known; 2. if that is not accepted this means that the false is equated with the true.

74. ChUp. 6, 1, 3.

75. *ādiśyate 'nenetyādeśaḥ/ādeśaḥ praśāsanaṃ*: ādeśa in the sense of *ādeṣṭr-* with internal object ādeśa- = *praśāsana-* "command"; cf. ŚBh. 1, 4, 23, p. 385 in the same connexion *ādiśyate praśīśyate 'nenetyādeśaḥ . . . sādḥakatamatvena kartā vivakṣitaḥ / tamā-deṣṭāram aprākṣyah* etc.

76. *etāsya vā akṣarasya praśāsane* etc. BĀUp. 3, 8, 9.

77. Manu 12, 122.

78. In *sadeva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*, acc. to R. (infra § 33) to be construed *idaṃ < prapañcam > agre sad āsīt* "the Universe was at the beginning real"; consequently *ekam eva* states that there is only one material cause and *advitīyam* that there was no second, that is efficient or operative, cause; cf. ŚBh. 2, 1, 15 p. 441 in the same connexion *sarvaśaktitvenādhiṣṭhāntarāsahatayādvitīyam ca*.

79. On *adhiṣṭhātr* cf. my remarks Intr. I.

known and the unrealized is realized?" The meaning which the father has in mind is this: "Have you heard of Brahman, who is the cause of the origination, subsistence and resorption etc. of the entire Universe and who is an ocean of noble qualities without end such as omniscience and the power of having all his desires materialized and his every will realized?" The father bears tacitly in mind the knowledge that the entire Universe, as it is an effect, is known by the knowledge of Brahman Himself whose body is constituted by spiritual and non-spiritual entities in subtle state in which they are cause, just because He is the universal cause — it being said that the cause is the effect in all its variety of configurations;⁸⁰ and remaining silent about this knowledge he asks his son: . . . by whom the unheard-of is heard-of, the unknown is known and the unrealized is realized.

The son does not know the particular knowledge his father has in mind, viz. the knowledge that the One is the cause of all entities. Still he understands that when two entities are different the knowledge of one produces no knowledge of the other. So he raises the objection: *Sir, how can such an ādeśa be?*⁸¹

§ 14. When this objection is put to him, the father imparts to his son the knowledge that he has in mind and he declares that all is known when the One is known: the One whose proper form is purely knowledge, bliss and perfection, whose greatness is immeasurable, who possesses boundless, unequalled and countless perfections, e.g. the power of having his every will realized, and who essentially is not subject to transformations:⁸² that is, the Supreme Brahman Himself, whose body is constituted by spiritual and non-spiritual entities in subtle state, i.e. not individualized by names and forms. This is the One who, by his own free will and for the

80. In R.'s Sāṃkhyan cosmogony the phenomenal world of matter and spirit evolves out of causal substances in which the physical and spiritual orders are contained in a subtle state, the ātmans as *puruṣa*, yet still mutually distinguishable, not merged in a primeval spirit, and in matter as *prakṛti*, an amorphous mass not yet individualized by names-and-forms.

81. *katham nu bhagavaḥ sa ādeśo bhavati* ChUp. 6, 1, 4.

82. *vikāra*—general name for the 'alterations' (for R. without the pejorative connotation often going with the term) that are brought about in an material object in the process of evolution, and in the knowledge of a spiritual entity in the process of 'egotization' (here the pejorative value is evident), viz. the contraction of his originally and essentially unlimited knowledge; cf. ŚBh. 2, 3, 18 *svarūpānyathābhāvarūpavikārah: viyaśāder acetanasya yādṛśo 'nyathābhāvo na tādrśo jīvasya / . . cidamśasya ca karmaphalā-dāder abhokṛtvāya tadanurūpajñānavikāsarūpavikāro bhavati*. The Supreme Being is free from either *vikāra* of essence or *vikāra* of property.

sake of his own sport,⁸³ constitutes with a portion⁸⁴ of Himself the peculiar structure of the world with all its infinite variety of animate and inanimate beings in which it consists.

§ 15. With a view to explain this point that the One—as described above—when known makes everything known, the father adduces an example drawn from common experience in order to illustrate that cause and effect are not different from each other: *yathā somyaikena mṛtṭpīṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛṇmayam vijñātam syād vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam*,⁸⁵ that means: “a single substance of clay can be transformed into various structures, conditions and forms—jug, bowl etc.—so that within itself it includes diverse practical purposes. Yet, although it may assume diverse denominations, it is an established fact that it remains the same substance clay and does not become another substance for it remains differentiated by the structural peculiarities⁸⁶ of clay. So it is possible through the knowledge of one lump of clay to know all that is differentiated by the same structural peculiarities of clay—jugs, bowls and the like.”

§ 16. The son does not know that Brahman is the sole cause of the entire Universe, so he asks: *Sir, you must tell me what that is*.⁸⁷ Then the father expounds that Brahman Himself, the omniscient and omnipotent, is the universal cause: he says: *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*. Here the word *īdam* denotes “the world”; *agra-* means “the time before creation”; and with *sad eva* it is declared that during that time before creation the world was essentially *sat*. He means to say that at the very time of its creation the world was still non-differentiated: so in *ekam eva* he states that the world that was in the state of *sat* was at that time not yet

83. *līlā*: the important conception of God's sport is best understood by its opposite *karman-*. It contains a free action (an action not resulting from a preceding action in an endless retrogressive succession) performed to no purpose at all: no purpose that of necessity would result in new phalās for the agent to enjoy or to suffer. Hence it is compared to the literally inconsequential playfulness of a child (cf. VP. 1, 2, 18, quoted infra § 42). In creating, sustaining and resorbing the world God has no cause to effectuate and no end to achieve.

84. *aṃśa-*

85. ChUp. 6, 1, 4.

86. *saṃsthāna-* “generic structure of an entity by which it can be classified under a group with a class-name”; cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 32 *tāvataiva gotvādijātivavyahāropapatter atirekavāde 'pi saṃsthānasya saṃpratipannatvāc ca saṃsthānam eva jātiḥ / saṃsthānam nāma svāsādhāranārūpam iti yathāvastusaṃsthānam anusaṃdheyam*. See LACOMBE, ASV. 97-98; SINHA, *Indian Psychology: Perception*, p. 49 f.

87. *bhagavaṃstv eva me tad bravītu* ChUp. 6, 1, 7.

differentiated into names-and-forms.⁸⁸ By this same exposition it is made clear that *sat* is the material cause of the world; now the word *advitīyam* denies that there was still another cause, or an operative cause, different from that material cause.

§ 17-a. Then the father proceeds to develop in a lucid manner what he had tacitly borne in mind before in the passage: *Have you asked about that ādeśa by whom the unheard-of is heard-of* etc., namely that the Commander or Operator Himself is the material cause. So he says: “That *sat*, which Itself is at once the material and the operative cause of the world, *tad aikṣata bahu syāṃ prajāyeyeti*”: that means: “That Supreme Brahman, denoted by the word *tad*, who is omniscient and omnipotent and has his every will realized and all his desires materialized, decided nonetheless, for the sake of his own sport: “I be many in the form of a world composed of an infinite variety of spiritual and non-spiritual beings; to that purpose I will multiply.” He then created the primordial elements—ether etc.⁸⁹—out of a single portion of Himself. Then again this Supreme Deity, denoted by the name *sat*,⁹⁰ *aikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatāḥ anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇvāṇṭi*:⁹¹ by using the expression *anena jīvenātmanā* he declares that the living soul is itself ensouled by Brahman and points out that all non-spiritual matter becomes *padārtha*⁹² when the

88. *nāmarūpa-* “principle of individuality of an entity that evolves out of its subtle into its gross state.” For the history of this interesting term I refer to MARYLA FALK'S—often speculative—account in *Nāmarūpa and Dharmarūpa*.

89. Note that R. has creation start with *ākāśa* or *viyat* “etheral space”, the first of the 5 ‘classical’ elements of matter (*mahābhūtāni*), whereas the pre-Sāṃkhyan or proto-Sāṃkhyan process described in ChUp. 6, knows only three elements, *tejas*, *āpas* and *anna* resp. (*tat tejo 'srjate* etc. 6, 2, 3) cf. my remarks Intr. I. Though R. does not explain himself there is no doubt that he, as S. suggests, takes *tejas-* ‘pradarśanārtham’ “by way of illustrative instance” (cf. also RENOÛ, *Terminologie* s.v.) denoting implicitly all or some other terms and concepts of the series to which it belongs (for a few examples taken from GBh. see my *Rāmānuja* etc. 37). In the ŚBh., in the *viyadadhikarāṇa* (2, 3, 1 sqq.) this interpretation is enlarged upon. Ś. in ChUpBh. 6, 2, 3 explains similarly. S.'s remark *śrībhāṣye mahādāderapi pradarśanārtham ityuktam* refers to ŚBh. 2, 3, 14 *mahādādikāryānāmapi tattadanantaravastuśarīrakāḥ sa eva puruṣottamaḥ kāraṇam*, so that the *tejas* of ChUp. not only implies the two preceding mahābhūtāni (*ākāśa-* and *vāyu-*) but also the preceding evolution of the functions *mahat*, *ahaṃkāra* etc.

90. i.e. the *sat* of 6,2, 1 *sad eva somya* etc.

91. ChUp. 6, 3, 2.

92. Only after Brahman has entered with the embodied soul (*jīvātman-* supra note 15) into the “three deities” (= the three elements *tejas-*, *āpas*, *anna-*) = 5 mahābhūtāni = prakṛti) the final stage of creation has been reached: the prakṛti with the ensouled spirit is particularized in objects with class-names: *padārtha-* “the object denoted by the name,” “class” “rubric of existent entities”, that is, prakṛti has become the empirical world of discourse.

living soul ensouled by Brahman enters into it, and that then all substance assumes name.⁹³

b. In other words: the individual soul is itself ensouled by Brahman, for the soul is a modification of Brahman because it constitutes His body, as appears from another śruti: . . . *whose body is the soul* etc. The non-spiritual entities⁹⁴ in the generic structures of a god, a man etc. are modifications of this same individual soul—which is a modification of Brahman himself—because they constitute the soul's body. Consequently all these entities are ultimately ensouled by Brahman. Hence follows that all words which have a definite denotative value owing to the combination of the radical element⁹⁵ with a suffix,⁹⁶ e.g. god, man, *yakṣa*, *rākṣasa*, cow, game, fowl, tree, creeper, wood, rock, grass, jug, cloth etc., actually denote the entire composite entity: the body, the individual soul represented by it,⁹⁷ and finally the inner Ruler of that soul, the Supreme Person in whom that entity terminates. All words denote this entire *compositum* by merely denoting the material mass which has a certain generic structure that is commonly known as being denoted by a certain word.

§ 18. Then the father sets forth in some detail that *sat* is the material cause, the operative cause, the substratum, the controller and the principal⁹⁸ of the entire phenomenal world of spiritual and non-spiritual entities: *sanmulāḥ soṃyemāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ*⁹⁹ etc. Thereafter the father proceeds to declare that because of the relation cause-effect, etc., the entire Universe being ensouled by Brahman is real. *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyam*. Finally the assertion that Brahman is the soul of all as He is the soul of the entire Universe, that this entire Universe constitutes His body and that He therefore, as He is modified by the individual soul, can be denoted by the word *tvam*, this assertion is now summed up and applied to one specific individual soul in the statement *tat tvam asi*.¹⁰⁰

93. R. describes *padārtha*- here as *nāṃabhāḥ*-.

94. *vastu*- most general term for "thing", often a totality: *acidvastu*- / *cidvastu*- "sum-total of non-spiritual / spiritual entities".

95. *prakṛti*- "verbal and nominal radical element" cf. RENOUE, *Terminologie* s.v.

96. *pratyaya*- "verbal and nominal affix (case-ending, personal ending, verbal present tense affix), cf. RENOUE, o.c., s.v.

97. *tadabhimānījīva*- for this use cf. Śrībhāṣya 4, 2 20 *kālaśabdaḥ kālābhīmānīdevatātivāhikaparāḥ* ~ Gītābhāṣya 8, 23 *atra kālaśabdo .. kālābhīmānīdevatābhūyastayā mārgopalakṣanārthaḥ*.

98. *śeṣin*- supra note 3.

99. ChUp. 6, 8, 4; *sat* as the material cause is *mūla*; as operative cause *āyatana* (apparently from *ā-YAT*- "making efforts, exerting energy"),

100. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

§ 19. In other words, in the above statement *aitadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyam*¹⁰¹ the words *idaṃ sarvaṃ* refer to the phenomenal world of spiritual and non-spiritual entities. Thus is declared that *eṣa*,¹⁰² or "He", is the soul of this phenomenal world, so that this śruti sets forth that Brahman ensouls the evolved phenomenal world.

Now the question calls for consideration whether Brahman ensouls the world in a soul-body relation, or is essentially identical with the world.¹⁰³ When it is supposed that Brahman is essentially identical with the world, this would mean that Brahman's perfections, such as we gathered from the beginning of the context *tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeyeti*: for instance that He is *satyasamkalpa*,¹⁰⁵ are thereby sublated. Besides, we have already learnt particularly from another śruti that He ensouls the world by constituting the soul of the world as a body, sc. from *antaḥpraviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām sarvātmā*,¹⁰⁶ i.e. "having entered into all mankind as its soul in the form of its controller," and consequently *sarvātmā* "the soul of all who form his body." Similarly also the śruti *ya ātmani* etc.¹⁰⁷ The passage under discussion, *anena jīvenātmanā* etc., tells us the same, as we have already pointed out.

Therefore, since all spiritual and non-spiritual entities constitute Brahman's body, Brahman being thus embodied and modified by all, is denoted by all words. Hence the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* construction *tat tvam* denotes Brahman as "the One who is modified by the individual soul inasmuch as this soul constitutes his body".

§ 20. When this is said the sense of the statement *tat tvam asi* beomes clear. *tvam* means "you, i.e. you that were previously held to be no more than the operator of a certain body are in reality a modification of the Supreme Spirit because you constitute his body, and therefore you terminate in this Supreme Spirit [and are incapable of separate existence and activity]"¹⁰⁸. Hence *tvam* denotes only the inner Ruler of *tvam* as differentiat-

101. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

102. *eṣa* in *aitadātmya*-.

103. The word *aitadātmya*- admits of two interpretations: "whose 'essence' is that" and "whose 'soul' is that": the Universe has Brahman for its *essence*, i.e. Br. is identical with the world; or: it has Him for its *soul*, i.e., Br. ensouls the world as the *ātman* ensouls the body.

105. This *satyasamkalpatva* (supra note 63) "the quality of having His every will realized" is exclusively the attribute of the omnipotent Creator who is not subject to the limitations and conditions of the created world; it is what *Draṃiḍa* (Appendix Fr. XV) styles a *daivata guṇa*.

106. TaittĀr. 3, 11.

107. BĀUp. 3, 7, 22 (M.).

108. manuscript M₂ adds here an important expression which may conveniently be explained here: *prthaksthiti pravṛtṭyanarha*- "incapable of subsisting and working inde-

ed by the mode *tvam*. Since Brahman is the soul of the embodied individual soul (cf. the śruti *anena jivenātmanānupraviśya, nāmarūpe vyākara-vāṇi*),¹⁰⁹ He has the same name as that individual soul. It follows that both words *tat* and *tvam*, coordinated in a *sāmānādhikarāṇya* construction, denote that one Brahman. The word *tat* refers to Brahman as the One who is the cause of the world, the abode of all perfections, the immaculate and untransmutable¹¹⁰ One; whereas *tvam* refers to that same Brahman under the aspect of inner Ruler of the individual soul as being modified by the embodied soul. So it is said that the words *tat* and *tvam* both apply to the same Brahman but under different aspects.¹¹¹ And in this manner all the various perfections of Brahman, e.g. that he is the perfect, untransformed abode of all beautiful qualities and the universal cause, are preserved and no one is sublated.

§ 21. Laymen¹¹² who have not received the instruction of the Vedānta do not see that all *padārthas* and all individual souls are ensouled by Brahman, and they think that the full meaning of all words is completely exhausted by the various *padārthas* they denote, which, however, form only part of their full significance. Now that they have heard what the Vedānta declares they know that Brahman is the soul of everything because it is His effect and He is its inner Ruler and that every word denotes Brahman as modified by everything.

But, it is objected, would that not mean that the original meaning¹¹³ of words like *cow* etc. as denoting specific *padārthas* is sublated?

No: When we elucidated the śruti *nāmarūpe vyākara-vāṇi* we had occasion to say that all words denote the Supreme Spirit only in so far He is differentiated by the non-spiritual matter and the individual soul. Uninstructed laymen might think when they utter a certain word that the

pendently", also *prthaksiddhyanarha-* "incapable of functioning independently (of a substratum)", is said of a quality in relation to its substance and consequently, since the individual soul constitutes a *prakāra* of the Supreme, also of the soul in relation to its Lord.

109. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

110. *niravadya-*; this upaniṣadic term (ŚvetUp. 6, 19), here specified *nirvikārya-*, is very frequently used by R. to describe God's absolute freedom from all imperfection, equivalent to another frequent expression *samastahyapratyanika-* "opposed to all imperfection".—*nirvikārya-*: only the Supreme Being is in no sense subject to *vikāras*, neither in His essence, like *prakṛti*, nor in His attribute, like the *ātman*; cf. supra note 82 and the passages quoted there.

111. Cf. the definition of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* quoted supra note 55.

112. Here the suggestion of § 17 that all language ultimately denotes the Supreme is taken up and developed in a polemical manner.

113. *vyutpatti-* "analytical explication of a word as deriving from a certain root with a certain meaning".

meaning of that word terminates completely in the material component of the entity denoted, which after all is only part of its full significance, and they would think so because the Supreme Spirit, who is the principal component of its meaning, is beyond the empirical means of knowledge.¹¹⁴ Only when the instruction of the Vedānta is imparted, the proper significance of a word is presented in full measure.

In this way all Vedic words denote their proper meanings but as terminating in the Supreme Spirit. All words are Vedic:¹¹⁵ the Supreme Brahman has extracted them from the Veda and, after having created all the corresponding objects as He did before, applied these words as names to those objects, which terminate in the Supreme Spirit, as He did before.¹¹⁶ So Manu says: "In the beginning He created the various names and functions and peculiar *saṁsthās* of all things out of the words of the Veda."¹¹⁷ *saṁsthā-* has here the meaning of *saṁsthāna-* "generic structure" or *rūpa-* "form".—And the Venerable Parāśara¹¹⁸ declares: "In the beginning He made the name-and-form of beings—gods, etc.—and the variety of duties out of the words of the Veda."¹¹⁹—And the śruti: *sūryācandra-masau dhātā yathāpūrvam akalpayat*¹²⁰ "after having created the sun etc. as before He gave them names as before."

§ 22. In this manner a detailed exposition is given¹²¹ of the doctrine that Brahman and the world are not different from each other, which demonstrates that all is known when the One is known. The demonstration that all is an effect of Brahman furnishes proof that that all has reality of itself in so far as it is ensouled by Brahman and not otherwise. Hence it

114. *pratyakṣādyaparicchēdya-* "not circumscribable by perception and inference:" the two *pramāṇas* of empirical knowledge; only the third (for R. also the last) *pramāṇa*, viz. *śabda* "verbal, i.e., scriptural testimony," can give any information on things metempirical; see Intr. IV.

115. This implies that, the Vedas being *apauruṣeya-* "not of human origin", the capacity of all language to denote meanings is not based on convention (*saṅketa-*) but on an inherent metaphysical potency in language in itself. The important point will be discussed infra § 137.

116. Viz., at the beginning of each new kalpa when the Vedas are newly promulgated by Brahmā. Note that, although here the Supreme Brahman is said to be the promulgator, the traditional view that Brahmā Caturmukha has this function is not necessarily denied: God works creation through His mode Brahmā, just as he works the world's sustenance through Viṣṇu and its annihilation through Śambhu, cf. infra § 112.

117. Manuśmṛti 1, 21 *sarveṣāṃ tu sa nāmāni*.

118. The promulgator of the Viṣṇupurāṇa, father of Vyāsa Dvaipāyana.

119. VP. 1, 5, 64 *nāma rūpam ca bhūtānām*.

120. RV. 10, 90, 1.

121. Viz., by ChUp. 6, 1, 3 as explained above.

is declared: *tat satyam* "that is real",¹²² just as in the illustrative example every transmutation of clay is real because it remains essentially clay.

§ 23. The so-called purifying śrutis¹²³ elucidate also a Supreme Brahman that is perfect and a treasury of all beautiful qualities. Even when they tell that Brahman is the opposite of everything they do not prove that Brahman is a non-differentiated entity:¹²⁴ for if He is the opposite of differentiated entities differentiation is necessarily implied.

§ 24. But, it is objected, if it is stated that Brahman is nothing but knowledge,¹²⁵ then we can be positive that Brahman is pure and non-differentiated knowledge.

Certainly not, for words which denote properties that describe the proper form of an entity may also refer to the proper form of that entity itself by means of that attribute, just like the names *cow* etc. do.¹²⁶ For this reason the Author of the Sūtras declares: *tadguṇasāratvāt tad-*

122. ChUp. 6, 8, 7 *aitadātmyaṃ sarvaṃ idam / tat satyam / sa ātmā*. R. makes *tat* resume *sarvaṃ idam*, so that the interpretation runs: "all this (the phenomenal world of *cit* and *acit*) is ensouled by Him: hence that (world) is real, He being the ātman; whereas Śāṅkara makes *tat satyam* refer to the ensouling ātman: *yena cātmanātmavat sarvaṃ idam jagat / tad eva sadākhyaṃ kāraṇaṃ satyaṃ paramārthasat* (ChUpBh. 6, 8, 7), and: *sanmātratvaṃ ca satyatvaṃ tat satyam iti śrutyantarat* (TaittUpBh. 2, 1).

123. Here R.'s explanation of the *śodhakavākyas* is taken up after the provisional suggestions of §§ 11-12.

124. Against the advaitin's contention that these apophatic śrutis assert an unqualified absolute by denying its qualifiedness by the various qualities negated, R. poses his view that the several negations of imperfect qualities imply as many affirmations of perfect qualities.

125. This is the *jñāna* of TaittUp. 2, 1 *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma*.

126. In other words: the co-ordination *jñānaṃ brahma in satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma* is of the same category as those of *satyaṃ brahma* and *anantaṃ brahma*. *Jñāna* here is a distinguishing attribute (*viśeṣaṇa-*) of brahman: so *jñānaṃ brahma* means "Br. is distinguished by the attribute *jñāna*" and not "Br. is *jñāna*". *Jñāna* is a property (*dharma-*) that describes the proper form (*svarūpanirūpaṇadharmā-* "an essential property"), so it may stand for that proper form itself.—Rāmānuja's *dr̥ṣṭānta gavādisabdavat* requires some elucidation. *Cow* is a class name and hence the word *gauḥ* describes a property common to all the individuals of the bovine genus; a broken-horned individual is a cow, but the relation is unilateral, not reciprocal: not every cow is broken-horned; similarly, not all knowledge is Brahman, for individual ātmans are also knowledge. This same *dr̥ṣṭānta* is developed ŚBh. 2, 3, 30: *tathā ca khaṇḍādayo yāvatsvarūpabhāvīgotvā-didharmaśabdena gaur iti vyapadīśyamānā dr̥śyante / svarūpanadharmatvād ity arthaḥ*. "So we know from experience that individual cows, broken-horned individuals etc., are designated "cow" as a word denoting the property of bovinity which covers their proper form completely: that is to say, because it is a property describing the proper form."

vyapadeśaḥ prājñavat,¹²⁷ *yāvadātmabhāvitvāc ca na doṣaḥ*.¹²⁸ Brahman's proper form is designated by knowledge as its defining attribute, but it is not mere knowledge itself.

But how do we know this?

From the śruti which asserts that He is a knower—e.g. *yaḥ sarvajñāḥ sarvavit*,¹²⁹ and this can be gathered from hundreds of śrutis, cf. *parāsyā śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svabhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca*,¹³⁰ *vijñātāram are kena vijānīyād*¹³¹ etc.—; from the fact that knowledge is a property and not a substance, and from the fact that it cannot be logically established that a mere property is a substance. Hence follows that words like *truth*, *knowledge* and the like declare that Brahman is differentiated by, for instance, knowledge in the proper sense of the word. When we disregard the proper sense of the two words *tat* and *tvam* and we make them out to be proof that the proper form of an entity is non-differentiated, we sacrifice their primary meanings.¹³²

§ 25. But when it is a positively established fact that two different words bear upon one identical object, then it is sound to assume *lakṣaṇā*, as for example in the sentence *so 'yaṃ Devadattaḥ*. In *so 'yam* the word *sa* refers to a person in connection with a different place and a different time, while the word *ayam* refers to a person connected with a near-by place or the present time. The co-ordination of both words denotes identity. But it is impossible to refer to one and the same person as if he were simultaneously connected with incompatible places or durations. So we contend that the two words are only meant to establish mere proper form and that this proper form is one in itself.

This is not true.¹³³ In the given illustration *so 'yam Devadattaḥ* there is not even a semblance of *lakṣaṇā* because there is no contradiction

127. BrS. 2, 3, "because that is (the ātman's) defining property, the (ātman) is designated by that property (namely) as having knowledge."

128. BrS. 2, 3, 30 "(this use of the term *jñāna* as a designation) is not objectionable, also because (*jñāna*) is entirely co-existent with the ātman" Some MSS. and the Pt. ed. interpolate a gloss which is identical with R.'s gloss on this sūtra in Vedāntadīpa.—Acc. to S., the reference to the later sūtra serves to avoid the objection of *lakṣaṇā: jātiguṇayor vyaktiguṇiparyantatvasya loke pratyakṣasiddhatvāt tad-vācīśabdānāṃ tatparyantatvam āśritam*.

129. MuṇḍUp. 1, 1, 1 "who is omniscient, all-knowing."

130. SvetUp. 6, 8 "His paramount power, so is revealed, is manifold, and natural to Him are knowledge, strength and activity."

131. BĀUp. 2, 4, 14.

132. This paragraph seems to be directed against Ś.'s interpretation ad TaittUp. 2, 1; for a detailed discussion; see Intr. chapter IV.

133. Same argument in ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 21; for a detailed discussion see Intr. IV. —R. denies the applicability of the *dr̥ṣṭānta so 'yaṃ Devadattaḥ* which, acc. to the advaitin

at all. It is not at all contradictory that one and the same person is involved in two different actions, one past and one present: in the past he was in a remote place, at present he is in a near-by place. So the declaration of the identity of a person involved in two actions, past and present, contains no contradiction, for the contradiction in his presence in two different places is solved by the difference in time.

Even if we assume *lakṣaṇā*, we can never apply it to both terms of a judgment, for a contradiction in terms is already solved by one term with *lakṣaṇā*. Here, as we have said there is no *lakṣaṇā* at all, for there is no contradiction when a person who in the past was connected with one place is at present connected with another place.

§ 26. Similarly in our passage it is declared that there is nothing contradictory in that the Supreme Brahman, who is the cause of the world, is also the soul of the individual soul inasmuch as he is its inner Ruler. Just as the identity of two beings is conceived with the aid of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (when we leave out those 'beings' there is identity of mere proper form, but that is not the meaning of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*; for, according to the experts, *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is the application to one object of several words in different functions) we have accordingly declared that both beings are identical. But we may not decide on a meaning of a summarizing statement that is contrary to the sense of the preceding section which it is to summarize.¹³⁴ For in the preceding paragraphs, the śrutis *tad aikṣata bahu*

(following the Naiyāyikas), is an identity judgment and predicates no attribute to the subject. The Devadatta of 'here and now' cannot be wholly identical with the Devadatta of "then and there" because then and there he had other attributes than here and now. So the identification: this particular D. = that particular D. is contradictory. Here we have to drop from the word "this" (*ayam*) the notion of proximate, from "that" (*sa*) that of remoteness and retain their simple demonstrative value.—R.'s interpretation can be summarized: "this D. was that D.", so that all differences between "this" and "that" (here and now / there and then) are accounted for by the difference in time.

In ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 110 R. resumes this question: *tattvamasyādivākyaṣu sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na nirviśeṣavastvaikyaparam etc. . . so 'yaṃ devadatta ity atrāpi na lakṣaṇā / . . deśabhedavirodhās ca kālabhedena parihrtaḥ /*

134. The "canons of exegesis" of Mīmāṃsā are summed up in the śloka *upakramo-pasaṃhārāv abhyāso 'pūrvatā phalam / arthavādupapattī ca liṅgaṃ tātparyamiścaye /* "initial and concluding statements, repetition, novel element of teaching, reward, description and argumentation are the characteristics by which the right interpretation is determined." Most important are *upakrama* and *upasaṃhāra*: the latter may never be in conflict with the former in order to establish the *ekavākyatā* of a context. The *upakrama* of ChUp. 6 is *tad aikṣata bahu syām* (6, 2, 3, developing 6, 2, 1 *sadeva somyedam*), the *upasaṃhāra* *tat tvam asi*. If this *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is taken in the advaitin's sense it would mean that Brahman is identical with the embodied soul (*jīvā*) in its essence; which would make Br. liable to the *jīva*'s characteristic nescience etc.

syām etc., it was asserted that Brahman is the sole universal cause and that he has all his desires materialized: contradictory to this would be to declare that Brahman is the substratum of nescience etc.

§ 27. Furthermore,¹³⁵ speech can never be a *pramāṇa* to prove a non-differentiated thing; for speech derives its character of *pramāṇa* from the peculiar nature of the words and sentences in which it consists. The nature of a word is to signify the peculiar difference of the object to which it corresponds; that of a sentence to signify the peculiar difference of a complex of such differentiated objects. It follows that speech can never signify a non-differentiated object. Words like "non-different" etc. signify an object — which we have already found to be differentiated by a specific difference — by denying that it has any of the differentiating features found in other objects. Otherwise such words would signify nothing at all, for a word implies numerous differences in the object signified by its radical element and affix, and a sentence signifies numerous complexes of such *padārthas*.

§ 28. But, it may be objected, we have not said that speech is a *pramāṇa* for a non-differentiated self-illuminating entity, for something that is self-evident stands in need of no *pramāṇa*. So all differentiations which arise from superimpositions,¹³⁶ e.g. that it is a knower etc., are altogether discarded by all words. When all differentiations have disappeared the mere being remains by itself, undetermined, self-illuminating.

That is not true, for by what word do you then denote that entity in such a way that all differentiations of superimposition disappear?

By the word "pure knowledge".¹³⁷

No! That word too refers to a differentiated substance; for by its radical element and affix it implies difference. The root *JÑĀ* in the sense of "to be conscious (of)"¹³⁸ tells us that it has an object and a subject and that it is a specific action with a specific nature which distinguishes it from other actions. The affix tells us that it has gender, number etc. This nature does also persist in the case of a self-evident, self-realized object: were it free from all difference then there would be no realization at all.

135. Cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 28, the passage *śabdasya tu viśeṣeṇa saviśeṣa eva vastuṇy abhidhānasāmāthyam / . . na nirviśeṣavastuṇi śabdāḥ pramāṇam /*

136. *adhyāsa*- "superimposition" defined by Ś. BrSBh. intr. as *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* "superimposition is the projection of something that has been perceived before elsewhere on something else, and is therefore derived from recollection."

137. *jñaptimātra*- see following note.

138. *JÑĀ avabodhana iti*: so Ś. *jñānaṃ jñaptir avabodhaḥ* (TaittUpBh, 2, 1); *avabodhana*- "being awake to, alive to, aware of, conscious of."

We say that knowledge is self-evident or self-realized by virtue of its own nature, viz. the nature of realizing or proving something else.¹³⁹

§ 29. — Brahman's proper form itself illuminates everything always. — But then it is impossible to attribute to it any properties that are foreign to it: when the proper form of a rope appears as such, then it is impossible to attribute to it the property of being a snake. That is why you have to assume an obscuring Nescience. Consequently the object of the clearing knowledge of the śāstra can only be a hidden part in Brahman:¹⁴⁰ otherwise the clearing knowledge would clear nothing at all: for the supposed nature of snake is sublated by the illumination of the nature of rope as different from the substratum of the original error. When there is one differentiation denoted by a word for that entity of pure knowledge, that differentiation must be a distinguishing feature of Brahman.¹⁴¹ Then it follows that Brahman is differentiated by all the differentiating features expounded by all śrutis.¹⁴²

§ 30. All this proves that the criteriologist have no criterion that in any way demonstrates the existence of a non-differentiated entity.¹⁴³ Even in the case of an indeterminate perception¹⁴⁴ the perceived entity is recognized as differentiated; for otherwise it would be impossible to have, in the

139. *anyasādhanasvabhāvatayā*—S. remarks *jñātur viśayavyavahārahetutayā hi svayamprakāśatvaṃ tvayā sādhitam* "you arrive at the notion of the self-illuminating character (of knowledge) because it is the ground for the knower to act upon its object" and he adds *svasaṃbandhād arthāntare tadvyavahārahetutvaṃ hi svayamprakāśatvānumānāhetuḥ / evaṃ nirviśeṣatve svayamprakāśatvānupapattir uktā* "the ground on which you conclude to this self-illuminating character is this that (knowledge) is the ground for activity in another matter which therefore stands in relation to itself; consequently the Author states that the notion of *svayamprakāśa* cannot logically be established for an entity that is non-differentiated." This is borrowed from ŚBh. 1, 1, 1 p. 25 *api tu sarvaṃ sādhayanty anubhūtiḥ* (the term is Vimuktātman's, Iṣṭasiddhi 1) *svayam eva siddhyati/prayogaś ca/anubhūtir ananyādhīnasvadharmavyavahārā/svasaṃbandhād arthāntare taddharmavyavahārahetuvāt* etc; the point which R. wants to make is that knowledge can only be proved to be *svataḥsiddha*, if it is, not *anyataḥsiddha*, but *anyasādhana*; hence, far from being unqualified, it is essentially qualified by this very nature of proving other entities.

140. As S. comments: there can be no obscuration unless there is something to be obscured. It would follow then that the advaitin's assertion that Brahman is *svayamprakāśa* cannot be logically maintained in his pakṣa.

141. If Brahman can be known, he must have the property (differentiating attribute) of being knowable.

142. If one differentiation of Brahman propounded in the śruti, viz. that of being knowable, is accepted of Brahman, all other differentiations propounded of Brahman must also be accepted.

143. Neither śabda nor pratyakṣa can prove an undifferentiated entity, nor, *a fortiori*, can anumāna that departs from pratyakṣa.

144. *nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*.

case of a determinate perception, the cognition in *so 'yam* of an entity differentiated by a previously apprehended modification.¹⁴⁵ From the fact that generic character like bovinity, etc. is a particular structural feature of an entity it follows that already at the indeterminate stage an entity is apprehended in this way: this entity is so with such structural *differentiae*.¹⁴⁶ In the case of a second and subsequent cognitions we recognize that these generic *differentiae* belong to more than one entity. From the second and subsequent cognitions we learn that the *padārtha* called 'modification by

145. In *so 'yam* the word *saḥ* points to a definite object perceived before, not to a mere indeterminate blur: the very recognition "this is that" proves that "that" had a distinguishing feature which allowed it of being recognized later on as "this" and nothing else, or, as stated in ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 29, of being cognized at all: *nirvikalpakam nāma kenacid viśeṣeṇa viyuktasya grahaṇam na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya / tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādarśanāt /*

146. ŚBh. 1. c. is more elaborate: *kenacid viśeṣeṇedam iṭham iti hi sarvā pratītir upajāyate trikoṇasāsnādīsamsthāna viśeṣeṇa vinā kasyacid api padārthasya grahaṇāyogāt / ato nirvikalpakam ekajātīyadravyeṣu prathamapīṇḍagrahaṇam trikoṇa-* n. is "triangular cow's head", not adj. to *sāsnā*, as THIBAUT and LACOMBE translate; *sāsnā* "dew-lap" is the *lakṣana* of *gotva*. This definition is often found bizarre in comparison with the Western one "horned, cloven-footed, ruminant etc.", but it is an obvious and practical one: it has no doubt its origin in the need for defining a cow not so much from other corniferous and ruminant mammals as from the very similar buffalo with which the cow is herded together and from which it is mainly distinguished by its dew-lap.

N.B. R.'s theory of indeterminate perception conflicts with that held by the Naiyāyikas. Acc. to the latter (and to the Buddhists who recognize the indeterminate perception as the only possible one) in indeterminate perception an object is seen without any qualities, a mere blur of which it can only be said that it is "something". Anāmbhaṭṭa (TS. § 42) defines: *niṣprakāraṇam jñānam nirvikalpakam, yathedaṃ kiṃcid* [but cf. Jayantabhaṭṭa, Nyāyamañjarī, p. 73, discussing Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya 1, 124: *na ca nirvikalpakasamaye yat kiṃcid idam ityādisāmānyasabdollekhaḥ ko 'pi kaiścid anubhūyate tasmād gaur ityādijñānam śabdātve 'pi tathāvidhasya jñānasya lakṣyasya sabbhāvān na vyartham lakṣaṇam ity evaṃ asaṃbhavadoṣanirākaraṇārtham avyapadeśyapadam iti] and comments (TD) *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhānavagāhī jñānam ityarthah* "nirvikalpaka is that cognition which is without *prakāra*, i.e. determinant feature distinguishing it from other cognitions", comm. "that is to say, cognition which comprehends no relation between the qualifying and the qualifiable," as distinct from determinate perception which does comprehend the relation between qualifying features—name, class etc.—and the object qualified. Similarly the advaitin: *nirvikalpakam tu saṃsargānavagāhī jñānam* (VedP.) but with his own example: *yathā so 'yam devadattas tattvamasītyādivākyañjānam*. R. argues: indeterminate perception must apprehend an object with some distinguishing feature: for if the indeterminate perception is followed by a determinate one—when the dimly perceived object draws near and is perceived for what it is with all its peculiarities—we recognize it as such: "this is that same object". So we must originally have perceived a differentiating feature to recognize it by. The identification "this is that" presupposes a common feature to both terms sufficiently peculiar to warrant an identification. The Naiyāyika reasons: we cannot know a cow before we know what makes a cow (sc. its *gotva*-), so unless we know its generic peculiarities we cannot know it for a cow. We know beforehand its generic peculiarities by repeated observation of cows. So the*

generic structure' is the differentiating feature of more than one entity as it applies to more than one. On the strength of this observation it is said that second and subsequent cognitions are determinate.

From this appears that the assumption¹⁴⁷ that one and the same *padārtha* has a double essence according to its being at once different and non-different should be rejected as self-contradictory. The generic structure itself is a *padārtha* different from the entity that has this structure; because it is a modification of it, it is incapable of functioning separately

simple "this"—perception we have at the indeterminate stage combines with our recollection of the generic peculiarities, and the simple perception combined with the recollection produces the knowledge of the relation: "this is a cow". R. replies: how do we arrive at our knowledge of these generic peculiarities in the first place? Knowledge of the individual precedes that of the class: we perceive a cow, i.e. a member of the class cow, when we see repeated in that individual the features previously perceived in another animal. So R. goes beyond the "recollection of *gotva*" which the Naiyāyika combines with the indeterminate "this" to produce the determinate or complex "perception" 'this cow': this view fails to account for the origin of the very perception of *gotva*. So R. poses that the indeterminate perception is the first complete perception of a previously unknown object, e.g. a cow: never having seen a cow before we perceive it neither as a member of a class, nor yet as an individual: hence R.'s use in Ved. and ŚBh. of the vague word *pinḍa*- "mass, object" which strictly cannot be equated with *vyakti*- (as ABHYANKAR does in his Notes, followed by LACOMBE, Note 306) "individual member of a class", for at that stage its individual peculiarities are no more perceived than its generic *differentiae* (which presuppose class). Determinate becomes our perception when we see our second and third cows: we recognize the same features and see that they are characteristic not of one animal but a number of them: generic features. R. defines ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 29 *ato nirvikalpakaṃ ekajātīyeṣu prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇam* "indeterminate is our perception when we see the first object of a class of objects." So YID. I, p. 9 *nirvikalpakaṃ nāma gunasamsthānādiviśiṣṭapramāṇagrahaṇam*. This view of *nirvikalpaka* is substantially that of the Prābhākaras whereas the Advaitin follows the Bhāṭṭa; cf. *Prakaranapañcikā* p. 54-55, esp. *tasmāt sāmānyaviśeṣau dve vastunī pratipadyamānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prathamam u<pa>padhyate, kiṃtu vastvantarānusaṃdhānaśūnyatayā sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatā na pratīyate* "consequently, in the first instance, the (indeterminate) perception proves to establish both generic and individual peculiarities, although, failing the accompanying comparison of another entity (of the same class), these generic features and individual peculiarities are not yet recognized as such," etc.; *savikalpakaṃ tu tat-prṣṭhabhāvī te eva vastunī sāmānyaviśeṣātmanā pratipadyate* "the determinate perception, on the other hand, following on the indeterminate one, apprehends both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as such". See JHA, *Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā*, p. 157 sqq.; KUPPUSWAMI, *Indian Logic*, p. 168-69.

147. *bhedābheda* view, to be refuted in greater detail infra §§ 54ff; they reason thus: one substance may have two "modes of being" (*dvyātmakatva*); it may be modified and it may be non-modified. The modifying feature has no real being of its own: it cannot exist apart from its substance. So the modified substance, the substance conjoined with its mode, has an essence of its own. Then the substance may be devoid of modes that are extrinsic to it: so it has another essence of pure entity (*svarūpa*). So one substance has two essence, one including and one excluding its mode.

and for the same reason it is not separately apprehensible. But all this does not prove that that entity has a double essence.

§ 31. Moreover, if the adherent of the doctrine that a non-differentiated entity exists contends that in the case of a self-evident entity the differentiations brought about by superimposition are denied by all words he should tell us which these words are.

—The śruti *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam*¹⁴⁸ for one. This śruti tells us that only the pure entity, which in the given context is implicitly designated as the cause,¹⁴⁹ is real and everything else unreal, because transformation and denomination are merely *vācārambhaṇa*.¹⁵⁰

—This proves nothing. After it has been asserted that when one known all becomes known, this illustration is adduced for him who thinks it impossible to have knowledge of one through knowledge of another: it shows that when one and the same entity exists as name-and-form by virtue of a differentiation in its condition by transformation, etc. — which differentiation is absolutely real —, then that entity, when known, remains the same entity also if it have another configuration different from the first one. It is the view for which the above illustration is furnished and no denial of all differentiation can be read in it.¹⁵¹ In *vācārambhaṇam* the word *vācā* means 'on account of *vyavahāra* or practical purpose' and *ārambhaṇa* is "that which is taken hold of". The name of clay in the condition of clod is one thing and its practical purpose is another.¹⁵² That same clay in the condition of jug, bowl, etc., has different names and different practical purposes; nevertheless it is that same clay which in every transformation is 'for various practical purposes taken hold of' by various generic structures and denominations.¹ And it is concluded that that is *eva satyam* "the same remains real". The

148. ChUp. 6, 1, 4.

149. Viz. *sat* of ChUp. 6, 2.

150. Cf. Ś. ad Brs. 2, 1, 14 (= R. 2, 1, 15) *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇasabdādibhyo* etc.

151. i.e., from being *sūkṣma*- "subtle", matter is transformed (as a *vikāra* in the causal process of *pariṇāma*) into being *sthūla*- "gross", constituting particularized entities.

152. For R. the effect is another phase (*avasthā*) of the cause; *vikāra*- is esp. the product of the process of *pariṇāma* viewed under the aspect of its relation to the cause from which it developed.

153. This interpretation is detailed in ŚBh. 2, 1, 15 as follows: *ārabhyata ālabhya sprṣyata ity ārambhanam / kṛtyalyuṣo bahulam* (Pāṇini 3, 3, 13) *iti karmaṇi lyuṣ / vā vākyapūrvakena vyavahāreṇa* [S (TātpD) ad *vyavahāreṇa* (Ved.): *prayojanatayā hetutvam ityarthah*] *hetunety arthah/ghaṭenodakam āharetya divāk pūrvako hy udakāharaṇa divyavahārah /*

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the possibility of knowledge of one thing through this knowledge of another thing is illustrated. No entity is being denied reality in this śruti, but the very sense stated above is further enlarged upon.

§ 32. Besides, if it were alleged by the śruti *yenāśrutam śrutam* that everything different from Brahman is unreal, the example *yathā somyaikena mrpīṇḍeṇa* would fail to illustrate the point.¹⁵⁴

— But the point is another one. The lack of reality of the transformations of clay — jug, bowl, etc. —, comparable to the falsity of the snake in the rope, etc.,¹⁵⁵ is not proved for Śvetaketu, who is eager to learn, by another *pramāṇa* and the ratiocination.¹⁵⁶ It is this point that our passage means to prove.

— No, you cannot possibly assume that, for that violates the character of an example introduced by *yathā*.¹⁵⁷

§ 33. But in the śruti *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*¹⁵⁸ it is obvious that both emphatical particles *sad eva* and *ekam eva* and the emphatical *advitīyam* deny all homogeneous and heterogeneous differentiations exceeding pure being.¹⁵⁹

This is not true. First he had illustrated with an example that the knowledge of one entity (which can have two modes of being, that of cause and that of effect) when having one mode of being, will give rise to the knowledge that it remains that same entity, even though it have another mode of being. Then, in order to propound that Brahman is the universal cause — which Śvetaketu does not yet know — he begins *sad eva somyedam*. In this passage, to be construed *idam agre sad evāśīd*, the word *agra-* denotes

154. *sādhyavikala-*; *sādhyā-* “probandum”, i.e., the assertion that we may know all by knowing one. The obvious sense of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* is that there is a causal process of *pariṇāma* by which a lump of clay is transformed into clay jugs: which means that these clay jugs, etc., are as real as the lump of clay; so the instance cannot illustrate the irreality of the “all to be known”.

155. The erroneous cognition of a snake where there is only a coiled rope is the stock-example of the falsity of our cognition of diversity in the Universe where there is nothing but the One self-identical Brahman. The ‘metamorphosis’ of the rope into snake is an instance of *vivarta* (cf. infra §§ 36; 49).

156. The *advaitin* is made to suggest that where both sensorial evidence and ratiocination fail to prove the falsity of the world, the sentence *yathā* etc. is a statement of scriptural authority (*śabdapramāṇa*) which proves this falsity apodictically.—The other *pramāṇa* is the *pratyakṣa*, ratiocination (*yukti*) stands for *anumānapramāṇa*; cf. S. *pratyakṣena bādḥādarśanān mithyātvasiddhiḥ/vyāvartamānatvādyukter ābhāsatvāc ca nā mithyātvasiddhiḥ*.

157. *yathā* introduces a statement of analogy, not a final assertion.

158. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

159. “This (Universe contained in its cause) was *sat* at the beginning. “Ś. explains *sat* as *sattāmātram*.”

a specific time, and *idam*¹⁶⁰ refers to the phenomenal world. Of this world denoted by *idam* he says that it exercises an action, viz., the action of being real, and that it is a really being substance. The words *ekam eva* deny that this was already transformed into a variety of names-and-forms.¹⁶¹ When this has been declared, it is set forth that the world has a material cause which is *sat*. The fact that the omniscient Brahman is a material cause for something else does not contradict His omnipotence: for even in the view that He is associated with something different from Himself as its operator, He remains essentially different from everything else. Therefore the word *advitīyam* negates, on the ground of Brahman's omnipotence, the existence of a separate operator.

There are a number of śrutis, like ours, which first declare that Brahman is the material cause and afterwards that He is also the operative cause. Other śrutis first admit that Brahman is the operative cause and then raise the question: if Brahman is different from everything else, then how can He be the material cause, etc., as well? — and then, by reasoning from Brahman's omnipotence, solve the apparent contradiction and assert that the same Brahman is the material cause and all subsidiary causes as well. In the śruti *kiṃ svid vanaṃ ka u sa vr̥kṣa āsīd yato dyāvāpṛthivī niṣṭatakṣur manīṣiṇo manasā pṛcchated u tad yad adhyatiṣṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan*¹⁶² it is first imagined that, if Brahman be the material cause, this would contradict our inference from general observation: ¹⁶³ but subsequently this seeming contradiction is solved by Brahman's categorical difference from everything else in existence: *brahma vanaṃ brahma sa vr̥kṣa āsīd yato niṣṭatakṣur manīṣiṇo manasā vibravīmi vaḥ brahmādhyatiṣṭhad bhuvanāni dhārayan*.¹⁶⁴

160. It (*idam*) is a substance because real being (*sat*) can be predicated of it.

161. It was not yet manifested as a plurality but abode in a single mass.

162. TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6 “What was the wood, or which was the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth? Ask this with your minds, O wise, that which supervises and supports the worlds.” In this śruti, it is assumed, the material cause (*vana-*, *vr̥kṣa-*) is distinguished from the operative cause or *adhiṣṭhātṛ* (sc. *tad yad adhyatiṣṭhat*); I have translated accordingly.

163. *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam* “knowledge by inference from general observations explained by Vātsyāyana (Bhāṣya ad NS. 1, 1, 5) *vrajyūpūrvakam anyatra dr̥ṣṭasyānyatra darśanam iti / tathā cādityayasya / tasmād asty apratyakṣapy ādityasya vrajyati /* “We see an object in another place than we saw it in before when it has moved; so we conclude the same for the sun (though we have not seen it move); so, albeit unperceived, we know that the sun moves.” Similarly, it is observed generally, that no material cause is simultaneously the operative cause as well, so that we might be led to infer the same for Brahman. But since Brahman is categorically different from everything else (*sarvavilakṣana-*), this general observation has no validity as to Him.

164. TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6: “Brahman is the wood, and Br. is the tree, out of which they fashioned heaven and earth: I tell you with the mind, O wise, that it is Brahman that supervises and supports the worlds”. (cf. supra note 162).

To resume. In the passage under discussion the words *agra*, etc., show therefore that there are a number of differentiations in Brahman Himself. There is no word to be found in it that voices a negation of differentiations such as you are pleased to assume. On the contrary the existence of a time-differentiation shows clearly that Brahman is the cause and the world his effect: *āsīt* denotes a specific action; then there are His modes of being the material as well as the operative cause of the world; then again His quality of omnipotence as proved by the denial of difference between material and operative: thus differentiations, unsuspected before, are expounded by thousands!

§ 34. Since this śruti means to teach that the relation between cause and effect is one based upon substantial reality, it gives the lie to the *asatkāryavāda* doctrine as voiced in *asad evedam agra āsīd*, etc.,¹⁶⁵ by countering it with the question: "How could that really be so, my son!" i.e., there is no ground whatever for the origination of an entity that did not exist before. That is what he says in *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta*: i.e., an entity that has originated from *asat* remains essentially *asat*, in the same way as an entity — a jug, etc. — that has originated from clay remains essentially clay. The origination of an existent entity is by definition its conjunction with a variety of modes or phases of being, and this conjunction is the ground that it may have a variety of practical purposes.¹⁶⁶

§ 35. In other words, it is declared that one and the same entity that is a cause becomes an effect when entering upon another mode of being. The point which is sought to establish hereby is this that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one. But this point cannot be proved in the *asatkāryavāda*¹⁶⁷ theory, for according to this theory an effect—called *avayavin*¹⁶⁸ because it has several causes: *nimitta*, *samavāyin*, *asamavāyin*,¹⁶⁹ etc. — originates as a completely different entity. Hence it is impos-

165. ChUp. 6, 2, 1 *tad dhaika āhuḥ* — *asad evedam agra āsīd*, etc. R. will discuss this śruti presently.

166. *vyavahāra*— cf. supra note 153a.

167. The *asatkāryavāda* (the doctrine that the effect is not contained in its cause but originates as a new entity) is summed up neatly in Annambhaṭṭa's definition of an effect (TS. § 39): *kāryam prāgabdhāvapratiyogī* "the effect is the counter-entity of its own antecedent non-existence," i.e., originates unprecedented.

168. "Composite, having members," sc. the various causes.

169. Cf. Annambhaṭṭa's definition (TS. § 40): *kāraṇam trividham samavāyiyasamavāyiniṃmittabhedavat / yatsamavetaṃ kāryam utpadyate tad samavāyikāraṇam / yathā tantavaḥ paṭasya pataśca svagatarūpādeḥ / kāryena kāraṇena vā sahaikasminn arthe samavetaṃ sati yat kāraṇam tad asamavāyikāraṇam / yathā tantusamyogaḥ paṭasya tanturūpam paṭarūpasya / tadubhayabhinnam nimittakāraṇam / yathā turivemādikaṃ paṭasya*. I refer to Athalye's and Foucher's discussions of these passages.

sible anyhow that the effect is known when the cause is known, inasmuch as the effect is an entity completely different from the entity that is its cause.

But, it may be put forward, what are the grounds on which you reject such a different entity that is *avayavin*?

First the fact that, as even our adversary who maintains that the effect originates as a new entity must agree¹⁷⁰—the different name, practical purpose etc., which apply to the identical entity, prove that a different phase has been entered upon by the cause; and secondly the fact that we do not see another entity appear at all. Hence it is said that the effect is nothing but the cause in another phase, and that is what our śruti declares.

§ 36. But is the *asatkāryavāda* not rejected just to show that there can be no error without a substratum?¹⁷¹ For one and the same being which alone is real in the form of spirituality, evolves into the form of the phenomenal world when it is obscured by Nescience.¹⁷² If Nescience is to have a

170. For neither the Naiyāyikas-Vaiśeṣikas hold that the effect originates *ex nihilo*. AS R. declares GBh. 2, 27 *utpattiviniśādayaḥ sato dravyasyāvasthāviśeṣāḥ / tantuprabhṛtīni dravyāṇi santy eva racanāviśeṣayuktāni paṭādiny ucyaṃte/asatkāryavādināpy etāvadv evopalabhyate / nahi tatra tantusamsthānaviśeṣātirekeṇa dravyāntaraṃ pratiyate / kāravayūpāranāmāntarabhajanavyavahāravaiśeṣāṇām etāvataivopapatter nā ca dravyāntarakalpanā yuktā /*

171. *niradhiṣṭhānabhramāsaṃbhava*—; the erroneous cognition of a snake presupposes the existence of a real object (*in casu*, a rope) on which this false cognition is projected or superimposed. Similarly the false cognition of the phenomenal world presupposes the existence of a real substratum or *adhiṣṭhāna*. The Mādhyamika Buddhist, professing the falsity of the world of cognized phenomena, denies that this falsity is projected or superimposed on something real: so they recognize the possibility of falsity projected on a void: *niradhiṣṭhāna / nirālambana*.

172. *ekam cidrūpaṃ satyam evāvidyācchāditaṃ jagadrūpeṇa vivartate*: this sentence sums up the ontologico-cosmogonical doctrine of *advaitavāda*: there is one entity, pure consciousness or spirituality, which alone is real. This one real entity 'unrolls' itself, or develops, into the world when it is obscured by Nescience. Hence follows that, if this Nescience is to have a substratum, the real itself must be its ultimate cause: for, as S. remarks (borrowing his argument from R. §§ 46-47, note 218), if the substratum were not real in itself, it would stand in need of a substratum itself, and so *ad infinitum*. The *vivartavāda* is an attempt to account for the phenomenal world without sacrificing the unchangeability of the absolute. *Vivarta* is both the process and the product of the development of the absolute and real into the finite and non-real, in other words, the transition into an effect that has not the same degree of being as its material cause (*vivarto nāma upādānaviśamasattākakāryāpattiḥ* Dharmarāja's definition, Ved. P. II, § 85, in contradistinction to *pariṇāma*, the transition of a cause into an effect with the same degree of being: *pariṇāmo nāma upādānasamasattākakāryāpattiḥ*). This process of *vivarta* has its origin in the obscuration of the absolute by Nescience, its opposite. Strictly, *avidyā* itself is the *vivarta*, and the phenomenal world the *pariṇāma* of *avidyā*. If the Advaitin wants to have ChUp. 6, 2, 1 confute the Mādhyamika doctrine, his interpretation should run like this: *katham asataḥ saḥ jāyeta* "how can an 'existent' being derive

substratum, we must assume that the Real itself is its ultimate cause. Which proves that the *asatkāryavāda* theory is untenable.

This is not true. What is actually declared is this that that theory is untenable because the assertion and the illustration that all is known when one is known can only have any bearing at all on the topic if the *satkārya* point of view is adopted. For that matter, in your own position the theory that an error without a substratum is impossible does not admit of proof itself.¹⁷³ Your doctrine leads to this conclusion: When one holds that the defect inherent in a spiritual being is real and that this defect is a real basis for errors to arise, then, being oneself afflicted with that defect, one is proved to have a vision of a phantom, say a fairy-tale castle, which in itself is unreal. But when one holds that this defect is unreal and therefore is no real basis for errors to arise, one is proved to have that illusion all the same, because of its very basis being unreal! Actually in your position an error without a substratum is not at all impossible.

§ 37. We have already pointed out that Brahman is declared to be differentiated by all the qualities ascribed to him: for even the so-called purifying statements, *satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma, anando brahma* etc., do not contradict the assertion that one denoted object may be qualified by a number of qualities which are established by *sāmānādhikarāṇya*¹⁷⁴ constructions and by the original sense of the terms.

from nothing?" The Advaitin and Mādhyamika concur in that this 'existent' being of the phenomenal world is ultimately unreal. Where they differ is the reality of its ultimate ground, accepted by the former, rejected by the latter. Śāṅkara (ChUpBh.) states that the above śruti attacks the Vaināsikas or Nihilist Buddhists: it is against this interpretation that R. raises his objection; but cf. my remarks Intr. III.

173. The advaitin derives the illusion of plurality—unreal without doubt—from *avi-dyā* or Nescience, about whose unreality he is less sure: he describes it as neither real nor unreal (*sadasadanirvacanīya*-). As R. will explain later, this leaves three possibilities: it is not *sat*, therefore *asat*; not *asat*, therefore *sat*; neither *sat* nor *asat*, therefore both *asat* and *sat*. Suppose we have an illusion: it must derive either from a real or from an unreal defect. If this defect is real, our illusion is proved, however unreal its content may be. If this defect is unreal, our illusion is still established (*upapanna*) because it cannot have risen from a defect that is non-existent. So in the latter case we are left with a demonstrable illusion for which we cannot account. Consequently the advaitin, unable to define the defect properly, implicitly admits the possibility of the *niradhiṣṭhānabhrama* which he professes to deny

174. *sāmānādhikarāṇya* shows a distinct peculiarity in the one entity denoted: the stock-example *nīla utpalah* is "a lotus that is blue and thus distinguished from white and red ones." The sense of a word established by grammatical analysis into root (*dhātu*), stem (*prātipadika*) and declined form (*pada*) shows again a number of peculiarities proper to the concept denoted: it may have a gender, be singular, dual or plural, govern or be governed in case relation etc., supra § 28.

§ 38. But the śruti *athāta ādeśo neti neti*¹⁷⁵ is obviously a negation all the way round.

I would ask: exactly what does it negate?

The entire phenomenal world which consists of incorporated and unincorporated beings according to the śruti *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca*.¹⁷⁶

But, considering the maxim: *Better keep from touching mud than wash it off*,¹⁷⁷ it seems hardly appropriate first to teach that all that was not suspected before to be Brahman's form is actually His form and then in the same breath to deny that same teaching. Let us see what the negation really means. The Author of the Sūtras himself declares: *for it denies that Brahman is only so much as has been said and asserts that He is more than that*:¹⁷⁸ so since immediately afterwards in *atha nāmadheyam satyasya satyam iti prāṇā vai satyam teṣāṃ eṣa satyam*¹⁷⁹ a host of qualities like *satya* etc. is propounded, the preceding *neti neti* denies merely that Brahman is only so much: Brahman is much more than has been stated before. This is the meaning of the above sūtra.

§ 39. But the śruti *neha nānāsti kiṃcana*¹⁸⁰ clearly denies that there is variety.

Here too it is declared later on, in *sarvasya vaśī sarvasyeśānaḥ*,¹⁸¹ that Brahman is *satyasamkalpa* and sovereign Lord respectively. Hence what is actually denied is not what you think but: a variety that would not be ensouled by Brahman: that alone is the opposite of what is declared in the assertion that the Lord has all entities, spiritual as well as non-spiritual, for his body and that therefore, as the Lord of all and as being modified by all, He exists as the sole One. *In all śrutis of this description there is nowhere*

175. BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 "so now the teaching 'it is not such nor such'".

176. BĀUp. 2, 3, 1 "verily Brahman has two forms, one embodied and one disembodied;" cf. Ś ad BrS. 3, 2, 22 *kim ayam pratiṣedho* (sc. *neti neti*) *rūpe* (sc. *mūrtaṃ caivāmūrtaṃ ca*) *rūpavaccobhayam api pratiṣedhati . . . dvau caitau pratiṣedhau, dvirnetiśabdaprayogāt*.

177. *prakṣalanāddhi pañkasya dūrād asparśanam varam* a popular maxim (*nyāya*): quoted twice in Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭasiddhi* (pp. 25; 215); to be found in Hitopadeśa I, 185, where the first half reads: *dharmārtham yasya vittehā varam tasya nirihatā*.

178. BrS. 3, 2, 22 *prakṛtāitāvattvam hi pratiṣedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ*.

179. BĀUp. 4, 3, 6 "so, the name of the real is the real: thus the real is verily the vital airs and the possessor of them is the real."

180. BĀUp. 6, 4, 19 "there is no variety here of any kind."

181. BĀUp. 6, 4, 22 "the ruler of all, the lord of all."

a word to be found which in unmistakable terms denies that Brahman is differentiated.¹⁸²

§ 40. Furthermore, you cannot interpret like this: Brahman who in reality is mere non-differentiated knowledge finds nonetheless variety in Himself when his own proper form is obscured by obscuring nescience. Obscuration is by definition the negation of illumination; so, since you do not admit that illumination is a property of, and exceeding, the proper form itself, it would follow that illumination is the proper form so that actually the proper form itself would disappear! To say that knowledge—synonymous with illumination—is permanent and that illumination is obscured by nescience, means either that the illumination is prevented from originating, or that existing illumination is terminated. Either alternative would mean that, since no illumination can originate, the proper form has ceased to exist.

—But illumination remains permanent and untransformed.

—Then what you say boils down to this: even though there be nescience, there is nothing hidden in Brahman: hence follows that He finds variety in Himself. Now this makes no sense to honest people.^{182a}

§ 41. —But even you must agree¹⁸³ that the proper form of the soul is knowledge and that the soul is self-illuminating. Now, when the soul is erroneously identified¹⁸⁴ with the proper form of its body, god etc., we must necessarily resort to assuming that the illumination of its proper form is obscured, inasmuch as no other formation¹⁸⁵ can be superimposed on the soul proper when the soul's proper form is known. Besides, the error that you have pointed out applies to only one soul in our case, whereas in your case, since you assume an infinite number of souls, you have to solve it for all souls.

182. This concluding statement rounds off the first part of R.'s refutation of advaitavāda, which is, according to the programmatic stanza (§ 2) *śrutinyāyāpeta*- "in conflict alike with śruti and reason." It has now been shown that the Scriptures lend no support to advaita. R. will now demonstrate that its theses cannot stand the test of rational criticism.

182a. *satso anirvacanīyam*: a pun on the repetitive *sadasadanirvacanīya*- with which the advaitin describes his *māyā* or *avidyā*.

183. Both R. and Ś. hold that the ātman is essentially knowledge, but where Ś. defines the essence as knowledge, R. regards knowledge as the essential property of a substance; and where Ś. accepts only one ātman that is at once identical with Brahman, R. admits an infinite plurality of individual ātmans subordinated to the Supreme Brahman.

184. *abhimāna*, see supra note § 24.

185. *ākāra*- "configuration, characteristic form". The ātman is, acc. to R. *jñānai-kārkāra*- (~ *jñānasvarūpa*-); by the process of *abhimāna* "presumption (Renou)" the ātman is erroneously identified with the empirical ego of a given body: the body's *ākāra* is superimposed on it; now, this superimposition is only conceivable if the proper form is not evident as such.—The term *adhyāsa* supra note 136 belongs particularly to the advaitin's terminology; R. avoids using it.

§ 42. The reply to this objection is this. The Supreme Brahman is by nature such that his proper form is absolutely opposed to imperfection and is solely constituted by infinite knowledge and bliss. He is an ocean of noble qualities¹⁸⁶—unlimited, unsurpassed and immeasurable—which are proper to his nature. His mode of being is that He is modified by all creatures, for his body is constituted by all entities because he is the inner Ruler of all entities: firstly the non-spiritual entities which enable the spiritual entities to attain the supreme salutary Goal, which are liable to evolutions of infinite variety and which are the objects of experiences for the spiritual entities,—and secondly, the spiritual entities themselves which are of an infinite variety, either bound or released: the sum-total of these entities constitutes a particle of Brahman and forms the material for his sport. They constitute his infinite, universal supernal manifestation which is not affected by the evolutions¹⁸⁷ that are brought about by Time, whose proper form comprises countless divisions, from the smallest to the highest units¹⁸⁸ and which is the operative cause of all evolutions of the Universe: origination, subsistence, resorption etc. It is this Brahman who is the object of our knowledge, that is knowledge imparted by the Veda. This Veda consists of numberless branches arranging themselves according to the part they belong to, Ṛg-, Yajur-, Sāma- and Atharvaveda, whose established doctrines have been transmitted in an uninterrupted series of studies,¹⁸⁹ *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *dharmaśāstra* etc. which are all founded on the Veda, consisting in *vidhi*,¹⁹⁰ *arthavāda*¹⁹¹ and *mantra*,¹⁹² and which are instituted by a great number of sages who were capable of immediate presentation of Brahman, such as the venerable Dvaipāyana, Parāśara, Vālmiki, Manu, Yājñavalkya,¹⁹³ Gautama,¹⁹⁴

186. *udāraguṇa*-, synonymous with *kalyāṇaguṇa*-, supra note 5.

187. *pariṇāma*-

188. *nimeṣakaṣṭhākalāmuhūrtaparārdhaparyanta*-; *nimeṣa*- "instant": 15 *nimeṣas* make one *kaṣṭhā*: 30 *kaṣṭhās* 1 *kalā*; 30 *kalās* 1 *muhūrta*: 30 *muhūrtas* one natural day (cf. VP. 1, 3, 8-9); *parārdha*- "half the duration of Brahmā's life; cosmic life so far lapsed" VP. 1, 3, 26-28. To this passage cf. VP. 4, 1, 84 *kalāmuhūrtādīmayaś ca kālo na yadvibhūteḥ pariṇāmahetuḥ*. S. adds that Time, though effecting evolution in matter, is subject to evolution itself: *nimeṣa* etc. are the various products. There is no evidence that R. subscribed to the Pañcarātra conception of *akhaṇḍakāla*- "impartite Time" cf. SCHRADER, *Pañcarātra* p. 66; repeated YID V, p. 77; def. ib. *akhaṇḍaḥ kālo nityaḥ kāryaḥ punar anityaḥ* (sc. *kālaḥ*).

189. *pāṭha*- "lit. recital" the oral traditions of the Vedic schools; the idea is that these texts do only repeat, in a more comprehensible form, what from all eternity had been formulated in the Veda.

190. *vidhi*- "injunction."

191. *arthavāda*- "exegetical portion."

192. *mantra*- "Vedic stanza used in ritual."

193. Author of *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*.

194. Author of *Gautamiyadharmasāstra*.

Āpastamba¹⁹⁵ etc. Now we recognize Brahman as the object of our knowledge and the Veda as the pramāṇa of our knowledge: could we then be unable to reach a proved conclusion? As the venerable Dvaipāyana declares in the Mahābhārata: . . . *who knows that I, unborn and undying, am the world's sovereign lord.*¹⁹⁶ *Two orders of entities are in this world, a transitory and an imperishable one: the transitory comprises all elements, the imperishable one is called kūṣastha. But there is another higher person that is called the Supreme Spirit, who is the eternal Lord who penetrates and supports the entire Universe.*¹⁹⁷ *And He matures the time; no time is there, there is the Lord alone. Those, my dear, are the evolutions of the realm of the Supreme Spirit. You should reflect on this that this entire transcendent Universe, evolving from the unevolved to the last differentiations and owning a wealth of developments, is Hari's sport.*¹⁹⁸ *For in Kṛṣṇa alone is the rise and decline of the worlds, and for Kṛṣṇa exist all these beings animate and inanimate.*¹⁹⁹ Here *kṛṣṇasya hi kṛte* "for Kṛṣṇa" means that the Universe is an accessory to Kṛṣṇa.²⁰⁰ The venerable Parāśara too declares: "The word Bhagavat is used for the pure Supreme Brahman in his infinite manifestation as the first universal cause."²⁰¹ The word Bhagavat connotes all his perfections, knowledge, power, strength, sovereignty, fortitude and glory, without any imperfect quality etc.²⁰² Thus this word Bhagavat is a master-word applicable to none but Vāsudeva who is the Supreme Brahman.²⁰³ This term, whose object, expression and signification are so worthy, applies directly only to Him, and to others only indirectly.²⁰⁴ That Supreme Order called Viṣṇu is thus qualified; it is immaculate, real, pervasive, perennial and free from all imperfections.²⁰⁵ And Time, comprising minute, hour etc., is no cause of any evolution in His manifestation.²⁰⁶ Hear the exploits of Him that sports like a child.²⁰⁷ Manu, too, says: . . . *the Commander of all, subtler than the subtle*²⁰⁸ . . . , Yājñavalkya,²⁰⁹ too: *the purification of the kṣetraja by knowledge of God is deemed the highest. And*

195. Eponym of Āpastambiyadharmasūtra.

196. BhG. 10, 3 *yo mām ajam.*

197. BhG. 15, 16-17 *dvāv imau puruṣau.*

198. MBh. 12, 25, 9, *kālam sa pacate.*

199. MBh. 2, 38, 23 *Kṛṣṇa eva hi lokānām.*

200. Same interpretation GBh. 4, 4; on *śeṣa-* supra note 3 and infra § 122.

201. VP. 6, 5, 72 *suddhe mahāvibhūtyākhye.*

202. VP. 6, 5, 79 *jñānaśaktibalaiśvarya-*

203. VP. 6, 5, 76 *evam eṣa mahāśabdo.*

204. VP. 6, 5, 77 *tatra pūjyapadarthokti-*

205. VP. 1, 22, 53 *evampṛakāram alam.*

206. VP. 4, 1, 84 *kalāmuhūrtādi-*

207. VP. 1, 2, 18 *kṛdato balakasyeva.*

208. Manusmṛti 12, 122; the Vulgate reads *anīyāṃsam aṇorapi.*

209. Yājñavalkyasmṛti 3, 34 *kṣetrajaśyēśvarajñānād viśuddhiḥ paramā matā.*

Āpastamba declares: *pūḥ prāṇinaḥ sarva eva guhāśayasya*,²¹⁰ i.e. "all breathing beings constitute the pūr "town" or "body"²¹¹ of Him whose dwelling-place is secret: the Supreme Spirit"; *prāṇinaḥ*²¹² means "the composite beings of matter ensouled by the individual soul."

§ 43. But what is the use of this pathos? The objection is still not refuted!

We reply: once we agree upon this we have refuted your entire objection by asserting that contraction and expansion of consciousness,²¹³ which is a *dharma* of the soul that belongs to its very nature, are supremely real inasmuch as they are caused by karman. For you, however, illumination is not a *dharma* but the proper form itself: so contraction and expansion of it cannot reasonably be admitted. Factors like karman,²¹⁴ which bring about the obscuration, are the cause that illumination cannot originate. If you assume that nescience is the obscuring factor, then the illumination, which is the proper form, is annihilated, as we have pointed out before. For us, on the other hand, the illumination of knowledge, which is an eternal *dharma* of the proper form, is contracted by karman that takes on the form of ignorance. Owing to that contraction the identification²¹⁵ of the soul with the proper form of its body, god etc., is brought about. This is the difference between our views. As has been said: *ignorance, also called karman, is considered to be the third power by which the power which is the individual soul that is in everyone is frustrated and has its share of all the sufferings of samsāra which have too long a life. And in proportion that this power called individual soul is obscured by the ignorance it works in all beings in different degrees.*²¹⁶ Which shows that ignorance, or the karman of the individual souls, causes the knowledge, which is a *dharma* proper to them, to contract and expand.

210. Āpastambiyadharmasūtra 1, 8, 22, 4 *pūḥ prāṇinaḥ sarva eva guhāśayasya*; the reading *sarvaguhāśayasya* of some MSS., adopted by Sudarśanāchari, is, as follows from R.'s own interpretation and Bühler's edition, to be rejected.

211. S. quotes 'the Naighaṇṭukas' (= Halāyudha, Abhidhānaratnamālā 2, 355) *angaṃ vapur varṣma puram pratikam.*

212. *prāṇin-*, synonymous with *śarīrin* "soul in the body."

213. *caitanya-* "spirituality" (<*cetana-* "spiritual being"; advaitic term rarely used by R.), synonymous with *jñāna-* or *prakāśa-*; for a systematic account of the theory of *dharmabhūtajñāna-* see YID chapter VII.

214. Other factors are, acc. to S., *vāsana* "residue of former impressions creating habits of thought and practice" and the *prakṛti* with its three constituent *guṇas*.

215. *abhimāna.*

216. VP. 6, 7, 61-63; for R.'s interpretation of this VP. context I may refer to my paper *The Śubhāśrayaprakaraṇa* etc.

§ 44. Furthermore, on the authority of the śrutis and on the strength of the doctrine of identity, you have to²¹⁷ resort to an obscuring nescience that is a deficiency which causes Brahman's proper form to disappear. Inasmuch as this nescience itself is false, it requires another deficiency that gives rise to the very notion of nescience, just as the phenomenal world requires a deficiency giving rise to the very notion of phenomenal world, viz. the nescience. Therefore, considering that nescience itself cannot be the ultimate cause of false notions, Brahman Itself must be the ultimate cause of false notions: since it has no beginning this nescience must have been false from all eternity: so it must from all eternity have been falsely conceived by Brahman; and since it cannot be admitted that the deficiency that gives rise to the false notion of nescience is ultimately real itself, therefore Brahman Itself is the ultimate cause of the false notion of nescience, this means that Brahman being eternal we would never get rid of nescience and so never be released.²¹⁸

§ 45. On the same grounds²¹⁹ we reject the theory: that there is only one body with one soul and the other bodies have no soul, just as the bodies we see in our dreams have no souls: in a dream only the dreamer's body has a soul and all the various and endless bodies that appear during the dream have no souls at all, because they are only the products of the imagination of that single one, so that their souls are false.²²⁰ Now we say,²²¹ since Brahman

217. "Have to" because the advaitin identifies the proper form with the obscured knowledge.

218. Since the advaitin considers the avidyā to be "illusory" (*mithyārūpa-*), i.e. to have no ultimate reality of its own, he must derive whatever reality it has from a source or basis (*adhiṣṭhāna-*) that is real, just as he, in order to explain the 'illusory' phenomenal world, resorts to avidyā as the source of this illusion. This source of the deficiency avidyā, which therefore must itself be deficient, must be real and not illusory in its turn: otherwise there would be *anavasthā* "regressus ad infinitum", every unreal deficiency deriving from a preceding one. This real source or substratum can be no one but Brahman. Avidyā is admittedly unreal from all eternity, so Brahman must have had this Nescience from all eternity. Now, the advaitin cannot allow the eternal co-existence of truth and untruth; it follows that in the final analysis he allows only for untruth: untruth, falsity etc. is the ultimate reality.

219. Viz. that all except Brahman is illusory (S.).

220. *ekajīvavāda*; Appaya Dīkṣita, *Siddhāntalēśasamgraha*, 2, 2, 32 describes this theory in very similar terms and images: *eko jīvaḥ, tena caikam eva śarīraṃ sajjīvam, anyāni svapnadṛṣṭaśarīrāṇīva nirjīvāni, tadajñānakalpitaṃ jagat, tasya svapnadarśanavat yāvadavidyam sarvo vyavahārah; baddhamuktavyavasthāpi nāsti jīvasyaikatvāt; śukamuktayādīkam api svapnapurusāntaramuktayādīkam iva kalpitaṃ; atra ca sambhāvitāsakalā-śaṅkāpaṅkaprakṣāṇam svapnadṛṣṭāntasāniladhārāyaiva kartavyam iti.*

221. R.'s argument is: acc. to the advaita only Brahman is real and everything else illusory; consequently all bodies are unreal and there exists no proper jīva existent in a body. Granted that the bodies and souls that we dream about are illusory, the advaitin cannot even maintain that there is an embodied dreamer: the embodied dreamer

only imagines the existence of souls different from his own proper form and further only imagines that there are any bodies at all, the real existence of an embodied soul in one single body is as false as the body itself, so it follows that all bodies are false and the existence of souls in those bodies is false too. Hence there is no difference between one body and the real existence of a soul in it. But for us when we awake from our dream the personal body of the dreamer and the real existence of a soul in it are not sublated whereas the other bodies and the indwelling souls of our dream are sublated. It follows that they are all false and that only the personal body with its indwelling soul has any reality at all: that is the difference we make.

§ 46. Further we must inquire now how the nescience ceases to exist, and what that cessation is after all.²²²

—The knowledge of identity puts an end to it, and this cessation is of such a kind that it is contrary to inexplicable.

Then we contend: something is contrary to inexplicable means something is explicable:²²³ it must be either real, or unreal, or both, there is no other alternative. When it is held to be different from Brahman, then the nescience cannot yet have ceased to exist.²²⁴ When it is held that Brahman Itself is the cessation, then it should have ceased before, because that follows from the knowledge of the Vedānta which teaches that Brahman

is also illusory. The bodies and souls that the (illusory) dreamer dreams about are illusory in the second degree, but the illusory dreamer is no more real than the phantoms of his dream. So, in the final analysis, there is no difference at all between the existence of any body and the existence therein of any soul, whether they are illusory in the first or in the second degree. So the entire instance is inappropriate: appropriate is it when the reality of the dreamer and his body is accepted: only then the illusoriness of the dream's bodies and souls can be defined by the reality of the dreamer's body and soul.

222. S. notes that *kīdṛṣi* in the question is used pejoratively (*lṣepārtha*), as it well may be: to it correspond in the reply the words *anīrvacanīyapratyanīkākāra*, which to R.'s realistic mind is an exceedingly clumsy way of expressing oneself.

223. Anything not inexplicable (*anīrvacanīyapratyanīka*) is therefore explicable: it must be explained either as real, or as unreal, or as both. If the cessation is unreal, there is nothing to discuss. If it is real, two alternatives present themselves: it is either different from, or identical with Brahman: 1. if it is different, then duality must persist ultimately and Nescience, responsible for duality, has therefore not ceased; 2. if it is identical with Brahman, Nescience has ceased from all eternity, so that Nescience does not appear at all. If the cessation is both real and unreal, Nescience is non-existent on both counts.

224. Being different from Brahman it is 'false' (belonging to the realm of Nescience), and consequently its annihilation is false; so, if Nescience is annihilated, it must still be there to account for the traces of duality left by its own annihilation.

was originally non-differentiated. So your theory that the knowledge of identity as such means cessation of nescience and that without it there is *samsāra* is invalidated.

§ 47. Moreover, the question must be raised: considering that the terminating knowledge itself is also false, who terminates that terminating knowledge in its turn?

—After having put an end to all difference other than itself the terminating knowledge vanishes by itself because its nature is but momentary, even as a fire in a forest or a counter-poison terminate themselves.

No! The terminating knowledge is different from Brahman. Therefore its proper form, and its origination and annihilation are false. Hence follows that the nescience persists in the form of its annihilation.²²⁵ So it remains to be said what puts an end to the notion that that knowledge has been annulled. A forest fire etc. too have of necessity a series of successive developments that are contrary to their initial phase of being.

§ 48. Furthermore, of what kind is the subject of the knowledge which denies everything that is different from Brahman as pure consciousness?

—He has the form of superimposition.

No, for then he is to be denied by, and consequently the object of, the terminating knowledge so that he cannot be its subject.

—Brahman's proper form then.

Then we have two alternatives: is Brahman's proper form *in its pure form* the subject of the terminating knowledge or *in its superimposed form*? If it is *superimposed*, than this superimposition and another nescience from which it derives will persist because they themselves are not the objects of the terminating knowledge. If still another knowledge is assumed to put an end to them, there will be a *regressus ad infinitum*, because this knowledge will also have the triple character of all knowledge. For if it lacks this triple character²²⁶ all knowledge ceases to be knowledge at all, since knowledge is of some subject and has the form of a definite validity for a definite object. So if it lacks this triple character of all knowledge, your terminating knowledge is no more terminating than a knowledge constituting a proper form. When you assume that the subject of knowledge is Brahman's proper

225. As S. remarks: to be annihilated is, by definition, to enter on a phase of being opposed to former phases; it is not completely nothing: *na tu dravyābhāvaḥ*.

226. The 'triple character' (*trirūpatva*), or the three constituent factors of all knowledge are 1. *jñātr* "the subject of knowing"; 2. *jñāna*- "the act of knowing"; 3. *jñeya*- "the object of knowing".

form in pure form, then you adopt our point of view. It is ridiculous to say that the proper form of the terminating knowledge as well as the person that exercises this knowledge are to be numbered among the objects that they themselves terminate: not less ridiculous, in fact, than if in the case of an action of cutting wood, when it is said: "Devadatta cuts everything but the earth," this would be taken to mean that the person cutting and the cutting activity itself are to be reckoned among the things that are cut!²²⁷

§ 49. Further, we should inquire into another question: what source gives rise to that knowledge of identity which puts an end to all diversity?

—That source is the śruti.

That is impossible: for the śruti being different from Brahman is a product of the imagination of nescience and can therefore never act as the source of knowledge that sublates the phenomenal world. For a certain erroneous notion that springs from a faulty cause, for example that a rope is a snake, is not sublated by the cognition that it is no snake but a rope, if that cognition too springs from a faulty cause. Suppose that when we have that notion of snake and are consequently afraid of it, a certain confused person comes along and assures us that it is only a rope and not a snake: then, if we knew that that person is confused, his assurance would not sublate our notion that the rope is a snake and our fear would not vanish.²²⁸ Similarly, a man who has effective knowledge²²⁹ knows at the very time when he hears the śruti that the śruti too is founded on error, since it is different from Brahman. Besides, if a man with knowledge were told that the terminating knowledge and the śāstra in which that knowledge is assembled can be sublated themselves, then he would instantly conclude: "Oh, but then there is no reality in the termination of the phenomenal world," and he would know that the phenomenal world is real, in the same way as he would know, when a man appearing in his dream had told him that his father had died, that his father was still alive in reality. Besides, the statements *tat tvam asi* etc. would not²³⁰ sublate the phenomenal world²³¹ because they are founded on error, just as the sublating assurance of the confused person to the effect that there was only a rope and no snake would not be sublating at all.

227. Same comparison ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 125 where THIBAUT renders *bhūtalavyatirik-tam* "everything on the surface of the earth", instead of "everything different from the earth itself:" to *bhūta-* corresponds Brahman, the act of knowing sublates everything different from Brahman. LACOMBE translates "tout ce qui dépassait la surface de la terre", which is not very clear.

228. Same argument and comparison ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 54.

229. *prayoajakajñānavataḥ*.

230. i.e., even if the *lakṣita* sense of *tat tvam asi* is admitted.

231. As represented by *tvam*, the embodied ātman.

§ 50. But, in point of fact, would it not be more like this: when we are afraid of something in a dream but we realize while dreaming that it is only a dream, then our previous fear vanishes, as is a matter of common experience: in the same manner this could be possible in our case too.

That is not true, for it is also a matter of common experience that our fear does not cease, even though we realize while dreaming that is all a dream; so that does not make any difference.

§ 51. You say that while we hear the śruti we realize that it is all a dream. But what you actually say is this: the śāstra, although it is false because it is a product of an erring imagination, expounds that Brahman has no second; and because later on it appears that the śāstra cannot validly bear upon a Brahman that is so as the śāstra asserts, it follows that this Brahman is proved. This is improper reasoning, for the assertion that all is nil sublates itself too.

—But this assertion itself is found on error.

Then you say yourself that the assertion that Brahman has no second is also founded on error. The only difference is that the invalidity of the assertion itself that all is nil appears later on. So, he who holds the view that all is nil and he who holds the view that all entities different from Brahman are false do not recognize the reality of the *pramāṇas* that prove their own points; therefore the really competent declare that their views have no title to philosophy at all: *Philosophy marches always on as long as philosophers have real means of knowledge; but the philosophy of the śūnyavādin has no title since it has no means.*²³²

§ 52. Moreover²³³ which *pramāṇa* proves that the phenomenal world as apprehended by perception is false?

—As perception can by other means be proved to derive from a deficiency, the non-deficient scripture, being not so proved by other means, sublates perception.

Then I ask: what deficiency can give rise to a perception that has infinite diversity for its object?

—Perception is produced by a deficiency arising from beginningless *vāsanās*²³⁴ of diversity etc.

But then the śāstra is produced by that same deficiency, so perception and śāstra cannot stand in the relation of thing sublated and thing sublating since they derive from the same deficiency.

§ 53. Perception apprehends the *padārthas* which have definite generic structures, e.g. of a human being, connected with the elements ether, wind etc. and with the sense-objects sound, touch etc. deriving from these elements. The śāstra, on the other hand, is concerned with the proper form of Brahman as modified by endless differentiating features, like his being the immanent soul in all creatures and his being real, with the various methods of worshipping Him, *upāsana* etc., and with the specific fruits that are obtained by His Grace which follows attainment of him, and with the specific eradication of the fundamental causes giving rise to things displeasing Him,—in a word, objects beyond the scope of perception. Hence follows that there can be no contradiction between śāstra and perception. Anyone who maintains the superior authority of śāstra qualified by numerous qualities, such as being the established doctrine transmitted by beginningless and endless uninterrupted studies etc., must necessarily recognize the reality of perception.

But enough of refuting this web of false doctrines and faulty reasoning that is swept away like reed by the forceful wind of hundreds of śrutis in succession. We have done with it!

§ 54. The second school²³⁵ assumes that there is no other entity existing but a Brahman conditioned by adjuncts.²³⁶ It follows that where there is a natural admixture of adjuncts to Brahman all defects inherent in adjuncts will be found in Brahman Himself. That means that all śrutis which set forth that Brahman is free from all defects, e.g. that *there is no imperfection in Him*,²³⁷ are discarded.

§ 55. But the idea is rather like this: a space-unit contained in a jug is of another character than the main space,²³⁸ since only the former is

235. Bhāskara's *bhedābhedavāda*, more precisely *aupādhikavāda*: doctrine that Brahman, conditioned by real *upādhis*, constitutes the phenomenal world.

236. *upādhī-* adjunct, i.e. an accidental factor added to an entity, subjecting it to restrictions and delimitations which condition its mode of being without impairing its essence".

237. *apahatapāpmā*, ChUp. 8, 7, 1.

238. *ākāśa-* "space/ether," first of the *mahābhūtāni*, conceived as a material element that is spatially unlimited: it is held to be *eka-* "indivisibly one" and *vibhu-* "omnipresent". Space may be adjoined to by a jug which has a finite measure of capacity; although this jug with the space contained therein delimits the space to a finite extent, it does not, to the mind of the *aupādhikavādin*, affect its unlimitedness. The comparison,

232. Kumārila, *Śloka-vārttika*, *Nirāmbanavāda*, st. 128 cd; the half śloka here translated follows (129 ab): *adhikāro 'nupāyatvān na vāde śūnyavādinah*, where *upāya* = *pramāṇa*.

233. Cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1.

234. Residues of mental impressions, creating a mentality and habits.

limited, and both spaces are different from each other. The properties, positive and negative,²³⁹ inherent in these space-units do not affect the main space because the main space is not so particularized. Similarly, the defects inherent in the embodied soul, which is set apart and determined by diversity brought about by adjuncts, do not affect the Supreme Brahman, i.e. the Brahman that is not subjected to adjuncts.

This proves nothing. It is not possible to cut the indivisible main space off from the jug etc. for it cannot be divided up; so that the jug remains connected with the main space itself.²⁴⁰ Similarly it would follow that since Brahman cannot be cut off, He would remain connected with the adjuncts in his entirety.

—But the particular place in space connected with the jug differs from all other places in space.²⁴¹

From the fact that the main space remains connected with the jug in varying places it follows that, when the jug moves about, any place without any restriction can be connected with the jug.²⁴² So, since the adjunct is in a comparable way conjoined with Brahman without any constant restriction to a definite place, it would follow that it can move about in varying places in Him, and if it does so, varying places in Brahman would alternately be connected with the adjunct and disconnected: that would mean that the whole of Brahman could be conjoined with the adjunct

although, as far as I can see, not developed by Bhāskara in this way, is found in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, e.g. 2, 3, 43 (p. 141) *katham punar niravayavasya paramātmano 'mśaḥ sambhavati / āgamāt tāvad avagamyate yathāgneḥ kṣudrā visphulingā iti drṣṭānta iti pranayanāt / yathā cākāśasya pārvivādhiṣṭhānāvachchinnaṃ karṇacchidraṃ ca*: “but how is it possible that the Supreme Spirit, who is indivisible, has an *amśa*?—This is learnt from the Scriptures: it is demonstrated in the illustrative instance “just as tiny sparks spring up out of a fire, similarly all *prāṇas*, all worlds, all gods, all creatures spring from this *ātman*” (BĀUp. 2, 1, 20), just as from space (a part) is delimited by a substratum like a clay jug, and (the space contained in) the cavity in the ear”. Also 1, 4, 21 (p. 81) *samyag āha bhavān asti bhedo 'py anādikālapravṛttāvidyākarmopādhyavacchedād amśo hi parasyāyam jīvo nāma yathāgner visphulingāḥ, yathākāśasya pārvivādya-dhiṣṭānopādhyavacchinnaḥ chidrapradeśaḥ tadamśasabdagrahaṇasakti yapekṣā, etc.*

239. *guṇa* and *doṣa*.

240. In other words: the finite character of the space enclosed in a jug cannot be separated from the main space: the main space contains the finitized extent so that, in its entirety, the main space is restricted: it can never transcend this extent.

241. The point which the *aupādhikavādin* wants to make is that the finitized extent of main space, though concededly never disconnected from the main space, yet derives from its isolated finiteness a distinct individuality marking it off from main space: essentially the enclosed space remains space.

242. R. retorts that each and every part of space can be delimited by a jug, so that space is forever alternating between limitedness and unlimitedness. Applied to Brahman this consequence is absurd.

and that every moment He would be bond and released! People in their right minds laugh at this.

§ 56. The one indivisible space is the auditory sense but nevertheless space is only partially defined as a sense:²⁴³ similarly Brahman too can be shown to be partially defined.

It is not reasonable to say that, since a definite place in space if connected with a certain room in the ear that has been prepared by a special sort of wind takes on the function of sense,²⁴⁴ therefore space itself is *partially* defined as a sense, although that place is infinitely variable.²⁴⁵ The bodies of all beings move freely without any restriction through space: therefore they are all connected with all and sundry places in space. So, if applied to our topic, it would rather follow that there is endless variation in and no constant restriction to the places in Brahman that are connected with adjuncts.

§ 57. — If we assume that space is the auditory sense by its proper form, we can likewise state that space is partially defined as a sense.²⁴⁶

But actually space is not the auditory sense at all. For the *Vaidikas* declare: *the eleven senses evolve out of the vaikārika ahaṃkāra*.²⁴⁷

243. The argument is that only that part of space contained in the aural cavity is the auditory sense. This argument is essentially the same one as that put forward above: even though *ākāśa* be partially defined as a sense (which R. does not admit), there is no spatially fixed part for it: any part of space may take on this function.

244. The *Naiyāyika* theory of sound holds that *śrotra*- “auditory organ” is that extent of space that is delimited by the aural cavity (*karṇaśaṣkulyavacchinnaṃ*). The organ of hearing therefore cannot move out to find its object (as the organ of seeing goes out to find its object), since outside the aural cavity it is plain *ākāśa*, not *śrotra*. So the space inside the ear (*śrotra*) receives the sound. R's expression *vāyuvīśeśasamskṛta* is explained by S. *uccāraṇaprayatnajanitavāyuvīśeśasamyogasamskṛta*- “prepared by the contact with a particular current of air produced by the energy of producing sounds.”

245. R.'s objection is that all space must be definable as *śrotra* since space is indivisible: any part of space may happen to be contained in an aural cavity, so all space must have this function.

246. This argument is more urgent: the *aupādhikavādin* concedes that all space is essentially *śrotra*, either in potentiality, or, in definite parts of it, in actuality. But, if applied to Brahman this would mean that Brahman is essentially identical with the finite conditioned entities: *aupādhikavāda* becomes pantheism, implicating the Absolute in the conditions of the finite.


247. However primitive these ancient *Sāṃkhyan* views may appear, their introduction here is very apt: while, to the very end, arguing by analogy of the *drṣṭānta* supplied by his opponent, R. proves that a scrutiny of the *drṣṭānta* itself puts his adversary in the wrong.—The 11 senses are the *manas*- “co-ordinating organ of sensorial impressions”, the 5 sensorial and the 5 motorial senses (*buddhindriya* and *karmendriya*).

The venerable Parāśara says likewise: *taijasānīndriyāṇy āhur devā vaikārikā kā daśa, ekādaśaṃ manaś cātra devā vaikārikāḥ smṛtaḥ*;²⁴⁸ i.e. ahaṃkāra is triple: *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *bhūtādi*; respectively it is *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmāsa*. After having declared that the order of creation is such that the elements, space, etc., evolve out of the *tāmāsa* form of ahaṃkāra, viz. the *bhūtādi*, he alludes to the rival view that the eleven senses evolve out of the *taijasa* or *rājasa* form of ahaṃkāra. Then he states his own view, namely that the *vaikārika indriyas* evolve out of the *sāttvika* ahaṃkāra: *devā vaikārikāḥ smṛtāḥ*, where *devāḥ* means "the senses".²⁴⁹ In the Mahābhārata it is declared that the *bhūtas* nourish the *āhaṃkārika indriyas*.²⁵⁰ Even if it were true that the senses evolve out of the *bhūtas*, the senses of the puruṣa would—since they are transformation of the elements ākāśa, etc.—become distinct and peculiar evolved products of these elements,²⁵¹ in the same manner as the body. Similarly, it cannot

248. VP. 1, 2, 46-47 "some contend that the indriyas derive from the *taijasa* form of ahaṃkāra, (but) the ten senses, and manas as the eleventh, are (in fact) products of its *vaikārika* form: hence the senses are known as *vaikārika*." There is some discrepancy between the various interpretations of the commentaries. Citsukha and Viṣṇucitta explain *devāḥ* as *indriyāṇi* (C. *devāḥ divyanti vyavaharanty ebhir iti devā indriyāṇi*; V. *indriyāṇāṃ devaśabdavācyatvaṃ tadadhiṣṭhātrdevatābhiprāyeṇa*); Śrīdhara and Dattātreyā as the superintending deities, referring to BhP. 2, 5, 30 *digvātārkapraceto'svīvahnīndropendramitrakāḥ* (ka- = Prajāpati). The Viśiṣṭādvaitin V. is the only one who interprets like R. *svapakṣam āha-atra devā* etc.; the others have the ten indriyas derive from *taijasa*, and only manas from *vaikārika*, explaining the plural *vaikārikāḥ* as the superintending deities of manas.—R.'s interpretation corresponds to that of Pañcarātra, cf. SCHRADER, *Pañcarātra*, p. 76.

249. The order of evolution described in VP. 1, 2, 34 is as is shown here: Pradhāna → Mahattatva → Ahaṃkāra;

Ahaṃkāra



250. Reference is to MBh. 12, 194, 5 ff. and similar texts.

251. Yet, being products of the *bhūtas*, the senses can be distinguished from them: they are not the elements itself, but their products (*śrotra* ← *ākāśa*). It is not clear exactly which stand R. takes: if *ākāśa* is not *śrotra*, then what is *śrotra*? "N'ayant aucune idée du dispositif de l'oreille interne, les Vaiśeṣika-Naiyāyika ont localisé l'organe de l'audition dans le pavillon; et, comme ils n'y apercevaient rien de spécial, au creux de la conque .. qui percevait le son: il s'ensuit que dans ce cas particulier l'organe du sens

be refuted that Brahman, being not cut off, nor divisible, nor transformed, would inevitably have without any restriction the defects of conjunction with adjuncts of infinite evil. Now, philosophers who know the scriptures do not think much of this: it is a theory of the very credulous! Assuming that Brahman's essence is subject to evolution, they sublimate the śrutis that declare that He is untransformed.²⁵² And when they say that Brahman itself remains untransformed and that it is Its creative potency that is involved in evolution,^{252a} then we raise the question: is this potency an evolved product of Brahman, or is it identical with Brahman? Whichever alternative is adopted, the assumption would remain necessary that Brahman's essence is subject to evolution.

§ 58. The third school²⁵³ assumes that the individual soul and Brahman are different-non-different: it follows that *Brahman* is identical with *soul* and that in the same way as Saubhari²⁵⁴ is different from himself and the Lord is different from His own incarnations, everyone is different from the Lord. This leads consequently to the conclusion that the defects inherent in the jīvas are also His.

In other words: the view that God Himself constitutes, *in His essence*, the various creatures gods, men, brutes, plants etc., declares that God is identical with these creatures *in essence*. Such being the case, all defects like happiness, unhappiness etc. that go with the soul, also go with the

se confond pour eux avec la substance dont il perçoit la qualité" Foucher, TS. p. 76. Insisting on some sort of a difference between auditory sense and space, comparable to that between body and component elements, R. seems to suggest that the auditory sense is vested in an organ of the body rather than identical with an indefinite and variably localized part of space.

252. Cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 113 *bhedābhedavāde tu brahmany evopādhisamsargāt tat-prayuktajīvagatadoṣā brahmany eva prāduḥ syur iti nirastanikhiladoṣaguṇāt mabhāvopadeśā hi virodhād eva parityaktāḥ syuḥ / svābhāvīkabhedābhedavāde 'pi brahmanāḥ svata eva jīvabhāvābhyupagamād guṇavaddoṣāś ca svābhāvīkā bhavyur iti nirdoṣabrahmatādātmyopadeśaviruddhā eva*. A detailed refutation is given in ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.

252a. Cf. Bhāskara, BrSBh. 1, 4, 25.

253. School of Yādavaprakāśa, S. sums up the difference between Bhāskara and Yādava: *acidbrahmanoḥ tu sarvasya brahmātmakatvaśruteḥ, nirmalatvādiruter upādhyantarābhyupagame 'navasthānācca bhedābhedau svābhāvīkāḥ abhyupagatau bhāskaramate / yādavaprakāśamate tu muktāv api bhedanirdeśāsruter jīvabrahmanoś ca svābhāvīkāḥ abhimatāv iti bhīdā*.

254. Saubhari, mythical person, reputed to possess 50 bodies at once to satisfy his 50 wives (*drṣyate hi saubhariprabhṛtīnāṃ śaktimatāṃ yugapad anekasārīrapratipattīḥ*, ŚBh. 1, 3, 26), of which he was the sole jīva (*saubhariprabhṛtīṣu hy ātmaikatvenāneka-sārīraprayuktasukhādīpratisaṃdhānam ekasya drṣyate*, ib. 2, 1, 15 p. 434); for the story see VP. 4, 2, 66-133; BhP. 9, 6, 38-55. The purpose of *saubharibhedavat* as well of *svāvatārabhedavat* is to exemplify identity in the guise of plurality: in spite of the seeming difference there is but identity: God is the individual soul.

Lord, just as all actions, e.g. the fetching of water, that go with the jug, bowl etc. which originate from a single lump of clay, also go with that lump of clay itself.

§ 59. — But is it not rather like this: in the same way as a substance of clay *by itself*, when it has no function in the various generic structures of jug, bowl etc., has other effects as well: similarly the Lord *by Himself*, when He does not function as the soul of god, man, animal etc., is possessed of omniscience and of all perfections like the power of having his every will realized.

True. You say that one and the same Lord possesses all sorts of perfections in one part of Himself and all sorts of imperfections in another part of Himself. This is the logical consequence of the fact that two different parts do not make two different Lords.

— But both parts are well distinct²⁵⁵ from each other.

What do you gain by that? For if the same Lord is in one part eternally miserable you cannot say properly that He is happy in another part. The Lord would be comparable to Devadatta who has one hand anointed with sandal-paste and adorned with bracelets and rings, and his other hand hit by a hammer and hurting with hell-fire!

We may say that this *bhedābheda* doctrine is worse even than the doctrine that Brahman is nescient:²⁵⁶ for it contends that immeasurable misery is ultimately real and that it can never be overcome because there is no end to beings implicated in *samsāra*.²⁵⁷

§ 60. — But the part 'embodied soul' in Him is different from Himself.

Then you are walking on my road. But when the relationship between Lord and soul is described in terms of identity in essence, then it is logically unsound to maintain difference; whereas it is sound when this identity is stated in the terms of a body-soul relation.²⁵⁸ Contrary to you we can declare that the Lord's qualities are universal, including his Sovereignty over all worlds etc.; and the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* thus retains its proper sense.

§ 61. Further, we say that one and the same entity cannot possibly be different and non-different at once, because that is a contradiction in

255. *vyavasthita*- "delimited one from the other."

256. i.e., *advaitavedānta*.

257. Since God is identical with the *jīva* in bondage, bondage is henceforth inescapable.

258. R.'s solution of 'difference in union'.

terms. If a jug is different from a cloth, than the one cannot exist in the other; only if there is no difference one can exist in the other. But that in the same place and at the same time one and the same entity does at once exist and not exist in another entity is a contradiction in terms.

§ 62. — But one entity can at once exist in another entity in so far as it is class and not exist in so far as it is individual.²⁵⁹

If there is no difference between the class 'ox' and the individual 'hornless ox', it follows that the individual 'hornless ox' also exists in the individual 'broken-horned ox'. If class and individual are different and non-different, there are two cases at once: first, if the individual 'broken-horned ox' is not different from the class 'ox', the broken-horned ox exists in the hornless ox; second, if they are different, the class does not exist at all in the individual, just as the class 'buffalo' does not exist in an individual horse.²⁶⁰ This contradiction is plainly insoluble. Class etc. constitute the generic structure²⁶¹ of a given thing and are consequently modifications of that thing; hence, as we have said before,²⁶² the modifying attribute and the modified thing are different *padārthas*, the modifying attribute has no separate function and cannot be separately apprehended,²⁶³ and the same generic structure can appear as modification in more than one thing.

§ 63. The judgment "*this is he*" is founded upon identity of mode, in the same manner as is the judgment: "*this one is a man-with-a-stick*."²⁶⁴ And this very modification, of class etc., is declared to be the differentiation of a given thing. The possession of such a differentiating attribute furnishes the ground on which we treat a thing as different.²⁶⁵ This modification is at once the ground for acting upon the difference and for acting on the thing itself, in the same way as awareness: just as the being aware

259. That is to say: two entities are non-different inasmuch as they belong to the same class and share the same generic differentiae, whereas at the same time they are different in so far as they differ in individual characteristics; cf. Bhāskara, BrSBh. 1, 1, 4.

260. R. considers this statement under the two aspects by which the *dvyātmakatva* (supra note 147) in *bhinnābhinnatva* can be viewed; *abhinnatva* and *bhinnābhinnatva*; the third aspect of *bhinnatva* conflicts too self-evidently with the alleged *dvyātmakatva* to bear mention. I have interpreted this extremely concise passage with the aid of S.; SRINIVASACHARI'S interpretation (*Bhedābheda* p. 211) differs. For a very detailed refutation cf. Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkara's BrSBh. 1, 1, 4; cf. also ŚBh. 1, 1, 4.

261. *saṁsthāna*- see supra note 86.

262. Supra § 30.

263. *prthagānupalambha*-

264. S. comments: *so 'yam iti buddhir anuvrttaviṣayavyavahārānvitā buddhis tajjātyatvabuddhir ayam api gauḥ iti buddhir ity arthah*; in the second case *ayam api daṇḍī*, the stick (*daṇḍa*-) is the prakāra.

265. *vyavahārahetu*-

of a given thing furnishes at once the ground for our acting on that thing and for acting upon the awareness²⁶⁶ itself.

§ 64. In consequence of these reasons all theories that perception apprehends mere being and does not apprehend difference are rejected,²⁶⁷ firstly because only an entity that has a definite generic structure — class etc. — is apprehended by perception; secondly because this class etc. taking on the form of generic structure furnishes the ground for treating it as different in regard to its correlative. That it is a fallacy to assume evolution in proper form has already been pointed out.²⁶⁸

III

§ 65. All the śrutis — e.g. *He who residing in the earth is different from the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who directs the earth from within, He is thy soul, the immortal inner Ruler.*²⁶⁹ *He who residing in the soul is different from the soul, whom the soul does not know, whose body is the soul, who directs the soul from within, He is thy soul, the immortal inner Ruler;*²⁷⁰ *He who lives within the earth, whose body is the earth, whom the earth does not know, etc. . . . who lives within the akṣara, whose body is the akṣara, whom the akṣara does not know. . . . who lives within death, whose body is death, whom death does not know—He is the One who is the immanent soul of all beings, who is without any evil, the divine unique God Nārāyaṇa;*²⁷¹ *Two birds, inseparable companions, have alighted on the same tree. One of them eats the sweet berry; the other looks on without eating;*²⁷² *The commander of men, who has entered within them, the soul of all;*²⁷³ *after having created it, He entered into it; having entered it It became present and yonder, true and untrue;*²⁷⁴ *By way of this living soul. . . .;*²⁷⁵ *When he knows the soul from the mover, then he attains with It immortality;*²⁷⁶ *when the enjoyer knows the enjoyed and the mover — all three of them are declared to be the triple Brahman;*²⁷⁷

266. *saṃvedana-*

267. By his theory of *dvyātmakatva* the *bhedābhedavādin* postulates the possibility of apprehending the "pure thing" (*vastusvarūpa-*) apart from its differentiations and attributes. Of this view R. has disposed supra § 30.

268. Supra § 57.

269. BĀUp. 3, 7, 3.

270. BĀUp. 3, 7, 22 (*Mādhyamīna*).

271. SubāUp. 7 *antaḥśarīre nihito guhāyām ajo yasya pṛthivī śarīraṃ yah pṛthivī-
vīm saṃcaran* (in this order throughout) etc.

272. MuṇḍUp. 3, 1, 1.

273. TaittĀr. 3, 11.

274. TaittUp. 2, 6.

275. ChUp. 6, 3, 2.

276. ŚvetUp. 1, 6.

277. ŚvetUp. 1, 12.

*He that eternal, spiritual and unique grants the desires of the eternal spiritual and plural;*²⁷⁸ *the Lord of the guṇas, Lord of matter and soul;*²⁷⁹ *There are two unborn ones, knowing and not knowing, sovereign and not sovereign;*²⁸⁰—all these śrutis and hundreds more, as well as the declarations of Vālmiki, Parāśara and Dvaipāyana, foremost of Vedic scholars, corroborating the evidence of the śrutis, such as *the entire world is thy body, the earth is thy fortitude;*²⁸¹ *whatsoever is created by all living creatures in the production of all that can be created, O Brahman, that all is verily Hari's body;*²⁸² *I am the soul, O Guḍākeśa, that is the resting-place of all beings;*²⁸³ *having entered into and residing within the heart of all I am the source of remembrance, knowledge and surmise;*²⁸⁴—all these śrutis and smṛtis propound that Brahman Himself is modified by all spiritual and non-spiritual entities; (1) since it is learnt from them that the Supreme Brahman is the soul of all and that all entities, spiritual and non-spiritual, constitute his body; (2) since the body is a *padārtha*²⁸⁵ only by virtue of its function of modifying the being it embodies; and (3) since, although body and embodied being have different properties, they are not confused with each other.²⁸⁶ This doctrine of a Brahman modified by all spirit and non-spirit they propound by the use of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* constructions etc., taken in their primary sense, which set forth Brahman's supernal manifestation²⁸⁷ by declaring that Brahman is embodied by all. For *sāmānādhikarāṇya* is the application of two terms to connote one meaning under the aspects of two modifications. In our interpretation it retains its primary meaning. So in the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* of *tat* and *tvam* in *tat tvam asi*²⁸⁸ the word *tat* refers to the perfect Brahman who is the universal cause and the possessor of all perfections; whereas the word *tvam*, which is used predicatively of spiritual entities, refers to Brahman as being qualified by the individual soul, or as embodied by that soul, existing as the inner Ruler of the soul that constitutes His body. When taken

278. KaṭhUp. 2, 2 (5), 13 = ŚvetUp. 6, 13.

279. ŚvetUp. 6, 16.

280. ŚvetUp. 1, 9.

281. Rāmāyaṇa, 6, 120, 26.

282. VP. 1, 22, 38.

283. BhG. 10, 20.

284. BhG. 15, 15.

285. i.e., exists as a describable magnitude with a definite function.

286. S. explains: *kāṣṭhasya rumāyās ca dharmabhede saty eva kāṣṭhasya saṃsarga-
gaprayuktaṃ lavaṇatvaṃ dṛśyate: evaṃ dharmabhede 'pi saṃsargaprayukto yah
saṃkaras tasya śarīraśarīrinor asaṃbhavād ity arthaḥ.*

287. *vaibhava-* "totality of the phenomenal manifestations (*vibhūti*) of the divine Personality."

288. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

in the sense that the other schools adopt the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* proper would be violated and Brahman made imperfect.

§ 66. In other words, the declaration that *Brahman is such* proves the reality—in subtle and gross phase alike—of the phenomenal world, consisting in a plurality of spiritual and non-spiritual entities, as the mode denoted by the word *such*. Thus the full meaning of the passage *bahusyām prajāyeyeti*²⁸⁹ is exhausted: the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities exists conditionally as the generic structure²⁹⁰ of this same Lord who has several generic structures, being either cause or effect.

§ 67. — However, it is a matter of common knowledge that only class and property are modifications of a substance in the form of its generic and specific structure, so that they alone can have the attributive function denoted by the word *such*, and not the substance itself. So it is improper to contend that a *padārtha* capable of independent function is merely, as an attributive 'such,' a modification of the Lord.

Not less common is the knowledge that a substance, too, e.g. a stick, an ear-ring etc., serves to modify another substance.

— But then we see that a possessive suffix²⁹¹ is required to make an independent substance like a stick etc. into a mode of another substance: *daṇḍa* — *daṇḍin*, *kuṇḍala* — *kuṇḍalin* etc. Therefore it is against reason, if by means of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* a spiritual or non-spiritual entity that is a substance of the same order as an ox is declared to be a modification of the Lord.

I reply: it is common usage in Vedic as well as in profane speech to call, by *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, certain substances, forming complexes of elements—ox, horse, man, god etc.—the modes of spiritual beings, gods etc., namely as their bodies: for example "Devadatta is born a man because of his good karman; Yajñadatta is born a cow because of his bad karman; another spiritual being is born a god because of his exceedingly good karman," etc.

§ 68. What we mean is this: we are not concerned about whether class, or property, or substance may constitute a mode. When a certain entity serves as a distinctive feature for a certain substance, then we can properly say, by means of a *sāmānādhikarāṇya* construction coordinating that entity with that substance, that it has no function apart from that

289. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

290. *saṁsthāna-*.

291. *matvarthīyapratyaya-* "suffix with the sense exemplified by *matu(p) oṁant-* / *mat-*," Pāṇini 5, 2, 94 *tad asyāsty asminn* "that is of / in this."

substance and therefore constitutes a mode of it.²⁹² And if a substance that may have a separate function is in some place at some time wanted as a mode for another substance, then it has a possessive suffix; and that is all the difference there is.

So, since the sum-total of all entities, animate and inanimate, constitute the Lord's body, their proper forms have real existence as the modes of the Lord. Such being the case, the Lord, who is the entity modified by all these entities, is denoted by the various words that denote these entities. Therefore these entities can appropriately be terms in *sāmānādhikarāṇya* with Him. All this we have already expounded in detail when we elucidated the śruti on the separation by name-and-form.²⁹³

§ 69. Consequently, Brahman Himself is also all effects, since He has the generic structure of being modified by all things: prakṛti, puruṣa, mahat, ahaṁkāra, tanmātra, elements and senses,²⁹⁴ the Egg of Brahmā consisting in fourteen worlds that derive from the above entities,²⁹⁵ and the gods, men, brutes,²⁹⁶ plants etc. that live within that universe. So by knowing solely that Brahman is the cause we know all. In this manner it is established very well that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one. At the same time it is stated, on the strength of the causal relation etc. established hereby,²⁹⁷ that the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities is ensouled by the Supreme Brahman inasmuch as it modifies Him.

292. i.e. all the material objects and their ensouling spiritual principles (*jīva-*) are in essence nothing but a mode of the Supreme Being. In the same way as the name of a body may conveniently be used to refer to the spiritual principle residing in it (e.g. *devadatto manuṣyo jātaḥ*, where Devadatta = *jīva* and *manuṣya-* is the body.), so the Supreme Being may be denoted by the name of the *jīva* (e.g. *tat tvam asi*).

293. ChUp. 6, 2, 3, supra § 17.

294. Sāṁkhyan terms: *puruṣa-* "spiritual order", *prakṛti-* "natura naturans" → *mahat*, first evolution = *buddhi-* "cognitive faculty" → *ahaṁkāra* "subjectifying organ, ego-factor" from which on the one hand evolve the *tanmātras* "rudimentals" (*śabda-* etc.) → elements (*bhūta-*, *ākāśa* etc.), and on the other hand the senses with their coordinator *manas* (I follow the account of Viṣṇupurāṇa, 1, 2 to which R. evidently subscribes).

295. Purāṇic cosmological conception of a universe built up in layers of 1. subterranean, 2. terrestrial, 3. celestial worlds hierarchically ordered: (1) Pātāla, Mahātala, Talātala, Rasātala, Sutala, Atala, inhabited by subhuman beings and/or souls in torment; 2. Bhūrloka "earth"; 3. Bhuvārloka, inhabited by superhuman beings; Svarloka, suprasolar heaven, also Indraloka; Maharloka; Janarloka; Taparloka; Satya- or Brahmāloka.

296. For an explication of the term *tiryāñc-* in this sense cf. VP. 1, 5, 22

297. S. explains *kāryakāraṇabhāvaśabdena sanmūlāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ* (ChUp. 6, 8, 6) *ity asyārtho vivakṣitaḥ*.

§ 70. — But does the negation, expressed in the śrutis that declare that Brahman is untransmuted and irreproachable,²⁹⁸ not deny that in his proper form the Supreme Brahman is the substratum of evolution? In *prakṛtiś ca, pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt*²⁹⁹ the Author of the Sūtras declares that, by virtue of the assertion that knowledge of all can be had through knowledge of one and on the strength of the adduced instance of the clay and its effects, the Supreme Person is the material cause of the world. But being the material cause means being the substratum of evolution. Now how can this be established?

§ 71. The reply is as follows. It has been said that the phenomenal world animated by souls does equally constitute the material cause. Contrary to the assumption that the Lord suffers evolution in the form of individual soul, is the assertion *nātmā, śruter nityatvāc ca tābhyaḥ*:³⁰⁰ the notion that Brahman is cruel and partial is refuted by the assertion — based upon the above assumption that the souls have no beginning — that it is the karman of all the various embodied souls that causes cruelty and partiality: *vaiṣamyanaigrhṛṇye, na: sāpekṣatvāt*.³⁰¹ In *na: karmāvibhāgād iti cen; nānāditvād upapadyate cāpy upalabhyate ca*³⁰² the Author declares that the contingency of obtainment of what is not due to karman and the loss of what is due to karmān would only occur if the embodied souls were not eternal.³⁰³

§ 72. The śrutis declare also that prakṛti is without beginning. In *ajām ekām lohitaśuklakṛṣṇām bahvīm prajāṃ janayantīm sarūpām/ajo hyeko juṣamāno 'nuṣete jahāty enām bhuktabhogām ajo 'nyaḥ*³⁰⁴ e.a. it is shown

298. Both terms *nirvikāra-* (-kārya-) *niravadya-* express particularly the Absolute Principle's absolute freedom from the conditions and limitations of the 'transformed' effect.

299. BrS, 1, 4, 23 "[Brahman is] the material cause, since [thus] there is no disagreement with the assertion (ChUp. 6, 1, 3) and the illustration (ChUp. 6, 1, 4)."

300. BrS. 2, 3, 18 "The individual soul [does] not [originate, as follows] from the Scriptures and from [its actual] eternity [proved] by those [Scriptures]."

301. BrS. 2, 1, 34 "[If it be objected that this means that] partiality and cruelty [are proper to Brahman, then I reply] no, since [karman] is taken into consideration."

302. BrS. 2, 1, 35 "If it be objected that this is not so, because there is no distinction of karman, [then I reply that it follows from the fact that] the ātman is without beginning: it is established and apprehended."

303. In other words: the very eternity of the ātman enables a perfect justice in retribution to be worked. Whatever befalls to a soul is due to its karman: there is no arbitrary end put to its existence which would subject it to only part of what is rightfully coming to it. ŚBh. 2, 1, 35 repeats the same words *tathānabhyupagame 'kṛtābhyaupagamakṛtavipranāśaprasaṅgaḥ*.

304. MahāNārUp. 9, 2 "With the one uncreated (matter) that has form, and that produces effects of various kinds, one uncreated (soul) joins itself to enjoy it, whereas another uncreated (soul) goes free from it when it has ceased to enjoy it", = ŚvetUp.

that both prakṛti and puruṣa are unborn. The śrutis out of this the *Mast of māyā created this entire Universe and the other component was created by the māyā*,³⁰⁵ and you are to know that the māyā is prakṛti and the *Mast of māyā the Sovereign Lord*³⁰⁶ show that it is the prakṛti that is the substratum of transformation in its proper form.³⁰⁷ Compare also the *śruti the Cow without beginning and without end, she is the genetrix that brings the beings into being*,³⁰⁸ and the *smṛti be sure that prakṛti as well as puruṣa are both without beginning, and that transmutations and guṇas alike are the products of prakṛti*.³⁰⁹ Earth, water, fire, wind, ether, manas, budh and ahaṃkāra are the eight components of my prakṛti.³¹⁰ Know, however that I have still another prakṛti which is of a higher order than the form a prakṛti that is constituted by the embodied souls, on which this material world is dependent, O Arjuna.³¹¹ Taking my material from my own prakṛti I create again and again,³¹² and under my guidance the prakṛti with animate and inanimate beings is brought forth.³¹³

§ 73. Therefore, since the prakṛti too constitutes the Lord's body the term prakṛti denotes the Lord — who is the prakṛti's soul — as being modified by prakṛti. Likewise the term puruṣa denotes the Lord — who is the puruṣa's soul — as being modified by puruṣa. Consequently the Lord is also the soul of the transformations of both prakṛti and puruṣa. So the *smṛti declares: Viṣṇu is the evolved as well as the unevolved, puruṣa is the same time; the same Sovereign Lord is alike that which moves*³¹⁴ and that which is moved, O Brahman.³¹⁵ It follows that only that part in the Supreme

4, 5 (reads *prajāḥ sṛjyamānām*) where no doubt (cf. next stanza *dvā suparnā sayujā* and a play is intended on *ajā* "she-goat" with red, white and black kinds, and *aja-* "he-goat") Red white and black products of the primeval causal matter are the fire (*tejo*), water (*āpas*) and earth (*anna-*), the three pre- or proto-Sāṃkhyan elements of ChUp. 6, 2, 3; cf. Intr. chap. I.

305. ŚvetUp. 4, 9 *asmān māyī sṛjate*, and cf. R.'s exegesis ŚBh. 1, 4, 27.

306. ŚvetUp. 4, 10 *māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt*.

307. As distinct from the ātman which suffers the transformations (*vikāra-* contraction (*samkoca-*) and expansion (*vikāsa-*) not in its proper form or essence (*svarūpa-*) but in its attribute knowledge.

308. MantrUp. 5; this stanza, continuing *sitāsītā ca raktā ca sarvakāmadughā vil* is evidently inspired by ŚvetUp. 4, 5 above.

309. BhG. 13, 19.

310. BhG. 7, 4.

311. BhG. 7, 5.

312. BhG. 9, 8.

313. BhG. 9, 10.

314. i.e. "sets in motion (*pravartayati*), creates".

315. VP. 1, 2, 18; the "evolved" (*vyakta-*) is the subtle primeval matter manifest in the gross creation as name-and-form, the "unevolved" (*avyakta-*) this subtle matter before this manifestation; Time as the *nimittakāraṇa* operating on prakṛti, the *upādāyakaṇa*, cf. supra note 188.

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303. In other words: the very eternity of the ātman enables a perfect justice in retribution to be worked. Whatever befalls to a soul is due to its karman: there is no arbitrary end put to its existence which would subject it to only part of what is rightfully coming to it. ŚBh. 2, 1, 35 repeats the same words *tathānabhyupagame 'kṛtābhyupagamakṛtaviprañāsaprasaṅgaḥ*.

304. MahāNārUp. 9, 2 "With the one uncreated (matter) that has form, and that produces effects of various kinds, one uncreated (soul) joins itself to enjoy it, whereas another uncreated (soul) goes free from it when it has ceased to enjoy it", = ŚvetUp.

that both prakṛti and puruṣa are unborn. The śrutis out of this the Master of *māyā* created this entire Universe and the other component was tied by the *māyā*,³⁰⁵ and you are to know that the *māyā* is prakṛti and the Master of *māyā* the Sovereign Lord³⁰⁶ show that it is the prakṛti that is the substratum of transformation in its proper form.³⁰⁷ Compare also the śruti the Cow without beginning and without end, she is the genetrix that brings the beings into being,³⁰⁸ and the smṛti be sure that prakṛti as well as puruṣa are both without beginning, and that transmutations and guṇas alike are the products of prakṛti.³⁰⁹ Earth, water, fire, wind, ether, manas, buddhi and ahaṃkāra are the eight components of my prakṛti.³¹⁰ Know, however, that I have still another prakṛti which is of a higher order than the former, a prakṛti that is constituted by the embodied souls, on which this material world is dependent, O Arjuna.³¹¹ Taking my material from my own prakṛti I create again and again,³¹² and under my guidance the prakṛti with its animate and inanimate beings is brought forth.³¹³

§ 73. Therefore, since the prakṛti too constitutes the Lord's body, the term prakṛti denotes the Lord — who is the prakṛti's soul — as being modified by prakṛti. Likewise the term puruṣa denotes the Lord — who is the puruṣa's soul — as being modified by puruṣa. Consequently the Lord is also the soul of the transformations of both prakṛti and puruṣa. So the smṛti declares: *Viṣṇu is the evolved as well as the unevolved, puruṣa and time; the same Sovereign Lord is alike that which moves*³¹⁴ and that which is moved, O Brahman.³¹⁵ It follows that only that part in the Supreme

4, 5 (reads *prajāḥ sṛjyamānām*) where no doubt (cf. next stanza *dvā suparṇā sayujā* etc.) a play is intended on *ajā* "she-goat" with red, white and black kinds, and *aja-* "he-goat". Red white and black products of the primeval causal matter are the fire (*tejas-*), water (*āpas*) and earth (*anna-*), the three pre- or proto-Sāṃkhyan elements of ChUp. 6, 2, 3; cf. Intr. chap. I.

305. ŚvetUp. 4, 9 *asmān māyī sṛjate*, and cf. R.'s exegesis ŚBh. 1, 4, 27.

306. ŚvetUp. 4, 10 *māyām tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt*.

307. As distinct from the ātman which suffers the transformations (*vikāra-*) of contraction (*saṃkoca-*) and expansion (*vikāsa-*) not in its proper form or essence (*svarūpa-*) but in its attribute knowledge.

308. MantrUp. 5; this stanza, continuing *sitāsītā ca raktā ca sarvakāmadughā vibhuḥ*, is evidently inspired by ŚvetUp. 4, 5 above.

309. BhG. 13, 19.

310. BhG. 7, 4.

311. BhG. 7, 5.

312. BhG. 9, 8.

313. BhG. 9, 10.

314. i.e. "sets in motion (*pravartayati*), creates".

315. VP. 1, 2, 18; the "evolved" (*vyakta-*) is the subtle primeval matter manifested in the gross creation as name-and-form, the "unevolved" (*avyakta-*) this subtle matter before this manifestation; Time as the *nimittakāraṇa* operating on prakṛti, the *upādāna-kāraṇa*, cf. supra note 188.

Spirit—modified by prakṛti—that is constituted by prakṛti is at all subject to transformations; that part in Him that is the substratum of this modification is not subject to them. Likewise all the obstacles of spiritual life³¹⁶ belong to that part in the Supreme Spirit, modified by individual soul, that is constituted by the individual soul; that part in Him that is the substratum of the modification 'individual soul' is the Controller, ir-reproachable,³¹⁷ possessed of all perfections and the power of having his every will realized.³¹⁸

§ 74. Such being the case, the Lord has the mode of being of cause on the one hand and on the other hand that of effect, viz. the Universe of which He is the material cause. So there is no difference between cause and effect,³¹⁹ and consequently no śruti is contradicted. Thus Brahman has the mode of being of cause when his body is constituted by prakṛti and puruṣa in their subtle phase³²⁰ (i.e. the phase in which they are not yet subject to division by name-and-form: in this phase the Universe is in the state of resorption), and Brahman has the mode of being of effect when his body is constituted by the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities in their gross phase (i.e. in which composite prakṛti and puruṣa are divided by name-and-form into isolated entities: this passage of Brahman into his gross phase is the creation of the Universe). So the venerable Parāśara declares: *He is the cause of the unborn prakṛti and puruṣa which are effects.*³²¹

§ 75. This is the reason why all terms that denote prakṛti and puruṣa—modes of the Lord—whether in their subtle or in their gross phase, denote

316. *apuruṣārtha*- "that which is not, or obstructs, the attainment of the puruṣārthas "goals of human endeavour", esp. paramapuruṣārtha- "release"; in this connexion the obstructing factors are contraction and expansion of knowledge (*saṃkoca*-, *vikāsa*-), the vikāras to which the soul in saṃsāra is subject.—Cf. ŚBh. 1, 4, 27 *tat*- (sc. *brahma*-)-*prakārabhūtakṣetrañāgatāś cāpuruṣārthāḥ*: *kṣetrañā* is esp. the individual soul in the transmigratory process of undergoing the results of its former acts.

317. In the invariable sense of "free from transformations (*vikāras*)".

318. *satyasamkalpatva*-, divine attribute *par excellence*.

319. This non-difference, it should be noted, is unilateral: the effect, participating in the immanent cause is not "something else (*anya*-) something new" as the Naiyāyikas contend, but materially the same as the cause and hence indiscernibly connected; the cause, however, is completely independent of and different from the effect: there is no reciprocal non-difference, no identity.

320. Note that prakṛti and puruṣa are especially used to denote matter and spirit at the pre-manifest stage as undifferentiated "*principles*". This undifferentiated subtlety does not, on the one hand, reduce matter to a primordial chaos, nor on the other hand affect the fundamental individuality of the ātmans mutually: they preserve their individuality as monads (*anu*-) while in 'gross creation' they are not so much individualized as particularized, or empiricized, by the bodies with which they are identified.

321. VP. 1, 9, 37.

in their primary sense the Supreme Spirit as being differentiated by the modes they constitute: in the very same manner as the terms god, man etc. denote the individual souls incorporated by the bodies god, man etc. To put it differently: in the same manner as the terms god, man etc. in their primary sense denote the embodied soul that is their modified substratum, since the diverse evolved products of prakṛti—such as god, man etc.—are *padārthas* only in so far as they are modifications of the embodied soul:³²² thus all terms denoting any spiritual and non-spiritual entity denote in their primary senses the Supreme Spirit, since that entity denoted modifies the Supreme Spirit by constituting his body.

§ 76. The relation between soul and body means the relation between substratum and dependent entity incapable of functioning separately, between³²³ transcendent controller and thing controlled, between principal and accessory.³²⁴ In this relation the one term is called *ātman* or "soul" because this is the one who *obtains*³²⁵ an object since he is in all respects the substratum, the controller and the principal; the other term is called body, i.e. *form*, because it is a *modification*³²⁶ that is inseparably connected since it is in all respects dependent entity, thing controlled and accessory. For such is the relation between the individual soul and its body. Consequently, inasmuch as all constitute the body of the Supreme Spirit, He can be denoted by all terms.

§ 77. This is declared by a host of śrutis: *sarve vedā yat padam āmananti*,³²⁷ *sarve vedā yatraikaṃ bhavanti*,³²⁸ i.e. "since they denote the sole One, they denote only one single sense;" *eko devo bahrudhā niviṣṭaḥ*,³²⁹ *sahaiva santam na vijānanti devāḥ*³³⁰ etc., where *devāḥ* means "the senses",³³¹ i.e., "the senses—terminating in the

322. Cf. supra note 285.

323. *prthaksiddhyanarhādharādheyabhāva*, esp. the relation between attribute and subject, or mode and modified substance (*prakāraprakāribhāva*-).

324. *śeṣaśeṣibhāva*-, this relation will be explained infra § 121.

325. *āpnotityātmā*; an old etymology possibly inspired by the early occurrence of a prakṛt form *appa*; cf. Śankara ad AitUp. 1, 1: *ātmā āpnoter atter atater vā*, and Ānandagiri who in his vyākhyā quotes the stanza: *yac cāpnoti yad ādatte yac cātti viṣayān iha/yac cāsya saṃtato bhāvas/asmād ātmeti giyate //*.

326. *prakārabhūtam ity ākāraḥ śarīram*; not a facile play on words: R. tries to bring out the etymological significance of both words: "something built on a basis" pointing at the utter dependence of "mode" or "form" on an inner ensouling principle.

327. KathUp. 4, 15 "the word that all the Vedas cite".

328. CityUp. 11, 1 "in whom all the Vedas become one".

329. CityUp. 14, 1 "the one God residing in many places".

330. CityUp. 11, 4 "the divinities do not know Him with whom they exist".

331. Cf. R.'s interpretation of VP. 1, 2, 46-47, supra note 248.

manas³³² of gods, men etc. have no knowledge of Him who having entered into themselves as their inner soul by being their immanent Ruler, remains with them." So, likewise, the pronouncements of the purāṇas: *natāḥ sma sarvavacasām pratiṣṭhā yatra śāsvatī*:³³³ for the basis of a word is in the object denoted. *kāryānām kāraṇam pūrvaṃ vacasām vacyam uttamaṃ*³³⁴ *vedaiś ca sarvair aham eva vedyaḥ etc.*³³⁵ "all these terms denote only the immanent Ruler modified by body and soul." for compare the śruti *Well, by entering the three deities by way of their living soul I will separate name and form.*³³⁶ Similarly Manu's word: *praśāsītāraṃ sarveṣāṃ aṅḡyāṃsam aṅḡyasām/rukmābhaṃ svapnadhīgamyaṃ vidyāt taṃ puruṣaṃ param*,³³⁷ i.e. "the *praśāsītṛ* or "controller"³³⁸ of all, having entered into them, sc. as their inner Ruler, is subtler than the individual souls (*aṅḡyāṃsah* "Souls" who are subtler because they pervade³³⁹ all non-spiritual entities), sc. because He pervades³⁴⁰ them in their turn; *rukmābha-* "having the appearance of the sun"; *svapnadhīgamya*-³⁴¹ "to be arrived at by cognition similar to a dream",

332. "The eleventh sense", the co-ordinating organ of sensual impressions.

333. VP. 1, 4, 23 ab; the stanza continues *tam ādyantam aśeṣasya jagataḥ paramaṃ prabhum* // "we bow for the paramount Lord, the beginning and the end of the entire Universe, in whom is the perennial basis of all words."

334. JitStotra 1, 7a "the prime cause of the effects, the supreme object denoted by the words"; the second half runs: *yogānām paramām siddhiṃ paramaṃ te padaṃ viduḥ*; according to Dr V. Raghavan from Madras, in a personal communication, the Jitāntastotra—a very popular hymn among South-Indian Vaiṣṇavas—is assigned in MSS to the Aṣṭākṣarikalpa of Pañcarātrāgama.

335. BhG. 15, 4.

336. ChUp. 6, 3, 2.

337. Manusmṛti 12, 122; Vulgate reads *anor api*.

338. *niyantṛ-*, signifying God's direction of the soul as its immanent ātman; note that Kullūka gives the same interpretation: *praśāsītāraṃ niyantāraṃ brahmādistambaparyantasya cetanācetanasya*.

339. *vyāpakatayā*; because the soul cannot rightly be said to be 'invariably concomitant' with the body in the Nyāya sense, it follows that the word *vyāpaka-* is used in a more literal sense cf. GBh. 2, 17 *vyāpakatvena niratīśayasūkṣmatvād ātmano vināśānarhasya tadvyatirikto na kaścit padārtho vināśaṃ kartum arhati, tadvyāpyatayā tasmāt sthūlatvāt etc.*

340. God as Viṣṇu the Pervader.

341. Cf. Kullūka: *svapnadhīgamyaṃ dṛṣṭānto 'yaṃ, svapnadhīsadṛṣṭājñānagrāhyam / yathā svapnadhīś cakṣurādibāhyendriyoparame manomātreṇa janyata evam ātmadhīr api*.—R., however, evidently takes as the *tertium comparationis* the extraordinary vividness of the images of our dreams. The *anudhyāna-* "contemplation" is an apex state of consciousness in which there is complete immediate presentation of the beloved God, cultivated and at last attained by the uninterrupted memorization of His perfections. It is synonymous with the *dhrūvānusmṛti-* ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 9-10, described *seyaṃ smṛtir darśanarūpā pratipādītā / darśanarūpatā ca pratyakṣāpatih / ataḥ sākṣātākārarūpā smṛtiḥ smaryamānātyarthapriyatvena svayam atyarthapriyā / evaṃrūpā dhrūvānu-smṛtir eva bhaktiśabdenābhīdhīyate*,

i.e. apprehensible only by contemplation in a state of extremely lucid perception. *enam eke vadanty agniṃ maruto 'nye prajāpatim/indram eke pare prāṇam apare brahma śāsvatam*:³⁴² *eke* sc. "some Vedas": i.e. inasmuch as the Supreme Brahman has, as described above, entered into everything as the *praśāsītṛ* or immanent Ruler, the terms *agni* etc. denote Him as adequately as the term "eternal Brahman". Similarly another smṛti: *ye yajanti pitṛṇ devān brāhmaṇān sahutāśānān/sarvabhūtāntarātmānaṃ Viṣṇum eva yajanti te*:³⁴³ i.e. the terms *pitṛ*, god, brahman, fire denote, by denoting themselves, simultaneously Viṣṇu Himself as their immanent soul.

§ 78. This is the central meaning of all śāstras: the individual souls are as such essentially uncontracted,³⁴⁴ unlimited and perfect knowledge.³⁴⁵ But they are enveloped³⁴⁶ by ignorance in the form of karman. So they are subject to contraction of knowledge proportionate to their karman, and they enter into bodies of various kinds and classes, from Brahmā to tuft of grass. Their range of knowledge is now confined to that which their various bodies encompass. So these souls are led to identify themselves with their various bodies and to perform acts that follow from this identification. Consequently they enter the continuous surge of saṃsāra, in this form that they experience³⁴⁷ the pleasure and pain correlated with these acts. As it is impossible for them to release themselves from this saṃsāra without resorting to the Venerable Lord,³⁴⁸ therefore, to serve this purpose, the śāstras start

342. Manusmṛti 12, 123; the Vulgate reads in a *etam*, in b *manum anye*; "some (Vedas) call him Agni, some the Maruts, others Prajāpati, yet others Indra or Life, others again call him the eternal Brahman".

343. Dakṣasmṛti? "Those who worship the ancestors, the gods, the Brahmans and the fire [so R.; rather "the brahmans who keep the sacrificial fires"], worship really Viṣṇu, the immanent ātman in all creatures".

344. *asaṃkucita-* "not contracted to the limited scope of empirical ego".

345. Note, again, that knowledge is the essential property of the ātman and so may stand for the essence itself.

346. *veṣṭita-*, term taken from VP. 6, 7, 61-62 *avidyā karmasaṃjñānyā tṛtīyā śaktir iṣyate / yayā kṣetrajñasaktiḥ sā veṣṭitā nṛpa sarvagā*.

347. *upabhoga-* term esp. used for the experiencing (suffering/enjoying) of the fruits of karman by the kṣetrajñā.

348. *bhagavatprapattim antareṇa*. S. remarks that this is said *bhaktiyogaṇiṣṭhasyāpi niṣpattiyartham tadaṅgatvena prapattir apeksitatvāt prapattiniṣṭhasya svatantratrayo-pāyatvāc ca* "because the one who devotes himself to bhaktiyoga stands also in need of prapatti as a *propaedeusis* to perfect his bhakti, and also because prapatti by itself, independent (of bhakti) is a means for the one who is devoted to prapatti". Elsewhere (Rāmānuja on the *Bhagavadgītā*, p. 24 ff). I have tried to show that R. does not consider prapatti a separate—let alone superior—'discipline' from bhakti, but rather a *propaedeusis* to bhakti, or even identical with it; S. inclines—though here at least not too overtly—to the later view that prapatti alone (*svatantratrayā*) is a means of release. Considering, however, the evidence of the Ved. I see no reason to change my opinion about the position of prapatti in Rāmānuja's doctrine.

with setting forth the equality of all those souls: they are equal because, when they are free from the differentiations god, man etc., they all have the self-same form of knowledge. Then the śāstras declare that that proper form of the soul is itself ensouled by the Venerable Lord, because it is the soul's sole proper form and essence³⁴⁹ to be accessory to its principal. This stated, they propound subsequently the proper form of the Lord: He is categorically different from everything else as He is in absolute opposition to imperfection and solely comprises perfection; He is the abode of innumerable numbers of beautiful qualities, boundless and absolute; He is the soul immanent in everything, because each and every spiritual and non-spiritual entity is brought into existence by His will. Then the śāstras conclude by expounding that worshipping Him, as well as obtaining the necessities for this worship, is the means of attaining Him.

§ 79. So is said in *nirvāṇamaya evāyam ātmā jñānamayo 'malaḥ/duḥ-khājñānamalā dharmāḥ prakṛtes te na cātmanah*:³⁵⁰ i.e. inasmuch as they derive from karman resulting from the natural conjunction of soul with matter, the properties summed up do not belong to the proper form of the soul. What is said is this: by distinguishing between that which has got and that which has not,³⁵¹ we learn that these properties belong to matter exclusively. Likewise in *vidyāvinayasampanne brāhmaṇe gavi hastini/sūni caiva svāpake ca paṇḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ*,^{351a} i.e. paṇḍitāḥ are they whose intellects³⁵² discriminate the proper form of the soul from the prakṛti in the form of god, man, animal, inanimate things with which it is conjoined; they are *samadarśinaḥ*, i.e. by knowing the real nature of the soul, viz. that it is separate from the differentiated forms of that prakṛti, they see that the soul that exists in any of these infinitely diversified configurations has the same form as all other souls.³⁵³ So the pronouncement *ihaiva tair jitaḥ sargo*

349. °*ekarasa*°; *rasa*- is here taken in the double meaning of "essence" and "ecstasy", corresponding to °*ekasvarūpa*°/°*svabhāva*° (e.g. GBh. 18, 54) and °*ekarati*° (GBh. Intr. *aśeṣaśeṣataikarati*-): serving God as His *seṣa* by the loving representation of bhakti is as such a source of extreme joy, as R. repeatedly declares.

350. VP. 6, 7, 22 "this ātman is full of beatitude and knowledge and it is pure; the properties of unhappiness, ignorance and impurity are proper to the prakṛti, not to the ātman"; on *nirvāṇamaya*- cf. R. GBh. 2, 72 *ad brahmanirvāṇam: nirvāṇamayaṁ brahma = sukhaikatānam ātmānam*.—Gītā Press ed. has the less apt reading °*ajñānamaya*° *dharmāḥ*.

351. *prāptāprāptavivekena*, S. *anvayavyatirekābhyām ity arthaḥ*: discriminating by means of positive and negative arrangement of terms; cf. Foucher, TS. p. 132-34.

351a. BhG. 5, 18 "wise men see the same in a Brahmin accomplished in knowledge and self-discipline, in a cow, an elephant, a dog and a dog-eater".

352. *buddhi*-; cf. R. GBh. 5, 18 *paṇḍitāḥ = ātmayāthātmyavido* "knowing the essentials of the ātman".

353. Cf. GBh. 5, 18 *jñānaikākāratayā sarvatra samadarśinaḥ/viśamākāras tu prakṛter nāmanah / ātmā tu sarvatra jñānaikākāratayā sama itī paśyantīty arthaḥ*.

yeṣāṁ sāmye sthitaṁ manaḥ/nirdoṣaṁ hi samaṁ brahma tasmād brahmaṇi te sthitāḥ,³⁵⁴ where *nirdoṣa*- means "free from the defect of natural conjunction with differentiated forms of prakṛti, such as gods etc.": thus any member of the order of souls is, when abiding in its proper form, equal to any other member, because it has the common form of knowledge as *nirvāṇa*.³⁵⁵

§ 80. Śruti, smṛti, itihāsa and purāṇa propound by using terms like *His body*,³⁵⁶ *His embodiment*³⁵⁷ etc. and by *sāmānādhikarānya* that this soul described above is essentially accessory³⁵⁸ to the Lord, controlled by Him and dependent on Him. This we have already set forth above.

§ 81. In the smṛti *daivī hy eṣā guṇamayī mama māyā duratyayā/mām eva ye prapadyante māyām etāṁ taranti te*³⁵⁹ it is declared that that release of the above soul from the saṁsāra in the form of its natural conjunction with prakṛti, which is due to karman and consists in various guṇas, is impossible without resorting to the Lord. The same is established on the strength of śrutis like *no other path is there for him to tread*.³⁶⁰ In the smṛti: *In an unevolved form do I pervade this entire Universe*:³⁶¹ *all creatures depend on Me but I do not depend on them. At the same time they do not rest on Me: behold my miraculous power*!³⁶² the Lord explains the diversity of the forms of His sovereignty by His omnipotence. Likewise He says: *viṣṭabhyāham idam kṛtsnam ekāṁśena sthito jagat*,³⁶³ i.e. "having entered into the world — which is of an infinitely varied, miraculous character — as its

354. BhG. 5, 19 "Those who have already here on earth overcome the conjunction have their minds focused on equality; for, if free from defect, the ātmans are equal:" *sarga*- in this (Ved.) connexion is doubtless to be taken as *saṁsarga*- (GBh. *sarga*- = *saṁsāra*-); note that R. here interprets *brahma* as *ātmavastu*- "the order of ātman" (neuter °*vastu*- corresponding with the neuter of *brahma*) as in GBh. 5, 19; on the equation *brahman* = *ātman* (i.e. individual ātman), cf. my *Rāmānuja* etc., p. 34-35.

355. *nirvāṇa*- in the above sense "beatitude" (VP. 6, 7, 22).

356. *śarīra*-, e.g. *Antaryāmibrāhmaṇa*, BĀh. p. 3, 7, 3-22.

357. *tanu*-, e.g. *KaṭhUp.* 2, 23.

358. *śeṣa*-.

359. BhG. 7, 14 "for that divine Magic of Mine, constituted by guṇas, is hard to overcome: those alone who resort to Me overcome that Magic": on R.'s interpretation of this stanza see my *Rāmānuja* etc. p. 25 f.

360. *TaittĀr.* 3, 13, 1 *tam evaṁ vidvān amṛta iha bhavati / nānyah panthā ayanāya vidyate*; note that acc. to R. the word for knowing (*vedana*-), sc. in *vidvān*, is synonymous with *upāsana*- or *bhakti*-.

361. BhG. 9, 4; R. GBh. explains *avyaktamūrtinā* as *aprakāśitasvarūpeṇa mayāntaryāmīṇā*.

362. BhG. 9, 5ab.

363. BhG. 10, 42 "supporting this universe I constitute the world with a single portion of myself".

immanent soul with an infinitesimal particle³⁶⁴ of Myself, I keep supporting it entirely by My will and I remain, while in this form possessing an infinite supernal manifestation, the abode of boundless perfect qualities as I am supremely miraculous." The same He says in: *ekatve sati nānātvaṃ nānātvē sati caikatā/acintyaṃ brahmaṇo rūpaṃ kas tad veditum arhati*,³⁶⁵ i.e. "while remaining one by being its sole controller, He enters the Universe as the soul immanent in the various spiritual and non-spiritual entities; having a variety of modifications in the forms of these entities and instigating a variety of activities He partakes of variety Himself." Having thus, with an infinitesimal particle of Himself, entered into the Universe with all its wonders and variety as its immanent soul and *viṣṭabhya*,³⁶⁶ i.e. though abiding in variety, the Sovereign Lord of lords, the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Person, Nārāyaṇa, whose hosts of perfections are boundless, unsurpassed and innumerable — who is the perfectly miraculous One — who appears like a blue cloud — who has long eyes so spotless as a lotus leaf — who is radiant with the splendour of thousands of suns —, the One in the Supreme Heaven revealed by śrutis such as *yo veda nihitaṃ guhāyāṃ parame vyoman*³⁶⁷ *tad āksare parame vyoman*³⁶⁸ etc., remains nonetheless essentially one.

§ 82. For any other entity but Brahman it is impossible to have another form, nature and power added to its own form, nature and power.³⁶⁹ But this Supreme Brahman, being categorically different from all entities, has all natures and all powers. Therefore it is not contradictory that this one being has an infinite and wonderful variety of forms and still retains His uniformity in this infinite and immeasurable diversity. So the fear lest there be contradiction in so far as He would be similar to a mere common entity is not justified. As has been said: *śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānām acintyañānagocarāḥ/yato 'to brahmaṇas tās tu sargādyā bhāvaśaktayaḥ // bhavanti tapasāṃ śreṣṭha pāvakasya yathoṣṇatā*:³⁷⁰ in other words: it is not fit to think that a certain power observed in one single being exclusively

364. *ayutāṃśena* "myriadth portion" has become in GBh. *ad* 10, 42 even *ayutāyutāṃśena*.

365. ? "in unity there is diversity and unity is in diversity: who is able to know Brahman's inconceivable form?"

366. From BhG. 10, 42 cited above, forming part of the context of śrutis and smṛtis expounding the Universe's utter dependence on God.

367. TaittUp. 2, 1, 1 "who knows that which is laid down in the innermost of the Supreme Heaven".

368. MahānārUp. 1, 2 "that is in the indestructible Supreme Heaven".

369. S. comments: *nahi dāhaśakto 'gnir jādyaḥjananaśaktiḥ*.

370. VP. 1, 3, 2-3 "the potencies of all entities transcend all except inconceivable knowledge: for these potencies, like fieriness in fire, rise from Brahman's creation O most excellent of ascetics!"

among all other beings, such as fire, water etc., is also to be found in another being that is categorically different from the former one: for instance the power of brightness, heat etc. found in fire is not to be found in water, which is categorically different from fire. Similarly it is not fit to infer that Brahman is similar to any other being in anything: He is categorically different from any other. What is meant hereby is: hence follows that Brahman possesses an infinite variety of powers. So it says: *With Thee, Most Eminent One, whose form is this greatly miraculous world, with Thee, greatest of miracles, I am united, O Kṛṣṇa*.³⁷¹

§ 83. I have arrived at the exclusion that this is the doctrine of the scriptures after a painstaking study not only of the endless number of all the various śrutis, but also of the commentaries on them which have been accepted by judicious scholars. It is like this: several śrutis declare that creation and resorption — which are not empirically known by other *pramāṇas* and which are diversified by a continual succession of a plurality of elements whose developments are unlimited — are the doing of Brahman. Some śrutis, e.g. *niravadyaṃ nirañjanam*,³⁷² *viññānam*,³⁷³ *ānandam*,³⁷⁴ *nirvikāram*,³⁷⁵ *niṣkalam niṣkriyam śāntam*,³⁷⁶ *nirguṇam*³⁷⁷ etc., assert that Brahman is unqualified and essentially knowledge. Other śrutis, e.g. *neha nāsti kiṃcana mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti ya iha nāneva paśyati*,³⁷⁸ *yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt tat kena kaṃ paśyet tat kena kaṃ viññāyāt*,³⁷⁹ deny that there is diversity. But other śrutis, like *yaḥ sarvajñāḥ sarvavit*,³⁸⁰ *yasya jñānamayaṃ tapaḥ*,³⁸¹ *sarvāni rūpāṇi vicitya dhīro nāmāni kṛtvābhivadan yad āste*,³⁸² *sarve nimeṣā jajñire vidyutaḥ puruṣād adhi*,³⁸³ *apahatapāpmā*

371. VP. 5, 19, 7.

372. SvetUp. 6, 19 *niṣkalam niṣkriyam śāntam niravadyaṃ nirañjanam*: "without parts, without action, tranquil, irreproachable and immaculate".

373. TaittUp. 3, 5, 1 *viññānam brahma* "Brahman is knowledge".

374. TaittUp. 2, 1.

375. YogaśikhUp. *nirvikāram nirāśrayam* "without causal transformations, not deriving from any cause".

376. SvetUp. 6, 19 cited above note 372.

377. MantrUp. 2 *antaḥ paśyanti sattvasthā nirguṇam guṇagahvare* "they who are in sattva see, deep down in the guṇas, the One without guṇas".

378. BĀUp. 4, 4, 19 "there is here no diversity whatever, he that sees diversity here will meet with death after his death".

379. BĀUp. 4, 5, 15 "but when the ātman is all of him, then whom does he know and how?"

380. MuṇḍUp. 1, 1, 9 "who is omniscient, all-knowing".

381. Not identified.

382. CityUp. 12, 7 "that which the sage, after pondering over all its forms and giving them names, keeps saluting".

383. MahānārUp. 1, 8 "all flashes of lightning spring from above the Person".

vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijaghatso 'pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ,³⁸⁴ negate only all those qualities that are held by everyone to be evil, and they declare that Brahman has an infinite number of beautiful qualities: that He is omniscient and omnipotent, that He has separated all according to name-and-form,³⁸⁵ and that He is the substratum of all.—Other śrutis, like *sarvaṃ khalv idam brahma tajjalāniti*,³⁸⁶ *aitadātmyam idam sarvaṃ*,³⁸⁷ *ekaḥ san bahu-dhā vicāraḥ*,³⁸⁸ first expound that the universe in all its diversity is created by Brahman and then declare that both Brahman and Universe are identical. Other śrutis, e.g., *prthag ātmānaṃ preritāraṃ ca matvā*,³⁸⁹ *bhoktā bhogyam preritāraṃ ca matvā*,³⁹⁰ *prajāpatir akāmayate prajāḥ sṛjeyeti*,³⁹¹ *patiṃ viśvasyātmesvaraṃ śāśvatam śivam acyutam*,³⁹² *tam īśvarāṇām paramaṃ maheśvaraṃ tam devatānām paramaṃ ca daivatam*,³⁹³ *sarvasya vaśi sarvasyeśānaḥ*,³⁹⁴ propound that Brahman is different from all, that all is subject to Brahman's sovereignty and is accessory to Brahman, and that the Lord is the master.—Others again like *antaḥpraviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām sarvātmā*,³⁹⁵ *eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛtaḥ*,³⁹⁶ *yasya pṛthivī śarīraṃ . . . yasyāpaḥ śarīraṃ . . . yasya tejaḥ śarīraṃ*, etc.; *yasyāvvyaktaṃ śarīraṃ . . . yasyākṣaraṃ śarīraṃ . . . yasya mṛtyuḥ śarīraṃ . . . yasyātmā śarīraṃ . . .*,³⁹⁷ point out the body-

384. ChUp. 8, 7, 1 "exempt from defect, unaging, undying, without sorrow and hunger and thirst, having every will realized and all desires materialized."

385. Viz. ChUp. 6, 3, 2 *seyaṃ devataikṣata- hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaraṇāniti*.

386. ChUp. 3. 14. 1 "all this is verily Brahman: the tranquil one meditates (on all things) as having their beginning and end in It." R. follows Śaṅkara's interpretation of *tajjalān* as *taj-ja-la-* ChUpBh. *tasmād brahmaṇo jātaṃ tejobannadikramaṇa* (cf. 6, 2, 3) *sarvaṃ / atas tajjam / tathā tenaiva jananakramaṇa pratilomatayā tasmīn eva brahmaṇi liyate tadātmatayā śliṣyata iti tallam*, in ŚBh. 1, 2, 1 (p. 137) *tajjalān iti hetutaḥ sarvaṃ khalv idam brahmeti prasiddhavan nirdeśāt / brahmaṇo jātatvād (= taj-ja-) brahmaṇi linatvād (= tal-la-) brahmādhīnajīvanatvāc (= tad-ana < AN "to breathe, live") ca hetor brahmātmakam sarvaṃ khalv idam jagad iti*, etc.

387. ChUp. 6, 8, 7 "all this has That for its soul".

388. CityUp. 11, 1 "though unique, manifold reflection".

389. SvetUp. 1, 6 "knowing the ātman and the actuator to be different".

390. SvetUp. 1, 12 "knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed and the actuator".

391. Not identified. "The lord of creatures desired: may I beget offspring".

392. MahānārUp. 9, 6 "Lord of all, ruler of the soul, the everlasting, auspicious Unfallen One".

393. SvetUp. 6, 7 "Him, paramount lord of the lords, supreme deity of all divinities".

394. BĀUp. 4, 4, 22 "ruler of all, lord of all".

395. TaittĀr. 3, 11 "the instructor of men entered within, the soul of all".

396. BĀUp. 3, 7, 3-22 ". . . he is the inner Ruler, the immortal One".

397. SubĀUp. 7, 1; the text runs: *antaḥśarīre nihito guhāyām aja eko nityo yasya pṛthivī śarīraṃ yaḥ pṛthivīm antare samcaraan yaṃ pṛthivī na veda/yasyāpaḥ*

soul relationship that exists between Brahman and the sum-total of entities other than Brahman.

§ 84. We have to interpret all these śrutis in such a manner that there is no contradiction between their statements, however diverse, and that their primary sense is not sacrificed. And we have done so.—The śrutis expounding an untransformed Brahman have their primary sense because they deny that His proper form is subject to evolution.³⁹⁸ Those declaring that He is unqualified are to be taken as denying that He is associated with the evil qualities mentioned in the context.³⁹⁹ Those that deny diversity are justly preserved because they signify that Brahman is modified by all inasmuch as He is the inner soul of all:⁴⁰⁰ for the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities forms a mode of Brahman by constituting his body. The passages which declare that He is different from all modes, master and lord of all, and the possessor of all perfections and the power of having all his desires materialized and his every will realized,⁴⁰¹ etc., are justly retained by accepting just that. Statements that He is mere knowledge and bliss are preserved because they set forth that the defining property of Brahman's proper form, different from all, substratum of all perfections, lord of all, master of all, basis of all, cause of the origination, subsistence and resorption of all, irreproachable and untransformed, all-ensouling — that this defining property is knowledge⁴⁰² in the form of bliss⁴⁰³ in absolute opposition to imperfection,⁴⁰⁴ and that therefore his proper form, being self-illuminating, is nothing but knowledge.⁴⁰⁵ Similarly well-founded are the declarations of identity as they

śarīraṃ etc., and concludes: *yasya mṛtyuḥ śarīraṃ yo mṛtyum antare samcaraan yaṃ mṛtyur na veda/sa eṣa sarvabhūtāntarātmāpapatapāpmā divyo deva eko nārāyaṇaḥ*. The Vulgate does not contain the clause *yasyātmā*, etc.

398. In other words, they point to Brahman as the absolutely transcendent principle from which change may come forth but which itself is not subject to any change whatever.

399. i.e., the contexts like ChUp. 8, 7, 1 and others cited above; cf. also ŚBh. 1, 1, (Th. p. 78ff.).

400. i.e., Brahman is the unitive principle underneath all diversity which clothes Him rather than involves Himself; as the inner Ruler He is strictly identical with Himself.

401. ChUp. 8, 7, 1 *satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ*.

402. Brahman is not knowledge, but is essentially characterized by it; knowledge being His essential property may, if this proviso be well understood, denote His essence.

403. Brahman's knowledge being eminently knowledge of His own perfection may be considered under the aspect of (*rūpa-* "form") perfect bliss.

404. *mala-*, for the more usual *heya-*.

405. *svaprakāśatayā jñānam api svarūpam eva*: in Brahman's absolute self-comprehension the three elements of all knowledge: subject — action — object of knowing, are in perfect unity.

establish that the *sāmānādhikarānya* constructions have their primary meaning in a body-soul relationship.⁴⁰⁶

§ 85. Such being the case, the question arises: what is the sense to be concluded from the Veda that is herewith established? That there is no difference,⁴⁰⁷ or that there is difference,⁴⁰⁸ or that there is a double essence, being at once different and non-different?⁴⁰⁹

All of them are established, because each can be concluded from the Vedānta. Non-difference is established in the sense that Brahman is modified by all because all constitute his body. Both difference and non-difference are established in the sense that the sole Brahman, being modified by the variety of spiritual and non-spiritual entities, abides in variety. There is difference inasmuch as the non-spiritual order, the spiritual order and the Lord have categorically different proper forms and natures and are never confused.

§ 86. But are we not to understand that the knowledge of identity as declared in *tat tvam asi Śvetaketo*,⁴¹⁰ *tasya tāvad eva ciram*,⁴¹¹ is the means by which Release — that is man's supreme End — is attained?

No, that is not so. Let us consider the śruti *pṛthag ātmānam pre-ritāraṃ ca matvā juṣṭas tatas tenāmṛtatvam eti*,⁴¹² that means: "after having acquired the knowledge that the soul and its Mover, i.e., the inner Ruler, are separate from each other, one attains *tatas*, i.e., in consequence of this very knowledge that they are separate, the immortality by the favour of that Supreme Spirit. So we have rather to understand that the means by which we can attain immortality in person is the knowledge that the soul and its Controller exist separately.

406. i.e., the identity viewed in the first place as a relation between various aspects of one entity: the person denoted by "thou" is indeed the Supreme Being denoted by "that" as viewed under the aspect of the inner Ruler contained in term-and-entity "thou".

407. The opinion of the Advaitin.

408. The opinion of the later Dvaitins, esp. Mādhva and his school, to whose precursors, possibly under influence of Sāṃkhya dualism, Rāmānuja may refer.

409. The opinion of the bhedābhedavādins; for *dvyātmakatā*, cf. supra § 30.

410. ChUp. 6, 8, 7.

411. ChUp. 6, 14, 2 *tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimokṣya atha sampātsya iti* "it will take him some time before he will have freed himself: then he shall succeed". Ś., ChUpBh. comments: *ato brahmavido jivanādiprayojanābhāve'pi pravṛttaphalānām karmaṇām avāśyam eva phalopabhogaḥ syād iti mukteṣvat tasya tāvad eva ciram iti yuktaṃ evoktaṃ iti*.

412. Śvet Up. 1, 12 "knowing the ātman and the actuator to be different one attains consequently by His favour the immortality".

§ 87. — But as this view is incompatible with the assertion that both are identical, we are compelled to assume that this knowledge works only the attainment of the qualified, not absolutely real Brahman.

Why then could not the opposite be true,⁴¹³ on the authority of our śruti that only by means of the knowledge that both are separate we can attain immortality in person?

In other words: when two equally valid views are seemingly contradictory, we have to discover for both a common connotation in which they do not contradict each other.

— But how can they possibly be reconciled?

The word *tvam* refers to Brahman as modified by the embodied soul, for this embodied soul is a mode of the Supreme Brahman — who is the inner Ruler — because it constitutes the body of Him as inner Ruler. The meaning of your śruti is that *this* is the knowledge to be acquired. Whereas the meaning of our śruti is this: it must be realized that the Supreme Spirit — who is the soul of the embodied soul, exists separately from that embodied soul because He is free from all defects and possesses immeasurable, unsurpassed and innumerable beautiful qualities, such as that of having his every will realized, etc. The śruti *bhoktā bhogyam pre-ritāraṃ ca matvā* means that we are to know the Supreme Brahman's three modes of being:

1. The natural properties of the order of *bhogyā*, or object: that it is non-spiritual, absolutely real⁴¹⁴ and always the substratum of transformations;

2. the natural properties of the *bhoktr*, or subject, i.e., the embodied soul: that, in spite of its being in essence unimpaired,⁴¹⁵ uncircumscribable knowledge and bliss, it is susceptible to various degrees of contraction and expansion due to ignorance in the form of ageless karman; that it is naturally

413. Here R. turns the tables on the advaitin by assuming the same intransigence of interpretation: but where the advaitin on the strength of a few citations (moreover, according to R., misquoted and misrepresented) rejects all other śrutis, R. proceeds to reconcile the differences which the advaitin, just by taking his obstinate stand, had exaggerated and, it is true, grossly overrated.

414. *paramārtha*:- this in fundamental opposition to the advaitin who does not admit the ultimate reality of inanimate matter. — *bhogyā*- "object of the soul's phenomenal activities" describes the inanimate matter as having no function apart from, and being completely subservient to, the order of souls.

415. For the soul as such is not subject to transformations, only his property knowledge is.

conjoined with the non-spiritual order which is its object; and that it is capable of release through worship of the Supreme Spirit; etc.

3. The mode of being of the inner Ruler of the above subject and object, and, in essence, the abode of immeasurable virtues.

§ 88. As has been explained by the competent early ācāryas⁴¹⁶ in their commentaries, the object of worshipful meditation in the so-called *sadvidyā* *tut tvam asi* is Brahman as qualified by qualities. The Author of the Vākya declares: *yuktaṃ tadguṇakopāsanād*,⁴¹⁷ and Dramiḍācārya when treating of the distinctions between the *vidyās*⁴¹⁸ comments as follows: *yady api saccitto na nirbhugnadaivatam guṇagaṇam manasānudhavet tathāpy antarguṇām eva devatām bhajata iti tatrāpi saguṇaiva devatā prāpyate*, that means: "although a person who is *saccitta*, i.e. wholly concentrated on the *sadvidyā*, does not memorize immediately — as he would when concentrating on the *daharavidyā* — the multitude of qualities like freedom from sin which are distinct from pure godhead⁴¹⁹ yet the Deity is also worshipped for anyone of His qualities that are exclusively His as the Supreme Deity — e.g. that of being the universal cause⁴²⁰ —, because all beautiful qualities are inherent in His proper form, so that in the *sadvidyā* too He is actually worshipped as being distinguished by all the beautiful qualities inherent in His proper form: therefore in the *sadvidyā*, too, the end to be attained is the *qualified* Brahman: thus are *sadvidyā* and *daharavidyā* distinguished."

§ 89. — However, it has been declared that the Supreme Spirit is the inner Ruler of all creatures and that all are subject to His ruling. If this is true, then there is strictly speaking no one who can be a qualified subject

416. The pūrvācāryas who are actually quoted by Rāmānuja in Ved. and ŚBh. are the authors of the Dramiḍabhāṣya, of the Vṛtti and of the Vākya; I refer to Intr. II and Appendix.

417. "This is appropriate, on account of the worship of Him as being possessed of these guṇas", also quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 79; the quotation probably refers to the *daharavidyā* where ChUp. 8, 7, 1 a number of properties qualifying the Supreme Soul are enumerated.

418. Selected portions of the principal Upaniṣads, constituting a special knowledge and meditation of one of the aspects of the Supreme Being. For a complete list see that appended to A. Govindācārya's Śrī Bhagavad-Gītā with Rāmānuja's commentary in English (Madras 1898). The *daharavidyā* has its name from ChUp. 8, 1, 1 *atha yad idam asmin brahmapure daharam puṇḍarikam veśma daharo 'sminn antarākāśah / tasmin yad antastad anveṣṭavyam tad vāva vijijñāsitavyam*; the *sadvidyā* from ChUp. 6, 2, 1 *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd*, etc.

419. R. explains *nirbhugnadaivatam* (attributive to *guṇagaṇam*) "that by which godhead is altered" (*nirbhugna*- "bent awry") by *guṇagaṇam daivatād vibhaktam*; for my translation, see Appendix § 2, Fragment XV.

420. Since according to ChUp. 6, 2, 3 the creation proceeds from *sat*.

of the instructions of injunctions and prohibitions.⁴²¹ For only someone who is able, by his own mental disposition, to be active or to be inactive can be really a qualified subject of injunctions and prohibitions of the kind: 'you are to do this', 'you are not to do that'. But there is no one like him. The directing Supreme Spirit is the one who ultimately causes everyone to be active in every activity: that is His ascendancy over each and everyone, so is declared. And this is also attested in the śruti: "*Him He incites to righteous action whom He wishes to guide upward beyond the world, and him He incites to unrighteous action whom He wishes to bring down*,⁴²² Now, would this not mean that there is cruelty in God because He incites to good and evil actions arbitrarily?"

§ 90. — The reply to this is as follows. The Supreme Spirit has bestowed equally upon all spiritual beings all that is required for activity or inactivity, for instance the capacity of spirituality, the capacity of activity, etc. So as to enable them to accomplish this, He has become their substratum and has entered into them as the principal to whom they are accessory, directing them by consenting. The spiritual being, whose capacities are so dependent on Him, performs of his own accord certain acts or refrains of his own accord from certain acts. But while observing the soul in its doings the Supreme Spirit Himself takes no sides. Therefore all is sound. Besides, it depends on every individual case whether He will cause good acts or evil acts to be performed: it is not an invariable rule that He will always cause one or the other in every case. When someone of his own accord has been active before in an extremely good action, then the Venerable Lord is pleased with him and by granting him a mental disposition for good actions helps him to be so active. When, however, someone has indulged in extremely inauspicious actions, then the Venerable Lord incites him to wicked activities by giving him a wicked disposition. So the Venerable Lord Himself has declared: "*When people are always well-disposed and worship Me, I am pleased and I bestow on them a disposition by which they may attain Me. To show them My mercy I dispel — immanent in their souls — the darkness of their ignorance with the radiant torch of knowledge*,⁴²³ *But the hostile, wicked, unholy criminals I cast away forever in demoniac forms of existence in their saṃsāras*."⁴²⁴

421. In other words, the person who acts or acts not is no longer a free agent: the responsibility for his actions is transferred to the directing inner Ruler.

422. KauśUp. 3, 8 *eṣa eva* (Vulgate: *eṣa hy evainam*) *sādhu karma kārayati taṃ bhyo lokebhya unniniṣati, eṣa eva* (: *eṣa u evainam*) *asādhu karma kārayati taṃ adho niniṣati*.

423. BhG. 10, 10-11.

424. BhG. 11, 19.

§ 91. When a person has caused the mass of evil karman, amassed during all his previous existences, to melt away by amassing unequalled good karman;—when he has become wholly dedicated to God as a result of his taking refuge at His lotus-like feet—when he has acquired the moral qualities *śama*, *dama*, *tapas*, *śauca*, *kṣamā*, *arjava*, *bhayaḥ*, *yābhayasthānaviveka*, *dayā*, *ahimsā*, etc.,⁴²⁵ and nourishes them by exercising them daily and applying to them his preceding knowledge of the true nature of the ontological orders gathered from the śāstras and corroborated by the teachings of the true ācāryas, — when he devotes himself to the accomplishment of periodical and occasional acts corresponding to his station and stage of life, as the forms⁴²⁶ in which he is to worship the Supreme Person and avoids what is forbidden; — when he throws himself altogether⁴²⁷ at the lotus-like feet of the Supreme Person; — when the darkness concealing his innermost self is dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Person who, supremely compassionate as He is, is pleased with the uninterrupted acts of worship that are dictated by the devotee's bhakti in glorification,⁴²⁸ remembrance,⁴²⁹ homage,⁴³⁰ salutation,⁴³¹ mortification,⁴³² exaltation,⁴³³ the listening to the description of His perfections and narrating them himself, meditation,⁴³⁴

425. The so-called ātma-guṇas enumerated BhG. 10, 4-5: *buddhir jñānam asaṃ-mohah kṣamā satyaṃ damaḥ śamaḥ / sukhaṃ duḥkham bhāvo 'bhāvo bhayaṃ cābhayaṃ eva ca // ahimsā samatā tuṣṭis tapo dānaṃ yaśo 'yasaḥ*; and BhG. 18, 42 *śamo damas tapaḥ śaucaṃ kṣāntir ārjavam eva ca / jñānam vijñānam āstikyam brahma-karmasvabhāvajam*. R. explains GBh. ad 10, 4-5: *śamo 'ntahkaraṇasya tathā* (i.e. *anartha-viṣayebhyo*) *niyamanam*; *dama* *bāhyakaraṇānām anartha-viṣayebhyo niyamanam*; ad 18, 42 *tapo bhoganiyamanarūpaḥ śāstrasiddhakāyākleśah; śaucaṃ śāstrīyakarmayogyatā; kṣāntih (= kṣamā) paraiḥ piḍyamānasyāpi avikṛtacittatā; ārjavam pareṣu manorūpaṃ bāhya-ceṣṭāprakāśanam; bhayaḥ bhayasthānaviveka-* "well distinguishing when fear and when fearlessness is indicated", S. explains: *bhagavadupacārabhīrutvaṃ bhayasthānavivekaḥ* "anxious care in the service of God", and *tadrakṣakatvādhyavasāyādīnā nirbhayatvam abhayasthānavivekaḥ* "fearlessness in resolving to protect Him etc. (i.e. His image etc.)"; *dayā* "compassion" S. *paraduḥkṣahīṣṇutvam; ahimsā* "inoffensiveness" R. GBh. 10, 5 *ahimsā paraduḥkṣahīhetutvam*.

426. *veśa-* "disguise".

427. i.e. "with all that is his" °*nyastātmātmīyasya*.

428. *stuti-*; S. *guṇakathanam bandikṛtyam vā*.

429. *smṛti-* "pondering over God's perfections and representing them incessantly to oneself".

430. *namaskṛti-*.

431. *vandana-*.

432. *yātana-* "self-sacrifice", which S., in harmony with the temple atmosphere evoked by *namaskṛti* and *vandana*, explains as *bhagavadudyanādikaraṇam*.

433. *kīrtana-* S. *bhagavannāmoccāraṇam*, probably alluding to Viṣṇu's thousand names (MBh. 13, 433) a litany very popular among Vaiṣṇavas.

434. *anudhyāna-* cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 11-12.

adoration and prostration, etc.; — then will he be able to attain the Supreme Person by virtue of his bhakti, which takes on the form of contemplation in the highest degree of lucid perception,⁴³⁵ directed to none but Him, uninterrupted, pre-eminent and held precious dear. This has been declared by that most eminent Guru, the venerable Yāmunācārya himself: *ubhayapari-karmitasvāntasyaikāntikātyantikabhaktiyogalabhyah*,⁴³⁶ that means: ". . . by someone whose inner faculty has been prepared by karmayoga and jñāna-yoga." Similarly the śruti: "He that has a clear insight in *vidyā* and *avidyā* will first conquer death by *avidyā* and then gain immortality by *vidyā*,"⁴³⁷ where *avidyā*⁴³⁸ stands for the above-mentioned moral conduct according to one's station and stage of life etc., and *vidyā* for the meditation in the form of bhakti. Likewise: "He that resorts to knowledge performs thereby a great deal of sacrifices; when he makes the brahmavidyā his foundation, he will conquer death by *avidyā*."⁴³⁹ In the passage: "He that knows this becomes immortal here and now: no other path is there for him to tread,"⁴⁴⁰ those who know Him become immortal,⁴⁴¹ he that knows Brahman attains the Most-High,⁴⁴² He who knows the Most-High, who knows Brahman becomes Brahman himself,^{442a} the verb to know is equivalent to "to meditate", for it has the sense of *DHYAI-*, "to meditate",⁴⁴³ in the passage *nididhyāsitavyah*, etc.⁴⁴⁴

What this "meditation" is is specified by another śruti: "This soul can not be grasped by explication, nor by mere knowledge, nor by great erudition: he alone whom God Himself elects can attain Him: He singles his soul out to serve as His body."⁴⁴⁵ That implies that He can only be grasped by

435. *viśadatatapratyakṣatāpanna*°.

436. *Ātmasiddhi* (in *Siddhitraya*), stated as the *siddhānta* in an enumeration of the various views taken of the manner in which God can be attained: "Release is only to be attained by the exclusive bhakti discipline of one whose inner faculty has been trained by both"; refer to my remarks Chapt. III.

437. *ĪUp. 11 vidyāṃ cāvidyāṃ ca yas tad vedobhayaṃ saha / avidyayā mṛtyum tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtam aśnute*.

438. i.e., *avidyā* in the sense of *karman*, as R. often takes the term; here *karman* esp. as preparatory and ancillary to the "discipline of loving comprehension" or bhakti.

439. VP. 6, 6, 12.

440. *TaittĀr. 3, 1, 13*.

441. *MahānārUp. 1, 11*.

442. *TaittUp. 2, 1, 1*.

442a. ? *so yo ha vai tat paraṃ veda brahma veda brahma bhavati*.

443. Cf. ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, pp. 8-19; GBh. 18, 65.

444. *nididhyāsitavyah* in *BĀUp. 4, 5, 6 ātmā vā arē draṣṭavyah śrotavyo mantavyo nididhāsitavyo maitreyi / ātmani khalv are drṣṭe śrute mate vijñāta idaṃ sarvaṃ viditam*; cf. ŚBh. 4, 1, 1 ad this śruti: *dhyāyatīnā vedanam abhidhīyate / dhyānaṃ ca cintanam / cintanam ca smṛtisamātīrūpaṃ na smṛtimātram / upāstir api tadekārthaḥ / ekāgracit-tavṛttinairantarye prayogadarśanāt*.

445. *MuṇḍUp. 3, 2, 3 nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena / yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyas tasyaiṣa ātmā vṛṇute tanūṃ svām*.

meditation that takes the form of bhakti, not merely by knowing, for *na medhayā* excludes mere knowledge.

§ 92. In other words, when an aspirant to release is wholly devoted to meditation in the form of knowledge of the kind enjoined by the Vedānta and when an oceanic feeling of perfect love for that meditation itself engulfs him, then by virtue of that love is he able to grasp the Supreme Person. This has been declared by the Venerable Lord: "that Supreme Person, O Pārtha, can be grasped by exclusive bhakti.⁴⁴⁶ By exclusive bhakti, O Arjuna, can I be known and beheld and entered so as I really am.⁴⁴⁷ When a person knows Me through bhakti for what I am and who I am in reality, then he knows Me thereby (*tatas*) in reality and he enters Me immediately,"⁴⁴⁸ i.e., immediately thereafter he enters Me *tatas* "thereby" sc. by virtue of his bhakti.

Bhakti is a kind of knowledge that is so excellent, precious and exclusive that it robs everything else of its interest.⁴⁴⁹ Now, he that has acquired this knowledge is elected by the Supreme Person, and so he can grasp Him. This is the full meaning of the śruti cited above.⁴⁵⁰ It is through bhaktiyoga, furthered at first by karmayoga that is daily intensified in the above way and subsequently by jñānayoga, that such knowledge in the form of supreme bhakti arises.⁴⁵¹ So the venerable Parāśara says: "A person who acts according to his station and stage of life propitiates the Supreme Person Viṣṇu: there is no other way of satisfying Him."⁴⁵² And the Supreme Person who, while remaining the Supreme Brahman, had descended to the earth in order to rescue the entire Universe,⁴⁵³ Himself has declared: "Listen how a man who keeps to his own task will find the highest achievement: by worshipping Me, from Whom all beings proceed and Who pervades this entire world, in his own task, man finds the supreme achievement:"⁴⁵⁴ He is attainable only by bhakti that has matured in the described manner.

§ 93. This 'path' which is shown in all the śrutis whose meaning is very lucidly explained by the ancient commentaries composed by Bodhā-

446. BhG. 8, 22.

447. BhG. 11, 54.

448. BhG. 18, 55.

449. *svetaravaitṛṣṇyāvaha*°.

450. MuṇḍUp. 3, 2, 3.

451. Cf. my *Rāmānuja* etc., Introduction Ch. IV.

452. VP. 3, 8, 9.

453. Cf. GBh. Intr....*svam eva rūpaṃ tatsajātīyasamsthānaṃ svasvabhāvaṃ*

ajahad eva kurvaṃs teṣu teṣu lokeṣv avatīryāvātīrya, and ŚBh. 1, 3, 2.

454. BhG. 18, 45 cd. 46.

yana,⁴⁵⁵ Ṭanka,⁴⁵⁶ Dramiḍa,⁴⁵⁷ Guhadeva, Kapardi, Bhāruci etc., and accepted by all who are competent to judge, is only to be arrived at by bhakti that has developed along the above lines. And herewith the Cārvākas,⁴⁵⁸ the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas,⁴⁵⁹ Naiyāyikas,⁴⁶⁰ Jainas,⁴⁶¹ and the followers of Kapila⁴⁶² and Patañjali⁴⁶³ are condemned alike, those who are outside the pale of the Veda together with those who derive their heterodoxies from the Veda.⁴⁶⁴ For doctrines derived from the Veda may present a completely reverse notion of things: Manu himself equates them with the heresies outside the Veda: "Heresies outside the Veda and traditional heterodoxies alike are all held to be fruitless after death for they are founded on *tamas*."⁴⁶⁵ This means that those whose natural *guṇa* is the highest *sattva*, untouched by *rajas* and *tamas*, have a truly Vedic interest,⁴⁶⁶ and true insight in the real meaning of the Veda.

§ 94. It has been declared in the Mātsyapurāṇa that the *kalpas* or world-ages are *saṃkīrṇāḥ sāttvikāś caiva rājasās tāmasās tathā*:⁴⁶⁷ after these periods of Brahmā have been described, namely that *some are mixed, some mainly of sattva, some mainly of rajas and some mainly of tamas constituents*, it is declared that Brahmā—who is compounded of all three constituents *sattva, rajas and tamas*—glorifies, in purāṇas that are uttered in any-one of the above ages, those component elements of the world which themselves are again compounded of the same set of constituents: "Brahmā has of old glorified in a purāṇa uttered in a certain age the particular deity determined by the predominant constituent of the age."⁴⁶⁸ And specifically:

455. Held to be the author of the Vṛtti which R. occasionally quotes (ŚBh. 1, 1, 10; 1, 2, 1; 1, 3, 7; 1, 3, 32); see Intr. II and Appendix.

456. Considered to be the author of the Vākya quoted in Ved. and ŚBh. (1, 1, 1; 1, 3, 13); also mentioned by Yāmuna who enumerates him among the false teachers; cf. Intr. II and Appendix.

457. Dramiḍabhāṣya's author; cf. Intr. II and Appendix.

458. Materialists and hedonists, followers of Carvāka.

459. *aulūkyā-*, after the founder Ulūka.

460. *ākṣapada-*, after the founder Akṣapada or Gautama.

461. *kṣapanaka-* "religious mendicant, esp. Jaina".

462. Kapila was the founder of the Sāṃkhya system.

463. Patañjali was the founder of the Yoga system.

464. Note that R. considers the Sāṃkhya to be rejected *in toto*; with this, no doubt mainly polemical, statement cf. the more conciliant view in the *utpattiyasambhāvādhikaraṇa* ŚBh. 2, 2, 43.

465. Manu 12, 95.

466. *vaidikī ruciḥ*.

467. Mātsya or Matsya Purāṇa 290, 13 ab.

468. Mātsya P. 290, 15.

In *tāmāsa* ages the glory of Agni and Śiva is sung,⁴⁶⁹ in *rājāsa* ages it is held that it is the superior glory of Brahmā,⁴⁷⁰ and in the *sāttvika* ages is it the superior glory of Hari: in those ages the votaries accomplished in Yoga will achieve their supreme end; in mixed ages that of Sarasvatī. . .⁴⁷¹

In other words, since Brahmā is the primeval *kṣetrajñā* or embodied soul, *sattva* will be predominant in some of his days, *rajas* in others and *tamas* in others again. For as the Venerable Lord has said: "There is no being on earth or in heaven or among the gods that is free from the three *prakṛti*-born *guṇas*."⁴⁷² On the authority of the śruti: "He who creates Brahmā in the beginning and bestows on him the Vedas."⁴⁷³ we learn also that Brahmā too is a *kṣetrajñā*⁴⁷⁴ as he is created and subject to the *śāstras*.

So when there is contradiction between *purāṇas* which Brahmā has revealed on days when *sattva* prevailed, and *purāṇas* revealed on other days when other *guṇas* prevailed, then the *purāṇa* that was revealed on a *sāttvika* day contains the truth and another that contradicts the former contains no truth: so Brahmā himself has declared on a day when he was in *sattva* himself,⁴⁷⁵ so that the *purāṇas* could decisively be discriminated. This is how the above citation is to be understood.

The Venerable Lord Himself has said what the effects of *sattva*, etc., are: "From *sattva* springs knowledge, from *rajas* greed, and from *tamas* indolence, bewilderment and ignorance."⁴⁷⁶ The cognitive faculty⁴⁷⁷ is *sāttvika* when it knows activity and inactivity,⁴⁷⁸ duty and non-duty, fear and safety, bondage and release. When the cognitive faculty has no exact knowledge of *dharma* and *adharmā*, duty and non-duty, then it is *rājāsa*. And when it, completely obscured, mistakes *adharmā* for *dharma*, and has reverse knowledge of all things, then this faculty is *tāmāsa*.⁴⁷⁹

469. Mātsya P. 290, 14 cd.

470. Mātsya P. 290, 14 ef.

471. Mātsya P. 290, 15 (additional śloka).

472. BhG. 18, 40.

473. ŚvetUp. 6, 18, *yo brahmāṇam vidadhāti pūrvaṃ yo vai vedāṃśca prahṇoti tasmai*.

474. i.e. an individual soul in, and limited by a body, be it divine.

475. It may be remarked however that Matsya P. has no such pretensions and that other *purāṇas* at times classify it as *tāmāsa*; cf. Ādidevānanda's note, YID., p. 181, 29.

476. BhG. 14, 17.

477. *buddhi-*, expl. GBh. 18, 29 *vivekapūrvakaniścayarūpaṃ jñānam* "knowledge based on discrimination and taking the form of decision".

478. GBh. 18, 30 *pravṛtti: abhyudayasādhanabhūto dharmah; nivṛtti: mokṣa-sādhanabhūto dharmah*.

479. BhG. 18, 30-32.

All the compilers of *purāṇas* have compiled their *purāṇas* after Brahmā himself had told them all the contents. This is said in: "I will narrate the story exactly like the venerable Grandfather, who sprang from the Lotus, has revealed it when he was questioned by the eminent sage Dakṣa and others."⁴⁸⁰

§ 95. — But how can the words of the Veda contradict one another if they are not of human origin?⁴⁸¹

— We have said before that they do not contradict one another when their true purport has been determined correctly.

For instance the śrutis: "After⁴⁸² the nasal sound has ceased,⁴⁸³ the vital air with the senses in the *manas* should be concentrated in the Supreme Spirit, and one should meditate on the Sovereign and so meditate further on all this. Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra have all been begotten; . . . not the cause: . . . the cause alone should be meditated."⁴⁸⁴ Śambhu,⁴⁸⁵ the Supreme Sovereign enjoying universal sovereignty, should be meditated upon as abiding in the centre of space." "Higher than Whom there is nothing; smaller or larger than Whom there is no one; like a tree He alone stands steadfast in the sky. This Person fills the entire world. Therefore that which is most supreme, that is formless and without defect. Those who know that become immortal, but the others find only misery. Having all faces, heads and necks, dwelling inside all beings, pervading all, this auspicious Venerable Lord is therefore omnipresent;⁴⁸⁶ when there was darkness, and neither day, nor night, nor being nor non-being, then the auspicious One was there, alone. That is the imperishable One, that is Savitṛ's coveted gift, and from that has arisen the ancient knowledge;⁴⁸⁷ etc., etc.: if these śrutis seem contradictory, then I remind you that the Supreme Brahman is Nārāyaṇa, as has been declared before. Then how could there be contradiction?

480. VP. 1, 2, 8.

481. *apauruṣeya-*; acc. to the view taken by the Mīmāṃsakas, both *pūrva* and *uttara*, the Veda is not a creation of man and thus open to error, but eternally conceived by the Supreme Being and in each age 'viewed' by inspired seers, cf. Intr. IV.

482. AtharvaśikhUp. 2.

483. *nādānte*, i.e. the *anunāsika* of the *praṇava OM*.

484. R. abbreviates; the passage runs: *brahmaviṣṇurudrendrās te samprasūyante sarvāṇi cendriyāṇi saha bhūtair; na kāraṇam kāraṇānam dhyātā: kāraṇam tu dhyeyah* etc.

485. *śambhu* is acc. to R. to be taken not as the well-known auspicious name of Śiva but literally as the "beneficial One", as will be shown.

486. ŚvetUp. 3, 9-11.

487. ŚvetUp. 4, 18 *yadā tamaḥ tan na divā* etc.

§ 96. But this is too little.—The Vedas with their aṅgas,⁴⁸⁸ corroborated by the glosses of the foremost of Vedic scholars and by ratiocination, proclaim that Brahman is the cause of the world's birth, etc.: "From Him is its birth, etc.,"⁴⁸⁹ "That, from which these creatures issue, by which they live when born, to which they return when departing, that you are to inquire into: that is Brahman,"⁴⁹⁰ which tells us that Brahman is the cause of the world's birth, etc. We are told the same by the very contexts that treat of the world's creation and resorption. From: "In the beginning, my dear son, sat was alone and without second,"⁴⁹¹ we learn that Brahman, denoted by the word sat is the supreme cause because He is the material and operative cause⁴⁹² of the world and its immanent Ruler. This very sense is in another śākhā conveyed with the word Brahman in lieu of sat: "Brahman verily was here alone in the beginning,"⁴⁹³ so that we know that the word sat denotes Brahman. The same sense we find again in another śākhā; "the Soul verily was here alone in the beginning,"⁴⁹⁴ so that we know that the words sat and Brahman denote the Soul. Similarly in another śākhā: "Nārāyaṇa was here alone, not Brahmā, not Śiva, nor heaven and earth, nor the constellations,"⁴⁹⁵ which is decisive proof that Nārāyaṇa is denoted by all the words for supreme cause, like sat, Brahman, the Soul, etc.

§ 97. In the passage:⁴⁹⁶ "Him, whom the sages weave in the middle of the sea, . . . Him one cannot apprehend as vertical or horizontal or in between. No one is master to Him and His alone is great fame. His form is not to be beheld, and no one can see Him with his eyes: the wise conceive Him with their minds in their hearts: they who know Him so become immortal," His absolute superiority is propounded; and it is denied that there is anything superior to Him in the passage: "No one is master to Him." Immediately thereafter the quotation in: *adbhyaḥ saṃbhūto hiraṇyagarbha ity aṣṭau*,⁴⁹⁷ connects the above passage as one coherent context with the text beginning: *adbhyaḥ saṃbhūtaḥ*,⁴⁹⁸ where the so-called mahāpuruṣa con-

488. The auxiliary sciences śikṣā, chandas, vyākaraṇa, nirukta, jyotiṣa and kalpa.

489. BrS. 1, 1, 2 *janmādy asya yataḥ*.

490. TaittUp. 3, 1.

491. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

492. cf. supra §§ 32-33.

493. BĀUp. 1, 4, 1.

494. AitUp. 1, 1.

495. MahUp. 1.

496. TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3 *yam antaḥ samudre kavayo vayanī . . . nainam ūrdhvaṃ na tīryāṇcaṃ na madhye pariḥgrābhāt etc.*

497. *aṣṭau*, i.e. eight ṛks RV. 10, 121, 1: *hiraṇyagarbhaḥ sam avartatāgre bhūtasya jātaḥ patir eka āsīt*, ff.

498. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 2.

text:⁴⁹⁹ "Hrī and Lakṣmī are His consorts,"⁵⁰⁰ elucidates that all this bears on Nārāyaṇa alone.

This sense is further enlarged upon in the Nārāyaṇa section,⁵⁰¹ from *sahasraśīrṣaṃ devam* onwards, concluding with: "He is Brahmā, He is Śiva and Indra,"⁵⁰² He is Akṣara, He the Supreme self-sufficient Sovereign." Here-with first all the words which in all the different śākhās denote the Supreme Entity — *akṣara, śiva, śambhu, parabrahman, parajyotis, paratattva, parāyaṇa, paramātman*, etc. — with all the qualities inherent in them, are applied to Nārāyaṇa, then it is asserted that all things collectively that are different from Him are dependent on Him, pervaded by Him, supported by Him, controlled by Him, accessory to Him and ensouled by Him; and finally it is declared that Brahmā and Śiva are likewise manifestations of Him, because they are of the same order as Indra and the like. This entire text serves only to expound who is the Supreme Entity; it enjoins nothing else.

§ 99. Other texts, e.g., "He that knows Brahman attains the Most-High",^{502a} enjoin that the Supreme Brahman — who is absolutely superior to all, as witness our text above⁵⁰³ — should be worshipped by *upāsana*,⁵⁰⁴ etc. So the declaration *prāṇaṃ manasi saha karaṇaiḥ*,⁵⁰⁵ etc. first summarizes all the transformations together — of senses, vital air, etc. — as contained in the Supreme Brahman as the universal cause, and then enjoins: *one should meditate on the Supreme Spirit as the Lord of all*,⁵⁰⁶ i.e., the meditation on Nārāyaṇa⁵⁰⁷ who is the Supreme Brahman.

§ 100. In "the Lord of all"⁵⁰⁸ and "no one is master to Him" it is declared that He is the sovereign over all: so the text enjoins in: "*śambhu, the sovereign Lord, enjoying universal sovereignty, should be meditated*

499. Name derived from the stanza *vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam*.

500. i.e. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 2 *hrīś ca te lakṣmīś ca patnyau*.

501. TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 *sahasraśīrṣaṃ devam viśvākṣaṃ viśvaśambhuvam / viśvam nārāyaṇaṃ devam akṣaraṃ paramaṃ prabhūm / sa brahmā sa śivaḥ sendraḥ so 'kṣaraḥ paramaḥ svarāt*; cf. AtharvaśikhUp. 2.

502. *sendraḥ*, irregular sandhi for *sa indraḥ*.

502a. TaittUp. 2, 1.

503. ŚvetUp. 3, 9 *yasmāt paraṃ nāparam asti*, or TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3 *na tasyeśe kaścana*.

504. One is reminded of the synonymy of *vedana* (in *brahma-vid-*) and *upāsana*.

505. above AtharvaśikhUp. 2.

506. viz. in *kāraṇaṃ tu dhyeyaḥ sarvaiśvaryaśampannaḥ sarveśvaraḥ*, etc.

507. As connected with TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 Nārāyaṇānuvāka.

508. MahānārUp. 9, 3 = TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 *patim viśvasya*, continuing *ātmeśvaraṃ śāśvataṃ śivam acyutam*.

upon in the centre of space,"⁵⁰⁹ that Nārāyaṇa—who is the supreme cause and is denoted by the word *śambhu*—is to be the object of our meditation. Since the text: "who is the object of meditation? . . . The cause is the object of meditation,"⁵¹⁰ propounds that not the effect is the right object of meditation but only the cause, therefore the Nārāyaṇa section—which declares only who is the supreme cause—asserts that Nārāyaṇa Himself is the supreme cause and that the word *śambhu* rightly denotes Him. The invention of other meanings contradictory to that given above is not justified in an assertion that enjoins that only the cause is the right object of meditation.

§ 101. The contention in "that which is more supreme than Him,"⁵¹¹ that something would be known that is higher than that Person is belied by: "higher than whom there is nothing, subtler or larger than whom there is no one," i.e. than whom nothing whatever is higher—no thing different from that Person is in any respect higher than Him; *anūyas*—means "subtle" and *jyāyas*—"the Lord of all": for He is the Lord of all because He pervades them all⁵¹²—i.e. nothing different from Him is subtler or more sovereign: this denies that anybody different from this Person is superior to Him, and that means that it is refuted that any superiority can be attributed to anyone but Him.

§ 102. So, what is the meaning of our text? In the beginning of the context under discussion it was asserted—in "when he knows Him, he passes beyond death: no other way is there for him to tread"⁵¹³—that knowledge of the Person is the cause of immortality, and that there is no way but this very way of knowledge. Later on, in the concluding passage "than whom nothing is higher . . . this Person fills the entire world,"⁵¹⁴ it is declared that the Person is superior to all. Finally, the assertion that knowledge is the cause of immortality and that there is no other way is wound up with the reason for it, which is given in the concluding statement: "therefore—sc. since that Personal Entity is most supreme—that <Personal Entity> is most supreme: that is without form and without defect: they who know this become immortal, but the others find only misery."⁵¹⁵ This must be the

509. TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1.

510. AtharvaśikUp. 1: *bhagavan kim ādau prayuktaṃ dhyānaṃ dhyāyitavyaṃ kim tad dhyānaṃ ko vā dhyātā kaś ca dhyeya iti.*

511. ŚvetUp. 3, 10.

512. This is to be seen in connexion with the Nārāyaṇānūvāka: *tat sarvaṃ vyāpya nārāyaṇaḥ sthitaḥ*, and: *patim viśvasya.*

513. ŚvetUp. 6, 15 where the borrowal *nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya* shows the connection with TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1.

514. ŚvetUp. 3, 9.

515. ŚvetUp. 3, 10.

sense,⁵¹⁶ otherwise the two assertions made in the opening text would be in conflict with the last one.

The text *śāśvataṃ śivam acyutam* etc. has told us already that this Person may be denoted by the word *śiva*, viz. because He possesses the quality of purity. So our text declares immediately that this Person may be denoted by *śiva*, for: "the great sovereign Person stirs every being into life." And in the manner described all the rest—"there was neither being nor non-being, only the śiva was there alone" etc.—can be deduced.

§ 103. Moreover, this Person—with whom no equal or superior can co-exist, as witness the above text "no one is master to Him—is first declared to be—cf. in the same section "subtler than the subtle"⁵¹⁸—the sovereign of the *Om* syllable, which is the matrix of the Vedas it is its beginning and end, inasmuch as He is denoted by the A that constitutes the radical element of *Om*.⁵¹⁹ Then, after this declaration is made, it is said that this Person is to be worshipped as dwelling in the space contained within the Little Lotus.⁵²⁰

The meaning is as follows: the *Om* syllable is the matrix of the entire Veda, and the A is the matrix of the *Om* syllable. The Veda—a transformation of the *Om* syllable—is dissolved in the *Om* which is its own matrix, and the *Om* being a transformation of the A is dissolved in the A which is its own matrix. Now, the One who is the *para* of, (i.e. the object denoted by) the A which is the matrix of the *Om*,⁵²¹ that One is the sovereign Lord. Consequently, the Nārāyaṇa who is denoted by the A which is the matrix of all denotative words, and who is the matrix of all the objects denoted by those words, is the sovereign Lord: this is the meaning. As the Venerable Lord has said: "I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire Universe: there is nothing more supreme than I am."⁵²² I am the A among the letters etc.⁵²³ On the authority of the śruti "the A is Brahman",⁵²⁴ and "the A is

516. The first that by knowing Him one obtains immortality; the second that there is no other way than by knowing Him.

517. ŚvetUp. 3, 12.

518. ŚvetUp. 3, 10: This reference to His subtlety is made to facilitate the transition to the discussion of the *OM* syllable, which, as will be shown, is the subtlest entity to which the entire Veda can be reduced.

519. For this passage cf. MahānārUp. 10, 8 *yo vedādau prokto vedānte ca pratiṣṭhitaḥ / tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ.*

520. MahānārUp. 10, 7 *dahraṃ vipāpmaṃ varaṃ veśmabhūtaṃ yat puṇḍarīkaṃ puramadhyastham / tatrāpi dahraṃ gaganam viśokaṃ tasmīn anyat tad upāsitavyam;* with which compare the *daharavidyā*, ChUp. 8, 1, 1.

521. MahānārUp. 10, 8 cited above: *tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ.*

522. BhG. 7, 6cd-7ab.

523. BhG. 10, 33.

524. AitĀ. 2, 3, 8 (*ad finem*) *a iti brahma.*

the entire language,"⁵²⁵ it is very clear that the A is the matrix of all denotative words and that Brahman is the matrix of all things denoted by words. Therefore, the assertion that Brahman is denoted by the A proves that Nārāyaṇa, who is denoted by the A, is the sovereign Lord.

§ 104. The Nārāyaṇa section, which with *sahasraśiṛṣaṃ devam* etc.,⁵²⁶ means to set forth who is the sole Supreme Entity, propounds in detail that He is superior to all. This Supreme Entity, dealt with by that text exclusively, is also in all other texts which deal with other topics understood by one word or the other and is to be regarded as that same Supreme Entity: thus the decision of the Author of the Sūtras in *sāstradrṣṭyā tūpadeśo vāmadevavat*.⁵²⁷ The fact that this very Supreme Entity is in some text to be understood by the words Brahmā, Śiva and the like, does not mean that the mere divinities Brahmā, Śiva etc., are 'supreme' themselves, for the section that deals exclusively with the topic declares explicitly that they form only a manifestation of Him inasmuch as they are on an equal footing with Indra and the like.⁵²⁸ Similarly in some texts the Supreme Brahman is referred to by the words *ākāśa*,⁵²⁹ *prāṇa*⁵³⁰ etc., which does not mean that the element space, or the vital air etc., are imagined to be 'supreme'.

§ 105. —But here an objection may be raised. In the text: "In this town of Brahman there is a little lotus that is a dwelling-place: inside there is a tiny space: that which is inside that space, that should be sought after, that indeed should be inquired into,"⁵³¹ the word *space*, serves to denote the material cause of the world, and it is declared that some sort of entity that dwells in that space should be sought after. But, since we hear in the śruti that space effects names-and-forms⁵³² and we see in the Puruṣasūkta⁵³³ that the *puruṣa* or Person is the agent of the effecting of names-and-forms,

525. AitĀr. 2, 3, 6 (*ad finem*) *akāro vai sarvā vāk*.

526. TaittĀr. 10, 11, 1 = MahānārUp. 11, 1.

527. BrS. 1, 1, 31 "this instruction [is made possible] by a true view taken of the Scriptures, [viz.] that it is a case like Vāmadeva's". ŚBh. 1, 1, 31R. interprets: This instruction of Indra that he is the object of meditation is to be understood from the Scriptures which state that, as the inner Ruler, God ensouls all entities: so these entities are He, in the same way as Vāmadeva. Similarly in our text the Supreme Entity can, on this principle, be expressed by a great many terms which ultimately denote the inner Ruler within them.

528. viz. *sa brahmā sa śivaḥ sendraḥ so 'kṣaraḥ*.

529. e.g. ChUp. 1, 9, 1 *asya lokasya kā gatir ity ākāśa ity uvāca*; cf. BrS. and ŚBh. 1, 1, 23.

530. e.g. ChUp. 1, 11, 4-5 *prastotar yā devatā prastāvam anvāyattā...katamā sā devateti prāṇa ity hovāca*, cf. BrS. and ŚBh. 1, 1, 24.

531. ChUp. 8, 1, 1, the *daharavidyā*, with which compare MahānārUp. 10, 7 quoted supra note 520.

532. ChUp. 8, 14, 1 *ākāśo vai nāma nāmarūpayor nirvāhitā*.

533. RV. 10, 90, 6ff.

we understand that the One whom we are to revere as the object of the commended inquiry must be another than that Person who is synonymous with space.⁵³⁴—This kind of objection is only raised by people who have not studied the Veda and have not seen the śāstras. For the śruti itself disposes of this objection there and then, and so does the Author of the Vākya. The śruti reads: "What is there to be found in that tiny space within the lotus that is to be sought after and inquired into?"⁵³⁵ and in reply to this objection the śruti first asserts in "Not less vast than the main space is that tiny space contained in the heart,"⁵³⁶ that there are no limits to the vastness of the Supreme Person, here denoted by the word *space*, and that He supports the entire Universe because He is the cause of the entire Universe,⁵³⁷ then, in "All desires are contained therein,"⁵³⁸—i.e., "in Him are the eight qualities, culminating in *satyasamkalpa*,⁵³⁹ contained as in a treasury—the śruti wants to make it clear with the words *apahatapāpmā* . . . *satyakāmaḥ*,⁵⁴⁰ that the Supreme Person as well as these eight qualities are to be inquired into separately, and so states that "that which is in Him should be sought after,"⁵⁴¹ so the śruti itself refutes the entire objection.

§ 106. In other words: the objection raised with "what is there to be found that should be sought after" is refuted by the statement that in Him there reside his nature of being creator, substratum, controller and principal of the entire world, as well as his qualities *apahatapāpmā* etc. Therefore the Author of the Vākya declares: *tasmin yad antar iti kāmavyapadeśaḥ* "the words "that which is therein" refer to His desires;" desire means: desired objects; i.e., the qualities of being *apahatapāpmā* etc. In other words: the Supreme Brahman, denoted by the words "tiny space", who creates, sustains and dissolves the entire Universe: that which is contained within that Supreme Brahman—sc. His immeasurable transcendence and his eight qualities of being free from sin etc.,—should both be the objects of inquiry.

So the text continues: "Those who, here on earth, come to know the Spirit and the actualized desires shall find their desires fulfilled in all the worlds."⁵⁴²

534. This objection seems to be inspired by Śaṅkara's ChUpBh. 8, 1, 1 *antarākāśa ākāśākhyam brahma / ākāśo vai nāma iti vaksyati*, ff.

535. ChUp. 8, 1, 2.

536. ChUp. 7, 1, 3 *yāvān vā ayam ākāśās tāvān eṣo 'ntarḥḍaya ākāśaḥ*.

537. ChUp. 8, 1, 3 *sarvaṃ tad asmin samāhitam iti*.

538. ChUp. 8, 1, 5 *asmin kāmāḥ samāhitāḥ*.

539. sc. those summed up 8, 1, 5.

540. ChUp. 8, 1, 1.

541. ChUp. 8, 1, 1.

542. ChUp. 8, 1, 6 *atha ya ihātmanam anuvidya vrajanty etāṃś ca satyān kāmān teṣāṃ sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmācāro bhavati*,

§ 107. We have to understand that when Viṣṇu⁵⁴³ — who is the Supreme Entity as declared in the text (which deals with this topic exclusively) that only the cause is the right object of meditation — enters into an effect, then this entering into an effect is a voluntary descent of Him, so as to help the world, just for his sport: thereby He completes the number of entities of certain categories which are his own effects. So, as a matter of sport, the Supreme One becomes Upendra,⁵⁴⁴ completing thereby the number of divinities. Likewise the Supreme Brahman has voluntarily descended into the shape of Daśaratha's son Rāma, thereby completing the number of kings of the Solar Dynasty. Similarly the Venerable Lord has voluntarily descended in the House of Vasudeva, to incarnate Himself in Kṛṣṇa in order to support the world, thereby completing the number of scions of the Lunar Dynasty.

§ 108. We have explained before that it is Nārāyaṇa whom the contexts that deal with creation and resorption declare to be the supreme cause. If in the Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad Rudra enlarges upon his own universal sovereignty,⁵⁴⁵ then this is true — as witness *so'ntarād antaram prāviśat* — in so far as the Supreme Spirit has entered into him: this is made clear by the śruti itself.⁵⁴⁶ The author of the Sūtras declares in *śāstradrṣṭyā tūpadeśo vāmādevavat* that this is the meaning of statements of this type; like that of Prahlāda for example: "Because the Infinite One is omnipresent, I am He. All is from me, I am all, all is in me everlasting, etc."⁵⁴⁷ Here the ground that justifies this type of statement is mentioned: the ground is that the Infinite One is omnipresent: the Supreme Spirit is omnipresent as the immanent soul of all spiritual and non-spiritual entities which constitute his own body. So we have said⁵⁴⁸ that all words denote the Supreme Spirit Himself as embodied by all entities. Hence the word "I" denotes the Supreme Spirit as the substance modified by a mode of which He himself is the soul. The Author

543. The Supreme Being is here referred to by His name Viṣṇu (rather denoting an aspect of the total divine personality Nārāyaṇa), because this name figures in the AtharvaśikhUp.; rightly S. comments: *atha brahmaviṣṇurudrendrās te sarve samprasūyanta iti viṣṇoḥ kāryatvaśravanāt paratvavaikalyaśaṅkāṃ vyudasyati*. It would appear from this paragraph that to R. Viṣṇu would primarily denote the God as the God of incarnations: the etymology *viś-*, always present to his mind, would favour this view.

544. For the story of Kṛṣṇa and the cows and Kṛṣṇa's consecration by Indra with the name Upendra, cf. Harivaṃśa ch. 75 and VP. 5, 12, esp. 12-15.

545. AtharvaśirUp. 1 *devā ha vai svargaṃ lokam āyaṃs te rudram aprēchan ko bhavān iti / so 'bravīd ahaṃ ekaḥ prathamam āsīd vartāmi ca bhaviṣyāmi ca nānyaḥ kaścīn matto vyatirikta iti / so 'ntarād antaram prāviśad diśo vyantaram prāviśat* (S. reads *diśās cāntaram samprāviśat*).

546. "He has entered within from elsewhere": S: *śarīrād antarasya prāṇāder apy-antaram jīvaṃ prāviśat*.

547. VP. 1, 19, 85.

548. Supra, § 17.

of the Vākya expresses the same in the terms of meditation on God under the aspect of the ego: "One may grasp Him as 'Oneself', for each has in Him his completion:"⁵⁴⁹ i.e., it is the Supreme Spirit—either in condition of effect or of cause—who ensouls the body constituted by spiritual and non-spiritual matter in gross or subtle form respectively: this is so because everyone and everything is completed in Him. The same declares the Author of the Sūtras in: "But as the self: this they accept for so have the texts understand them."⁵⁵⁰ So, again, in the Mahābhārata in the Brahmarūdrasamvāda, where Brahmā tells Rudra: "He is the immanent soul of you and me and whoever else has a body."⁵⁵¹ i.e., the sovereign Lord Nārāyaṇa exists as the immanent soul in Rudra, Brahmā and all embodied beings. Likewise in the same epic: "Viṣṇu is the soul of the venerable Bhava whose might is immense. Therefore the sovereign Lord suffers the bow to be drawn",⁵⁵² again in "those two chief gods, who are believed to have sprung from His serenity and from His wrath, work creation and destruction when He has shown them the way,"⁵⁵³ i.e., Nārāyaṇa, existing as their immanent soul, shows Brahmā and Rudra the way so that they can work creation and resorption respectively.

§ 109. Those who profess that there is difference between the operative and the material cause are heterodox,⁵⁵⁴ for they contradict the sūtras which have been composed by an orthodox follower of the Veda, for example: "from Whom the birth etc., of this proceed,"⁵⁵⁵ "He is the material cause, for that is in harmony with the promise and the instance,"⁵⁵⁶ and moreover they contradict all the hosts of śrutis such as for example; "In the beginning, my dear son, this was sat: it was alone and without second,⁵⁵⁷ that reflected: I be many: I will multiply,"⁵⁵⁸ the forest was Brahman and the tree was Brahman out of which they build heaven and earth: Brahman underlies the

549. *ātmety eva tu gṛhṇīyāt sarvasya tanniṣpatteḥ*, cf. Appendix § 2, Fr. XI.

550. BrS. 4, 1, 3 *ātmety tūpagacchanti grāhyanti ca*; cf. ŚBh.: The sages look upon God as the all-ensouling principle, for this is taught by a number of texts like the *Antaryāmi*brāhmaṇa.

551. MBh. 12, 353 ff. (Calc. Ed. 13743) which reads *mamāntarātmā tava ca*.

552. MBh. 8, 1503cd-1504ab (C. reading *Viṣṇuś cātmā*); in the context Viṣṇu enters the bow.

553. MBh. 12, 343, 19 (C. 12146, reading *°ādeśita°*): Brahmā is sprung from His serenity (*prasāda*), Rudra from His wrath.

554. *vedabāhya-* "outside the Veda, not accepting the authority of the Vedic texts."

555. BrS. 1, 1, 2 *janmādy asya yataḥ*.

556. BrS. 1, 4, 23 *prakṛtiś ca pratijñādrṣṭāntānuparodhāt*; the *pratijñā* is the promissory assertion ChUp. 6, 1, 3 *uta tam ādeśam aprākṣyaḥ...yenāsrutaṃ śrutam*, etc.; the *drṣṭānta* the instance of the clay 6, 1, 5; the sūtra refers to 6, 2 where the creation of the world out of *sat* is taught.

557. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

558. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

worlds supporting it;⁵⁵⁹ all the flashes of lightning spring forth from over that Person;⁵⁶⁰ no one is master to Him and His alone is great fame;⁵⁶¹ there is no diversity whatever here;⁵⁶² ruler of all, sovereign over all;⁵⁶³ this Person is all that was and that shall be, the sovereign of immortality;⁵⁶⁴ no other path is there for him to tread."⁵⁶⁵

§ 110. The epics and purāṇas tell us in the contexts treating of the subsistence and resorption of the world that this is the Supreme Entity. For instance the Mahābhārata: "Who has created this entire world, animate and inanimate? And to whom shall it return? Tell us that, Grandfather."⁵⁶⁶ to which Brahmā replies: "Nārāyaṇa, who is embodied by the world, the soul of the infinite, the One everlasting, etc."⁵⁶⁷ and also: "ṛṣis, pitṛs, gods, the great elements, the minerals: the entire world, animate and inanimate, springs from Nārāyaṇa."⁵⁶⁸

Likewise is set forth in the Viṣṇupurāṇa which is accepted without dissension by all instructed persons from the East, North, South and West as adequate in so far as it establishes all the laws and all the categories.⁵⁶⁹ We learn from the Sūtra: "from whom the birth etc., of this proceed,"⁵⁷⁰ that Brahmā is the cause of the birth etc. of the world. Now the Viṣṇupurāṇa, which first raises the question: "What has caused the world to be born etc.?" and then gives the answer: "It has originated from Viṣṇu,"⁵⁷¹ serves only to expound a certain aspect of Brahmā's proper form: this is the consensus of all.

This text then reads: "The prakṛti, comprising the evolved and the unevolved, of which I have told you, and the puruṣa will both dissolve in the Supreme Spirit. This Supreme Spirit, who is the substratum of all and the paramount sovereign, is sung in the Vedas and Vedāntas by the name of Viṣṇu":⁵⁷² i.e. all texts in all the Vedas and Upaniṣads proclaim that He alone

559. TaittBr. 2, 8, 9, 6.

560. MahānārUp. 1, 8 = TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3.

561. TaittĀr. 10, 1, 3.

562. BĀUp. 4, 4, 19.

563. BĀUp. 4, 4, 22.

564. RV. 10, 90, 2 puruṣa evedaṃ sarvaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yac ca bhavyam / utāmr-latvasyesāno.

565. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1.

566. MBh. 12, 182, 1.

567. MBh. 12, 182, 12.

568. MBh. 12, 7074 (C).

569. tattva-

570. BrS. 1, 1, 2

571. VP. 1, 1, 31.

572. VP. 6, 4, 39-40.

is the supreme cause. In the same manner as, among all śrutis, the Nārāyaṇa section serves only to set forth a certain aspect of the Supreme Brahmā's proper form, so the Viṣṇupurāṇa only sets forth a certain aspect of Him. Beginning with the question: "What is the Supreme Brahmā?" in: "I wish to hear from you who know the dharma how the world was and how it will be again, what is the stuff that the world is made of and whence it comes with all its animate and inanimate creatures, how and where it was when it was dissolved and whither it will return to be dissolved,"⁵⁷³ the Viṣṇupurāṇa serves only to establish decisively a certain aspect of the Supreme Brahmā's proper form. This appears from: "The world has originated from Viṣṇu and in Him it subsists. He is the One who sustains and annihilates the world, and He is the world."⁵⁷⁴ He is the paramount sovereign, supreme, existing as the Supreme Spirit, without any particularizing attributes like form, colour etc. He is free from decay and destruction, from evolution, birth and growth, so that it can only be said of Him that He always is. He is in everything and everything dwells in Him: that is why the wise call Him Vāsudeva. That Brahmā is supreme, eternal, unborn, undying, imperishable, essentially simple, and always perfect as no imperfection is in It. This Brahmā takes on completely the form of puruṣa and that of Time as the proper form of the evolved and the unevolved."⁵⁷⁵ "He transcends, O Sage, the matter constituted by all beings and the transformations natural to it and the imperfections inherent in it like its guṇas, etc. He is the universal Spirit, transcending all obscurations, and He covers all that is between heaven and earth. All beautiful qualities are inherent in his nature and He supports the sum-total of creation with a fraction of his omnipotence. The vast body He has assumed is in harmony with His pleasure and taken on by his own wish, and in that body He works the fulfilment of what is salutary to the entire Universe. Comprising the beautiful qualities of glory, force, sovereignty, transcendent knowledge, fortitude, might etc., He is chiefier than the chiefest and none of the afflictions etc. affect Him the paramount sovereign. The Lord's form encompasses all beings in their singleness and in their totality, unevolved and manifest. He is the universal Lord who espies all and knows all, omnipotent and hence called Paramount Sovereign. That by which this Supreme God, free from imperfections, pure, immaculate and simple, is known or seen or understood, that is true knowledge; all that is different from this knowledge is declared to be ignorance."⁵⁷⁶

573. VP. 1, 1, 4-5.

574. VP. 1, 1, 31.

575. VP. 1, 2, 10-14.

576. VP. 6, 5, 83-87.

§ 111. All other purāṇas which give a diverging version should be so interpreted that they are not in conflict with the above one. Their divergence should be understood by considering the way in which each of them had its origin. If they are totally incompatible, then they are to be neglected because they must have had their origin in another guṇa than sattva.⁵⁷⁷

§ 112. —However, does not this very Viṣṇupurāṇa you quoted above tell us that the members of the trimūrti⁵⁷⁸ are equal? See the passage: “The one venerable Lord Janārdana assumes the names of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva to create, sustain and destroy.”⁵⁷⁹ —No, that is not true. The clause “the one Janārdana” establishes the fact that the entire phenomenal world, constituted by Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva, etc., is ensouled by Janārdana alone. This passage clarifies what has already been stated in “He is the world”⁵⁸⁰ by declaring that “as the Creator the transcendent God creates Himself, as Viṣṇu He protects Himself and what is under his protection, and as the Destroyer He destroys Himself at the end.”⁵⁸¹ Here Brahmā as the creator, the created beings, the destroyer and the destroyed beings are all referred to simultaneously, so that, when it is subsequently asserted that Viṣṇu ensouls all and everything, this assertion shows us the peculiar distinction between creator and destroyer as manifestations of Janārdana on the one hand and created and destroyed beings on the other hand. The words Janārdana and Viṣṇu being synonymous it follows that the manifestation comprises Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva together as a class. Hence it is said that the Supreme Entity exists, by his own choice and for the sake of his own sport, within the manifestation: as is voiced immediately afterwards in: “Earth, water, fire, wind, ether, all senses and the inner faculty constitute the world called puruṣa. As the imperishable One is the immanent soul of all beings and is embodied by all, therefore the creation etc. localized in these beings are ultimately useful to Him alone. So Viṣṇu, most excellent, beneficent and benevolent, is embodied by all in the various modes of Brahmā etc., in which He is creating and created, protecting, consuming and protected.”⁵⁸²

§ 113. —A doubt may arise here: how is it possible that Brahman, who is irreproachable, untransformed and endowed with all perfections, can ensoul a phenomenal world that is partly evil, as the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* constructions would have us believe?

577. Supra, § 94.

578. “Trinity” of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, constituting the three personified aspects of one supreme and transcendent Deity.

579. VP. 1, 2, 66.

580. VP. 1, 1, 31.

581. VP. 1, 2, 67.

582. VP. 1, 2, 68-69.

—This doubt is conclusively disposed of by the text itself, which proves its contention with: “inasmuch as the imperishable One is the immanent soul of all beings and embodied by all”⁵⁸³ for having asserted that Viṣṇu Himself, the paramount sovereign and the Supreme Brahman, is the entire Universe, the text demonstrates this assertion by giving its ground: “because the imperishable One is the immanent soul of all beings and embodied by all.”⁵⁸⁴ i.e., because the imperishable One is this by all embodied immanent soul of all beings; later on the text will declare that “all this is in truth Hari’s body.”

In other words: there is no contradiction in that Viṣṇu, the Supreme Brahman, is imperishable and yet ensouls the world in so far as all constitute His body: for this defines the respective natures of body and soul from each other. The descent of the sovereign Lord Viṣṇu thus described into animals, men and gods—like Brahmā etc.—dwelling among the countless subservient entities that make up the phenomenal world, this descent, which is voluntary and serves as a refuge in which the different classes may foregather, has already been mentioned above. That those beings, Brahmā etc., are all subject to karman as they belong to the three *bhāvanās*,⁵⁸⁵ and that the venerable Lord Vāsudeva, who is the Supreme Brahman, descends among gods etc., by his own free will and in his own proper form to succour the entire Universe is most clearly declared in the sixth book of the Viṣṇupurāṇa in the chapter on *śubhāśraya*.⁵⁸⁶ That his body in his incarnation as a god etc., is not of the stuff common bodies are made of is put forward in the Mahābhārata as well: “the body of this Supreme Spirit has not the common structure of being built up by the various elements,”⁵⁸⁷ and in the śruti: “Unborn though He remains, He is born variously: the wise know his origin.”⁵⁸⁸ The meaning is this: for Brahmā and the like, who are subject to karman, it is

583. VP. 1, 2, 68.

584. VP. 1, 22, 38.

585. *bhāvanā*, term from VP. 6, 7, 47 ff., where it has approximately the sense of “creative potency manifesting itself in three successive ontological orders (*bhāva-*), that of Brahman, the creator, Karman, the creation, and Brahmakarman, the mediators of creation Sanandana, etc. As it is stated that Hiranyagarbha and the gods belong to creation (50-51), R. quotes the *bhāvanātraya* as proof that Brahmā and the gods are *ksetrajñas* and as such subject to karman. For a detailed discussion of the meaning of the term *bhāvanā* both in VP. and with R., I refer to my paper *The Śubhāśrayaprakaraṇa Viṣṇupurāṇa* 6, 7 and the meaning of *bhāvanā*, Adyar Library Bulletin (Adyar 1955), XIX, 1-2, p. 3 ff.

586. VP. 6, 7, 47 ff.; for R.’s interpretation of this section I refer to the paper quoted in the preceding note.

587. MBh. ? *na bhūtasamghasamsthāno deho ’sya paramātmanah.*

588. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 3.

reward of nocturnal *sattras*, or the relation of means and end that exists between reviling a Brahmin and a fine of one hundred gold pieces.⁶²¹

So the text "He that knows Brahman attains the Most-High"⁶²² would teach the attainment of Brahman, viz. as the reward that specifies the qualified subject to the *thing to do* in worshipping Brahman, and would be equivalent to: "He who aspires to attain the Most-High should know Brahman:" the proper form and the properties of Brahman, which in this text are understood to be the end to be attained, would be established because they subserve the purpose of the *thing to do*; this would include all His properties—of being creator, destroyer, substratum, immanent soul etc., of the world—, so nothing would be disproved anyway.

§ 118. Such being the case, all the objects included in mantras and arthavādas that are not incompatible and are unprecedented⁶²³ are established because they subserve, or are accessory to, the vidhis or injunctions. So it is declared in Dramiḍa's commentary, from "on the strength of the *śruti ṛnam hi vai jāyate*" onwards: "the text has the function of praising the cutting; however, no praise is possible if the object be non-existent."⁶²⁴ in other words: the entire division of exegetical texts or *arthavāda*, which in a thousand ways describes the previously unknown qualities of *yāga* etc., as propitiations of deities, gives in a thousand ways rise to the knowledge⁶²⁵ that the object of the act is praiseworthy, whereas no such knowledge would arise if these arthavādas did not exist. Hence follows that they inform us of the real existence of qualities, so as to give rise to the knowledge that the object of the act is praiseworthy. Hence follows again that in this very manner all the objects, known through mantras and arthavādas, are proved to exist.

§ 119. Further, those who maintain that the texts bear only on *things to do* should tell us how they define a 'thing to do'.

—It is that which comes into existence on the existence of an operation and is the aim of that operation.⁶²⁶

621. TaittS. 2, 6, 10, 2.

622. TaittUp. 2, 1, 1.

623. *apūrva*-.

624. cf. Appendix § 2, Fr. III.

625. It would seem that the point which R. makes here would not be disputed by Prabhākara, as far as Jha's evidence goes: at the most he would dispute the denotativeness or expressiveness of those arthavādas which cannot be connected with a vidhi or injunction.

626. *kāryatva: kṛtibhāvabhāvitā kṛtyuddeśyatā ca; kṛti* "operation" but not yet materialized, still conative: "volition" is another approximate rendering; cf. JHA, p. 335 "the *kārya* by its very nature is something brought about by *kṛti*, or operation; and

—Then the question arises: what is this 'aim of operation'?

—The aim or objective of operation is that in view of which, or to which end, the operation takes place.⁶²⁷

—Then define what is the 'object envisioned by operation', taking operation as a human activity.⁶²⁸

—The aim or objective of an operation is that desirous of which man enters upon an operation.⁶²⁹

—Well, then the aim, or the thing aimed at by the operation, is identical with the thing desired by man.⁶³⁰

Or if you think that a desired object has two aspects: that of being present as the object of desire, and that of actuating a person, and say⁶³¹ that the latter aspect, that of actuating a person, alone constitutes the aim of operation is wasted effort due to bias in favour of your own view. For actually the very fact that the object, which is thus understood to be the object of desire, cannot be realized unless an effort is made, actuates a person, for all activity starts thence. When a person understands, after the desire has arisen, that he cannot realize his desire unless he makes an effort, the desire to be active arises and in consequence thereof he is active. This is the view that the experts take. It follows that in reality one's action has

this operation is none other than the exertion [*prayatna*] of the agent." So it is rightly said that *kārya* comes into existence on the preceding existence of an operation. It is moreover that at which the operation aims: *uddeśya*. Lacombe, note 974, remarks "pour Rāmānuja, cette notion est identique à la précédente [i.e., *kārya*, v.B.]; on peut la désigner comme la "fin de l'action" par opposition à la "fin de l'agent", la fin de l'action n'étant que' un moyen de la fin de l'agent;" but the Prābhākara view is the exact opposite of this: in fact the goal of the agent is itself subordinated to the goal of the action: see below.

627. *yad adhikṛtya kṛtir vartate*; in ŚBh., 1. c., the same is expressed more concisely: *kṛtyuddeśyatvaṃ kṛtikarmatvam* "the *kṛtyuddeśa* is the object of the operation".

628. *adhikāra*-

629. ŚBh. 1.c. *kṛtikarmatvaṃ (= kṛtyuddeśyatvam) ca kṛtyā prāptum iṣṭatamatvam* "the object of the operation is that which is most desired to be obtained by the operation".

630. *iṣṭatvaṃ kṛtyuddeśyatvam*; thus the definition is reached that a *kārya* is the object of desire.

631. As the Prābhākara does: the reward—e.g., heaven—is only of secondary importance in itself, as a reward: its main function is to specify the *adhikārin* as one who is *svargakāma* "desirous of heaven" and on whom the *kārya* is incumbent. Consistently reasoned from this premise it follows that the *kārya* is ultimately its own end, or, in more moral terms (the appropriateness of which may, however, be questioned) "duty for duty's sake": I refer to HIRIYANNA'S interesting paper *The doctrine of niyoga* J. Or. Res., Madras Vol. XV, Part II (1946).

no other aim or objective than gaining for oneself, as a result of one's own efforts, the object of one's desire; how can you fail to see this?

—Or you may say: the reason why an object is desired is that it is agreeable to a person. The objective of an operation is that which is agreeable to a person. — I reply: No; pleasure is synonymous with that which is agreeable to a person, and suffering with what is disagreeable; so nothing that is not pleasure can be agreeable. But do we not see that cessation of suffering, although it is not positive pleasure, is yet agreeable to a person?

— No! For pleasure and suffering are to be discriminated as follows: pleasure is that which is agreeable to oneself—suffering is that which is disagreeable to oneself. The former of the two, pleasure or what is agreeable, is desirable, and the latter, pleasure or what is disagreeable, is undesirable. So, since we cannot bear suffering, its cessation becomes also desirable: consequently, because it is similarly desirable we mistake it for similarly agreeable.

So a person who is naturally conjoined with prakṛti, and hence implicated in saṃsāra, may be in three conditions: he may be in contact with something agreeable; or with something disagreeable; or he may rest in his proper form. The last condition, that of resting in his proper form, implies cessation of contact alike with something disagreeable and with something agreeable. Therefore when a person is suffering something disagreeable it is likewise desirable for him to rest in his proper form, and, because that is like pleasure in that it is also desirable, he mistakes it for being also agreeable.

§ 120. Therefore, competent criteriologists laugh at one who maintains that the *niyoga*,⁶³² or mandate, is in itself agreeable, for agreeableness has only the form of pleasure. We understand that a mandate derives its mandatory, permanent and unprecedented character only from its function of leading up to a certain objective that is desired.

In the mandate: *svargakāmo yajeta* the radical action⁶³³ becomes different from the optative mood as the *thing to do*, since this is positively intended as the *means of realizing* heaven inasmuch as the word *svargakāma* is mentioned in direct connection with it.

Don't say that in *yajeta* the *niyoga* is primarily understood to be its own principal factor and that from the connected mention of *svargakāma* follows that the *niyoga* is agreeable to the realization of heaven in order to

632. The usual term of the Prābhākaras for *kārya*.

633. *kriyā*, "the verbal action as such": the *kriyā* of YAJ- is *yajana*- "the act of worshipping (by sacrifices)", whereas the *kārya* of the verb is formed by suffixes, esp. the *linādi* suffixes of the optative/potential mood, etc.

ensure its own realization.⁶³⁴ In *yajeta* it is rather understood that the radical meaning can only be realized through the exertion of a person. The connected mention of *svargakāma* compels us to assume that something else than the radical meaning is mandatory, permanent and unprecedented, etc.: and this puts a definite restriction to what we are to take as the means of realizing heaven. The optative etc. forms denote as *the thing to do* only a means of realizing heaven which can be construed with the person denoted by the collocated word *svargakāma*. This explication, which is the most natural one, is also violated.

In other words: immediately when we hear a text consisting in words that are intimately interconnected, we understand that the meaning of one word is to be consistently connected with the thing denoted by the other directly connected word. Therefore—since the *realizing means* is to be so construed that it bears upon the sense of the whole text—it is as contradictory and hence untenable for this means to have no further significant bearing as it is for the radical action itself.

Therefore, in sentences like: "There is a cottage on the Ganges," we take it that the word *Ganges* denotes as its meaning "a certain entity that can be dwelt on." Primarily, of course, the word *Ganges* denotes the whole entity "Ganges": but the quality of being drinkable—a quality proper to the entity denoted by the word *Ganges* as a whole—is not directly in keeping with the sense of the sentence as a whole. So here too: when we hear only the word *yajeta*, we remember it simply as a *thing to do*, without further significant bearing: but when we have to bring it in keeping with the sense of the text as a whole, this simple self-contained significance remains no longer.

— But at the moment we hear a word that denotes a *thing to do*, we understand it primarily as a *thing to do*, with no other significance.

634. The *svarga* has the principal function of qualifying the *niyojya* or the person prompted by the mandate; the object to be realized (*sādhya*) by the *niyoga* is not primarily the *svarga* but the *niyoga* itself. Cf. *Prakaranapañcikā*, p. 190 *nanu niyogasya kāmyamānaphalasādhanatvābhyupagamāt phalasyaiva prādhānyāt tasyaiva vākyaṛthatvam ity ata āha—ātmāsiddhyanukūlasya niyojyasya prasiddhaye/kurvat (text kurvan) svargādīkam api pradhānam kāryam eva naḥ //* etc. "To meet the objection that, since it is understood that the mandate is the means of realizing the desired result, therefore the result itself is the principal and consequently the sentence bears on that, he (Prabhākara?) says: '(The mention of *svargakāma*, etc., serves only) to make known the prompted person who is agreeable (to performing the *niyoga*) because it serves his personal ends; for us the principal is the *kārya* itself which also brings about such results as *svarga*, etc.'"

— That does not rhyme either: for in the case of a mandate like “Fetch the cow” we understand that the action of fetching the cow— involving suffering itself— is a *thing to do* only in so far as it serves as a *means of realizing* a certain desired result. Hence it is contrary to all human experience that the *niyoga* or mandate itself would be agreeable to man, and one who maintains that the mandate is agreeable to man is belied by his own experience.

In the case of mandates like: “One desirous of rain should sacrifice with the *kārīrī*,”⁶³⁵ one will not, when the mandate has been realized, experience the mandate itself as agreeable, because the operative cause of realizing rain is different from rain itself. Even though the rain is not invariably realized in one’s present life, yet, in the very absence of such an invariable rule, one has necessarily to assume that the mandate itself has been realized, and in that mandate no one experiences any pleasure synonymous with agreeableness. In the manner here described there is no other objective of operation than the desired object that is to be realized by the operation.

§ 121. —But⁶³⁶ the objective of operation is the principal to which the operation itself is accessory.

— Then tell us what makes this principal and what the accessory?

— The accessory is that which is correlated with the *thing to do*, and being the principal means being correlated with that accessory.

— Then you say no more than that the principal is the same as the *thing to do*; but what we are concerned with is, what makes a *thing to do*?

— An accessory is that which admits of being invariably concomitant with an operation taking place in view of the other term.

— Then how do you define the relation “in view of the other term”? For that is what we are concerned with.

635. *kārīryā vṛṣṭikāmo yajeta*; *kārīrī* is a sacrifice in which the *karīra* plant (the thorny *Capparis Aphylla*) figures; the only source to which I have been able to trace this śruti is a quotation by the commentator ad Ātreyaśākhīya Kāṇḍānukrama of Taitt. Veda, 3, 17: *kalpe . . . kārīrīvidhiḥ*, explained: *kalpe—sūtre* (reference is probably to ĀśvŚrS. 2, 13 *varṣakāmeṣṭiḥ kārīrīḥ*) *divākīrtyāny ucyante . . . kārīrīvidhiḥ: kārīrīr yā* (sic, read *kārīryā*) *vṛṣṭikāmo yajeti* (read *yajeteti*), in A. WEBER, *Indische Studien*, 3, p. 373 ff., esp. 394.

636. This paragraph corresponds to ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 129; on *śeṣaḥ* in the ritualistic sense of KMS. 3, 1, 2 *śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt* “one constituent is accessory when it is subservient to another”.

— The object envisioned is that which is to be realized by the thing intended.

— What is the “thing intended”?

— The purpose of the operation.

— But I have already replied that the final purpose of the operation is the same as the purpose for which he started operating: and its content is his desire, to gain which he has to resort to operating. Actually the relation between principal and accessory is in any situation as follows: the accessory is in essence that which admits of application to, or which has its use for, another term inasmuch as it serves to support the transcending importance intrinsic to that other term that constitutes the principal. To illustrate: the *yāga* has its use, and so have the exertions required therefor, inasmuch as they serve to bring about the desired result; and everything else has its use, if, and in so far as, it serves to realize the *yāga*.

§ 122. Similarly, it is the essence of born slaves that they have their use in so far as they support the transcending importance of particular persons.⁶³⁷ In the same manner, all entities—comprising spiritual and non-spiritual beings, eternal and non-eternal—have essentially only their use inasmuch as they support the transcendence of the Lord. Thus everyone and everything is accessory to the Lord and the Lord is principal to all: as has been declared in śrutis like “the Master of all, the Lord of all, the Patron of the universe, etc.” Your sense, to wit that the *thing to do* is the principal factor that is to be realized through operation, can only appeal to the credulous.

§ 123. Moreover,⁶³⁸ in the mandate *svargakāmo yajeta*, and similar mandates, the word *svargakāma* designates the particular agent that is

637. Rāmānuja borrows here no doubt from Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 190 *yathātmana eva samvidadhānaḥ svāmī garbhādāsasyopakaroti tathā niyogo 'pi niyojyasyeti na prādhānyapadapracyutiḥ* “just as a master benefits a born slave by making use of him for his own purposes, so the niyoga benefits the niyojya: but this does not mean that the niyoga loses its status of principal term”. Noteworthy is the turn which Rāmānuja gives to this metaphor by lifting the relation master-slave to a cosmic plane where it represents the relation God-universe. The same metaphor is utilized in ŚBh. loc. cit. but in an altogether different sense and wording: *pradhānas tu bhṛtyapoṣe 'pi svoddeśena pravartata iti cen na, bhṛtyo 'pi pradhānapoṣe svoddeśenaiva pravartate* “don’t say that the principal serves his own purposes even by maintaining his servant, for the servant too serves his own purposes in maintaining the principal”.

638. Rāmānuja questions here the propriety of introducing the notion of *niyojya*; acc. to the Prābhākara the niyojya is the one who knows that the kārya is his to do, and is distinguishable from the agent: the latter is agent of acting, the other of knowing; the personal ending of the verb indicates the niyojya in a general way, the word

denoted by the termination of the verb. Now, how do we arrive at the view that this word against the rules of grammar designates the particular *niyojya*, or the person prompted by the mandate?

— It is impossible that a person qualified by *svarga* as the objective to be realized is construed as the agent of an action that is not a means of realizing *svarga*.⁶³⁹

— But neither can he be construed as the *niyojya*, or the person prompted by the mandate, if that mandate is not the means of realizing *svarga*: which decides that it is a means of realizing *svarga*.⁶⁴⁰ But at this decision, that it is a means of realizing *svarga*, we can only arrive when the injunctive text has established with what kind of agent the action is to be construed. To illustrate: when it is said that “he who wants a meal must go to Devadatta’s house,” it follows, from the simple fact that one hears that *he who wants a meal* is the agent of the action of going to Devadatta’s house, that now one also knows something one did not know before: namely that the action of going to Devadatta’s house is the means of obtaining a meal. The same is the case here.⁶⁴¹ Would it be proper to imagine that one who is said to be the agent of one action is

svargakāma specifies him. R. argues that this procedure is ungrammatical: the personal ending refers to the *karṭṛ* who is specified as *svargakāma*.

639. The Prābhākara argues that one cannot at the same time be related to the *sādhyā*—i.e., the *svarga*—and to the *sādhana*—i.e., the action of sacrificing—. The verbal form *yajeta*, constituting the *kārya*, does as such not at all require a peculiarly specified agent *svargakāma*: the agent is already expressed by the personal ending; in the *niyojya* both the agent and the *svargakāma* are united.

640. Rāmānuja replies that the *niyojya*, that is the prospective agent who desirous of *svarga* knows the *kārya* to be *his*, cannot be construed with the personal ending either, unless—and that is the point—the *kārya* is primarily the means of realizing *svarga* and not itself. This reverts the order of the Prābhākara: the mere injunction is indifferent unless its purpose is given; that purpose is given in *svargakāma*; consequently *kārya* primarily subserves *svarga*. Otherwise neither the *niyojya* nor the agent *svargakāma* can be construed with *yajeta*. So the connexion of the *karṭṛ* or agent is primarily given in the injunction itself.

641. Agency in one act does not imply agency in another act; acc. to the Prābhākara, the *niyojya* is in the first place the agent of knowing that the *kārya* is his task and in the second place and consequently the *karṭṛ*. But this “agency of knowing” is merely presumed, not given in the injunction, so that the notion of *niyojya* has no title to take precedence over that of *karṭṛ*; so the *vārttika* quoted Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 182: *tathāpi svasambandhikāryabodhṛtvenaivānvayo varṇanāya iti niyojya-samarpakatvam evāśrīyata ity evam api kim ity āha—niyojyaḥ... budhyate* (text: *budhyate*): “yet the construction (of the *svargakāma* with the *kārya*) is to be described as his being the knower of the *kārya* as related to himself: so (the word *svargakāma*) is taken as conveying the *niyojya*. He explains how this is in the stanza: “the *niyojya*, etc.”

the agent of another action? That is what you do: for you imagine that the one who is—in *yajeta*—said to be the agent of *yāga*, or sacrifice, is the agent of *buddhi*, or knowing. In fact, just the imagined assumption that he is the agent of knowing makes him the *niyojya*, or the person prompted by the mandate: for you say: “the *niyojya* is he who knows that the thing to do is his to do.”

— But he must first know before he can sacrifice.

— That means that if Devadatta, who is said to be the agent of cooking in “Devadatta must cook,” first goes somewhere in order to cook, he *must* first go somewhere else before he is able to cook. Is it proper to imagine that he is the agent of going?⁶⁴²

§ 124. Further, why do you assume that the *apūrva*, as denoted by the optative etc. verbal forms, is something permanent?⁶⁴³

— Because otherwise the collocation of the word *svargakāma* would not be accounted for.

— In what sense would it not be accounted for?

— *Svargakāma* is someone who desires to realize *svarga*. If the action of *yāga* etc. would be ephemeral, then it would not enable the *svargakāma* to achieve the realization of heaven since that will take place at another time.

— Then it is only not accounted for the people who have not a ghost of an idea of the final conclusions of the Vedānta. Those who do know their Veda hold that the sovereign Lord, the venerable Nārāyaṇa, grants any desired result when He is propitiated with any ritual act. For instance, Damañḍacārya, the foremost of the authorities on the Veda, declares:⁶⁴⁴

642. The Prābhākara’s contention that the agency of knowing ‘corresponds’ to, or ‘suits’ the agency of sacrificing is not helpful: if Devadatta has to go somewhere in order to be able to perform the duty of cooking enjoined on him in *devadattaḥ pacet*, we may say that his going to cook ‘suits’ his actual cooking, but this agency of going is nowhere given in the simple injunction that he is to cook: that is our presumption.

643. *apūrva-* is in the first place the *codanā*, *vidhi*, itself: KMS. 2, 1, 5 *codanā punar ārambhaḥ*, and Śābarabhāṣya ad loc. *codanety apūrvam brūmaḥ*, etc. Śābara defines ad 1, 1, 2 *kriyāyāḥ pravartakaṃ vacanam*. According to the Prābhākara the *codanā* is “unprecedented” because it is known from no other source than itself: *kriyādibhinnaṃ yat kāryaṃ vedyaṃ mānāntarair na tat / ato mānāntarāpūrvam apūrvam ity gīyate*. (Prakaraṇapañcikā, p. 187). In the second place it is the *codanā*’s own suprasensible effectiveness that persists as something permanent (*sthāyy eva kṛcīt*) after the *kārya* has been completed until its result will materialize.

644. For a literal translation see Appendix.

phalasaṃbibhatsayā hi karmabhir ātmānaṃ pipriṣantīti sa pūto 'laṃ phalā-yeti śāstramaryādā. That is to say: since they want to obtain the results they desire, they want to propitiate, with acts like sacrifice, charity etc., the Supreme Spirit, the venerable Lord Vāsudeva, through the intermediary of deities like Indra etc. whose inner Ruler He is and by whose names He may consequently be denoted: for when He has been propitiated with those acts, He grants the results they desire.—Similarly the śruti: *iṣṭāpūrtam bahudhā jātam jāyamānaṃ viśvaṃ bibharti bhuvanasya nābhīḥ*⁶⁴⁵—*iṣṭāpūrtam*⁶⁴⁶ means “the ritual act enjoined by all śrutis and smṛtis:” so *viśvaṃ bibharti* “the Supreme Person ‘bears’ for Himself, i.e. accepts for Himself all these ritual acts which are understood to be associated with deities like Indra, Agni, Varuṇa etc., whose immanent soul He is;” for He is *bhuvanasya nābhīḥ*, i.e. the supporter of the world comprising the classes of brahmins, kṣatriyas etc.: He is called *nābhīḥ*, or navel, since He by granting the diverse results of the various acts, is as such the bearer of the Universe.—The same śruti declares that He is denoted by the names of the deities Agni, Vāyu and the like, because He is their immanent soul: “*that is Agni, that is Vāyu, the sun and the moon*”⁶⁴⁷—The Venerable Lord puts it thus: “*If any votary wishes to worship with faith any body, then I make that faith of him unshakable. Inspired by that faith he aspires to worship it, and in result he will obtain his desires, which I shall grant him.*”⁶⁴⁸ “*Any body*” here means that the particular deities etc. constitute the bodies of the Venerable Lord who exists as their inner Ruler.—Again: “*For I am the one who enjoy all sacrifices, and I am the patron,*”⁶⁴⁹ where *patron*⁶⁵⁰ means: “the bestower of all results.”—So also: “*Thou, comprising all gods, art the One who always receivest the sacrifices, O Acyuta!*”⁶⁵¹ “*Those men who, intent on their proper tasks, propitiate Thee, O Lord, will surpass that illusion entirely to their souls’ release.*”⁶⁵²

In Vedas, epics and purāṇas it is set forth at length that all acts are propitiations of the sovereign Lord and that the Supreme Person, when duly propitiated with all these acts, grants their diverse results that are desired. In this very manner, therefore, all śrutis set forth that the omnipotent,

645. MahānārUp. 1, 6 = TaittĀr. 6, 1, 6.

646. R. distinguishes between *iṣṭa-* as *śrauta* and *pūrta-* as *smārta* acts.

647. MahānārUp. 1, 7 = TaittĀr. 6, 1, 7: *tad evāgnis tad vāyus tat sūryas tad u candramāḥ / tad eva śukram amṛtam tad brahma tad āpaḥ sa prajāpatiḥ.*

648. BhG. 7, 21-22.

649. BhG. 9, 24.

650. *prabhu-* “one who has power”.

651. VP. 5, 20, 97; Gītā Press ed. has the expletive ‘*cintya* for the preferable *nityam*.”

652. VP. 5, 30, 16.

omniscient and sovereign Venerable Lord is the One who enjoys—as the inner Ruler of the deities Indra etc.—all the acts mentioned in the Veda, *yāga, dāna, homa*⁶⁵³ etc., and that He is the One who grants all the results: for instance, the śruti *caturhotāro yatra saṃpadam gacchanti devaiḥ*,⁶⁵⁴ i.e. “*in whom—sc. in the Supreme Spirit as the inner Ruler within the gods—the caturhotṛs—sc. the sacrifices—come to coincide with the gods—sc. come to be associated with the gods.*” In other words: the gods, Indra etc., by existing as the bodies of the Supreme Spirit who is their inner Ruler, are associated with *yāga* etc. Or as the Venerable Lord has put it: “*the enjoyer of sacrifice and austerities, the sovereign lord of all worlds.*”⁶⁵⁵

To conclude, the ritual acts have the form of propitiations of the Supreme Spirit who is the inner Ruler of the deities Agni and the like. He alone grants the results that are coveted. So what is the point of assuming or imagining that an *apūrva* is denoted, which strays far from the path of etymological explication?⁶⁵⁶

— But, granting this, what sense then have we to assume for the optative etc. verbal forms ?

— YAJ has the sense of “worship of the gods”; hence *yāga-* and other derivatives are propitiations of the deities. The optative etc. verbal suffixes denote that this *yāga* in its radical meaning⁶⁵⁷ is—as appears from etymological explication—the object to be realized by the activity of an agent. In this way everything is sound. The terminations which denote agents connote that the radical sense of the word is modified by the connection with the activity of an agent; other affixes denote the present, past and other tenses; whereas the optative affixes indicate that the verbal action is the object to be realized by the activity of an agent.

§ 125. Moreover, the very texts that enjoin the various acts first enjoin that a definite act be performed by an agent who is desirous of its effect, and then they say that that act has the form of propitiation of a deity and that through the intermediary of that deity the effect of that act will be realized: e.g. a text like “*One desirous of prosperity must sacrifice a white*

653. *yāga-* general term for sacrifice, *homa* particular sacrifice by pouring the substance out in fire, cf. KMS. 4, 2, 27-28.

654. TaittĀr. 3, 11, 2; *caturhotṛ*, name of a recital during the new and full moon rites, denotes by extension the rites themselves.

655. BhG. 5, 29.

656. That the *apūrva* or *codanā*, i.e., the verbal affixes of the potential, etc., moods (*linādi*), should persist as their own eventual effectiveness is an assumption that is at best metagrammatical.

657. *prakṛtyartha-*.

he-goat that is destined for Vāyu: for Vāyu is the nimblest of the deities. On account of its destination, it runs up to Vāyu himself. He leads him to prosperity."⁶⁵⁸ here we find nothing that could disprove the realization of the result. Consequently it is unreasonable to say that the knowledge that the acts are means of realizing their results is merely based upon assumption.⁶⁵⁹

I mean this: the subsidiary text that supplements the injunction⁶⁶⁰ tells us what modification of the *yāga* as a means of realizing the result is required by the injunction. For instance the injunction: "Therefore one must not revile a Brahmin."⁶⁶¹ In the subsidiary text supplementing this injunction which prohibits reviling we are told that the prohibited act of reviling is a means of realizing a fine of one hundred gold pieces, and we accept this as part of the prohibitive injunction because it subserves the purpose of it. So in the injunction under discussion again we learn from the subsidiary text that the *yāga*, as it is enjoined to be performed by one who has a definite desire, is thereby modified as a means of realizing the *svarga* that is desired. Why disregard this and then smuggle in again this *yāga* as a means of realizing a result by merely *assuming* that it is? "Hiding his gold treasure in his house, he goes begging with poor people for a poor man's meal,"⁶⁶² is a maxim that fits you admirably! Nor is it an invisible factor⁶⁶³ that makes the reviling a means of being fined one hundred gold pieces. When a person performs the recommended acts, fails to perform the enjoined acts and performs the censured acts, all his pleasures and sufferings are due to the favour and disfavour of the Supreme Person.

There are all sorts of śrutis which declare this: "For He alone brings bliss⁶⁶⁴ . . . then he finds peace . . . no peace befalls him."⁶⁶⁵ In fear of Him

658. TaittS. 2, 1, 1 *vāyavyam śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ / vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devatā / vāyur eva svena bhāgadheyenopa dhāvati / sa evainaṃ bhūtiṃ gamayati*, quoted also ĀpŚrS. 19, 16, 3.

659. *upādānikī*, S. explains *upādānapramānasidhā vidhyākṣepasiddhetyarthaḥ* "proved by the means of assumption, i.e., by implied suggestion of the injunction".

660. *vākyāśeṣa-*

661. TaittS. 2, 6, 10, 2.

662. A proverb (*nyāya*) according to S. built on *hiranyanidhiṃ nihitam akṣetrajñā uparyupari saṃcaranto na vindeyuḥ* (ChUp. 8, 3, 2) which makes the citation in this connexion subtly insulting.

663. *adrṣṭa-* "includes the transcendental effect produced upon some material thing by a ritual treatment of it which produces no visible effect upon it." It includes the *apūrva* but this "exists of itself, and is not a function of any material or other object" (EDGERTON, MNPr. p. 279, s.v. *apūrva-*).

664. TaittUp. 2, 7 *ēṣa hy evānandayāti*.

665. TaittUp. 2, 7 (... *yadā hy evaiṣa ekasminn adrṣṭye 'bhayaṃ pratiṣṭhāṃ vin-date) atha so 'bhayaṃ gato bhavati*,

the wind blows, the sun rises and run Agni and Indra and finally Death.⁶⁶⁶ In obedience to the commandment of Him the imperishable One, O Gārgī, sun and moon stand apart⁶⁶⁷ . . . in obedience to His commandment, O Gārgī, men praise the liberal, the gods the sacrificer, and the pitṛs are entitled to the *darvī*.⁶⁶⁸ As declared in the *Draṃidabhāṣya*: "In obedience to His command the wind blows, the rivers flow; by Him the oceans have been confined and they spring like rams as if they were rutting," and "for being dependent on His will the world neither falls nor bursts asunder. When the Venerable Lord knows that someone follows His commandments, then He makes him prosper in His mercy, for He knows and is capable of acting."⁶⁶⁹

§ 126. When a person performs the enjoined acts such as the worshipping of the Supreme Person—which presupposes true knowledge of Him—then, by His favour, he finds happiness culminating in the attainment of Him, and security,⁶⁷⁰ according to his qualification. But when he does not perform the enjoined acts of worshipping Him etc., preceded by true knowledge of Him, and performs censured acts, then he will find immense suffering, which presupposes failure to attain Him, and insecurity. As the Venerable Lord has said: "Perform acts constantly: for acts are better than knowledge": herewith He enjoins that acts must be performed after knowledge has been acquired.⁶⁷¹ Then in "having dedicated all acts to Me"⁶⁷² He sets forth that the acts are propitiations of Himself and that the souls are under His control. Then He continues: "The men who always follow what I have taught here, faithfully and without muttering, will find release through acts. But those who mutter against it and refuse to follow my teaching, are ignorant of any knowledge, lost and devoid of understanding: be sure of that,^{672a} so as to praise those who obey His commandment and to condemn those who do not. Then He repeats that they who do not keep to His command have a

666 TaittUp. 2, 8 *bhīṣāsmād vātaḥ pavate / bhīṣodeti sūryaḥ / bhīṣāsmād agniḥ cendraś ca / mṛtyur dhāvati pañcamah*.

667. BĀUp. 3, 8, 9.

668. BĀUp. 3, 8, 9 *ad finem*.

669. Cf. Appendix.

670. *abhaya-*.

671. BhG. 3, 8; R.'s interpretation in GBh. ad loc. differs: *ataḥ karmayoge 'py ātmano 'kartṛvabhāvanayātmayāthātmyānusamdhānam antarbhūtam* (after which two more arguments for karmayoga's superiority to jñānayoga are given): "consequently karmayoga itself contains an essential knowledge of the ātman because it entails the realization that the ātman itself is not the agent of karman" (cf. my *Rāmānuja*, etc., p. 20-21); cp. also the GBh. explication: *niyataṃ vyāptam, prakṛtisamṣṛṣṭena hi vyāptam (karma)*, in which cf. my *Rāmānuja*, etc., ad loc.

672. BhG. 3, 30.

672a. BhG. 3, 31.

demoniac disposition, and finally He declares their ultimate downfall in: "I hurl these hostile, cruel, despicable and criminal men incessantly into demoniac forms of existence in their *saṃsāras*. Reduced to demons, confused, and in life after life failing to attain Me, they will gradually go down to the nethermost limit."⁶⁷³ While He describes the eternal place that the followers of His command will reach in: "He that always performs acts while resorting to Me will attain by My favour for ever the eternal place."⁶⁷⁴ In order to prevent that all those people who have not studied the Vedānta should lack faith in acts, emphatical declarations are made in the *devatādhikāraṇa*.⁶⁷⁵ However, the final conclusion of those who know the Veda is that all śāstras constitute one śāstra only.

§ 127. There are thousands of śrutis that declare that this Supreme Brahman Nārāyaṇa has a proper form of undefinable knowledge and beatitude in the purest form; He has immeasurable, innumerable, all-surpassing beautiful qualities, such as knowledge, power, strength, sovereignty, fortitude, glory etc.; the sum-total of spiritual and non-spiritual entities different from Himself are actuated by an act of His will; He possesses one invariable divine form that is in accordance with His pleasure and in harmony with Himself; He has an infinite variety of unsurpassed beautiful ornaments that suit His form, and immeasurable, endless and marvelous weapons of all kinds that are equal to His power;⁶⁷⁶ He has a Consort⁶⁷⁷ who suits His pleasure and who is in harmony with Him, possessing an immeasurable eminence of proper form, qualities, supernal power, ascendancy and character; He has an infinite entourage of attendants and necessities,⁶⁷⁸ suitable to Him, the knowledge, actions etc. of whom are perfect and whose qualities are limitless; He has an infinite glorious manifestation, such as is fitting to Him, comprising all objects and all means of experience; He has a divine residence, the proper form and nature of which are beyond the ken of thought and the power of expression: all this and so forth is everlasting and irreproachable.

This is declared in the śrutis: "I know that Great Person who has the colour of the sun, beyond matter;⁶⁷⁹ that golden Person within the

673. BhG. 16, 19-20

674. BhG. 18, 56.

675. KMS. 9, 1, 9.

676. Cf. the *astrabhūṣaṇādhyāya*, VP. 1, 22.

677. Śrī-, hence the typically Śrī-Vaiṣṇava appellation *Śriyaḥ patih* with which opens the GBh. intr. which is an elaboration of this Ved. paragraph.

678. The attendants are such superior beings as Ananta-Śeṣa, Garuḍa, Viśvakṣena, etc., etc. (YID. 9, p. 134); under *paricchada*- S. mentions *kalācīkāprabhṛtayaḥ* "Ladle, etc. (?)" ; the attendants are according to GBh. intr. *sūris*, on which see below.

679. SvetUp. 3, 7 *vedāham etaṃ puruṣam*, etc.

*sun*⁶⁸⁰... His eyes are like a many-coloured lotus;⁶⁸¹ that is the space within the heart: therein is this Person, *manomaya*-, immortal, golden:⁶⁸² *manomaya*- means "to be grasped by the pure mind only";⁶⁸³ — "all the flashes of lightning spring forth from over this Person:"⁶⁸⁴ sc. "from over this sun-coloured Person;" *nīlatoyadamadhyasthā vidyullekheva bhāsvarā*,⁶⁸⁵ sc. "like a flash of lightning that has a dark cloud within:"⁶⁸⁶ that bundle of flames that burn within the space in the heart of the Little Lotus and whose proper form is the Supreme Spirit appearing as the dark spot within those flames, blazes forth like a flash of lightning that has a dark cloud within itself; — "open to the mind, embodied in the vital airs, radiant, having all desires materialized and every will realized, soul of the space, who has all acts,⁶⁸⁷ all desires, all scents, all juices, encompassing all this, voiceless, unconcerned;⁶⁸⁸ His saffron-coloured garment;⁶⁸⁹ etc., etc.

The same meaning is conveyed by hundreds of śrutis, such as: "Viṣṇu's Consort, Mistress of the world;⁶⁹⁰ *Hṛī* and *Lakṣmī* are Thy spouses;⁶⁹¹ the *sūris* regard always that supreme place of Viṣṇu;⁶⁹² lying beyond matter;⁶⁹³ that is one, unevolved, infinite, complete, primordial, beyond matter;⁶⁹⁴ he that knows the treasure contained in the innermost Supreme Heaven;⁶⁹⁵ who watches in the Supreme Heaven;⁶⁹⁶ that is what is and what shall be, that is in the imperishable Supreme Heaven."⁶⁹⁷

680. ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *ya eṣo 'ntar āditye*, etc.

681. ChUp. 1, 6, 7 *tasya yathā kapyāsam*, etc., on the interpretation of which cf. infra §§ 134 ff.

682. TaittUp. 1, 6, 1 *sa ya eṣo 'ntar hṛdaya*, etc.

683. Cf. MuṇḍUp. 3, 1, 8: *na cakṣuṣā gṛhyate nāpi vācā manasā tu viśuddhena*.

684. MahānārUp. 1, 6 = TaittĀr. 6, 1, 6.

685. MahānārUp. 3, 12 *nīlatoyadamadhyasthā*, etc.

686. *madhyasthanīlatoyadā*; S. explains that the compound is a *bahuvrīhi* with irregular position of the first member (*pūrvanipāta*) peculiar to *chandas* usage; R. interprets the obvious *tatpuruṣa* comp. in this way to harmonize this śruti with the others cited.

687. S. explains *sarvakarman*- as "the One whose effect is the Universe".

688. ChUp. 3, 14, 2 *manomayaḥ prāṇaśarīrah*; no doubt here *manomaya* is to be taken in the sense of "comprehensible by the mind".

689. BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 (*tasya haitasya puruṣasya rūpaṃ*) *yathā māhārajanam vāsaḥ*.

690. TaittS. 4, 4, 12, 5 *tasyeśānā*, etc.

691. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1 *hrīś ca te*, etc.

692. SubālUp. 6 *tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam*, etc.

693. TaittS. 2, 2, 12, 5 *kṣayantam*, etc.

694. MahānārUp. 1, 5 *yad ekam avyaktam*, etc.

695. TaittUp. 2, 1 *yo veda nihitam*, etc.

696. RV. 10, 129, 7 *yo 'syādhykṣaḥ parame vyoman*.

697. RV. 10, 90, 2 *tad eva bhūtam u bhavyamā*, etc., cf. MahānārUp. 1, 2.

§ 128. On the authority of the statement in the śruti *tad Viṣṇoḥ paramam padam* that the *sūris* always regard the supreme residence of Viṣṇu the Supreme Brahman, we know that there is a class of beings of perfect knowledge who have the gift of regarding at all times. The specification of the statement is either that those who are *sūris* regard it, or that those who regard it are *sūris*.

—But in neither case more than one *guṇa* can be enjoined.

—That is not true here, because all *guṇas* have not been established: 698 the supreme residence that is qualified by all *guṇas* is enjoined; as witness the Sūtra: “When the *guṇas* are not laid down by another sentence, the Sacrifice as well as its Accessories are enjoined by the same statement; because of their being mixed up in the Injunctive word, but not when the act is set forth by another statement.” 699 Even as in the injunction of an act, e.g. *yad āgneyo ’ṣṭakapālo . . . bhavati*, 700 an act is enjoined that is qualified by all *guṇas* or accessories because neither act nor *guṇas* have yet been established: similarly our śruti propounds the supreme residence of Viṣṇu that has not yet been established as being always regarded by the *sūris*: so there is no contradiction. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the mantras which are *karaṇas*, 701 which allude to something that is being acted, 702 which have the form

698. KMS. 1, 4, 9; the problem is as follows: in the above declaration, however read, two different statements are found: they see that supreme place, and: they are *sūris*, by which different *guṇas* are ‘enjoined’; now in the case where the karman “act” has already been established by another declaration, another subsidiary declaration may describe only one *guṇa*, since otherwise there is *vākyabheda* “syntactical discontinuity”: *prāpte karmany anekavidhāne vākyabhedāpatteḥ* (MNPr. § 33, which quotes Kumāṛila, TantrV. 2, 2, 6 ab. *prāpte karmani nāneko vidhātum śakyate guṇaḥ* “when the acts has been established elsewhere not more than one *guṇa* can be enjoined”). There is another case, which R. envisages, where more than one *guṇa* is allowed, viz. in a *viśiṣṭavidhi* “injunction of an act as being further specified”, (MNPr. § 12) for which the quoted KMSūtra provides.

699. KMS. 1, 4, 9.

700. *yad āgneyo ’ṣṭakapālo* (‘*māvāsyāṃ paurṇamāsyām cācyuto*) *bhavati* (*suvar-gasya lokasyābhijityai*), adduced as an instance in case by Śabara ad 1, 4, 9, to whose commentary I may refer; the reference is TaittS. 2, 6, 33.

701. *karaṇamantrāḥ*, explained by S. *homādisādhanatayā vihītāḥ* “enjoined as the means for *homa*. etc., rites”.

702. *kriyamānānuvādināḥ*, expl. by S.: *barhir devasādānaṃ dāmi ityādayaḥ*; cf. MNPr. § 92 *tad dhi barhiḥ saṃskāradvārāpūrvasaṃbandhīti mantrasya sāmartyāt tadarthatve sati nānarthakyaṃ prasajyate*, etc., “inasmuch as the mantra, by virtue of its own denotative potency, is related to the apūrva by means of the preparation of barhis and is thus significant, no insignificance can be imputed to it”, etc.; the text is MaitrS. 1, 1, 2.

of *stotra*⁷⁰³ and *śāstra*,⁷⁰⁴ which are applied to *japa* etc.,⁷⁰⁵ which are recited in context⁷⁰⁶ or not recited in context,⁷⁰⁷ all denote their proper sense, if not contradictory and not yet established, in the same way as the *brāhmaṇas*.⁷⁰⁸ A *stotra* is a description of *guṇas* found in the *guṇin* which is to be realized by mantras that are sung; *śāstra* is a description of *guṇas* to be found in the *guṇin* which is to be realized by mantras that are not sung. The declaration which the mantras that elucidate their meanings in application make about the particular *guṇas* — neither yet established nor contradictory — that are to be found in deities etc. are in agreement with that application.

The above śruti⁷⁰³ does not apply to persons who are released because it would not be proper to say of them that they always regard.⁷¹⁰ Nor does it apply to the continuous flow of released souls as a whole, for that would stultify the śruti because it tells us in *sadā paśyanti* that it applies to each agent separately.⁷¹¹ We have said before that even if we assume that mantras and arthavādas have meanings only for a *thing to do* their meanings are established: so *a fortiori* when etymological explication proves that they have in fact bearing upon an established thing in their own right. In this manner everything is sound.⁷¹²

— But in the assertion *tad Viṣṇoḥ paramam padam* the words *paramam padam* denote the proper form of the Supreme One, for we cannot detect a difference between this śruti and śrutis like: “the Supreme ‘pada’, free from all imperfection, that has the name of Viṣṇu.”⁷¹³

— That is not true, for in śrutis like: “lying beyond matter;”⁷¹⁴ “that is in the imperishable Supreme Heaven;”⁷¹⁵ “who watches in the Supreme

703. S.: *gānaviśiṣṭamanthroccaraṇa*- “recital of mantras by chanting”.

704. S.: *gānarahitam ekaśrutirūpoccarana*- “recital (of mantras), without chanting as one śruti”.

705. S.: i.e., *japa* and *adhyayana*, the former being recital in a low voice, the latter in a loud voice.

706. As e.g., the mantra *barhir devasādānaṃ dāmi* is recited in the context of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* ritual; cf. MNPr. § 92; on *prakaraṇa*- as a criterion (*pramāṇa*) for deciding the function of subsidiary (*aṅga*-/*śeṣa*-), among which mantra is included), cf. MNPr. §§ 116 ff.

707. On mantras recited out of context, cf. MNPr. §§ 94 f., and §§ 248 ff.

708. i.e., the *vidhi*-, *brāhmaṇa*- par excellence.

709. i.e., *tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ*.

710. For before they were released they did not see.

711. For cf. the sequel: *tad viprāso vipanyavo jāgrvāṃsaḥ samindhate*, explained below.

712. Cf. supra.

713. VP. 1, 22, 53.

714. TaittS. 2, 2, 12, 5.

715. TaittUp. 2, 1,

Heaven;”⁷¹⁶ “who knows that which is laid down in the innermost Supreme Heaven;”⁷¹⁷ only a Supreme place is indicated, and in “that Supreme pada of Viṣṇu”⁷¹⁸ it is designated that there is difference between one and the other. So by this very text we learn from the specification “the Supreme ‘pada’ that has the name of Viṣṇu” that there is yet another supreme ‘pada’ different from this one, but it is declared that it is this ‘pada’ or ‘place’ that is always regarded by the sūris.

§ 129. — In other words: in some texts the words *paramaṃ padam* refer to a supreme place, in other texts they refer to the proper form of the soul as separated from prakṛti; and in other texts again they refer to the proper form of the Venerable Lord Himself. The Supreme Place is referred to in “The sūris regard always the *paramaṃ padam* of Viṣṇu.” The proper form of the soul separated from prakṛti is referred to in: “During creation, subsistence and resorption the prakṛti exists on in a triple form according to the activity of the three guṇas; but its *paramaṃ padam* is beyond guṇas and great.”⁷¹⁹ Finally the proper form of the Venerable Lord is referred to in “The *paramaṃ padam*, free from all imperfection, that has the name of Viṣṇu.”⁷²⁰ The words *paramaṃ padam* can refer to all three because they constitute the highest attainable end.

— But how can all three of them be the highest attainable end ?

— The proper form of the Venerable Lord is the supreme pada, because that is the highest attainable end in its own right. The other two are supreme ‘padas’ inasmuch as they are implied in the attainment of the Lord. The realization of the proper form of the soul released from all bonds of karman is implied in the attainment of the Lord:⁷²¹ this on the authority of the instruction imparted by the śruti “those desires are real but they are concealed by the unreal,”⁷²² which, by using the word “unreal” declares that the hosts of perfections of the Lord are concealed by one’s personal karman.

§ 130. — But how do you make out that this concealment in the form of the “unreal” is due to the karman of the embodied soul?

716. RV. 10, 129, 7.

717. TaittUp. 2, 1.

718. i.e., the Supreme Residence.

719. VP. 1, 22, 41.

720. VP. 1, 22, 53.

721. Or, to put it differently: the essence of God cannot be attained, i.e., intuitively realized, unless the soul’s essence has been recognized: *ātmāvalokana-* is a pro-paedeutic to the attainment of God: cf. my *Rāmānuja*, etc. Intr. IV.

722. ChUp. 8, 3, 1 *ta ime satyaḥ kāmā anṛtāpidhānāḥ*.

— On the authority of the assertion: “Ignorance, otherwise called *karman*, is regarded as another potency by which the ubiquitous potency of the embodied soul is enveloped, and it meets all the sufferings of *samsāra* in endless succession because it is concealed by that ignorance,”⁷²³ etc.”

§ 131. That the attainment of the Supreme Place, too, is implied in the attainment of the Venerable Lord is clear enough: in the śruti “lying beyond *rajas*”⁷²⁴ the word *rajas* denotes the prakṛti characterized by the three guṇas: for *rajas* has no proper existence alone and isolated from the other guṇas. The sense of the text is consequently: “Him who lies, i.e. dwells, in a definite place beyond this our prakṛti” characterized by the three guṇas. So we know by this that the dwelling-place of Viṣṇu must be beyond the matter that is governed by guṇas and that constitutes the embodied soul’s field of experience. In the text “I know that great person who has the colour of the sun, beyond *tamas*,”⁷²⁵ the same prakṛti is denoted by the word *tamas*. Since *tamas* alone has no proper existence either, this text forms one coherent context with the text reading “lying beyond *rajas*”; so we gather this sense: “I know that great person, of the colour of the sun, who dwells beyond *tamas*.”

The śruti “who knows Brahman—who is real, knowledge and infinite—laid down in the innermost Supreme Heaven: that is in the imperishable Supreme Heaven”⁷²⁶ tells us that the word “Supreme Heaven” denote that Supreme Place as having an untransformed form. So since the clause “the imperishable Supreme Heaven” asserts that this place is imperishable, the words “Supreme Heaven” cannot denote celestial bodies like the sun etc. because those are perishable. Texts such as “where the ancient gods have found the fulfilment of their ends,” “where the first-born ṛṣis of olden times”⁷²⁷ etc.” tell us that they are the sūris. Similarly the śruti *tad viprāso vipanyavo jāgrvāmsaḥ samindhate Viṣṇor yat paramaṃ padam*:⁷²⁸ *viprāsaḥ*, i.e., “intelligent beings”—*vipanyavaḥ* “devoted to glorification”—*jāgrvāmsaḥ* “of unimpaired knowledge”—the meaning being that those intelligent beings of unimpaired knowledge and incessantly glorifying that Supreme Place of Viṣṇu blaze forth.

723. VP. 6, 7, 61-62.

724. TaittS. 2, 2, 12, 5.

725. ŚvetUp. 3, 7.

726. TaittUp. 2, 1.

727. RV. 10, 90, 16 *yatra pūrve sādhyāḥ santi devāḥ ? yatrarsayaḥ prathamajā ye purānāḥ*.

728. SubāUp. 6.

§ 132. In the same way as the hosts of beautiful qualities—knowledge, strength, sovereignty etc.—in the text “*this was sat in the beginning, my dear son,*” so these attendants, this place etc. are implied in the proper form of the Supreme Brahman.⁷²⁹ Therefore, since they, too, are comprised by the beautiful qualities; since in the śruti “*this was sat in the beginning*” the word *this* encompasses the phenomenal world of objects of experience conjoined with the order of experiencing beings that are subject to karman; and since the former attendants are however not included among the beings subject to karman because they “regard always” according to the śruti “*the sūris regard always*”: therefore the text from *apahatapāpmā* to *apipāsaḥ*⁷³⁰ negates first the imperfect nature proper to the prakṛti—constituted by the three guṇas—that furnishes the means of His own sport, and the imperfect nature proper to the ordinary prakṛti-conjoined puruṣa; and then, with *satyakāmaḥ*, it asserts the reality of the sum-total of His own objects and means of experience. *Satyakāma-* means “He whose kāmas, i.e. the objects of desire, are real.” Therefore the meaning is: the objects and means of His experience that the Supreme Brahman desires for Himself are real or eternal. The word *satya-* signifies that, whereas an entity that is the means of another's sport, is liable to transformation and therefore, albeit real in so far as capable of connexion with pramāṇas, yet unreal in so far as impermanent, the sūris etc. on the contrary are permanent. *Satyasaṃkalpa-* asserts, that although these objects and means of experience etc. be eternal, unsurpassed and endless, an infinite number of new entities owe their realization to His will alone. So *satyasaṃkalpa-* declares that the differences in proper form, condition and activity of these means of experience and means of His sport, spiritual and non-spiritual, permanent and non-permanent, are entirely dependent on His volition.

§ 133. This same sense is stated in epics and purāṇas, which corroborate the Vedas as witness this passage: “*Seeing that both were intelligent and firmly established in the Vedas, the Lord made them apprehend, in order to corroborate the Vedas.*”⁷³¹ For example it reads in the Holy Rāmāyaṇa, thus composed to support the Veda, as follows: “*That great Yogin, the ancient Supreme Spirit, is in his evolved phase without beginning, middle and end, great beyond the great,*⁷³² *beyond matter: He is the creator, who bears the Conch-shell, Disc and Club: on His chest is the śrīvatsa curl; He has Śrī for ever as His consort; He is invincible, eternal and immutable.*”⁷³³ “*Various*

729. ChUp. 6, 2, 1.

730. ChUp. 8, 1, 5.

731. Rām. 1, 4, 6 *tau tu medhāvīnau dṛṣṭvā*, etc.; the two persons are Kuśa and

Lava.
732. The great (*mahat*) here will have the sense of *mahattattva*.

733. Rām. 6, 1, 4, 14-15,

*arrows and a long-drawn bow accompany the descendant of Kakutstha; all the individuals follow suit.*⁷³⁴ *With body and with entourage he enters the glory of Viṣṇu.*⁷³⁵

In the Holy Viṣṇupurāṇa: “*That multiplicity of forms comprising all the forms in which all these potencies have their seats constitutes another vast form of Hari.*⁷³⁶ *Brahman is incorporate, Hari encompasses*⁷³⁷ *the entire Brahman. Śrī, Viṣṇu's faithful consort, the Mother of the world is eternal herself, and she is omnipresent even as Viṣṇu Himself is.*⁷³⁸ *When He is god, she assumes a divine body, when He is man she assumes a human body: she makes her own body agree with that of Viṣṇu.*⁷³⁹ “*The Yogins who in perfect concentration constantly meditate upon Brahman possess that supreme place which the sūris regard.*” “*... whose manifestation is not subject to the evolutions that are caused by Time consisting of kalā, muhūrta etc.*”⁷⁴⁰

And in the Mahābhārata: “*Go to the divine residence, O Lord, undecaying, unthinkable, unknowable, primordial, which is to be known from the revelations, and protect us, your votaries, by incarnating yourself in every age with your own body.*⁷⁴¹ *Time gets ripe, and there is no time, there is the Lord alone.*”⁷⁴²

The Author of the Sūtras declares that the Supreme Brahman has form in the sūtra “*within, on account of the instruction of His properties.*”⁷⁴³

§ 134. He who is always gloriously visible⁷⁴⁴ is the pre-eminent Person who dwells within the orb of the sun.⁷⁴⁵ His splendour is like that of a colossal mountain of molten gold⁷⁴⁶ and His brilliance that of the rays of hundreds of thousands of suns. His long eyes are spotless like the petals of a lotus⁷⁴⁷ which, sprouting forth from deep water on a soft stalk, blossoms in the rays

734. Rām. 7, 109, 7; Vulgate reads in c *tathāyudhāni te*.

735. Rām. 7, 110, 13 ab; Vulgate reads in c *sahānujaḥ*.

736. VP. 6, 7, 70; *mahat* in the sense of the *tattva*, and by extension “Universe”.

737. VP. 1, 22, 63 cd.

738. VP. 1, 9, 145.

739. VP. 1, 8, 39; Gītā Press ed. reads in b *yogaṇīscāye*, in c *teṣāṃ tu*, in d *yat tat*.

740. VP. 4, 1, 84 ab.

741. MBh. 12, 5, 27.

742. MBh. 12, 191, 9 ab (Poona cr ed).

743. BrS. 1, 1, 21 *antas taddharmopadeśāt*, referring to ChUp. 1, 1, 6, on the basis of which R. will now give a description of the Divine Person.

744. *darīdṛṣyate*, intensive built on *dṛṣyate* of ChUp. 1, 6, 6.

745. 1, 6, 6: *antar āditye*.

746. 1, 6, 6: *hiraṇmayāḥ*.

747. 1, 6, 7: *pundarikam evam akṣiṇī*,

of the sun.⁷⁴⁸ His eyes⁷⁴⁹ and His forehead and His nose are beautiful, His coral-like lips smile graciously, and His soft cheeks are beaming. His neck is as delicately shaped as a conch-shell and His bud-like divine ears, beautifully formed, hang down on His stalwart shoulders. His arms are thick, round and long and He is adorned with fingers that are reddened by nails of a most becoming reddish tinge. His body, with its slender waist and broad chest, is well-proportioned in all parts, and His shape is of an unutterably divine form. His colour is pleasing. His feet are as beautiful as budding lotuses. He wears a yellow robe that suits Him and He is adorned with immeasurable, marvelous, endless and divine ornaments—a spotless diadem, earrings, necklaces, the Kaustubha gem, bracelets, anklets, belt etc.—and with Conch, Disc, Club, Sword, the Bow Śārṅga, the curl Śrīvatsa and the garland Vanamālā.⁷⁵⁰ He attracts eye and thought alike of all by the measureless and boundless beauty that is His. He overflows the entire creation of animate and inanimate beings with the nectar of His comeliness. His youth is exceedingly wonderful, unimaginable and eternal. He is as delicately tender as blossoming flowers. He perfumes the infinite space between the cardinal points with the odour of holiness. His profound majesty is forever encompassing the entire Universe. He looks upon the hosts of His devotees with loving eyes, filled with compassion and affection. His sport is to evolve, sustain and dissolve all the worlds. All evil is foreign to Him—He is the treasury of all beautiful qualities and He is essentially different from all other entities. He is the Supreme Spirit, the Supreme Brahman, Nārāyaṇa. This is the sense to be read in ‘on account of the instruction of his properties,⁷⁵¹ He rules all the worlds—all His desires,⁷⁵² He is beyond all impurities,⁷⁵³ etc. His properties are declared in the texts: ‘the ruler of all, the sovereign of all,⁷⁵⁴ free from imperfection, unaging, . . . whose every

748. According to S., who substantiates this statement by quotations, R. here describes what is called *kapyāsa* (1, 6, 7) in three ways: conformably to the three explanations of this disputed term allowed by the Vākyakāra (see Appendix § 2, Fr. XIII); respectively *gambhīrāmbhaṣsamudbhūta-*, borrowed from *Dramiḍa* (< *kam* “water”, *api*, *asa* “ground, soil”); *sumṛṣṭānāla-* (< *kapi* [< *kam* *pibati*] “stalk”; *āsa* [*yasminn āste*] “seat”); *ravikaravikāsita-* (< *kapi* [< *kam* *pibati*] “sun”, *āsa* [*tenāsyate kṣipyate vikāsyate*] “expansion, blowing”).

749. In the sequel R. has been inspired by VP. 6, 7, 80 ff.

750. I refer to VP. 1, 22 on Viṣṇu’s ornaments and weapons.

751. BrS. 1, 1, 21 *antas taddharmopadeśāt*.

752. MahUp. ?

753. ChUp. 1, 6, 7.

754. BAUp. 4, 4, 22.

will is realized,⁷⁵⁵ ‘supreme beyond all’
“Lord of all, sovereign of the souls,”⁷⁵⁶

§ 135. The Author of the Vākya golden person is regarded⁷⁵⁸ teaches everything, because we learn that He desires, and also because He is beyond having stated the prima facie view assumed form to favour His worship temporarily assumed by his sovereign thoughts,” subsequently denies that He beyond sensual perception and only for this has been declared.⁷⁵⁹ i.e. e have been stated to constitute the proper the same manner His form belongs to declare that His proper form is such

The same has been commented “The form of the creator of all is beyond grasped by the eye, it can only be apprehended has another means; this on account of eye, nor by speech, but by purified thought cannot be declared to have form, for the “saffron-coloured garment,”⁷⁶⁰ “I know colour of the sun, beyond matter;”⁷⁶¹ that He is a witness,” etc. [Vākya] “The similarity of form, just as “moon-face has not the sense of “being a product of beginning.” Even as we learn from the qualities that the Supreme Brahman has qualities, in the same way we know by has the colour of the sun,” etc. that the Supreme Brahman, has a perfectly with His pleasure and in harmony with consort, Mistress of this world,” “Hrī

755. ChUp. 8, 1, 5.

756. MahānārUp. 11, 2.

757. MahānārUp. 11, 3.

758. Reference is to ChUp. 8, 1, 6 a

759. Viz. MuṇḍUp. 3, 1, 8.

760. BAUp. 2, 3, 6.

761. ŚvetUp. 3, 7.

762. TaittS. 4, 4, 12, 5.

sūris regard always, "beyond matter," "lying beyond this matter,"⁷⁶³ etc. refer to consorts, attendants, a residence etc., we know also that they actually exist: as the Author of the Bhāṣya declared: "for the śāstra asserts things so as they are."

§ 136. In other words: even as the text "Brahman, who is real, knowledge, eternal"⁷⁶⁴ declares that the proper form of the Supreme Spirit is essentially different from everything else inasmuch as it is antagonistic to all evil and comprises only boundless bliss, and inasmuch as it is undefinable—even as, further, the texts "Who is omniscient, all-knowing,"⁷⁶⁵ "His supreme potency is diverse, His knowledge, power and works are proper to His nature,"⁷⁶⁶ "everything derives its light from this luminary, all this is luminous by His luminosity,"⁷⁶⁷ etc. declare that His qualities which are unsurpassed and innumerable are essentially different from everything else—in the same manner the text "who has the colour of the sun," etc. declares that His form, attendants, residence etc. are essentially different from everything else, are proper to Him exclusively and have an inexplicable proper form and nature.

§ 137. If the Vedas are pramāṇa, then they denote the sum-total of unprecedented and compatible meanings, classified under vidhi, arthavāda and mantra, so as they are in reality. That the Vedas are pramāṇa is stated in the sūtra. "Meaning is inherent in the word."⁷⁶⁸ Even as the power of heat is inherent in fire etc., and even as the power of originating particular cognitions is inherent in the senses of vision etc., in the same way the power of denotation is inherent in language.⁷⁶⁹ It is not right to say that the denotativeness of language is based on convention, as is that of the language of gestures. In the very absence of any knowledge about a person or persons who fixed the convention, although there is no break in the beginningless transmission of the notion (of the denotative character of language), the originally conventional meanings would have been known as such either directly or traditionally. Nor is it right to imagine that the denotativeness of language is as conventional as that of words like Devadatta etc., for with words of that type the convention is known either directly or traditionally. With words like cow, inasmuch as no convention is known, although there

763. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1.

764. TaittUp. 2, 1.

765. MuṇḍUp. 2, 2, 7 *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit.*

766. ŚvetUp. 6, 8 *parāsyā śaktir vividhaiva.*

767. MuṇḍUp. 2, 3, 10/ŚvetUp. 6, 14 *tam eva bhāntam.*

768. KMS. 1, 1, 5 *autpattikas tu śabdasyarthena sambandhaḥ.*

769. This theory of the originality of language is the one generally adhered to by the ancient systems, though the (ancient) Naiyāyikas formulate it thus that the denotativeness of language is a convention established by God himself.

is no break in the beginningless transmission, the power of denotation is inherent. It is clear that the cognitive power of language is inherent, heat is inherent in fire and the power of

§ 138. — However, if the denotation is in it as it is in the senses, then why is it not to be denotative, that its relation to its denotation

— We reply: it is as with the marks like smoke have invariably a denotation in fire etc., and so give rise to the cognition, also an invariable relation with the denotation in cognition.

— But then language, being the denotation, is to be Inference and not a pramāṇa in its own right.

— No: the relation between word and object of cognition. Smoke etc., is a mediate stage of knowledge of that relation, that is the difference.

Summing up, inasmuch as we speak of denoting a meaning when the relation between word and object is such that we have no knowledge of any object in the beginningless transmission of language, therefore we conclude that the denotation is the word itself.

§ 139. So, denotative combination is inherent in contextual language.⁷⁷¹ There where the denotation is from human cognition⁷⁷² we speak of the word-order in speaking always derived from the previous word-order in an end.

770. liṅga-; I refer to Tarkasamgraha.

771. *vākyaśabda-* "language consisting of a number of single words (*padas*) are coordinated in a *padasaṃghāta-* cf. Śabaravāmin's definition (3, 3, 14).

772. i.e. the construction of sentences of thought traceable to human experience.

773. *saṃskāra-*.

preterhuman⁷⁷⁴ and we say that the Vedas are preterhuman. That which makes the Vedas preterhuman and eternal is that it is spoken in exactly the same precise order that has been remembered by the mental impressions left by previous orders in an endless retrogressive chain. And these Vedas — congeries of syllables, each of which has its definite place in a regular order from the beginning onwards — continue in an infinite number of branches differing according to the Veda — Ṛg-, Yajur-, Sāma- or Atharva-Veda — to which they belong. And these Vedas, in the form of vidhi, arthavāda and mantra, denote the proper form of Nārāyaṇa, who is the Supreme Brahman, and the manner in which He is to be propitiated, and finally the particular results that follow when He is propitiated. The entire body of language called Veda, which gives rise to the knowledge of the Supreme Person, of His proper form, of the propitiation of Him, and of the fruit thereof, is eternal. Since the Vedas are endless and difficult to understand, the great ṛṣis have been ordered by the Supreme Person to transmit the sense of the Veda in every age in order to help all the worlds, and they have composed the dharmasāstras, epics and purāṇas which are founded on vidhi, arthavāda and mantra.⁷⁷⁵ The profane words are extracted as before from the vocabulary of the Vedas and are applied, as before, to certain objects as their names,⁷⁷⁶ and their usage is fixed by tradition.

— However, if all the words denoting meanings are ultimately Vedic, is it proper then to define them separately as belonging either to the hymns or to profane parlance?⁷⁷⁷

— In the Vedas the same words have their appointed place in that regular order only and are there alone used, whereas the words used elsewhere are used differently, so we commit no error.

§ 140. Thus it is set forth that Nārāyaṇa — who is the Supreme Brahman — to be known from the Vedas with their subsidiaries, corroborated by epics, purāṇas and dharmasāstras, is antagonistic to all evil and essentially

774. *apauruṣeya-*; the sentences of the Veda do not represent a train of thought traceable to human experience: a sentence like *svargakāmo yajeta* can only have a preterhuman origin since its contents cannot be derived from human knowledge: hence it is “unprecedented”. All such sentences together form a huge frame of interdependencies in which elements are comprehensible from within but never from without.

775. S. suggests a distinction between the dharmasāstras as continuing and supporting the pūrvabhāga—pre-upaniṣad Veda—and the epics and purāṇas supporting the Upaniṣads.

776. S. refers justly to VP. 1, 5, 63, quoted by R. supra § 21 in a similar connexion.

777. Resp. *chandas-* and *bhāṣā-*; for references see RENOY, *Terminologie*, s.v. *bhāṣ-*.

different from everything else. His proper form is purely boundless knowledge and bliss. He is a treasury of hosts of natural, innumerable beautiful qualities. All spiritual and non-spiritual entities, in all the varieties of proper form, modes of existence and activities, obey His volition. The proper form and nature of His infinite supernal manifestation⁷⁷⁸ are undefinable. The means of His sport are constituted by the phenomenal world consisting of an infinite variety of spiritual and non-spiritual entities. In the śrutis⁷⁷⁹ “all this is verily Brahman, all this is ensouled by Him... Thou art That, *Śvetaketu*,⁷⁸⁰ some call Him Agni, others the Maruts, others Prajāpati, others Indra, others the vital air, others the eternal Brahman,⁷⁸¹ the splendours and brightnesses that are in the world; the world, the world-protectors and the three Vedas; the three fires and five oblations: the Son of Devakī is all and all the gods,⁷⁸² You are the sacrifice, You are the vaṣaṭ, You are the Om syllable,⁷⁸³ You are Ṛtadhāman, the ancient Vasu of the Vasus, Prajāpati,⁷⁸⁴ the entire world is Thy body and the earth is Thy fortitude; fire, wrath, grace, soma is Thine, O Thou who art adorned with the Śrīvatsa,⁷⁸⁵ Viṣṇu is the luminaries, Viṣṇu is the woods, Viṣṇu is the lands, Viṣṇu is the mountains and spaces, He is the rivers and the oceans, He is all what and what is not, O great priest:”⁷⁸⁶ in all these śrutis all words used in *sāmānādhikaraṇya* declare that Brahman is modified by all because all constitute His body, as I have said before.

The Supreme Brahman, whose every will is true, wills, of His own accord, that He be modified by the many. He then, of His own accord, divides the subtle elemental matter in the form of the totality of non-spiritual entities from the multitudinous hosts of experiencing entities, which were both dissolved in himself hitherto, and creates out of the subtle elemental matter the primeval elements, introduces into them as their souls the experiencing entities, creates the entire Universe out of these primeval elements controlled by spiritual souls in mutual conjunction, and then of His own accord enters into them as their immanent soul⁷⁸⁷ and exists on as the

778. *mahāvibhūti-*

779. ChUp. 3, 14, 1 *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*.

780. ChUp. 6, 8, 7 *aitadātmīyam idaṃ sarvaṃ (tat satyam sa ātmā) tat tvam asi Śvetaketo*.

781. Manu 12, 123 where the vulgate reads *manum anye* for *maruto 'nye*.

782. MBh.?

783. Rām. 6, 120, 20.

784. Rām. 6, 120, 7.

785. Rām. 6, 120, 26.

786. VP. 2, 12, 38.

787. ChUp. 6, 2, 3.

Supreme Spirit whose body is formed by all, and is thus modified by the many. This subtle matter of the primeval elements is called by the name of prakṛti, and all the experiencing entities are in their totality denoted by the name puruṣa. Both prakṛti and puruṣa constitute modes of the Supreme Spirit because they constitute the Supreme Spirit's body. Hence the Supreme Spirit Himself can be denoted by the words prakṛti and puruṣa. All this, which has been expounded before, is elucidated by the śruti: "He willed: I be many: I will multiply; having created that, He entered into that; when He had entered into that it was present and yonder, it was explained and unexplained, an abode and not an abode, knowledge and not knowledge, true and false; and it was real."⁷⁸⁸

§ 141. We have already declared that the means of attaining Brahman is a superior bhakti in the form of memorization staggered to a state of extremely lucid perception, which is immeasurably and overwhelmingly dear to the devotee. It is achieved by complete devotion of bhakti which is furthered by the performance of one's proper acts preceded by knowledge of the orders of reality as learnt from the śāstra.⁷⁸⁹ The word bhakti has the sense of a kind of love, and this love again that of a certain kind of knowledge.

— However, according to people in the world love has no other sense than that of pleasure, and pleasure that is to be realized by a certain kind of knowledge is a different thing altogether.

— No, for whatever kind of knowledge is said to lead to pleasure is pleasure itself.

§ 142. In other words: cognitions with a content fall either under pleasure or suffering, or the state of neither pleasure nor suffering, and they become one or the other of these three according to their content or object. If knowledge particularized by a particular object excites pleasure, it is held dear accordingly. The cognition that has that pleasurable object is pleasure itself, and we do not notice any different thing: particularly because this cognition leads to the practical behaviour of being happy. The capacity of particularizing such a pleasurable cognition is but relative and impermanent in any object different from Brahman, but in Brahman Itself it is absolute and permanent: it is said that "Brahman is bliss."⁷⁹⁰ Since knowledge is pleasurable if its object is pleasurable, Brahman is pleasurable as such.

788. TaittUp. 2, 6.

789. i.e. the discriminatory knowledge of the ontological orders of prakṛti, puruṣa and God.

790. TaittUp. 3, 6 ānando brahma,

This is declared in: "He is pleasure: He that obtains this pleasure becomes happy,"⁷⁹¹ i.e., Brahman being pleasure one is happy when one has attained Brahman. The Supreme Person, being in His own right and of His own accord boundless and absolute bliss, becomes bliss to another too, because there is no differentiation in that He is beatitudinous.⁷⁹² So the meaning of our text is: He that has Brahman as the object of his knowledge becomes happy. When it is realized that the soul stands in a relation of subservience to the Supreme Brahman because this Supreme Brahman — treasury of hosts of innumerable absolute and immeasurable beautiful qualities, irreproachable, possessing an infinite supernal manifestation — ocean of immeasurable and absolute goodness, beauty and love — is the Principal to which the soul is accessory or subservient, then the Supreme Brahman who is thus an object of absolute love leads the soul to Himself.

§ 143. — However, this would mean in other words that the soul's absolute subservience itself is immeasurable and absolute happiness: but this is contradicted by all experience, for we see that literally all spiritual beings have one great wish: to be completely independent; compared with that, dependence means suffering. And there is the smṛti: "All dependence means suffering,"⁷⁹³ and in the same line: "Service is called a dog's way, so try to avoid it."⁷⁹⁴

— This attitude reveals the misconceived identification⁷⁹⁵ of body and soul by those who have not learnt that the soul is essentially different from the body. For the body, which, as a matter of fact, is a mass in which qualities, such as the generic structure of man, etc., subsist, is held to be independent and they who are bound to saṃsāra think that the body is the 'I'.⁷⁹⁶ Whatever misconception one has of one's own soul, one holds the end of life to agree with that. What is pleasure is differently determined according to the body for which the soul is mistaken — lion, tiger, boar, man, yakṣa, rakṣas, piśāca, god, dānava, male, female, etc. — and these different pleasures are mutually incompatible. So everything is judged by whatever aim of life corresponds to the mistaken identity of the soul. The proper form of the soul has, however, knowledge for its one and only form, and is essentially different from the body, god, etc., and the soul's essence is that it is

791. TaittUp. 2, 7, raso vai saḥ / raso hy evāyaṃ labdhvānandī bhavati.

792. God is beatitudinous in self-contemplation: being his own object; if as such he is another's object there is no difference in his being a beatitudinous object.

793. Manusmṛti 6, 160 a sarvaṃ paravaśaṃ duḥkhaṃ (sarvaṃ ātmaśaṃ sukham).

794. Manusmṛti 6, 4.

795. abhimāna-

796. i.e. the self, soul or ātman is confused with empirical ego.

subservient to Another. When this conception of the soul as it really is has been formed the end of life is held to be that which is in accordance with that. The smṛti: "The soul is pure knowledge"⁷⁹⁷ declares that the soul's only form is knowledge. From numerous śrutis of the kind of "the Master of all"⁷⁹⁸ we know that the soul's sole form is to be subservient to the Supreme Spirit. Therefore the wishful misconception of independence must be regarded as an erroneous cognition due to karman, just as the wishful misconception that the soul is identical with the body of a lion, tiger, etc. Consequently it is also due to karman that objects other than the Supreme Person are pleasurable. Therefore they are slight and impermanent, while the Supreme Person is happiness in Himself, so that this happiness is permanent, immeasurable and absolute — on the authority of the śruti: "Brahman is joy, Brahman is space,⁷⁹⁹ Brahman is bliss,⁸⁰⁰ Brahman is real, knowledge, infinite."⁸⁰¹ No other entity other than Brahman is essentially happiness, and if it happens to be pleasurable, it is impermanent because it is due to karman: this has been declared by the venerable Parāśara: "sinful karman and auspicious karman are called hell or heaven,⁸⁰² one and the same thing may lead to suffering, pleasure and jealousy and wrath: so for what reason has that thing that character?"⁸⁰³ i.e., what makes an entity that is completely or enduringly pleasure, pain, etc., just that entity? This exclusive character is due to good and evil karman. After showing the want of consistency when we consider a number of persons, in that the pleasure of one is the suffering of another, he says that that same inconsistency holds also in one and the same person: "That which led to joy now leads again to pain, and what led to wrath now leads to peace,⁸⁰⁴ i.e., that any thing is markedly pleasure or pain is due to the effects of karman, not to the proper form of that thing itself; hence it disappears when an end is put to karman.

§ 144. The smṛti that you just quoted "all dependence means suffering"⁸⁰⁵ declares as a matter of fact that, since there is no mutual relationship of principal and subservient terms with entities that are different from the Supreme Person, any subservience to something different from Him is suffering. In "service is called a dog's way"⁸⁰⁶ it is stated that obedience to one who is not worth it is a dog's way. According to the text: "For He alone

797. VP. 6, 7, 22.

798. MahānārUp. 9, 3.

799. ChUp. 4, 10, 5 (prāṇo brahma) kaṃ brahma khaṃ brahma (iti).

800. TaittUp. 3, 6.

801. TaittUp. 2, 1.

802. VP. 4, 6, 44 cd.

803. VP. 4, 6, 45.

804. VP. 4, 6, 46-47.

805. Manusmṛti 6, 160.

806. Manusmṛti 6, 4.

should be worshipped by all always in all stages of life,"⁸⁰⁷ only the Supreme Person is worthy of the obedience of all those who know what the true nature of the soul is. As the Venerable Lord put it: "When a man serves Me through unerring devotion to bhakti, he will pass beyond the guṇas and become Brahman."⁸⁰⁸ This service in the form of bhakti is denoted by the word for "knowing" in the śrutis: "He that knows Brahman attains the Most-High,⁸⁰⁹ "He that knows this, becomes immortal,⁸¹⁰ knowing Brahman he becomes Brahman,"⁸¹¹ etc. From the specifying text: "He whom He chooses may attain Him,"⁸¹² we understand from the clause: "whom He chooses" that one must be elected and that the most beloved one is elected. The most beloved of the Lord is he in whom boundless and absolute love for the Lord has been inspired: this is stated by the Lord in: "For I am exceedingly beloved of the knower and he is beloved by Me."⁸¹³ Therefore it is knowledge which has risen to superior bhakti that is really the means of attaining the Lord, as the lord Dvaipāyana declares in the Mokṣadharmā by way of comment upon all the Upaniṣads: "His form is not to be beheld and no one perceives Him with the eye, only he who has concentrated on his soul espies — by bhakti and discrimination⁸¹⁴ — the proper form of knowledge in this life,"⁸¹⁵ i.e., after having realized one's own soul by discrimination, one sees the Supreme Spirit by bhakti, sc. one has immediate presentation of Him, attains Him: this follows because the meaning is the same as in the text: "...but by exclusive bhakti can I..."⁸¹⁶ Since bhakti is taken as a form of cognition, everything is established.

§ 145. Considering that there must be people who are at once profound enough and without professional jealousy and who know how to discriminate between what is of the essence and what not, I have written for them this Summary of the Meaning of the Veda.⁸¹⁷

807. MBh. ?

808. BhG. 14, 26.

809. TaittUp. 2, 1.

810. TaittĀr. 3, 1, 3.

811. MuṇḍUp. 3, 2, 9 (so yo ha vai tat paramaṃ) brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati.

812. MuṇḍUp. 3, 2, 3.

813. BhG. 7, 17.

814. dhṛti- "discrimination" as according to R. GBh. ad 6, 25 where he glosses buddhyā dhṛtigṛhītayā by vivekaviśayayā.

815. MBh. 12, 230, 68 cd—69 ab (Kumbhakonam ed.).

816. BhG. 11, 54 bhaktyā tv ananyayā śakya aham evaṃvidho 'rjuna/jñātum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca paramtapa //

817. Inspired by Yāmuna? cf. Āgamaprāmānya st. 2-3 ye 'mī kecana matsarāt sarvasya durmānasārā narāḥ / gambhīrāṃ guṇasālinīm api giram nindanti nindantu te // sārāsāravacārakausāladasāpāre pare 'vasthītāḥ / santah santy anasūyavo 'pi bahavaḥ śaṃsanti ye madgiram //

inevitable—however much it may be adverse to them—that they are born by gaining entrance in a body of a god etc., which is a particular generic structure built up by combined elements evolved out of prakṛti and which corresponds to their various karman. The sovereign Venerable Lord, however, who has his every will realized, does not suffer births in the way of the above creatures, whose births are tainted by imperfection: still He is born in many ways—as a god etc.—but by his own free will and in his own proper form which is unsurpassingly good, and in order to succour the world. And the wise, i.e., the foremost sages, know his *bahudhā yonim*, i.e., the multiple origin of this sovereign Lord who nonetheless does not suffer imperfect births.

§ 114. Of the doubt, voiced in the sūtra: “*there would be something higher, because of the mention of bridge, measure, relation and difference*”,⁵⁸⁹ that there would be someone else who is superior to the Supreme Brahman—who was already declared to be the operative as well as the material cause of this entire Universe in the sūtras: “*from whom the birth etc., of this proceed*,⁵⁹⁰ and matter, for that is in harmony with the promise and the instance”⁵⁹¹—the Author of the Sūtras himself disposes with “*no, because of resemblance*,⁵⁹² it serves the idea, even as the quarter”,⁵⁹³ because of the difference in place as in the case of light etc.,⁵⁹⁴ since it is possible,⁵⁹⁵ it is thus, since other views are belied,⁵⁹⁶ therefore his omnipresence, as follows from the mention of extent etc.”⁵⁹⁷

§ 115. Similarly⁵⁹⁸ we learn from the Mānavadharmasāstra, the text: “*Dispensing the darkness He made his appearance*,⁵⁹⁹ wishing to create his various progeny; in the beginning He brought forth water and therein He discharged his seed,⁶⁰⁰ and therein rose Brahmā of himself”,⁶⁰¹ that Brahmā is an em-

589. BrS. 3, 2, 30.

590. BrS. 1, 1, 2.

591. BrS. 1, 4, 23, “matter” in the sense of material cause.

592. BrS. 3, 2, 31.

593. BrS. 3, 2, 32.

594. BrS. 3, 2, 33.

595. BrS. 3, 2, 34.

596. BrS. 3, 2, 35.

597. BrS. 3, 2, 36.

598. The sūtras quoted are exegetical pronouncements on texts in the Chāndogya Up. which might suggest that there is something beyond Brahman, or that Brahman is not absolutely perfect. For the exact interpretation of the cryptic sūtras I refer to R.’s commentary in the Śrībhāṣya.

599. Manusmṛti 1, 6, d [svayaṃbhūr bhagavān avyakto] prādūr āsīt tamonudaḥ.

600. Manusmṛti 1, 8 [so’bhidhāya śarirāt svāt] sisṛkṣur vividhāḥ prajāḥ / apa eva sasarjādau tāsu vīryam apāsrjat. The Vulgate reads bijam (so Kullūka: śaktirūpam) avāsrjat.

601. Manusmṛti 1, 9 c tasmīñ jajñe svayaṃ brahmā [sarvalokapitāmahaḥ].

speech of an actuating agency?⁶¹⁰ It is perfectly easy to understand the denotative power of speech as bearing upon established things too! Suppose a person A sends a person B to inform Devadatta that the stick is standing in the inner room. A does not tell him by word of mouth but employs a gesture of the hand. If B wants to tell that to Devadatta, he will use spoken language to the effect: "The stick is in the inner room." Now another person C keeps him company; C knows what that original manual gesture signifies, as a dumb man would, but he had no knowledge before of significative language, nevertheless, he knows now what sense the sentence: "The stick is in the inner room," conveys, as he has witnessed how it was used. What is difficult about this?⁶¹¹

Similarly the father, mother etc., teach a child by degrees how to speak; first they point again and again with their finger at various persons and objects while using the words for them: "That is father, that is mother, uncle, a man, an animal, the moon, a snake." The child observes that when the same words are used afterwards a certain idea about their objects presents itself to him.⁶¹² So gradually the child concludes that the application

610. The Prābhākara view that language (*śabda*) has an inherent denoting capacity, i.e., the potency of denoting objects by itself, metaphysically, and not by virtue of a human convention, is not denied by Rāmānuja; what he calls into question is the assumed necessity that this denotativeness is only restricted to imperative, etc., sentences enjoining things to be done.

611. It is interesting to remark that R. appears not to have been satisfied with this example: in ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 127 he changed it: *prakaraṇāntareṇāpi śabdārthasambandhāva dhāraṇam suśakam/kenacit puruṣeṇa hastaceṣṭādīnāṃ pitā te sukham āsta iti devadattāya jñāpayeti preṣitah kaścit tajjñāpane pravṛttah pitā te sukham āsta iti śabdaṃ prayukte / pārśvastho 'nyo vyāpitsur mūkavac ceṣṭāviṣeṣajñāsa tajjñāpane pravṛttam imam jñātvānugatas tajjñāpanāya prayuktam imam śabdaṃ śrutvāyaṃ śabdāsa tadarthabuddhihetur iti niścinoti kāryārtha eva vyutpattir iti nibandho nirnibandhanah*; indeed, the Prābhākara might consider the example *sādhyavikala*. Devadatta on obtaining this information that the stick is in the inner room might quite conceivably act upon it and retrieve the stick and by his action show the dumb person the meaning of the sentence. In other words, the sentence can be construed as an injunction, so that R. has not really made his point. The ŚBh. example "your father is keeping well" does not admit of any construction as a *kārya*.

612. *tair eva śabdais teṣu artheṣu svātmanaś ca buddhyutpattim dṛṣṭvā*; the construction is succinct but precise; on the basis of our text we can restore a better ŚBh. reading: the parallel ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 127, line 9 should be read with MSS. BC *tair eva śabdais teṣu artheṣu svātmanāṃ buddhyutpattim dṛṣṭvā*, instead of *svātmanā* adopted by Abhyankar and translated by Thibaut (? "those words of themselves give rise...") and Lacombe ("ils, [sc. les enfants,] se rendent progressivement compte que tel ou tel mot fait naître de lui-même [en leur esprit] la notion de tel ou tel objet"). The correct translation there too is "(the children) observe that these words create in them an impression of those various objects": a *buddhyutpatti* of themselves, created by the words, about their objects,

of the sun.⁷⁴⁸ His eyes⁷⁴⁹ and His forehead and His nose are beautiful, His coral-like lips smile graciously, and His soft cheeks are beaming. His neck is as delicately shaped as a conch-shell and His bud-like divine ears, beautifully formed, hang down on His stalwart shoulders. His arms are thick, round and long and He is adorned with fingers that are reddened by nails of a most becoming reddish tinge. His body, with its slender waist and broad chest, is well-proportioned in all parts, and His shape is of an unutterably divine form. His colour is pleasing. His feet are as beautiful as budding lotuses. He wears a yellow robe that suits Him and He is adorned with immeasurable, marvelous, endless and divine ornaments—a spotless diadem, earrings, necklaces, the Kaustubha gem, bracelets, anklets, belt etc.—and with Conch, Disc, Club, Sword, the Bow Śārṅga, the curl Śrīvatsa and the garland Vanamālā.⁷⁵⁰ He attracts eye and thought alike of all by the measureless and boundless beauty that is His. He overflows the entire creation of animate and inanimate beings with the nectar of His comeliness. His youth is exceedingly wonderful, unimaginable and eternal. He is as delicately tender as blossoming flowers. He perfumes the infinite space between the cardinal points with the odour of holiness. His profound majesty is for ever encompassing the entire Universe. He looks upon the hosts of His devotees with loving eyes, filled with compassion and affection. His sport is to evolve, sustain and dissolve all the worlds. All evil is foreign to Him—He is the treasury of all beautiful qualities and He is essentially different from all other entities. He is the Supreme Spirit, the Supreme Brahman, Nārāyaṇa. This is the sense to be read in ‘on account of the instruction of his properties,’⁷⁵¹ He rules all the worlds—all His desires,⁷⁵² ‘He is beyond all impurities,’⁷⁵³ etc. His properties are declared in the texts: ‘the ruler of all, the sovereign of all,’⁷⁵⁴ free from imperfection, unaging, . . . whose every

748. According to S., who substantiates this statement by quotations, R. here describes what is called *kapyāsa* (1, 6, 7) in three ways: conformably to the three explanations of this disputed term allowed by the Vākyakāra (see Appendix § 2, Fr. XIII); respectively *gambhīrāmbhaṣsamudbhūta-*, borrowed from Dramaḍa (< *kaṃ* “water”, *api*, *asa* “ground, soil”); *sumṛṣṭānāla-* (< *kapi* [< *kaṃ pibati*] “stalk”; *āsa* [*yasminn āste*] “seat”); *ravikaravikāsita-* (< *kapi* [< *kaṃ pibati*] “sun”, *āsa* [*tenūsyate kṣīpyate vikāsyate*] “expansion, blowing”).

749. In the sequel R. has been inspired by VP. 6, 7, 80 ff.

750. I refer to VP. 1, 22 on Viṣṇu’s ornaments and weapons.

751. BrS. 1, 1, 21 *antas taddharmopadeśāt*.

752. MahUp. ?

753. ChUp. 1, 6, 7.

754. BĀUp. 4, 4, 22.

sūris regard always, "beyond matter," "lying beyond this matter,"⁷⁶³ etc. refer to consorts, attendants, a residence etc., we know also that they actually exist: as the Author of the Bhāṣya declared: "for the śāstra asserts things so as they are."

§ 136. In other words: even as the text "*Brahman, who is real, knowledge, eternal*"⁷⁶⁴ declares that the proper form of the Supreme Spirit is essentially different from everything else inasmuch as it is antagonistic to all evil and comprises only boundless bliss, and inasmuch as it is undefinable—even as, further, the texts "*Who is omniscient, all-knowing,*"⁷⁶⁵ "*His supreme potency is diverse, His knowledge, power and works are proper to His nature,*"⁷⁶⁶ "*everything derives its light from this luminary, all this is luminous by His luminosity,*"⁷⁶⁷ etc. declare that His qualities which are unsurpassed and innumerable are essentially different from everything else—in the same manner the text "*who has the colour of the sun,*" etc. declares that His form, attendants, residence etc. are essentially different from everything else, are proper to Him exclusively and have an inexplicable proper form and nature.

§ 137. If the Vedas are *pramāṇa*, then they denote the sum-total of unprecedented and compatible meanings, classified under *vidhi*, *arthavāda* and *mantra*, so as they are in reality. That the Vedas are *pramāṇa* is stated in the *sūtra*. "*Meaning is inherent in the word.*"⁷⁶⁸ Even as the power of heat is inherent in fire etc., and even as the power of originating particular cognitions is inherent in the senses of vision etc., in the same way the power of denotation is inherent in language.⁷⁶⁹ It is not right to say that the denotativeness of language is based on convention, as is that of the language of gestures. In the very absence of any knowledge about a person or persons who fixed the convention, although there is no break in the beginningless transmission of the notion (of the denotative character of language), the originally conventional meanings would have been known as such either directly or traditionally. Nor is it right to imagine that the denotativeness of language is as conventional as that of words like *Devadatta* etc., for with words of that type the convention is known either directly or traditionally. With words like *cow*, inasmuch as no convention is known, although there

763. TaittĀr. 3, 13, 1.

764. TaittUp. 2, 1.

765. MuṇḍUp. 2, 2, 7 *yaḥ sarvajñaḥ sarvavit.*

766. ŚvetUp. 6, 8 *parāsyā śaktir vividhaiva.*

767. MuṇḍUp. 2, 3, 10/ŚvetUp. 6, 14 *tam eva bhāntam.*

768. KMS. 1, 1, 5 *autpattikas tu śabdasyarthena sambandhaḥ.*

769. This theory of the originality of language is the one generally adhered to by the ancient systems, though the (ancient) Naiyāyikas formulate it thus that the denotativeness of language is a convention established by God himself.

APPENDIX

§ 1. Fragments from Bodhāyana's Vṛtti.

- I. On *atha* in *athāto brahmajijñāsā* (BrS. 1, 1, 1) —
vṛttāt karmādhigamād anantaraṃ brahnavividiṣā —
“immediately after knowledge of *karman* has been acquired does the desire of knowing *brahman* arise.”
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 2.
- II. On *idem*, following on Fragment I —
*saṃhitam etac chārīrakaṃ Jaiminīyena ṣoḍaśalakṣaṇeneti śāstraika-
tvasiddhiḥ* —
“since this Śārīraka forms one volume with Jaimini's Sūtras in 16 Chapters, it is proved that both constitute one and the same śāstra.”
— quoted 1, 1, 1, p. 2.
- III. On *jyotiṣā* in BrS. 1, 4, 13 (14) *jyotiṣaikaṣām asaty anne* —
jagadvyāpāravarjaṃ samāno jyotiṣā —
“(the ātman is) equal to Light when free from involvement in the world's activities.”
— quoted 1, 1, 1, p. 79.
- IV. ad BrS. 1, 1, 10 *gatisāmānyāt* —
*satā somya tadā saṃpanno bhavatīti saṃpattyasampattibhyām etad
avasīyate* —
“in the text ‘(when a person sleeps) then, my son, he is joined with the Existent’ (ChUp. 6, 8, 1) that is decided on the strength of joining and disjoining” — Apparently in the same connexion the Vṛtti quotes BĀUp. 4, 3, 21 *prājñenātmanā pariṣvaktāḥ* ‘(thus, when this person is) embraced by the conscient soul (he knows nothing inside or outside)’.
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 10.
- V. ad BrS. 1, 2, 1, *sarvatra prasiddhopadeśāt* —
sarvaṃ khalv asti sarvātmā brahmeśaḥ —
“Brahman is ‘verily everything’ (= ChUp. 3, 14, 1 *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*), ‘the soul of all’ (= ŚvetUp. 3, 21), ‘the Lord’ (= ŚvetUp. 3, 7 *īśaṃ taṃ jñātvāmṛtā bhavanti*).”
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 2, 1.

- VI. ad BrS. 1, 3, 7 (8) *bhūmā samprasādād adhy upadeśāt — bhūmā tv eveti bhūmā brahma nāmādiramparayatmana ūrdhvam asyopadeśāt —*
 “according to the text ‘(one should try to know) that *bhūmā* (“vast one”)’ Brahman is *bhūmā*, for the instruction thereof is, in the preceding part, of the ātman by the series beginning with *nāma* etc.” In other words, ChUp. 7, 2, 3 (and the preceding 7, 1, 3 ff.) bears on the ātman, for the *satya* of 7, 15, 5 can be connected with the *satya* of 8, 3 which explicitly bears on the ātman; note that *brahman* is interchangeable with *ātman*.
 — quoted ŚBh. 1, 3, 7.
- VII. ad BrS. 1, 3, 30 (31) ff. *madhvādiṣv asaṃbhavād anadhikāraṃ Jaiminiḥ/jyotiṣi bhāvāc ca/bhāvaṃ tu Bādarāyaṇo ’sti hi — asti hi madhvādiṣu saṃbhavo brahmaṇa eva sarvatra nicāyavat —*
 “it is possible that (the gods are qualified for) the *madhvidyā* etc. for Brahman is to be sought for in everything.”
 — quoted ŚBh. 1, 3, 32.

§ 2. Vākya and Dramiḍabhāṣya.

A. Fragments possibly from BĀUp.Bhāṣya of Dramiḍa.

- I. (Unconnected) *phalasaṃbibhatsayā karmabhir ātmānaṃ piprīsanti sa prīto ’laṃ phalāya iti śāstramaryādā —*
 “If they, motivated by the desire to be provided with the fruits, are anxious to please the ātman with acts, then, when he is pleased, he suffices to bestow those fruits — thus disposes scripture.”
 — ŚBh. 2, 2, 3 has the variant *phalavidhatsayā* “motivated by the desire to ordain those fruits”: *lectio facilior* for °*bibhats*°.
 — quoted Ved. § 124; ŚBh. 2, 2, 3.
- II. ad BĀUp. 3, 8, 9 *etasya vā akṣarasya praśāsane gārgi sūryacandra-masau vidhṛtau tiṣṭataḥ etc.*; cf. also TaittUp. 2, 8 —
asyājñayā dhāvati vāyuh/nādyah sravanti/tena kṛtasīmāno jalāsayaḥ samadā iva meṣavisarpitaṃ kurvanti —
 “At his behest the wind runs, the rivers flow; the oceans, shown their limits by him, jump crazily like (rutting) rams.”
 — quoted Ved. § 124.
- IIa. Apparently same context as II —
tatsaṃkalpanibandhanā hīme lokā na cyavante na sphuṭante / svaśāsanānuvartinaṃ jñātvā kāruṇyāt sa bhagavān vardhayeta vidvān karmadakṣaḥ —

“For all these worlds, being supported by his will, do not collapse, nor do they fly apart. When he knows that one follows his command then, mercifully, the Venerable Lord, who knows, who is equal to the task, will make one prosper.”
 — cf. BĀUp. quoted in II; for the second half compare 3, 8, 10.
 — quoted Ved. § 124.

III. Unconnected.

Bh. *ṛṇaṃ ha vai jāyata iti śruter . . . yady api avadānastutiparam vākyaṃ tathāpi nāsātā stutir upapadyate.*
 “On account of the śruti: “There shall indeed be debt . . .”, even though the statement be meant (only) to praise the offering, yet there can be no praise if the object is non-existent.”
 — Reference is to ŚatBr. 1, 7, 2, 1-6, ending *tad avadānaṃ nāma*; in the context *avadāna* has the general sense of offering, to cover both *yāga* and *homa*. It is clear that Dramiḍa argues that the *arthavāda* must establish the objects referred to, even though it have the function of praising the object, for without object no praise: in other words, *arthavāda* portions are not less significant than pure *vidhi* portions.
 — quoted Ved. § 118.

B. Fragments from ChUpVākya and Bhāṣya.

IV. (Unconnected) —

V. *upanīṣaṇṇatvād upanīṣat — Bh. gahane hīyaṃ vidyā saṃni-viṣṭā — Vāmanaṭīkā gahane brahmaṇy upanīṣaṇṇā —*
 “The term *upanīṣat* derives from the fact that it is put down.”
 “For this meditation is contained in the mysterious One.”
 “It is put down in the mysterious, i.e. the brahman.”
 — quoted Venkaṭanātha, Tattvaṭīkā I, p. 34.

- V. ad ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *hiraṇmayah puruṣo dṛśyate —*
 V. *hiraṇmaya iti rūpasāmānyāc candramukhavat —*
 Bh. *na mayaḍ atra vikāram ādāya prayujyate / anārabhyatvād ātmanaḥ —*
 “‘Golden’ is used because of similarity of colour; it is a comparison of the type *candramukha* “moon-like face”.”
 “The suffix °*maya*- is here not used in the sense of modification: that would not agree with the fact that the ātman is not caused.”
 — quoted Ved. § 135; TātpD. p. 156.

VI. ad ChUp. 1, 6, 6 *atha ya eṣo 'ntarāditye hiraṇmayah puruṣo V. hiraṇmayah puruṣo dṛśyata iti prājñah sarvāntarah syāt / lokakāmvayapadeśāt tathodayāt pāpmanām —*

"In the text 'the golden person is seen' it is the conscient One, entered into all who is meant: this follows from the fact that the world's desire is mentioned and that he transcends the evil things." — "the world's desire" cf. ChUp. 1, 7, 6 *sa eṣa ye caitasmād arvāñco lokās teṣāṃ ceṣṭe manuṣyakāmānām ca*; "he transcends all evil according to 1, 6, 7; that he enters everything is expressed in 1, 7." — quoted Ved. § 135.

VII. In the same connexion the objection and reply —

V. *syāt tad rūpaṃ kṛtakam anugrahārtham / taccetasām aiśvaryaṭ / rūpaṃ vātindriyam antahkaraṇapratyakṣanirdeśāt —*

—"Could it be that that body [or: his body] is artificial, meant as a favour (i.e. to favour meditation)? For he has power over their minds."

—"Rather is it suprasensible, for it is said that it is evident to the inner faculty."

— that there is a pūrvapakṣa — so Dramiḍa — follows from initial *syāt*; *vā* in the sense of *viparyaya*, cf. BrS. 2, 2, 41; *kṛtaka*—"artificial, make-believe, illusory."

Bh. *na vā māyāmātram / añjasaiva viśvasrjo rūpaṃ / tat tu na cakṣuṣā grāhyam / manasā tv akaluṣeṇa sādhanāntaravatā grāhyate — na cakṣuṣā grāhyate nāpi vācā manasā tu viśuddhena iti śruteḥ / na hy arūpāyā devatāyā rūpaṃ upadiśyate / yathābhūtavādi hi śāstram / mähārajanam vāsaḥ — vedāham etaṃ puruṣam mahāntam ādityavarṇam tamasah parastād iti prakaraṇāntaranirdeśac ca sāksīnah —*

"No, the body is not made of *māyā*: the body of the Creator of all can only be natural. It can however not be grasped by the eye; but it is grasped by the mind which, when freed from impurity, disposes of another means of perception: this follows from the śruti: "It is not grasped by the eye, nor by the word, but by the mind if pure." For scripture will not teach that a disembodied deity possesses a body: scripture states things just as they are. Other contexts also set forth that he is a witness (i.e. embodied person): "(that Person has a body like) a saffron-coloured garment" "I know that great Person, with the colour of the sun, beyond darkness." — the śrutis are respectively MuṇḍUp. 3, 1, 8; BĀUp. 2, 3, 6 and ŚvetUp. 3, 7.

— quoted Ved. § 135.

VIII. ad ChUp. 1, 6, 7 *kapyāsam puṇḍarīkam —*

[S. remarks that the Vākyakāra enumerates 6 possible meanings of *kapyāsam*, and rejects three: 1. *ādityamaṇḍalam*, 2. *markaṭa-prṣṭham*, 3. *iśadvikāsitam*; and accepts three 1.] *ādityakṣiptam śrīmatvāt* "(splendour) emitted by the sun, for (the lotus) is resplendent" [2. *nālāsanam*, 3. *jalabhuvam*.]

Bh. comments on second set of three with — *gambhīrāmbhaḥ . . . "deep water."*

—cf. Rāmānuja's description *gambhīrāmbhaḥsamudbhūta-sumrṣṭa-nālaravikaravikāsitā-*, corresponding to the acceptable renderings 3, 2 and 1.

— quoted TātpD. p. 326.

IX. V. *sakṛt pratyayam kuryāc chabdārthasya kṛtatvāt prayājādivat / siddham tūpāsanaśabdāt —*

"One should conceive this idea just once, because thereby the sense of the scripture has already been accomplished completely, as in the case of the Prayāja's etc." "No, (what has been said, viz. that it is repetitive) is proved by the use of the word *upāsana*."

— R. interprets both sentences as pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta, as would also follow the Vākyakāra's definition of *abhyāsa*. This quotation most probably precedes in order that on *upāsana* (see X).

— The meaning of the pūrvapakṣin's reference is this: the *prayāja*'s are a group of accessory sacrifices in the darśapūrṇamāsa rites; to them correspond 6 *pradhānayāgas*, so that it would follow that to each *pradhānayāga* a *prayāja* is to be joined, but according to *tantra* (the rule by which an accessory is to be performed only once for an entire group of principals) the *prayāja* is performed only once; *tantra* is defined by Śabaravāmin KMS. 11, 1, 1 *tatra yat sakṛt kṛtam bahūnām upakaroti tat tantram ity ucyate*.

— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 9

X. ad Ch. Up. 3, 14, 1 *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma tajjalān iti śānta upāsita —*

V. *vedanam upāsanam syāt / tadviṣaye śravaṇāt / upāsanam syād dhruvānusmṛtir / darśanāc ca —*

"Meditating would be *knowing*: for this follows from the śrutis on this topic. Meditating then would be *constant memorization* also, for it is *representing visually*."

— connexion with ChUp. uncertain; so is their suggested coherence. The term *dhruvānusmṛti* is derived from ChUp. 7, 26, 2 (infra). The suggested sense of *darśanāc* is according to Rāmānuja's expli-

cation, but not certain. No comment of Dramiḍa.
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, pp. 9 and 10.

- XI. ad ChUp. 3, 14, 1 *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma . . . yathākṛatur
asmīṃl loke puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati* —
V. *ātmetryeva tu gr̥hṇīyāt / sarvasya tanniṣpatteḥ* —
“One must only realize that (all this) is the ātman; (then he
becomes that which is thought) for all is fulfilled in the ātman.”
— connexion uncertain but probable; no comment of Dramiḍa.
— quoted Ved. § 108; ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 18; p. 116 (partly).

- XII. V. *parināmas tu syād dadhyādivat* —
“there is an inner causal change, as in the case of curds turning
into butter, etc.”
— Most probably in connexion with the *sadvidyā* ChUp. 6, 1, 4 and
explaining the word *vikāra*-; cf. Intr. Chapter IV, ref. is to ChUp. 6, 6,
— No comments of Dramiḍa quoted, but it is stated that the author
of the *vṛtti* on the Vākya, doubtless identical with the *bhāṣya*,
adheres to the same view.
— quoted Bhāskara, BrS. 1, 4, 25.

- XIII. ad ChUp. 7, 26, 2 *āhārasuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ / sattvaśuddhau
dhruvā smṛtiḥ / smṛtilambhe sarvagranthīnām vipramokṣaḥ* —
V. *tallabdhir vivekavimokābhīyāsakriyākalyāṇānavasādānuddhar-
ṣebhyaḥ saṃbhavān nirvacanāc ca / . . . jātyāśrayanimittāduṣṭād
annāt kāyaśuddhir vivekaḥ / vimokaḥ kāmānabhiṣvaṅgaḥ / āram-
bhaṇasamśīlanam punaḥpunar abhyāsaḥ / pañcamahāyajñādyanu-
ṣṭhānam śaktiḥ kriyā / satyārjavadayādānāhīmsānabhidhyāḥ kalyā-
ṇāni / deśakālavaiṣamyāc chokavastvādyanusmṛteś ca tajjanyaṃ
dānyam abhāsvaratvaṃ manaso 'vasādaḥ / tadviparyayo 'nava-
sādaḥ / tadviparyayajā tuṣṭir uddharṣaḥ / tadviparyayajo 'nud-
dharṣaḥ* —
— “That ātman is attained by distinction, detachment, exercise,
rite, moral virtues, non-despondency, non-contentment: for this
agrees (with the śruti) and is also explicitly stated. Distinction is
purity of body through nourishment that is pure in kind, provenance,
and without [spoiling] accidents. Detachment is ceasing to long for
desired things. Exercise is repeated meditation on the ārambhaṇa-
śruti. Rite is to capacity performing of the five major sacrifices etc.
The moral virtues are veridicity, honesty, compassionateness,
generosity, non-offensiveness, freedom from desires. Despondency
is the misery, the dullness of mind caused by the vicissitudes in
space and time and by the memory of painful things etc.; its opposite

is non-despondency. Contentment is the satisfaction caused by the
opposites of the above; non-contentment is caused by the opposite
of satisfaction.”

— Connexion with this ChUp. passage in its entirety uncertain; Bh.
has commented on the passage and given references to corresponding
śrutis. R. mentions one reference to BhG. explicitly: *tadbhāva-
bhāvitaḥ* BhG. 7, 26 *ad abhyāsa*.
— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, pp. 11-2.

- XIV. ad ChUp. 8, 1, 1 *tasmin yad antas tad anveṣṭavyaṃ tad vāva
vijñāsitavyam* —
V. *tasmin yad antar iti kāmavyapadeśaḥ* —
“In the clause ‘that which is therein’ reference is made to the
desires.”
— quoted Ved. § 106; ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 80.

- XV. ad ChUp. 8, 1, 1 (*daharavidyā*) —
V. *yuktam / tadguṇakopāsanāt* —
“(Also with regard to the *sadvidyā*) it is appropriate; for medita-
tion is on an object that has those qualities” —
Bh. *yady api saccitto na nirbhugnaḥ daivataṃ guṇagaṇam manasānu-
dhāvet tathāpy antarguṇām eva devatām bhajate* —
“Although one, when meditating on the *sadvidyā*, does not pursue
with one’s thought the multitude of qualities that are negative and
divine, still one lovingly approaches the Deity as having inner
qualities.”
— Dramiḍa’s comment probably not directly on this Vākya, cf.
Rāmānuja: *vyākhyātaṃ ca Dramiḍācāryeṇa vidyāvikalpaṃ vadatā*.
— Rendering of Dr. not certain; R. differs. I take it that *nirbhugna*
refers to the qualities of the *Daharavidyā apahatapāpmā* etc., which
are negative, and *daivata* to the qualities *satyakāmaḥ satya-
saṃkalpaḥ*, which are strictly divine. That the passage was obscure
to early philosophers is proved by Sarvajñātman’s diverging inter-
pretation (*infra*).
— quoted Ved. § 88; ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 79.

- XVI. ad ChUp. 8, 1, 6 *ya ihātmānam anuvidya vrajanty etāṃś ca satyān
kāmāms teṣāṃ sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmācāro bhavati* —
Bh. *devatāsāyujyād āsarīrasyāpi devatāvat sarvārthasiddhiḥ syāt* —
“Because (the soul) will be united with the deity, therefore, though
being without a body, it will find all its ends accomplished, as if
it were the deity itself.”

— connexion uncertain, but suggested by R's quotation of the śruti in the immediate sequel.

— quoted ŚBh. 1, 1, 1, p. 79.

XVII. ad ChUp. 8, 12, 1 . . . *ātto vai saśarīraḥ priyāpriyābhyām / na vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayor apahatir asti / aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spr̥sataḥ —*

Bh. *yathā loke rājā pracuradandaśūke ghore 'narthasaṃkaṭe 'pi pradeśe vartamāno 'pi vyajanādyaavadhūtadeho doṣair na spr̥syate 'bhipretāṃś ca lokān punar api pālayiṣyati bhogāṃś ca gandhādīn viśvajanabhogyān dhārayati tathāsau lokeśvaro bhramatsvasāmarthyacāmaro doṣair na spr̥syate rakṣati ca lokān brahmalokādīn bhogāṃś ca viśvajanopabhogyān dhārayati —*

“Just as a king on earth who, though living in a place teeming with mosquitoes and infested with horrible beasts of prey, yet keeping his body clean with ointments etc. is not touched by infections and will time and again protect the beloved countries and support the objects of experience, smell etc., that are within everybody's reach to enjoy, similarly He, the king of the worlds, waving the fan of his omnipotence, is not touched by defects and protects the worlds from the Brahmaloḥka onwards, and supports the objects of experience that are to be enjoyed by all mankind.”

— If R.'s reference is right, the passage patently attacks the view that the śruti referred to declares that the Supreme Being has *no* body. — quoted ŚBh. 2, 1, 14.

C. Indirect evidence from quotations.

XVIII. Sarvajñātman's references in Saṃkṣepaśārīraka III, 217 ff.¹

— *ātreyaivākyaṃ api saṃvyavahāramātraṃ
kāryaṃ samastam iti naḥ kathayāmbabhūva /
satkāryavādaviṣayo na hi doṣarāśir
māyāmaye bhavitum utsahate virodhāt // 217 //
kāṇādadarśanasamāśrayadoṣarāśir
dūrān nirasta iha saṃvyavahāramātraṃ /
vedāntabhūmikuśalo munir atrivaṃśyas
tenāha kāryam iha saṃvyavahāramātraṃ // 218 //
ṣaṣṭhaprapāṭhakanibaddham udīritaṃ yat
tat satyam eva khalu satyasamāśrayatvāt /*

1. For the translation see Intr. Ch. II, p. 25.

*tatraiva yat punar uvāca samudrapheṇa-
dṛṣṭāntapūrvakam ado vyavahāradṛṣṭyā // 219 //
pūrvam vikāram upavarṇya śanaikṣanais tad-
dṛṣṭim viṣrjya nikaṭam pariḡṛhya tasmāt /
sarvam vikāram atha saṃvyavahāramātraṃ
advaitam eva parirakṣati vākyakāraḥ // 220 //
antarguṇā bhagavatī paradevateti
pratyaḡguṇeti bhagavān api Bhāṣyakāraḥ /
āha sma yat tad iha nirguṇavāde.
saṃgacchate na tu punaḥ saḡuṇapravāde // 221 //*

XIXa. Bhāskara, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1, 1, 3 *ad finem* gives as an example of true knowledge to be gained from “false” instruction a parable that is substantially identical with one quoted by Sureśvara and ascribed to Dramaḍa (see b.):

— *dṛṣyate ca loke mīthyāviṣaya upadeśas tattvajñānārthaparaḥ-
yathā kila kaścid rājaputras taskarair ānīya niṣādarājya niveditas
tena cāsau putratvena pariḡṛhīto mlecchācārābhīratir evāste / taṃ
rājamantrī tatrāgatya mlecchajātyanugūṇam evācāraṃ kaṃcid
anuvārṇya paścādbhūte rājaputro 'si na mlecchaputra iti grāhite
samastamlecchācāraṃ hitvā svarūpam eva pratipadyate.*

“In profane experience, too, it is found that an instruction dealing with something false leads to knowledge of the truth; as, for example: a certain prince was abducted by robbers, and brought to a Niṣāda chieftain; and, adopted by the chieftain as his son, the prince lived contentedly as a barbarian. Then a minister of the king came there and observed how the prince followed a way of life that was typical of the barbarian race; after some time when the minister had made him understand that he was the son of a king, not of a barbarian, he abandoned the barbarian way of life and knew his true self.”

— Dvivedin's edition om. *ānīya* after *taskarair* and *bhūte* after *paścād*, both restored from Madras Govt. MSS. Library R. 6123.

— *kila* at the beginning and *iti* at the end would indicate that the story is a quotation; none of 6 MSS consulted, however, add anything in support.

XIXb. Sureśvara's story of the prince reared by hunters, BĀUpBhāṣya-vārttika 2, 1, 506 ff. Ānandagiri ad 506 introduces the *ākhyāyikā* with: *tattvamādivākyaṃ aikyaḡparaṃ taccheṣaḥ ṣṛṣṭyādivākyaṃ ity atra Dravidācāryapraṇītām ākhyāyikām avatārayati —
ācakṣate tatrā cātra kecid ākhyāyikām śubhām /
yathābhīlasitārtho 'yaṃ yathā saṃbhāvyaṭe sphuṭaḥ // 506 //*

*yathā hi kaścit prāg āsīc cakravartino suto yuvā /
 vyādhiyogopaghātāder unmattaḥ samapadyata // 507 //
 dhvastarājābhimānaḥ san mugdho vanam upeyivān /
 vyādhaiḥ parigrhītaś ca vyādho 'smīty abhimanyate // 508 //
 tat karmā tadalamkāraḥ kālena mahatābhavat /
 dhvastarājatvasamskāro vasañ śabarasadmani // 509 //
 śubhauśadhyupayogāc ca svasthadhīḥ samajāyata /
 svasvabhāvānurodhāc ca vyādhebhyo vyutthitātmādīḥ // 510 //
 tacchīlarūpakarmabhyo vyāvṛttadhīśanaḥ svataḥ /
 kevalasmṛtyabhāvāc ca na vyādhatvaṃ jahāty asau // 511 //
 kutaścīd āgamāj jñātvā tam upetyāpratāraakaḥ /
 tajjātikarmasambandhatattvavit tatpituḥ sakhā // 512 //
 pravṛtṭyā karmanā jātyā cakravartyucitais tathā /
 lakṣaṇai rājaputratvaṃ yathā kaścit prabodhayet // 513 //
 labdhamātrasmṛtiḥ so 'tha rājāsmīty avabodhataḥ /
 bādhitvā svam asaṃbodham hitvā vyādhatvam ātmanaḥ // 514 //
 rājyābhīṣekam āpnoti prāpya siṃhāsanaṃ pituḥ /
 avāptarājasūnutvāt tatprāptau nāpi ceṣṭate // 515 //
 mohādhyastātmanvyādhatvān mohadhvaṃsātrekatakaḥ /
 rājaputratvasamprāptau nānyat kiṃcid apekṣate // 516 //
 yathā tathāyaṃ brahmaiva brahmāsaṃbodhamātrataḥ /
 buddhīndriyaśarīrādāv ātmatvaṃ pratipedivān // 517 //*

["In support of the view that the assertion "Thou art that" states identity and that the passages dealing with creation etc. (ChUp. 6, 2, 1 ff.) are subordinate to that assertion, he introduces a parable that has been composed by Dravidācārya."]

"In this connexion some tell a beautiful tale to bring out clearly the meaning which is intended here.

Formerly there was a young prince, the son of an emperor, and, due to an infection of some disease, he went mad. Having lost the notion that he was a king, he made for the woods in his bewilderment. He was adopted by hunters and thought that he was a hunter himself: and for a long time he acted and dressed as they did, living in a tribal settlement without any memory of his royal status. Then, by the beneficial use of medicinal herbs, his mind was cured and, in accordance with his real nature, his self-esteem rose beyond the level of hunters. Still, although his mind turned away from their habits, appearance and activities, he did not give up the hunters' way of life for his memory alone had not yet returned. By some report a friend of his father's, who knew what his status and duties were in reality, got to know him and approached him without guile: and

as he himself had concluded from the other's carriage, acts, nobility and the marks of imperial stature, he told him that he was a prince. By *knowing* that he was a prince his memory was restored: his ignorance about himself was superseded and he gave up what was of the hunter in himself. Having arrived at his father's throne he underwent the ceremony of the royal consecration, and when he had been restored as a prince he deviated from his position never more. Having regained his princely status by the mere difference that the disappearance of his illusion made (for it was illusion that his notion of being a hunter was suggested to his real self), he had nothing left to desire. Likewise this person, who is really Brahman, is led by his mere unconsciousness of Brahman to attribute to his mind, senses, body etc.

XIXc. The same story is referred to in Saṃkhyasūtra 4, 1 *rājaputratvat tattvopadeśāt* "on account of the instruction about the true nature, as in the case of the royal prince" and described by Vijñānabhikṣu, *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya* ad loc.

— *atreyaṃ ākhyāyikā-kaścīd rājaputro gaṇḍarkṣajanmanā purān niḥsāritaḥ śabareṇa kenacit posito 'haṃ śabara ity abhimanyamāna āste / taṃ jīvantam jñātvā kaścīd amātyaḥ prabodhayati na tvaṃ śabaro rājaputro' sīti / sa yathā jhaṭity eva cāṇḍālābhimānaṃ tyaktvā tāttvikam rājabhāvam evāmbate rājāham asmīti, evam eva . . .*

—"The story about this is as follows: a certain royal prince was abducted from his town by a bear and reared by a tribesman and he lived in the mistaken conviction that he himself was a tribesman. Having discovered that the prince was alive a minister revealed to him that he was not a tribesman but a royal prince. And even as he gave up at once his notion that he was an outcaste and was restored to his true nature of royalty with the true knowledge: "I am a king," in a like manner etc. . . ."

— *gaṇḍarkṣa* is further unknown; it is either a bear characterized by heavy jowls, or a rhinoceros (*gaṇḍa*), the latter meaning being less plausible.